Despite massive democratization reforms and constitutional amendments implemented in the context of European Union (EU) membership requirements, Turkey still has a constitution that was drafted under military rule following the 1980 coup. The symbolic weight of this fact is the major hindrance to greater democratization. Hence, the task of drafting a new constitution is one of the most pressing issues in Turkish politics. Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya provide an excellent overview of the history of Turkish constitution making that will help observers of Turkish politics to locate the current political debates in Turkey within a historical and theoretical framework.
The authors’ starting premise is that the failure of Turkish democratic consolidation is caused by the lack of a consensual style of constitution making. As evidence, the authors draw comparisons between the process of constitution making in Turkey and those in post World War II Germany, Italy, and Spain, which represent accommodationist and consensual-style cases. They also draw on cases representing a more confrontational style of constitution making, such as in France (1946) and Portugal (1976).
Turkey has had five constitutions to date (1876, 1921, 1924, 1961, and 1982) and drastic constitutional amendments (1909, 1971, 1973, 1995, 2001, and 2004). Yet in no case was a constitution drafted or amended through public consensus or a social contract. Rather, elites from the military or with a military background imposed constitutions on society. As the authors point out, the EU membership process was the primary force facilitating the more recent democratization packages.
The authors present rich analysis of previous cases of constitution making in Turkey, though their discussion becomes more detailed as they approach the present. The 1921 constitution needs further elaboration because it appears to be a perfect example of the societal consensus to which the authors refer. Many scholars in the field accept the 1961 constitution drafted after the 1960 military coup as Turkey's most democratic one. However, as the authors point out, although the 1961 constitution “greatly expanded civil liberties and granted extensive social rights for citizens,” it also strengthened judicial control over elected politicians (p. 16). In this way, the system provided a buffer zone for maintaining the Kemalist political system, which represented a mistrust of civilian governments. In effect, the power of the military–judicial bureaucracy was institutionalized at the expense of the parliament. The 1982 constitution represented a move away from democracy by legitimizing and legalizing “the role of the military as the ultimate guardian and arbiter of the political system” (p. 21). This is still the core impediment to democratization in Turkey because the constitutional court acts as the guardian of the bureaucratic authoritarian system against the unpredictable civilian political parties; it often closes down political parties and rejects significant democratization reforms by citing the constitution.
Chapter 2 examines minor amendments to the 1982 constitution enacted between 1987 and 1995. The authors see this period as one of missed opportunities for reform initially due to Turgut Özal's unwillingness to avoid any confrontation with President Evren and later to fragmentation of Turkish politics via interparty conflicts. The unwillingness displayed by subsequent governments to confront the legal-military bureaucratic establishment remained a major obstacle to constitutional reform, leading them to delegate the task to an external supervisor, the EU, through Turkey's EU membership process. It is not surprising that a lengthy portion of the book (pp. 43–96) is devoted to a discussion of constitutional reforms enacted as part of the EU membership process, including comprehensive amendments made in 2001 and 2004 as well as nine harmonization packages adopted between 2002 and 2004 (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). The length and scope of these amendments suggest that this external push toward constitutional reform greatly benefitted Turkey's democratization process.
However, this raises a major theoretical conundrum for the authors: how to account for democratization as a top-down process absent the societal or elite consensus the authors claim as crucial for democratic consolidation. Although Özbudun and Gençkaya see some hope in all post-1983 constitutional amendments, these could not have been legitimized or even possible without the EU membership process, because they involved the support of one or more opposition parties. A major dilemma in Turkish politics is that if a consensual style of constitution making is adopted, then there will be a limited chance for a new constitution or significant constitutional reform. The two opposition parties, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi and the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, adamantly oppose any constitutional and judicial reforms. At present the Turkish parliament has accepted a package of constitutional reforms to be brought to referendum, but the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi brought the reform package to the Constitutional Court, which acts to protect the interests of the judicial-bureaucratic system.
In contrast, as the authors point out, the existing military-drafted 1982 constitution is a symbolic stain on Turkish democracy and hinders democratization by ensuring the continuation of Kemalist bureaucratic authoritarianism. Hence, the success of democratic consolidation requires eliminating the authoritarian, statist, and tutelary spirit of the 1982 constitution, which is only possible through the drafting of a new, civilian-made constitution (pp. 114–15). This task, however, would require bypassing the secularist elites who are interested in the preservation of the status quo and oppose any attempt at constitutional reform. This dilemma poses serious questions the authors must reconcile with their basic thesis, which is that a confrontational and dissentious style of constitution making hinders democratic consolidation.
Overall, Özbudun and Gençkaya offer a rich survey of the Turkish constitution-making process as well as legal dimensions of Turkey's EU membership process. Their work nicely connects with the larger body of scholarship on the link between constitution making and democratic consolidation. Hence, this is a timely book for observers of Turkey and the field of comparative politics.
