On 1 January 1986, Portugal and Spain joined the European Economic Community (EEC), following Greece’s accession a few years earlier. During his welcome speech to new European Parliament (EP) members, President Pierre Pflimlin celebrated this third enlargement as a political success, claiming it could increase ‘democracy’s chances of survival’.Footnote 1 Yet he made no reference to the parallel demise of the last European empire in Africa. This article reflects upon a broader silence within the EP on the decolonisation process in Portugal and, more extensively, in most EEC founding states.
Focusing on the period from the 1974 Carnation Revolution to Portugal’s EEC membership request in 1977, the analysis precedes the institutional reforms that would later expand the powers of the EP. Specifically, in the areas of association with non-member states and enlargement policy, it was only with the 1986 Single European Act that the ‘assent procedure’ was introduced, granting the EP a formal power to approve or reject certain major decisions. Before then, decision-making was concentrated in the hands of the member states’ governments represented in the Council of Ministers, while the EP could only issue non-binding opinions. Likewise, relations with Sub-Saharan Africa remained primarily intergovernmental. The 1975 Lomé Convention was negotiated by the Commission in accordance with the mandate provided by the Council, while the southern African region, including South Africa, Rhodesia and former Portuguese colonies, fell within the scope of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which operated outside the Rome Treaties.
Given this limited space for manoeuvre, the EP’s ability to exert political pressure through questions, resolutions and debates has long been underestimated. This article situates itself within a more recent body of scholarship, including contributions by Kaiser, who over the past decade has highlighted the historiographical void regarding the EP and recognised its active influence on the evolution of the European integration process.Footnote 2 It also draws on the works of Italian scholars such as Tulli and Laschi, who have emphasised the autonomous role of the EP in the EEC’s external relations.Footnote 3 Adding to this literature, this contribution underlines the analytical significance of studying the EP, even in those areas whose intrinsic political nature complicated unified parliamentary stances and thus the ability to influence the Council. Indeed, the EP’s organisation along ideological rather than national lines provides a valuable platform for grasping cross-country patterns. At the same time, the EP’s limited powers allowed deputies to express themselves more freely, with fewer national constraints and left them with more time to reflect on historical legacies and identity. Relations with post-colonial Africa fall within this category, and EP debates unveil traces of the forgotten legacy of colonialism.
On these premises, the present study builds on and brings together studies on the EP’s engagement with both the third EEC enlargement and the evolution of EEC–Sub-Saharan African relationships. Rather than adding to the well-established literature on Portugal’s decolonisation or the European Community (EC)’s external relations, this article uses these two arenas to explore persistent silences and omissions regarding colonial memory.
Portuguese historiography has examined the complex legacy arising from the intersection of political liberalisation and decolonisation, with particular emphasis on the distinctive features of Lisbon’s EEC accession process.Footnote 4 Nevertheless, the EP’s insights into Portugal’s decolonisation remain underexplored. Its perspectives on the southern European enlargements have indeed predominantly been scrutinised through the lens of democratic transitions.Footnote 5 Similarly, studies of earlier association attempts highlighted that, since the approval of the Birkelbach report at the beginning of 1962, the then European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA) actively defended democracy as a key political requirement. De Angelis and Karamouzi examined its apprehensions following the 1962 Spanish request to open negotiations with the EEC.Footnote 6 Likewise, Leitão identified comparable dynamics following Portugal’s application on 18 May of the same year. He further argued that, although the failure of the Iberian governments’ initial negotiation attempts could not be attributed to the EPA’s opposition, the authoritarian nature of the Portuguese regime doomed any possibility of associated membership.Footnote 7 It is true that, despite the absence of any political requirements at the time, no association agreement was ever concluded with the Iberian dictatorships, while the one with Greece was suspended after the 1967 coup. Nonetheless, recent scholarship has highlighted the complexity of EEC relations with former southern European authoritarian regimes. Contrary to teleological representations of the European enlargement process, targeted state policies and limited trade liberalisation under António de Oliveira Salazar had already begun aligning Portugal’s economy with Western European standards.Footnote 8 Furthermore, since the 1968 transition, Marcelo Caetano’s regime adopted measures to reduce protectionism and encourage foreign investment, fostering trade with the EEC.Footnote 9 Eventually, Portugal signed a Free Trade Agreement with the EEC on 22 July 1972, along with a parallel accord with the European Coal and Steel Community.Footnote 10 EEC member states also adopted divergent foreign policy approaches during the East–West divide. For example, the Netherlands and Denmark criticised Lisbon’s African wars, while France and West Germany aligned with the United States and the United Kingdom in supporting Portugal as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member.Footnote 11 This lack of unified action was also reflected in the EP, where only a few initiatives addressed Portugal’s colonial wars.
Regarding the second analytical level, the April 1974 Carnation Revolution coincided with a critical phase in negotiations between the EEC and the newly formed African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. The 1973 oil crisis had already exposed the EEC’s dependency on raw materials, while, on 1 May 1974, a United Nations General Assembly declaration on a New International Economic Order (NIEO) reflected the Global South’s acquired negotiating power.Footnote 12 In July, the Kingston conference marked a turning point in EEC–ACP relations, as European representatives agreed to include non-reciprocal trade preferences in the future agreement, acknowledging the need to overcome structural North–South asymmetries.Footnote 13 Scholars have examined the external and internal factors leading to the 1975 Lomé Convention. At the EEC level, the United Kingdom’s 1973 accession facilitated the expansion of the former Yaoundé Association beyond its predominantly francophone and neocolonial character. Renewed in 1969 without significant changes, the Yaoundé Convention was first signed in 1963 following independence.Footnote 14 Its purpose was to overcome the anachronistic features of the Rome Treaties’ Association with Overseas Countries and Territories. Historians and political scientists have stressed the French and Belgian interests behind an instrument which tied the colonial territories of four of the founding states to the nascent EEC.Footnote 15 However, Laschi remarked that an analytical distinction between supranational and intergovernmental institutions allows for underscoring EPA’s first original attempts to promote a renewed image of the EEC as a multilateral forum.Footnote 16 The literature has also covered various EP initiatives, including study visits and conferences, aimed at building direct relationships with representatives of the newly independent states.Footnote 17 Yet, as Pasquinucci noted, calls for equality often coexisted with references to the positive legacies of European colonialism.Footnote 18 While offering a fundamental basis for understanding EP views of EEC relationships with newly independent Lusophone African states, the above-mentioned studies focus on the first decolonisation wave. Significant developments during the mid-seventies could offer new insights into parliamentary affairs.
Ultimately, together with apartheid in South Africa, post-independence Mozambique and Angola were among the first concerns of the nascent EPC.Footnote 19 According to Holland, the Carnation Revolution marked a turning point, since member states had previously treated the southern African region bilaterally.Footnote 20 In this context, the EP frequently discussed inconsistent responses to the Angolan post-independence crisis. Yet, these debates have not been scrutinised in the historiographical literature, while studies exploring the link between the EP and the EPC mainly focus on the post-direct-election period.Footnote 21 Moreover, while political scientists have focused on the pragmatic limits of parliamentary action, this research starts from different methodological premises and aims to identify nuanced cross-party positions.
This article primarily draws on the Historical Archives of the European Parliament (HAEP) and the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) to analyse key plenary and committee debates and group dynamics. It is structured as follows: the first section examines parliamentary perceptions of Portugal’s dual transition, investigating whether the prospect of closer political ties created an opportunity to engage with the legacies of the empire or, conversely, whether the emphasis on democratisation overshadowed its longer-term consequences. Initiatives and omissions that emerged during these first internal discussions provide a basis for understanding EP’s external perceptions of its relationships with the soon-independent Lusophone African states, which are analysed in the next two sections. Specifically, the second one addresses the reframing of reciprocal relationships within the broader Lomé Convention framework, while the final section investigates EP responses to contradictory policies of member states in Angola in a Cold War context.
Engaging with Portugal’s Dual Transition: A Missed Opportunity?
Less than a week after the Carnation Revolution, the EP’s Political Committee released a statement on the political situation in Portugal. The document was issued following an exchange of views in the presence of the Commission of the European Communities, and it welcomed ‘the prospect of an early return of Portugal to the principles of parliamentary democracy’.Footnote 22 In addition, although it did not explicitly mention any association or enlargement option, it contended that democratisation offered a new basis for improving relations between the European and Portuguese parliaments and, more broadly, between the EEC and Portugal.Footnote 23 In the broader context of southern European political transitions, Salm identified similar EP reactions in the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek cases.Footnote 24 Yet a rapid decolonisation, coupled with the state crisis that followed the 25 April coup, added complexity to an apparently homogeneous democratisation wave.Footnote 25 Since Portuguese historiography has extensively reconstructed Portugal’s political transition, the following paragraphs selectively draw on it as a contextual framework for analysing EP’s responses.
On 15 May, António de Spínola was nominated president of the republic, and a provisional government was appointed the next day. The new foreign affairs minister, Mário Soares, immediately began contacts with the leaders of the African liberation movements. In August, the Algiers Agreement outlined the path to decolonisation for Guinea-Bissau while paving the way for the independence of Cape Verde. The Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas; MFA) would ultimately commit to decolonisation. However, throughout the summer of 1974, Spínola still advocated for ‘federated’ solutions. Following his resignation on 30 September, Lisbon moved more decisively towards the implementation of independence. Meanwhile, negotiations over the decolonisation of São Tomé and Príncipe had begun, while on 7 September the Lusaka Agreement provided for the formation of a provisional Mozambican government with a FRELIMO majority, fuelling resentment among minority parties and the white community. Finally, in January 1975, the three main Angolan liberation movements signed the Alvor Agreements with Portugal, scheduling independence for the following November.Footnote 26
Reading the 30 April Political Committee’s statement through this lens, the word ‘decolonisation’ was not included. This primary focus on the authoritarian character of the Portuguese regime was not novel. A brief return to some pre-revolutionary initiatives is therefore instrumental in tracing the continuity and limits of the EP’s engagement with Portuguese decolonisation. While existing studies have primarily examined institutional strategies and national party interests on this matter, the present article evaluates the space afforded to the colonial past within parliamentary debate. From this perspective, examining such omissions could inform contradictions in post-independence rhetoric.
Negotiations leading to the 1972 Trade Agreements provided EP deputies with several occasions to express their concern about Marcelo Caetano’s rapprochement with the Community. Yet even the composition of the EP Committees contributed to the far more limited attention paid to the colonial wars. Theoretically, Sub-Saharan Africa was addressed within the Committee on relations with Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), which was renamed the Committee on Development and Cooperation in 1973. However, this site mainly treated relationships between the EEC and those that had by then become independent sovereign states. Moreover, the few attempts to address Portugal’s colonial wars never yielded coherent outcomes. In January 1970, for instance, the Belgian Socialist Ernst Glinne drafted his Note on the Cahora Bassa Dam, calling for a unified response from the EP against member states’ financing of the venture. In September 1969, Portugal had in fact signed a contract with the Zambesi Hydroelectric Consortium (ZAMCO) to construct a dam in Mozambique.Footnote 27 The significant portion of South African companies within the consortium indicated that the electricity production and new irrigation sources would benefit the apartheid regime rather than the local population, which was still under colonial rule.Footnote 28 According to the Belgian socialist, the project was against Eurafrican cooperation as conceived by the Yaoundé Convention.Footnote 29 Moreover, not only did enterprises from France and West Germany express their interest in the venture, but export credits from Paris and Bonn contributed to its financing.Footnote 30 The role of European governments in supporting the project has been the subject of scholarly analysis. Marcos has argued that the prospect of enhancing French interests in southern Africa overcame economic and political concerns associated with such a massive venture.Footnote 31 Likewise, Lopes explored West German attitudes, pointing out the provision of substantial credit guarantees.Footnote 32 In accordance with the literature on the gap between the line of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; SPD) as a party in office and the positions of individual parliamentarians, German Socialist Ilse Elsner used the Bundestag to question Karl Schiller, the federal minister for economic affairs, about Cahora Bassa.Footnote 33 This initiative followed discussions within the European Socialists’ Group, confirming an internal cohesion that scholars already acknowledged.Footnote 34 More broadly, it suggested that transnational cooperation deepened beyond the mere transposition of delegates’ national interests in Strasbourg: issues raised in the context of European groups’ interactions were reflected in national parliaments, potentially influencing areas outside the EP’s competences.Footnote 35 Hints of the European Socialist Group’s unity on this issue were also apparent in EP plenary debates. On 15 March 1973, Vredeling requested clarification from the Commission on press reports denouncing French investments in the Cahora Bassa dam.Footnote 36
The EP’s Committee for Relations with AASM first discussed Glinne’s note on 27 January 1970.Footnote 37 Although he recalled that Hamburg’s joint Assembly had already agreed on the matter, the French European commissioner for overseas development, Henri Rochereau, warned that a political stance could be perceived as a form of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of African governments, confirming this position during the next meeting.Footnote 38 On 14 December, Glinne reiterated that ‘We cannot glorify the friendship between Europe and Africa during the Conference and then turn a blind eye to certain facts once again.’Footnote 39 However, Ernst Achenbach, the Committee’s president, urged caution, while the French Gaullist Hervé Laudrin raised doubts in terms of compatibility of topics such as the Cahora Bassa dam with the Committee’s competence.Footnote 40
On the other hand, the External Economic Relations committee addressed negotiations with Portugal solely regarding its commercial side. Occasionally, joint meetings with the Political Committee discussed democracy and human rights.Footnote 41 Nevertheless, these interventions primarily addressed the three dictatorships collectively, rather than focusing on Portugal’s colonial issues. Such an approach partly echoed political initiatives and debates undertaken by the main transnational party networks such as the Socialist International and the International Union of Christian Democrats.Footnote 42
Within the plenary, only a few questions explicitly mentioned the colonial wars, although the first EEC enlargement could revitalise the debate. In fact, the 1972 Wiriyamu massacre had prompted severe criticism in the British Parliament.Footnote 43 Through a written question addressed to the Commission on 1 August, Dick Taverne suggested notifying the Portuguese ambassador about the possible incompatibility between human rights violations and Portugal’s privileged commercial status. He also asked the Commission to comment on the atrocities committed by Portuguese troops in Angola and Mozambique.Footnote 44
Nonetheless, these initiatives remained fragmented and never led to in-depth debates or approved resolutions. Moreover, as noted above, it was never the Political Committee that addressed the colonial wars, excluding them from wider reflections on European identity. This depoliticisation appears to align with historiographical arguments emphasising the EC/European Union’s long-standing silence on colonialism. By contrast, Sierp has remarked on the relative ease with which democracy and human rights would later be framed as core components of the European integration process.Footnote 45
These earlier initiatives provided fundamental context for understanding the EP’s actions and omissions in the immediate aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. Conflict over decolonisation in Portugal contributed to a delicate state crisis, raising fears about its political trajectory.Footnote 46 Between Francisco da Costa Gomes’s assumption of the presidency and the political stabilisation that followed the legislative elections of the spring of 1976, the EP engaged with Portugal’s political transition during two significant debates.
On 17 October 1974, the Italian Socialist Libero Della Briotta requested immediate Community aid through an oral question to the Commission. Moreover, he recommended the early conclusion of an association treaty, as the European Socialist Group deemed political and economic support essential for the flourishing of the young Portuguese democracy.Footnote 47 In his answer, the Vice President Christopher Soames stressed that European engagement should make use of the flexibility afforded by current arrangements.Footnote 48 During the subsequent debate, representatives from all the major political groups expressed a certain degree of optimism towards developments in Portugal. The Belgian Christian Democrat Alfred Bertrand praised Lisbon for ‘spreading her new wings and preparing for the nuptial flights of parliamentary democracy’.Footnote 49 However, departing from the socialists’ view, he suggested waiting for the forthcoming March elections before concluding any association deal.Footnote 50 British Conservatives were even more cautious. James Scott-Hopkins described Portugal’s democracy as a ‘very delicate flower’.Footnote 51 Drawing on his own country’s experience, he also acknowledged the enormous challenge that decolonisation implied: ‘We, of the many nations represented in this Parliament, have a great deal of knowledge and experience of the difficulties encountered in giving freedom to former colonial territories.’Footnote 52 On this topic, Della Briotta suggested a European-level arrangement with former Lusophone colonies, to be conceived under the framework that would soon substitute the Yaoundé Convention. Portugal’s double transition could thus be channelled along two parallel tracks: Lisbon’s association with the EEC and, on the other hand, its former colonies’ accession to the evolving EEC–ACP framework. Notably, the Italian socialist referred to a vaguely defined European ‘political responsibility towards all the countries of Africa’.Footnote 53 In the same vein, Bertrand noted that the Community should welcome Portugal’s soon-independent overseas territories into the ACP group.Footnote 54 In this regard, Soames informed the Parliament that, the previous week, the commissioner for development and cooperation, Claude Cheysson, had met with Portuguese authorities to discuss future relationships between the Community and Lusophone Africa.Footnote 55 Choosing to visit Lisbon for these talks, the Commission implicitly recognised Portugal’s intermediary role. Ultimately, the Liberal and Allies Group also supported broadening the scope of the Association to newly sovereign states.Footnote 56
At the beginning of 1975, soaring polarisation and violent incidents seemed to confirm EP conservative deputies’ early fears over Portugal’s political instability. On 25 January, left-wing protesters disrupted the first congress of the right-wing Democratic and Social Centre (Centro Democrático Social; CDS) party in Oporto, which was cancelled. The next and much tenser EP debate took place on 19 February, when Soames reassured the EP plenary that all major political parties and the Portuguese government had firmly condemned the events.Footnote 57 Nonetheless, the following March saw Spínola’s failed coup and the subsequent institutionalisation of an MFA-led Council of the Revolution. The MFA’s proximity to left-wing groups and its intention to give the democratic transition a socialist character raised fears of a potential communist takeover.Footnote 58 As Pasquinucci noted, this concern even tempered the EP’s enthusiasm for the end of the dictatorship.Footnote 59 During the 11 April plenary, the two irreconcilable fronts that had impeded tabling a common motion for resolution within the Political Committee became apparent.Footnote 60 Moreover, only a few references addressed the ongoing decolonisation. Expressing the Socialist Group’s decision to abstain from the resolution, Glinne emphasised the need to take into account the disastrous socio-economic consequences of the dictatorship and the colonial wars.Footnote 61 At the opposite extreme, Lord Reay warned that Europe could only consider Portuguese membership once a democratic system was established.Footnote 62 This apprehension aligns with the literature on the first British Conservative delegates’ guiding strategies in the EP. Specifically, Crowson has emphasised their efforts to democratise the EEC decision-making process, drawing on a long-term consolidated parliamentary tradition.Footnote 63 Jackson further highlighted that this awareness was at the origin of a certain ‘presumption’ behind relevant parliamentary initiatives.Footnote 64 On the other hand, as Buettner examined in depth, the United Kingdom, just as most EEC founding states, had never come to terms with its colonial past.Footnote 65 Taken together, these two strands of literature help explain British Conservatives’ comments on Portugal’s decolonisation process. In particular, they frequently framed the issue in terms of identity, evoking a shared heritage that could not solely be interpreted in negative terms. Lord Reay underscored the geographic and historical ties between Portugal and the Communities, referring to a common European civilisation that comprised the former colonial empires. Remarkably, Ribeiro identified an analogous rhetoric when accounting for the ambition of Portugal’s elites to include the country among the former colonial powers, as a means to dispel the myth of empire.Footnote 66 These findings support historiographical arguments which identify a broader colonial legacy that goes beyond national borders.Footnote 67 Turning to the 11 April debate, Lord Reay also referred to Portugal, arguing that:
In overseas exploration, it was the pioneer of Europe. Also, like many of us, it acquired and maintained an overseas empire to which it became deeply attached and, like us, it has had to go through, it is the last of us to go through, the painful process of decolonisation.Footnote 68
Although Reay recalled the evolution of EEC–African relations from colonial to equality patterns, he perceived an automatic link between Portuguese membership and its former colonies’ association with the Community:
We believe, therefore, that Portugal belongs in Europe. We believe that her relations with her African ex-colonial territories could be developed in a corresponding manner, or in association or in unity with, the relationship Europe is herself developing towards the other countries of Africa with which she has similar relationships.Footnote 69
Across the Assembly, only a minority, which included British members of the European Conservative group, explicitly romanticised Portugal’s colonial past. Moreover, when speaking on behalf of their groups, most EP deputies unequivocally endorsed Portugal’s decolonisation.Footnote 70 On the other hand, the EP’s first initiatives focused on the delivery of food aid, in line with the growing attention to global hunger.Footnote 71 As previously observed, European socialists even emphasised the devastating and enduring economic consequences of colonialism to justify this request. As a result of this climate, the resolution approved on 11 April not only reflected the EP’s apprehension about political developments in Portugal, but it also expressed confidence in the ‘positive prospects for decolonisation under the Lomé convention’.Footnote 72
Eventually, the Portuguese Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Português; PSP) won a clear plurality in the 25 April 1975 Constituent Assembly elections, reassuring EEC institutions amid Cold War tensions. In July, the European Council reiterated its support for Portugal’s transition to a pluralistic democracy and expressed its intention to open economic cooperation.Footnote 73 Although political instability persisted during the ‘Hot Summer’ of 1975, in September, the EP plenary expressed its support for immediate Community economic aid to Portugal.Footnote 74 The appointment of the sixth Provisional Government and the failure of the far-left coup of 25 November confirmed the moderate turn of Portugal’s political system, paving the way for the approval of the new democratic Constitution in April 1976.Footnote 75
On the other hand, the EP never engaged in deeper political and identity-oriented discussions on a colonial past shared by Portugal and several EEC member states. As observed above, this void resulted in vague references to a European responsibility towards the entire African continent. Notably, this perceived obligation extended beyond the former colonies of current EEC member states, encompassing Lusophone African territories. As the next section explores, this implicit acceptance of asymmetric duties sharply contrasted with the celebration of the Lomé Convention as a complete break with the colonial past.
From Decolonisation to Multilateral Cooperation: Reframing EEC–Lusophone African Relationships Through Lomé
At the peak of Portugal’s state crisis and parallel to its ongoing decolonisation process, on 28 February 1975, the EEC and its member states signed an unprecedented multilateral agreement with forty-six ACP states. As observed above, the two main debates on Portugal’s double transition led EP deputies from all major political groups to express their desire to welcome the soon-independent Lusophone African states within the nascent Lomé Convention. This prospect was reiterated during debates dedicated to EEC–ACP negotiations. At the 10 December 1974 plenary on the renewal and enlargement of the Association, for example, Glinne suggested easing the accession procedure for Portuguese colonies undergoing a transition period.Footnote 76 On this topic, Cheysson shared that, once independent, countries such as Mozambique would undoubtedly obtain their seat.Footnote 77 The cooperation and development commissioner restated this intent on 16 October 1975, noting that São Tomé and Príncipe had officially applied for membership.Footnote 78
Guinea-Bissau was among the forty-six ACP signatories, whereas São Tomé and Príncipe and Cape Verde joined Lomé in 1977. This outcome revealed that the Community’s welcoming attitude was matched by the new independent countries’ eagerness to join Lomé. On 1 April 1977, the Italian Socialist Pietro Lezzi asked the Commission whether Angola and Mozambique had also expressed interest in acceding to the Convention.Footnote 79 Eventually, the latter signed Lomé III, while Angola followed in 1985. These developments began before Portugal’s EEC membership application, showing that both Africans and Europeans viewed their engagement within the Lomé Convention multilateral framework as distinct from relations with their historical metropoles. Within the EP, this same pattern had already been noted regarding the Commonwealth. As the European Conservative Tom Normanton argued, ‘These twenty-two former British colonies see their economic and industrial future aligned with the Community as opposed to Britain.’Footnote 80
More extensively, this aspiration echoed broader optimism about the Lomé Convention’s capacity to overcome enduring neocolonial ties. Indeed, already during negotiations leading to its signature, internal and international developments had given ACP representatives greater contractual leverage, contributing to a final text that encompassed key principles of the NIEO proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly. According to the president of the Commission of the European Economic Communities, François-Xavier Ortoli, the new agreement inaugurated a world order based on cooperation, rather than confrontation.Footnote 81 At the same time, the president in office of the ACP Council of Ministers, Babacar Ba, believed that the accord could simultaneously transform reciprocal trade, political and cultural relationships.Footnote 82 Most notably for this research, according to Garavini, the Lomé Convention gave the EC a new look, since it provided its member states with an opportunity to reconcile with their own colonial past.Footnote 83
As a consequence of this positive climate, a keen enthusiasm for the end of the neocolonial era swept the EP. On 14 March, Colette Flesch, the president of the Committee on Development and Cooperation and a member of the Liberal and Allies Group, praised the agreement’s economic and political significance.Footnote 84 During the debate, the Belgian Christian Democrat Pierre Deschamps argued that the Convention finally marked ‘a break with the colonial past’,Footnote 85 while the Luxembourgish Socialist Willy Dondelinger celebrated ‘a treaty between equals with no trace of colonialism’.Footnote 86
Historians would later debate whether Lomé really implied the end of the neocolonial features in relationships between the two continents. From a pragmatic viewpoint, in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, Lomé guaranteed stable, low-cost supplies of essential raw materials.Footnote 87 Moreover, as Pallotti argued, the accord consolidated persistent asymmetric dependency ties.Footnote 88 This topic was also investigated in the field of International Relations, with Carbone highlighting long-lasting incoherent behaviours.Footnote 89
Nonetheless, with few exceptions from members of the Communist and Allies Group, enduring political and economic inconsistencies largely remained unseen. EP deputies never explicitly discussed the ‘particular’ features of EEC–Sub-Saharan African relationships, since the innovative and wider character of the Lomé Convention was considered adequate. This outcome reflects what Laschi has observed regarding the then EPA, which, despite its attempts to build equitable relations, never engaged in a thorough debate on the political objectives underpinning the Rome Treaties Association.Footnote 90 When applied to evolving relationships with former Portuguese colonies, these observations partly explain enduring rhetorical contradictions. On the one hand, following Portugal’s membership application on 28 March 1977, EP deputies would often defend the link between decolonisation and Portugal’s EEC accession. In January 1978, Jean Durieux included the absence of colonial structures as one of the three conditions that the Liberals and Allies deemed essential for the southern European enlargements.Footnote 91 However, in November 1978, Pintat defined Portugal as ‘a good gateway to Africa’ during a group visit to Lisbon.Footnote 92 Nearly a decade later, in a speech on an enlarged Europe in November 1984, the former EP President Simone Veil emphasised that Lisbon’s ‘historical ties’ with strategic African partners could enhance the EEC’s international trade.Footnote 93 These statements underscore a perceived continuity with Portugal’s former overseas ties. Besides, as Pinto and Teixeira noted, the Lomé Convention’s multilateral framework facilitated the restoration of Portugal’s economic and political relations with the newly independent countries.Footnote 94 By the time Portuguese Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) joined the EP in 1986, they would carry with them a comparable colonial amnesia. In fact, further supporting Buettner’s argument for a multinational colonial culture, the reframing of EEC–African relations coincided with similar processes unfolding in Portugal.Footnote 95
Once, as MacQueen has argued, the New State (Estado Novo) had clung to the image of a benevolent and inclusive empire due to its incapacity to reshape relations with overseas territories into neocolonial ties.Footnote 96 However, such ideas were rooted in long-standing racial and cultural prejudices that long predated Salazar.Footnote 97 Almeida and Corkill thus remarked that, through the 1976 Constitution, the new democratic regime reworked the Luso-tropicalist ideas that had previously justified Portugal’s colonial rule to promote a national narrative of openness and multiculturalism.Footnote 98 Additionally, Ribeiro noted that, in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution, the oratory of Portuguese troops who fraternised with the liberation movements helped sidestep the need to confront the consequences of the wars.Footnote 99 Remarkably, liberation leaders reinforced this narrative, and FRELIMO representatives celebrated the ideals of freedom that had breached the colonial army.Footnote 100 Pinto and Teixeira further analysed how, similarly to what occurred in Spain, Portuguese elites leveraged the prospect of European integration to legitimise the new democratic system while stabilising the economy.Footnote 101 In this scenario, the Portuguese Socialist Party conducted its 1976 electoral campaign under the slogan ‘Europe with us’.Footnote 102 By adopting this pragmatic perspective and labelling the colonial chapter as concluded, political actors in Lisbon and in Strasbourg overlooked its long-lasting effects.
Between Independence and Cold War Constraints: EP’s Perceptions of Lusophone African States’ Sovereignty
The end of the Portuguese Empire in Africa only demolished one of the enduring pillars of the so-called ‘white fortress’ in southern Africa.Footnote 103 Moreover, Cold War constraints complicated the region’s geopolitical landscape. Thus, while concerns over Portugal’s fragile democratisation process diminished, the EP’s attention turned to the deteriorating situation in former Lusophone African colonies. This section explores a further dimension of EP external perceptions of the newly independent states, starting with EP’s reactions to asynchronous member states’ policies in the context of nascent EPC. Southern Africa was indeed among the first fields in which member states attempted to coordinate, though their initial actions were limited and fragmented. In particular, Holland noted that the only common EC response to the Mozambican transition was a late congratulatory message sent to the new FRELIMO majority.Footnote 104 Furthermore, the unstable situation in Angola led to the uncoordinated EC recognition of the MPLA government, with member states autonomously deciding when to establish diplomatic relations.Footnote 105 Although the Alvor Agreements had scheduled independence for November 1975, the tripartite transitional government it envisaged quickly collapsed. By March, armed conflict had broken out between the MPLA and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola; FNLA).Footnote 106 During the subsequent months, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola; UNITA) also became involved. On 9 August, it officially declared its separation from the provisional government alongside the FNLA.Footnote 107 By 11 November, when Portugal officially granted independence to ‘the Angolan people’, the MPLA had established its de facto government in Luanda, while the country descended into a large-scale civil war.Footnote 108
Within the EP, the two main groups often criticised member states’ ‘schizophrenic’ behaviour, which stood in contrast to the 23 February 1976 Council declaration against apartheid. According to Holland, although historically important, the statement did not eliminate the preference for bilateral approaches.Footnote 109 These interinstitutional tensions were particularly evident during the emergency debate on Angola on 10 March 1976. In his intervention, the German Christian Democrat Erik Blumenfeld commented on Gaston Thorn’s statement according to which, in the previous February, the Council had spoken with one single voice. Hence, he denounced the Nine’s lack of shared vision and cohesion, exemplified by the French diplomats’ unilateral action regarding the MPLA’s recognition. During the Cold War, he argued, the predominance of national interests in foreign policy had led Europe to entrust every decision to its US ally.Footnote 110 From the benches of the Socialist Group, the British Labour Party deputy Michael Stewart also deplored the divisions among member states in identifying a common independence day for Angola.Footnote 111 However, he believed that the priority was now the internationalisation of the civil war, which had transformed the country into a frontline for Cold War rivalries. As historiography reconstructed in depth, Cuban forces and the Soviet Union sustained the MPLA, while Zaire and the United States backed the FNLA. Moreover, UNITA was initially supported by Zambia and later by South Africa and the United States.Footnote 112
On behalf of the Council, Thorn acknowledged that the Angolan people should determine their own destiny rather than allow the EC, the United States or the Soviet Union to decide.Footnote 113 He then argued that, in a time when Europe was no longer a colonising power, other nations had begun to interfere in African internal affairs.Footnote 114 Yet, such statements reinforced the image of the continent as a passive battleground for external powers. Several MEPs echoed this view, portraying the European empires as a thing of the past. Torn between South African incursions, external influence attempts and calls for self-determination, Africa was depicted as the victim of a new ‘scramble’. Angola, in particular, was helplessly witnessing its dismemberment, operated externally by foreign countries and internally by rival factions. As previously shown, the Socialist Group was the most active in emphasising the economic consequences of colonialism. However, when the debate shifted to political issues, some representatives stuck to stereotyped representations of Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, they were often influenced by national interests. Stewart expressed compassion for a continent which had passed from European domination to new and more insidious forms of external intervention: ‘Unhappy Africa, snatched at and carved up by rival empires in the last century, is now in this century apparently in danger of being carved up by rival forces styling themselves as liberators.’Footnote 115 In this comparison, European imperialism in Africa seemed dangerous only to a certain extent, while the new forms of interference caused more significant problems:
But that is not only Africa’s tragedy. It is our danger. There were dangers up to a point in the imperial grab for Africa in the last century, when rival empires came into contact. There are similar dangers if what are called ‘liberating forces’ are to move over Africa, rubbing up against each other – and possibly greater dangers.Footnote 116
A further issue was that the Angolan people were actively welcoming the Cuban forces. According to Stewart, white supremacy had led Africans to ally with anyone without thinking about the consequences of these choices:
Why was there such a welcome, an open door? It occurred because there are so many black Africans who are bound to feel that the doctrine and practice of white supremacy is so intolerably wrong that they will reach out for help from any quarter for the time being, not perhaps considering what the future cost may be, to assert their rejection of white supremacy, whether it be practised by the old Portuguese empire or in other parts of Africa.Footnote 117
On the one hand, Stewart believed that explicitly condemning white domination was fundamental to avoiding misunderstandings. However, his contribution suggested that Africans opposed racism by acting impulsively rather than rationally. Notably, as several studies pointed out, portraying the continent as driven by emotion was a hallmark of colonial discourse. The work of Fanon stands as a valuable example in this sense.Footnote 118
Within the Assembly, even the concept of racism was divisive and subject to diverging interpretations. Blumenfeld made his support for the declaration of the ministers of foreign affairs against racist policies conditional on a contextual condemnation of discrimination practised by black-African dictatorships, particularly that of Idi Amin in Uganda.Footnote 119 This juxtaposition between apartheid and authoritarian practices in post-colonial African states underscores an understanding of racism that has been widely analysed by historians and sociologists and that abstracts racism from its colonial power relations’ roots.Footnote 120
Drawing on the Christian Democratic rhetoric of solidarity and moral responsibility, Blumenfeld also proclaimed a new European ‘mission’ on the African continent by stating that ‘we Europeans have the task of protecting from this danger the countries and people of Africa’.Footnote 121 Similarly, from the non-attached benches, the member of the Italian Social Movement – National Right (Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale; MSI), Valerio De Sanctis, argued that new hegemonies could replace the equally inexcusable ‘old-style’ colonialism. Therefore, ‘Europe must save the peoples of Africa from new forms of colonialism.’Footnote 122 According to this view, during the Cold War, Africans needed protection against the infiltration of foreign ideologies. Nonetheless, it seemed that Africans did not want to be rescued. Deschamps criticised the MPLA for allowing foreign military personnel to operate in Angolan territory.Footnote 123 In line with this position, speaking on behalf of the European Conservative Group, Sir Derek Walker-Smith considered the withdrawal of foreign troops as a fundamental condition for providing Community aid. The declared purpose would be to ‘help to preserve southern Africa from Soviet imperialism and, we hope, to follow paths of pluralist democracy and harmonious non-racial evolution’.Footnote 124 Naturally, not all MEPs adopted this perspective. The Danish Liberal Democrat Ove Guldberg, for example, emphasised the importance of not instructing sovereign countries on how to behave. Likewise, speaking on behalf of the Communist and Allies Group, Tullia Carettoni Romagnoli emphasised the contradictions and double standards hidden behind such discourses. According to the Italian representative, not only the MPLA but also Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA received foreign military aid. The latter only seemed more acceptable because South Africa or Western allies were financing it.Footnote 125
Following this discussion, the EP plenary voted on a resolution on the Community’s African policy. The motion had been tabled by Ludwig Fellermaier, on behalf of the Socialist Group, Alfred Bertrand, on behalf of the Christian Democratic Group, Jean Durieux, for the Liberal and Allies Group, Peter Kirk, for the European Conservatives and Christian de la Malène, on behalf of the European Progressive Democrats.Footnote 126 Given the proponents’ diverse political backgrounds, the compromise text was rather vague and simply condemned foreign interference in African states. Moreover, the resolution also emphasised the lack of unity among the Nine regarding the MPLA recognition and the 23 February declaration.Footnote 127 Within the broader context of limited parliamentary action, this passage demonstrated EP deputies’ ability to transcend national party divisions.
The final document also included an amendment tabled by Fellermaier and Stewart, which reaffirmed the Parliament’s rejection of racist policies which may, among other things, result in interference from outside.Footnote 128 In responding to Blumenfeld’s comments on his alleged selective condemnation of racist policies, the British socialist had ironically clarified, prior to the vote, that the new formula included every form of racialist oppression, ‘whether practised by white against black, black against white or any combination of colours one wishes to suggest’.Footnote 129 Nonetheless, this new paragraph downplayed African agency.
Comparable patterns emerged across the plenary debate on a common policy on southern Africa on 12 January 1977. The discussion followed an oral question tabled on behalf of the Socialist Group to the Council. In particular, the British Conservative James Spicer pointed out the humanitarian crisis caused by the scorched earth tactics of the Angolan troops, supported by Cubans.Footnote 130 Similarly, Lord St. Oswald stressed the need to support only true democratic allies in the region, rather than legitimising oppressive leaders.Footnote 131 In this regard, the British Labour Party’s president of the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Crosland, commented on the British Conservatives’ selective reference to the FRELIMO and FNLA, which omitted the undemocratic nature of the Rhodesian and South African regimes.Footnote 132
Although the subsequent years fall outside the scope of this article, it is worth noting that, following direct elections in 1979, similar EP dynamics would continue to accompany foreign interventions in former Portuguese African colonies, particularly in Angola and Mozambique. Pretoria’s destabilising efforts in the region escalated, triggering negative reactions among most EP deputies. During his group’s meeting on 13 January 1984, Glinne drew attention to the scale of South African operations in Angolan territory.Footnote 133 On the other hand, from the centre-right benches of the Parliament, most European deputies continued to stress the need to inform neighbouring countries about the dangers of Soviet imperialism. A relevant example in this sense is the meeting of the Liberal and Democratic Group in March 1981. On that occasion, Jean-François Pintat expressed renewed concerns about the Soviet Union’s attempts to gain control over African natural resources. According to the group’s president, Moscow was exploiting the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique to pursue its predatory purposes.Footnote 134 Similar remarks were raised in June 1982, at the European People’s Party’s Group Study Days in Limerick. During his speech, the Italian minister of foreign affairs and former president of the EP, Emilio Colombo, acknowledged the African people’s right to make their own foreign policy choices, praising any effective stance of non-alignment. However, he also expressed concerns over any decisions that might diverge from the Western alignment, particularly those involving the presence of foreign military forces, as had occurred in Angola.Footnote 135 Moving to the far right, some representatives autonomously pursued informal contacts with opposition forces in Angola. Among such initiatives, in 1983, French deputy Olivier d’Ormesson, together with three other far-right members, visited UNITA’s headquarters. Even if this action was carried out without the authorisation of any political group, it did result in tensions in the Lomé Convention framework. In particular, the Angolan government raised sharp criticism within the ACP-EEC Joint Consultative Assembly.Footnote 136
Returning to the debates analysed above, any alliance between newly sovereign governments and the Eastern bloc was widely perceived as a vulnerability to external intervention. Except for members of the Communists and Allies Group and certain individual deputies from major political forces, most EP representatives expressed attitudes oriented towards protecting African populations. This approach unveiled cross-party doubts regarding their capacity for self-government. Historians examining the political and cultural legacies of colonialism have highlighted the persistence of stereotypes that occasionally resurfaced in European cities when interacting with Africans. In the Italian context, for instance, Triulzi discussed the concept of a latency of colonial memory.Footnote 137 However, most studies have concentrated on national rather than European perspectives, although comparative analyses such as Lotem’s have addressed both France and the United Kingdom.Footnote 138 This section has shown that unresolved stereotypes not only occasionally emerged within the EP but were also shared, to varying degrees, by representatives from all major political parties. Furthermore, the possibility of rational or instrumental foreign policy decisions during the civil wars was largely dismissed. This perspective, combined with ambiguous understandings of the concept of racism, also neglected the parallel development of broader and specifically Pan-African interpretations of Marxist political thought. As Sivanandan has examined in detail, these developments extended beyond the pursuit of support from the Soviet Union and Cuba and integrated the concepts of race and class.Footnote 139
Conclusion
In April 1974, the Carnation Revolution opened new prospects for both the further enlargement of the EEC and new and equitable relationships with the soon-to-be independent Lusophone African states. While these two dimensions proceeded along two parallel strands, considering the interactions between internal and external levels of analysis facilitates understanding the complex legacies of colonialism.Footnote 140 The EP’s involvement in Portugal’s decolonisation process must be scrutinised by considering the limited powers accorded to the institution during the period under consideration. EEC enlargements, negotiations with the ACP group and EPC coordination efforts were essentially intergovernmental in character. However, by sitting on ideological division lines, EP deputies scrutinised EEC’s external relations through a political lens. Thus, they sought to use debates, questions and resolutions to exert political pressure on the Council.
The first section of this paper considered the internal dimension of reactions to Portugal’s double transition. Starting from comparative studies on the EP’s defence of a nexus between democracy and enlargement, it enquired whether the prospect of closer political relationships with Portugal prompted an internal, identity-oriented discussion of a shared colonial past. Overall, interventions on Portugal’s decolonisation cohesively expressed hope for rapid independence. Moreover, all the major political groups supported the quick inclusion of former Lusophone African colonies within the forthcoming Lomé Convention. Ultimately, some deputies, particularly from the Socialist Group, acknowledged the devastating consequences of Portugal’s colonial wars. However, in line with what the literature has remarked regarding earlier debates on EEC–African relationships, the EP never took the opportunity offered by the prospect of closer political relationships with Portugal and its former colonies to address the ongoing cultural and political legacies of European colonialism. While recognising the hardships of decolonisation, British Conservatives even explicitly welcomed Lisbon into the ranks of former imperial powers.
In turn, as the second and third sections examined, these omissions were also reflected in EP deputies’ perceptions of the external relationships between Europe and the newly independent states. Specifically, the second section explored how the EP reframed interactions between Lusophone Africa and the EEC through the Lomé Convention. Speaking on behalf of their political groups, EP deputies simply called for the quick inclusion of Portugal’s former colonies into a novel, multilateral framework, which they considered sufficient to overcome a colonial past that had never been profoundly addressed. Although former Portuguese colonies’ accession to Lomé preceded the third EEC enlargement, EP deputies’ statements underscored a perceived continuity with Portugal’s former overseas ties. In fact, the EP was operating within pre-existing dependency patterns in redefining its approach towards Africa. Remarkably, the literature has identified similar patterns in the responses of Portugal’s elites to the empire’s fall.
Finally, starting from EP’s responses to EPC coordination attempts in Angola and Mozambique, the third section explored a further dimension of EP external perceptions. It argued that a void in terms of colonial memory contributed to widespread confusion over the very concept of racism. Following the dismantling of the ‘last empire’ in Africa, Soviet interventions and South African attempts to influence majorities in Lusophone Africa in the Cold War context gave rise to irreconcilable divisions within the plenary. Eventually, addressing racial discrimination proved complicated, and compromise resolutions remained vague. At the same time, a lack of a complete understanding of the implications of the European colonial past was evident in the persistent prejudices regarding the self-governance capabilities of the newly independent southern African states. With few exceptions, these assumptions were shared across the entire political spectrum, thus including the same socialist deputies who vehemently condemned Pretoria’s interference and white supremacy doctrines.
In conclusion, this article acknowledged the challenges the EP faced in formulating firm, coherent positions on Lusophone Africa. Additionally, it shifted the analytical lens from institutional effectiveness to parliamentary discourse, arguing that the EP, often dismissed as politically marginal, offered a valuable site for uncovering persistent assumptions and colonial imaginaries that are less visible in analyses focused solely on high politics. The limited powers accorded to the EP offered deputies greater space to articulate identity-centred perspectives. At the same time, its transnational internal organisation facilitated the emergence of political concerns that transcended the pragmatic objectives of national governments. Overall, this research revealed that, while celebrating new and equitable relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, EP deputies navigated and, at times, unconsciously reproduced racialised stereotypes concerning Portuguese colonies.
