William Clare Roberts has written a major study of Karl Marx's masterwork, Capital, volume 1. But to assess Marx's Inferno properly one has ignore its apparent selling point, the claim that in writing Capital 1, Marx sought to rewrite “Dante's Inferno as a descent into the modern ‘social Hell’ of the capitalist mode of production” (1). This is wholly unconvincing. The only real argument for this that Roberts offers is a strained comparison with Marx's use of Hamlet in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. He writes: “it seems not unreasonable to suppose that Marx might similarly have borrowed the plot of Dante's Inferno in order to supply himself with an order for his exposition in Capital” (32). The reasonableness of such a supposition depends on the supporting evidence, of which Roberts offers none. The interpretation serves merely as a structuring device for his book, and is largely ignored while Roberts makes his substantive arguments.
The novelty of these arguments lies in the systematic deployment of some of the resources of Anglophone political philosophy, and more particularly the approach to the history of political thought pioneered by Quentin Skinner, to read Capital 1. This is so in two crucial respects. First, methodologically, the effort to interpret Marx's text by setting it in the context of the debates to which it was a contribution and the rival theorists to whom it was a response: this involves paying particular attention to the various schools of British and French radicalism and socialism, notably the Saint-Simonians, Owenites, and Proudhonists. Second, a preoccupation with the classical republican tradition, associated with Roman political writers and their early modern admirers, and with Machiavelli and Rousseau; Skinner stresses the importance of this tradition's development of a nonliberal conception of freedom as nondomination, very different from the negative conception of freedom as noninterference pioneered by Hobbes (Liberty before Liberalism [Cambridge University Press, 1998]). Roberts argues that republicanism influences the radical currents of Marx's day, alongside Marx himself.
In adopting this strategy, Roberts is bending the stick against the approach developed by probably the most influential contemporary school of Capital interpretation among Anglophone Marxist scholars, the proponents of “systematic dialectics,” whom he accuses of inventing “an ideal, counterfactual Capital” (11) to demonstrate its correspondence with Hegel's Science of Logic. Though this is fair criticism, Roberts seeks to differentiate his own approach with some much more dubious arguments. He says his focus on volume 1 “follows naturally from my emphasis on Marx's published text—his speech act—over and against these authors’ emphasis upon Marx's research project” (11n35). He justifies ignoring volumes 2 and 3 on the grounds that “Marx did very little work on volumes two and three of Capital after the publication of the last instalment of the French edition of volume one in 1875. … Volume one of Capital must be taken as Marx's last testament” (16). But this justification does not stand up to examination. Friedrich Engels indeed edited Capital, volume 3, after Marx's death in 1883 from a manuscript written in 1864–65, but 230 out of 599 pages of the Penguin edition of volume 2 is based on post-1875 drafts.
In fact, Roberts does not consistently stick to focusing on Capital 1, since he uses the Grundrisse quite a lot—this is important, for example, for his interpretation of capitalism as a system of impersonal domination. But Roberts ignores the most substantial of Marx's drafts, the Economic Manuscript of 1861–63 (from which Theories of Surplus-Value was extracted). This leads to specific weaknesses—notably, when it comes to his account Marx's views on technology in chapter 5, which ignores Marx's very extensive discussion in the 1861–63 Manuscript, from which the treatment in Capital 1 is at least partly distilled. But, more broadly, ignoring Marx's research process in this way undermines a main aim of Roberts's study, namely, reconstructing Marx's intellectual and political context.
Roberts offers a very interesting assessment of Marx's closeness to Robert Owen because of their shared commitment to cooperative production as the alternative to capitalism. But precisely because they agree, this makes Owen less important in understanding Marx's dialogues with his contemporaries than Proudhon, with whom he strongly disagrees. The struggle against Proudhon's influence on the Left and the workers’ movement in France runs through Marx's political thinking from the 1840s to the 1870s. This reflects the strategic centrality of France for Marx and Engels. Britain might be the core of industrial capitalism, but France remained the heartland of European revolution. Marx's leadership of the First International between 1864 and 1872 involved fierce political competition with the Proudhonists. Even after the collapse of the International in the wake of the defeat of the 1871 Paris Commune, Marx sought to increase his influence in France. The French edition of Capital 1, published under his close supervision in 1873–75, has to be seen in this context.
Theoretically at stake in this struggle is the meaning of the critique of political economy, as Marx describes his own intellectual project. He was not unique in pursuing this kind of socialist engagement with political economy. As Roberts notes, Proudhon, alongside many influential British socialists, “thought that socialist and communist militants had to, in one way or another, study and learn from political economy” (47). What is the key point of differentiation between Marx's and Proudhon's critiques of political economy? As Roberts puts it, for Proudhon, “force precedes and distorts exchange, which ought to be—but is not, yet—an exchange of equivalents” (108). In other words, capitalism represents an unjust distortion of market relationships that, if properly constituted, would offer the worker (conceived primarily as a small producer) the full reward of his labor. This distortion originates in the monopoly inherent in landed property, but is fully developed in the modern system of finance and credit.
Marx's own theory of capitalist exploitation asserts on the contrary that exploitation is the normal result of properly constituted market relationships—the system of generalized commodity production that can only be realized as capitalism. He demonstrates in Capital 1, part 2, that this system presupposes the transformation of labor-power into a commodity, whose consequence is exploitation in the form of the capitalist employer's appropriation of part of the value created by the worker. The locus of exploitation is thus production, where value is extracted and surplus value appropriated—not, as Proudhon claimed, finance.
This does not mean that Marx ignores finance. It was the outbreak of the crisis of 1857–58, which took the form of a financial panic originating in the United States, that prompted him to resume his economic studies and write the enormous manuscript known as the Grundrisse. Its substantive argument begins with a chapter on money that starts off criticizing Proudhonian proposals for monetary reform. This critique builds on the sophisticated understanding of money and its functions Marx had already developed in his London Notebooks of 1850–53 (see Lucia Pradella, Globalization and the Critique of Political Economy [Routledge, 2014], chap. 4). But these controversies pose the question of the theoretical foundations of the critique of political economy.
The common reference point for most socialist controversialists was provided by the labour theory of value (LTV) rigorously developed by David Ricardo in his On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). (Remarkably, Roberts more or less ignores Ricardo.) But the LTV was used here primarily as the basis of a normative critique of capitalism analogous to Proudhon's. Thus Thomas Hodgskin writes that “the best means of securing the progressive improvement, both of individuals and nations, is to do justice and allow labour to possess and enjoy the whole of its produce” (Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital [Labour Publishing Co., 1922], 109). Owen also argues along similar lines that a “substantial improvement in the progress of society may easily be effected by exchanging all articles with each other at their prime cost, or with reference to the amount of labour in each” (A New View of Society and Other Writings [Penguin, 1991], 269). The implication is that capital violates the LTV, which itself is understood as articulating, in Roberts's words, “a transactional conception of justice according to which justice is embodied in reciprocal exchanges of goods and services at or near the cost of production” (134).
Marx himself initially based his rebuttal of Proudhon on a rigorous reading of Ricardo's Principles: this informs his 1847 polemic The Poverty of Philosophy. But he became increasingly aware of serious weaknesses in Ricardo's theory, which in fact had become visible soon after the appearance of the Principles: (1) How can the LTV explain the exchange between capital and labor? (2) Is the LTV compatible with the existence of a general rate of profit? To provide a theory of value and exploitation that can ground a successful account of the nature of capitalism, as Marx believes Proudhon and the British socialists do not, he must give a convincing answer to these questions.
Therefore Ricardian value theory requires critical reconstruction to be usable for a critique of political economy. We see Marx undertaking this across successive drafts—the Grundrisse (which provides the means to overcome the first great difficulty with Ricardo's version of the LTV), the 1861–63 Manuscript (which deals with the second of these difficulties), the 1864–65 Manuscript (the draft of Capital 3, the completion of Marx's argument)—and then in Capital 1 itself. The published versions of Capital 1, important though they are, are simply stopping points in a much more extensive process of research and writing that involved continual self-criticism, conceptual revision, and the accumulation of yet more empirical data (as I try to show in Deciphering Capital [Bookmarks, 2014]). This is the most important reason why Marx left Capital unfinished, and Engels the thankless task of editing and publishing volumes 2 and 3. So Marx's achievement is very hard to grasp and assess without setting Capital 1 in the context of the larger argument he sought to develop.
Roberts thus addresses only one aspect of the context of Capital 1, Marx's debates about value and exploitation with his fellow socialists, without seeing that he is able to come up with a more powerful critique of political economy only thanks to his struggle with and conquest of Ricardo. This does not take away what is of value in Marx's Inferno. Reminding us that volume 1 was written as a political intervention in the socialist movement while Marx was in the leadership of the First International is a valuable corrective to more hermetic readings of Capital. Roberts's detailed discussions of the text—even when disputable—are always interesting and provocative. The two final chapters—respectively a discussion of primitive accumulation that rebuts fashionable attempts to counterpose it to Marx's theory of capitalist exploitation and a vindication of Marx's politics against the criticisms of, notably, G. A. Cohen—are something of a tour de force.
One still has, however, even in these chapters a queasy feeling that Roberts is shoehorning Marx into a republicanism that does not quite fit him. The feeling is strongest when Roberts argues, against Allen Wood among others, that Marx does not have “a notion of freedom as individual and collective self-mastery”—in other words, a positive conception of freedom as self-determination or self-realization (248; compare Allen Wood, Karl Marx [Routledge, 2004], 48–54). But this claim is strongly contradicted by the considerable textual evidence to the contrary, which is not confined (as Roberts contends) to Marx's early writings. Thus in the Grundrisse Marx often refers to communism as “free individuality” and links it to labor, writing of “self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour” (Grundrisse [Harmondsworth, 1973], 611).
These reservations about Roberts's interpretation of Capital do not require one to deny that Marx draws on the republican tradition in his political arguments. Undoubtedly it provided, and continues to provide, conceptual resources for anticapitalist criticism. But Roberts's emphases might lead one to underestimate the modernity of Marx's thought. This is so in two ways. First, Marx is heavily dependent on his engagement with classical political economy—one of the intellectual pinnacles of the Enlightenment—for his critical understanding of capitalism, which goes beyond identifying its moral flaws to offering an analysis of what he calls its laws of motion. Secondly, Marx's project—like that of all socialists in the first half of the nineteenth century—takes shape in the space created by the French Revolution and seeks to address how both to continue and to radicalize this revolution. In developing his critique of political economy, he draws on German classical idealism, above all Hegel, for whom the French Revolution is a central reference point: we see this, for example, in Marx's conceptualization of freedom as self-determination. None of this means that Marx's theoretical discourse does not resonate with older styles of thinking as well—commentators have, for example, detected the presences of Aristotle and Epicurus. Roberts has added to our sense of the complexity of Marx's thought by thematizing its debt to the classical republican tradition. But this is far from the whole story.
