In 1975, before left revolutionaries in Central American created a crisis for the USA, few had studied these small countries dominated by militaries and a few families that exported coffee, cotton, cattle or sugar. By the time the Central American wars ended, whole book cabinets could be filled with books on one country or another, but few of these works were comparative. Salvador Martí y Puig and Carlos Figueroa Ibarra and their two collaborators (Salvador Santiuste Cué and Alberto Martín Álvarez) compare the Central American left in six insightful essays.
The Reagan administration saw a vast communist conspiracy in ‘our backyard’ that would topple ‘dominoes’ to the Rio Grande. These studies show that the insurgent groups in each country had a hard time conspiring among themselves – owing to strategic differences, turf battles and repression – and probably did not have the capacity to mount a regional effort. The USSR and the Cuban supported the Sandinistas after 1979, but so did many other countries. Some wounded Salvadorean guerrillas made their way to Cuban hospitals, through Nicaragua. But in a decade of effort, the USA was able to discover but one truck with a few small arms it said was going from Nicaragua to El Salvador. The book demonstrates that these were homegrown revolutions brought on by increasing landlessness and repression.
The Sandinistas defeated Somoza. The FMLN fought the Salvadorean military, heavily backed by the USA, to a mutually detrimental stalemate, while the URNG in Guatemala was dealt a strategic defeat by the end of 1983 following a brutal scorched earth campaign by the military, which had little or no support from the USA. The authors give some credence to the view that explains the contrasting outcomes with reference to a divided elite in Nicaragua, with many opposed to the rotten and corrupt dictator Somoza, whereas these same classes in El Salvador and Guatemala with military allies stood united against the left. But the authors do not minimise the influence of massive US military aid in El Salvador in propping up the government.
The Salvadorean land barons were fervent in their anti-communism and some financed the early 1980s death squads and urged the military on to a ‘total war’ strategy. But their solidarity had weak spots: massive capital outflows in the early 1980s and some discretely paid ‘war taxes’ to the FMLN when it threatened their particular interests. Exports fell in El Salvador by 57 per cent from 1979 through 1982, whereas in Guatemala the decline was less than four per cent. There is much to indicate that the Guatemalan military was more experienced, even more brutal, and a more effective fighting force than their Salvadorean counterparts, and that the URNG was less effective, and with even fewer arms than the FMLN.
The steps to the post war period were again quite different for each left group. The URNG staved off complete defeat for over a decade. In a context of disarray in the Guatemalan government, and with strong international pressure to end the last Central American war, the URNG negotiated a treaty by 1996 that was surprising in its rhetorical reach, given the URNG's lack of power, but very short in enforceable provisions. By contrast, the FMLN forced negotiations with its own 1989 ‘Tet’ offensive. Hardliners proved willing to negotiate after seeing peasant guerrillas in their rich neighbourhoods and after US patronage was threatened when the military slaughtered five Jesuit priests. The FMLN won treaty provisions in 1992 that achieved substantial military and police reform and constitutional changes that opened the political system and reformed the Supreme Court. But these gains came at the cost of ignoring its original goal of radical economic change.
The Sandinistas had achieved radical economic change in the first part of the 1980s, but could not finally defeat the contra army or force the USA to stop financing it. With an economy in economic collapse (30,000 percent inflation in 1988) and the prospect of more war, Daniel Ortega lost the election to a fractious coalition of 13 parties in 1990, bringing the war to an end.
As the authors detail, the post-war years made public internal dissension and struggles for position in the left groups. For the URNG and the Guatemalan left this has led to needlessly disastrous results in elections, as Figueroa skillfully illustrates. By contrast, the FMLN has done rather well in elections, despite at least three bruising internal battles with excision of factions and cadres. The FMLN finished a distant second in 1994 to the dominant rightist ARENA party, no mean achievement for a party with little electoral experience. In three subsequent legislative elections it has tied or threatened the ARENA electoral juggernaut in Assembly and local elections, particularly in large cities. Its internal battles contributed, however, to decisive defeats in three presidential elections.
As Salvador Martí points out, in contrast to the FMLN, the FSLN, headed by Daniel Ortega, has often negotiated with the governing party. At first the FSLN mobilised the grassroots, negotiated through crises and even made tactical alliances with the Chamorro government (1990–1996) as the party and unions lost thousands of jobs in a neoliberal restructuring amidst political violence over thousands of disputed plots of land. Dissension grew against Ortega and leading figures left the party and collective leadership was by a party run by one person. He proceeded to negotiate a pact with his arch-enemy Arnoldo Alemán (1996–2001), which divided up several government offices between the two parties and changed the electoral rules to allow a victory with but 35% of the vote if the leader was five points ahead of the second place finisher – Ortega's gamble that the anti-Sandinista camp would divide. This it did when Bolaños turned on his patron Alemán, and with the aid of the USA, had him prosecuted and jailed for theft of funds and money laundering (before a Sandinista judge Alemán had appointed as part of the Pact). This, and Alemán's ironfisted control of his party from jail, led to two ‘liberal’ candidates against Ortega in 2006 and enabled him to win after gaining approximately the same portion of the vote that he had gained in the previous three elections that he had lost by fourteen points. The book stops short of the election but provides a solid, nuanced portrayal of the post-war left in Central America in a neoliberal era.
