“If Hillary Clinton had won the 2016 election …” Wouldn't it be nice to climb down into that imaginative rabbit hole and stay there for a while? The possibilities are so reassuringly normal—as opposed to the strange nightmare in which we find ourselves today. For the purposes of this roundtable, however, I wish to consider only one small potential consequence of a Hillary win: and that is what it would have been like to read Catherine Gallagher's new book if Hillary Clinton had won the 2016 election. I would probably have experienced Telling It Like It Wasn't as a fascinating intellectual history of a mode or a discourse that has enormous political purchase today, largely as a result of its “affiliation with legal and political historical justice projects.”Footnote 1 Although thinkers of all political persuasions use this mode, Gallagher explains, the political counterfactual has played a particularly prominent role in “the pressure exerted by the civil rights movement in favor of a Second Reconstruction, affirmative action programs, and claims for reparations” (124–25). It has served as a way to right the wrongs of history, in other words, and as such has served us extremely well. Or, at least, that is how I would have felt if Hillary Clinton had won the 2016 election. But she did not. As a result, rather than simple intellectual pleasure and political hopefulness, reading Telling It Like It Wasn't filled me with a strong sense of dread.
Interestingly, the problem with the historical counterfactual in the current context is not its reliance on fiction, as one might expect. Instead, it is its reliance on history. As Gallagher explains, the historical counterfactual is a “discourse … premised on … an explicit or implicit past-tense, hypothetical, conditional conjecture pursued when the antecedent condition is known to be contrary to fact” (2). As an example, she offers John F. Kennedy's assassination—as in, “If John F. Kennedy had not been assassinated in 1963 … the war in Vietnam would have been over by 1968” (2). Gallagher is primarily interested in how the historical counterfactual uses fiction; as she explains, thinking though alternative historical outcomes enables us to engage questions about identity—not only the identities of people (is Kennedy still the same person if he is not assassinated?), but also, even more interestingly, the identities of large historical abstractions such as nations: the Civil War, Reconstruction, World War II. Counterfactual characters, Gallagher explains, “almost automatically scale up into larger collectivities” (14). As a result, “Debates about the counterfactual career … of JFK” usually have as their ultimate aim speculation “on how the nation [he] led would have been different under the changed circumstances” (14). As such, the historical counterfactual enables us to consider how we understand that nation: what it is that makes it recognizably the same, despite changes in fortune. In the process, it also strips our world of its “neutral, inert givenness and open[s] it to our judgment” (15)—an exercise that can have important political implications.
The problem with this mode of thinking in the current context is that it assumes a basic commitment to the starting point: the difference between the factual and the counterfactual. This is not to say, of course, that historical counterfactualists consistently get history right, or agree as to what constitutes historical accuracy. But it is to say that the historical counterfactual is premised on the assumption that there is such a thing as history: that JFK was, in fact, assassinated, and that the assassin was not assisted by Ted Cruz's father—and that the usefulness of the mental exercise requires the acceptance of these commonly agreed-upon facts. This is not a starting point we can now take for granted. As a result, arguments for something like reparations—the very idea of reparations constituting an obvious product of historical counterfactualism—have to contend not simply with racism, or even disagreements about the legacy of slavery, but basic questions about the status of slavery in the first place. Maybe it wasn't so bad? In this context, it is tempting to simply throw in the towel on the historical counterfactual—turn away from historical arguments altogether in order to make positive claims that invite different kinds of debates. Perhaps by turning away from history and toward value? aspiration? utopia? I am not making a strong argument here; I am simply sharing the concerns that this book helped crystallize for me—concerns about the difficulty of using history in claims about the future.
Needless to say, none of these questions constitute a criticism of Telling It Like It Wasn't. On the contrary, by defining this mode and offering its genealogy, Gallagher makes clear its ubiquity and power. As in her previous work, she shows us how fictions educate our feelings and provide us with important tools for thought. At a moment when the very idea of historical truth is so wholly under attack, I simply wish to raise a question as to the risks we may run when we invoke it.
