In summer 1936, the Croat peasant leader Vladko Maček was not overly concerned with the growing European political crisis stemming from a conflict that had erupted in Spain. Instead, his priorities lay with rebuilding the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS) after six years of illegality under King Aleksandar's dictatorship in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Aleksandar had banned all political parties and brought an end to parliamentary democracy in 1929, yet Maček had continued limited political activity as leader of the so-called ‘Croatian national movement’, despite the assassination or imprisonment of many of its leading members. The elections of 5 May 1935, marred by political violence and vote-rigging, nevertheless represented the first tentative steps at restoring democracy and the re-emergence of the HSS as a legal party. By 1936, Seljačka sloga (Peasants’ Co-operative) and Gospodarska sloga (Economic Co-operative), two HSS branch organisations that sought to improve the lives of Croatia's peasants through education, health care, bringing electricity to the villages and raising agricultural prices, were once again legalised by the regime and began to expand rapidly. The party's press, notably the daily Hrvatski dnevnik (Croatian Daily) and weekly Seljački dom (Peasant Home), resumed publication, although they remained subject to strict censorship laws. As the only ‘legal’ Croatian political party, the HSS represented more than just the peasants who were its main constituents. It had transformed into a mass movement that, at least in the mid-1930s, had the undivided support of the vast majority of Croats in their struggle to change Croatia's status within the Yugoslav state, commonly referred to as the ‘Croat’ or ‘national’ question. As the leader of the broad movement headed by the HSS, Maček focused his energies on abolishing the reviled Alexandrine constitution (imposed in 1931) and reorganising Yugoslavia into a federal state through peaceful and democratic means.
However, the situation in Europe was changing, and in the rising tension the continent's democracies were increasingly on the defensive. The failed coup by conservative officers against a leftist government in Spain on the night of 17/18 July 1936 rapidly expanded into a bloody civil war and international conflict, whose ripples were felt in every European country and beyond.
International involvement in Spain raised the spectre of a new European conflict. Whereas Germany and Italy drew closer after 1936, France and Britain appeared weakened and indecisive in response to the Spanish crisis, resulting in a policy of appeasement towards the Rome–Berlin Axis. Other European countries dissatisfied with the Versailles system looked to the revanchist powers as a means to recover territory lost after the First World War. Although a general European war did not break out over Spain, the stage was being set for the Second World War.
At the same time domestic politics became polarised over the Spanish Civil War even in countries not directly involved in the crisis. The Catholic Church played a prominent role in drumming up international support for the insurgents, known as the Nationalists, while communists, repeating Moscow's line that democracy and not revolution was at stake in Spain, grew in stature as the most vocal anti-fascists. The International Brigades, comprising some 40,000 leftist volunteers from over fifty countries, exemplified the belief that fascism had to be stopped on the battleground in Spain.
Both sides in the war used propaganda on a massive scale; as Arthur Koestler noted, ‘propaganda for foreign consumption has been almost of more importance for both sides than propaganda for home consumption’.Footnote 1 Newspapers in various European countries engaged in bitter polemics over the war, often reflecting the growing polarisation in the political arena. The war in Spain provoked impassioned reactions far beyond the Iberian peninsula, inspiring a generation of writers, poets, intellectuals, filmmakers, photographers and artists to comment on what was perceived as the pre-eminent moral issue of the time.
Although Maček at times used the worsening international situation to pressure Belgrade into resolving the Croat question, ultimately the consequences of the Spanish Civil War proved fatal for the HSS. From 1936 to 1939 the rise of the fascist powers, the polarisation and radicalisation of political life and the militant rhetoric of the pro-communist and pro-fascist press in Croatia created conditions for alternative solutions for the Croat question. The political strategies of the HSS, based on pacifism, democracy and co-operation with Belgrade, carried little weight in the Europe being forged in the turbulent period after 1936. The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, and the invasion of Yugoslavia two years later, accelerated the division of the Croatian national movement into rival ideological camps. The HSS, the strongest Croatian political force of the interwar period, suffered a cataclysmic blow during the tragedy of the Second World War. Although the fascist Ustaša regime and the communist-led Partisans absorbed the right and left wing respectively of the HSS, HSS members served as little more than window dressing for the claim of legitimacy put forward by the two opposing authoritarian movements seeking to fashion the future of Croatia.
This article examines Maček's position on the Spanish Civil War, and its portrayal in the HSS press. Recent scholarship has shown how polarising and radicalising the Spanish conflict was on domestic politics in countries as far from hostilities as Ireland and Poland.Footnote 2 Croatian historiography dealing with the HSS has tended to overlook international developments from 1936 to 1939 (perhaps because Maček likewise gave them little thought), instead focusing exclusively on the protracted, and often unproductive, negotiations with Belgrade.Footnote 3 Maček's failure to realise the impact of the Spanish war on Croatian politics is indicative of his weaknesses as a leader in difficult times. His position on the national question in Spain, or rather the lack thereof, exposed the hypocrisy of the HSS leadership as a champion of national rights, and was exploited by Croatian communists. Under Maček's watch, the HSS missed the opportunity to take a strong moral stance against fascism during the Spanish conflict, and his fence-sitting from the 1930s onwards permitted the more extreme ideological movements in Croatia to take advantage of the rapidly changing conditions of a Europe engulfed in war.
The Spanish Civil War
A left-wing coalition government, known as the Popular Front, had taken power in Spain in February 1936, promising to enact serious social, economic, and agricultural reforms. The Popular Front included liberal republican parties, socialists, nationalists from Catalonia and communists, these last having adopted an anti-fascist platform based on the 7th Comintern Congress held in summer 1935.Footnote 4 For conservative Spaniards this amounted to a mortal Bolshevik threat, and the Spanish army, which had repeatedly taken power in Spain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, decided that a pronunciamiento (military coup) was necessary to restore order. The pillars of traditional Spanish society – the powerful Catholic Church, large landowners, industrialists and monarchists of various stripes – along with an indigenous fascist movement, the Falange, rallied to the side of the army in its rebellion against the Popular Front government. Surprisingly strong resistance from loyal army units and hastily armed anarcho-syndicalist militias foiled a quick takeover by the coup plotters, and a divided Spain became engulfed in a bitter civil war between the loyalists, or Republicans, and the insurgents, or Nationalists.
What had begun as a purely Spanish affair quickly became internationalised. As the front page of the Washington Post noted in early August 1936, ‘with each passing day [the civil war] is assuming continental proportions as one nation after another is, willingly or unwillingly, being drawn into the maelstrom’.Footnote 5 Hitler and Mussolini, determined to challenge the political status quo established by the Versailles treaties, funnelled military supplies and thousands of troops to aid General Francisco Franco, the emerging Nationalist leader. The Spanish Republic, abandoned by Western democracies in their fear of another European conflict, turned to the Soviet Union as its primary ally against the better equipped and trained Nationalists. The reliance on Germany and Italy on one hand, and on the Soviet Union on the other, reinforced the ideological character of the Spanish Civil War, increasingly portrayed around the globe as an epic struggle between communism and fascism.
The Spanish Civil War had a profound impact on a Europe recovering from both the devastation of the First World War and the Great Depression. Supporters of the Nationalists emphasised Franco's anti-communism and his defence of the Catholic Church. Those who rallied to defend the Republic just as passionately argued that anti-fascism and democracy were the key tenets of the besieged Spanish government. Individuals throughout Europe and around the globe saw in the Spanish Civil War a reflection of their own struggles, which is why it had such a polarising effect beyond the countries directly affected by the conflict. This was certainly the case in Croatia, despite the efforts of the authoritarian Yugoslav regime to limit and censor public discussion of the events in Spain. Ultimately Maček, in trying to maintain his control over the Croatian national movement, adopted a similar tactic of ignoring and suppressing open discussion of the divisive Spanish crisis.
‘That war does not concern us’
Although Maček and the HSS could find almost no common ground with Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović (1935–9), they could agree with the regime's insistence on staying neutral on the Spanish issue and its relentless crackdown on anything deemed supportive of one side or the other in Spain.Footnote 6 In his speeches in the parliament and through statements in the government mouthpiece Vreme (Time), Stojadinović stressed that Yugoslavia would pursue a ‘policy of absolute non-intervention’ because ‘the events in Spain are a purely internal matter of the Spanish people’.Footnote 7 In March 1937, following reports of hundreds of Yugoslav volunteers joining the Republican army, the regime passed a strict law prohibiting the recruitment of volunteers, the departure of volunteers from Yugoslav territory, the collection of money or other charitable contributions for either side in Spain, and the issuing of visas to Spain.Footnote 8 Publicly the government-controlled press, such as Belgrade's Samouprava (Self-management) and Zagreb's Glasnik (Herald), tried to minimise the coverage of the fighting in Spain and insisted that the war had little relevance for the Yugoslav audience, even though it dominated the rest of the world's headlines.
Behind the scenes, however, the regime was well aware that the situation in Spain was relevant and potentially destabilising to a country internally weakened by the Croat question and numerous other problems. Therefore it censored newspaper reporting on the war, and mobilised its police apparatus to confiscate publications supporting the Republic, break up the communist network sending volunteers to Spain (primarily through Croatia) and prevent public demonstrations in support of either side. Dispatches from the US embassy in Belgrade increasingly noted that in spite of Stojadinović's proclaimed neutrality, the Yugoslav regime had tacitly adopted a pro-Franco position and directed the police repression almost exclusively against the supporters of the legal Spanish government.Footnote 9
Maček was also aware of how destabilising the Spanish Civil War could be. Although the HSS's Hrvatski dnevnik, along with other independent Zagreb dailies such as Jutarnji list (Morning Paper) and Obzor (Horizon), continually carried front-page articles on the carnage in Spain, the editorials and commentary from the HSS leadership strove to deny any importance to the European crisis generated by that conflict. For the HSS, the Spanish Civil War was a battleground on which two antagonistic ‘foreign ideologies’, communism and fascism, were fighting it out, with the greatest losers being the Spanish peasantry. Both these ideologies would lead to tyranny, which was contrary to the ideals of Croatian democracy and peasant humanitarianism.Footnote 10 Initially the HSS press, echoing the regime, characterised the conflict as ‘provoked by anarchists and Marxists with their terror’.Footnote 11 Later the HSS criticised both sides, arguing that ‘any true friend of humanity and progress does not want the victory of either the fascists or Marxists, but democracy’.Footnote 12
The HSS press relentlessly commented on the dangers of ‘foreign ideologies’. ‘Let us first of all liberate ourselves from the spiritual slavery of foreign ideas’, Maček wrote in Hrvatski dnevnik, ‘whether outright capitalistic, fascist or Marxist-socialist. Before all, let us be spiritually unified with our peasant people.’Footnote 13 The HSS was critical of the capitalist system that exploited the peasantry, but did not want the peasants to give their support to either communism or fascist corporatism. Instead, the party insisted that it offered its own ‘autochthonous world view’ in line with peasant democracy. The main party organ of the HSS, Seljački dom, hammered at this point with numerous headlines such as ‘Foreign Ideas Fall Before the Croatian Peasant Movement’, ‘The Croatian Peasant Movement and Relations with Foreign Ideas’ and ‘The Croat Nation Goes its Own Way’ – with Spain as the example of what happens when a nation turns to foreign ideologies to solve its problems. Its editors concluded that ‘we don't need any imported ideas such as communism or fascism, because the Croat nation has its own ideas, developed in its own Croatian peasant movement, which can meet the needs of not only the peasant, but those of the civil servant, worker, and citizen’.Footnote 14
Although the HSS frequently condemned both fascism and communism, it had a greater dislike for the Republican government than for the Nationalists, often referring to the former as ‘reds’ and the latter as fighters purging Spain of the international communist threat. This position reflected Maček's own anti-communism and belief that the moderate HSS leadership could easily control the extreme nationalist and clericalist elements in the Croatian national movement, who were vociferously supporting Franco and fascist intervention in Spain. Maček was convinced that any kind of anti-fascist or popular front was merely a Trojan horse for a communist takeover (which was in fact the Comintern's strategy), and therefore insisted through the HSS press that his party already served as the only ‘front’ needed by the Croatian people.Footnote 15 Yet his failure to take a strong stance against fascism at a time when German and Italian aggression was openly taking place in Spain was emblematic of his political passivism, and foreshadowed the HSS's marginalisation in the anti-fascist struggle during the Second World War. As a party with pacifist and democratic ideals, the HSS had a moral obligation to aggressively denounce fascism and Nazism as well as their Croatian adherents. This did not take place until after 1939, when Ante Pavelić's exiled Ustaša movement began to act with greater impunity against the HSS in Croatia on the eve of the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia.
One can argue that Maček's strategy of trying to ignore the conflict in Spain was no different from that of many politicians in the Western democracies, and that a position more sympathetic to the Republic would have exposed him to the criticism of being a communist supporter. However, in Croatia there were other, non-communist voices that spoke out against fascist aggression in Spain and the rise of Croatian fascist groups. The most vocal anti-fascist party in Croatia, apart from the communists, was the Independent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka, SDS), whose primary constituents were Croatian Serbs. In an alliance with the HSS since 1927, the SDS nevertheless had a significantly different approach towards the Spanish issue. As much as the HSS used the violence in Spain to condemn Croatian communists, the SDS used the example of Spain to criticise sympathisers of fascism in Croatia, and drew attention to the brutal and intolerant nature of Franco's forces. In response to claims in the right-wing press ‘that the horrors of the civil war in Spain are the consequences and fruit of democracy’, the main newspaper of the SDS, Nova riječ (New Word), warned of the dangerous growth of anti-democratic, pro-fascist, and militant movements in Croatia, and added that the civil war was actually caused by the reactionary forces and not democracy.Footnote 16Nova riječ was one of the rare newspapers that actively criticised the propaganda being generated in the wake of the Spanish Civil War, primarily from the Nationalist side, which was regularly reprinted by Zagreb's main dailies without being questioned or its accuracy verified.
The SDS leaders also brought up the issue of Spain and the dangers of fascism during public speeches, in contrast to the HSS leadership, which only reluctantly mentioned the conflict preoccupying Europe. At a speech in Vrginmost (modern-day Gvozd in the ethnically mixed Kordun region) on 28 February 1937, two SDS deputies addressed the crowd and, according to a police report, in addition to calling for unity between Serbs and Croats and the need for freedom of the press, spoke ‘against fascism, because fascism constricts national freedom’.Footnote 17 The HSS, meanwhile, was willing to sacrifice some of its morals in order to ‘preserve’ the unity of its national movement, which included a growing right wing with pro-fascist sympathies. In January 1938, SDS leader Rade Pribićević warned that ‘dictatorship and fascism have seized power in several foreign countries, and that is leading to an unavoidable war, against which we must do everything possible’.Footnote 18 The consistent anti-fascist message of the SDS during the period of the Spanish Civil War was a crucial factor in the decision of most SDS followers to join the communist-led Partisan resistance, as opposed to the Serbian nationalist and collaborationist Četniks, after the creation of the fascist Ustaša state in 1941.Footnote 19
On rare occasions leftist members of the HSS broke ranks and offered a slightly different perspective on the war in Spain. For example, Mihovil Pavlek-Miškina and Franjo Gaži participated in a forum in Zagreb on 21 January 1937, in which they blamed some of the causes of the war on the conservatism of the Catholic Church and the Spanish monarchy for their mistreatment of the peasantry.Footnote 20 This prompted a scathing attack from the leading Catholic and pro-Franco newspaper, Hrvatska straža (Croatian Sentinel), which denounced the HSS deputies for their ‘blasphemy’ and suggestions that the Popular Front was not to blame for the carnage in Spain.Footnote 21 Božidar Magovac, a long-time HSS member, publicist and former secretary of Seljačka sloga, broke with Maček in 1936 and published his own weekly paper, Seljački svijet (Peasant World), which represented the opinions of the left wing of the HSS. In what was probably a swipe at both the regime and the HSS leadership, Magovac argued that the ruling class used the spectre of Spain to stifle any attempts to change the status quo in Croatia.Footnote 22 He believed that being critical of the HSS or supporting the Republic did not make one a communist, and his paper lacked the fervent anti-communism of other HSS publications.
Vladimir Radić, son of the martyred Stjepan Radić, revived his father's paper Narodni val (National Wave) in early 1937 and presented a decidedly more pro-Republican position than the official HSS press. He insisted that the Western democracies, notably France and Britain, needed to be decisive in order to prevent a wider European war. ‘[Spain] is again one of countless examples of the fact that that fascism and dictatorship mean WAR’, argued Radić, ‘while a democratic and free government means PEACE, happiness and progress for the nation.’Footnote 23 Unlike most HSS leaders, Radić realised that democracy was also threatened by the war in Spain, and that it was not simply a battle between communist and fascist dictatorships.
Yet these differing opinions on Spain from within the HSS ranks had little impact on Maček and the HSS leadership in their approach to the war, which continued to be one of denial and moral ambivalence.
The national question in Spain and Croatia
Many observers of the war in Spain noticed similarities between the national movements of the Catalans and Basques – peoples on the Iberian peninsula with distinct languages, cultures and histories – and those of Yugoslavia's own ethnic groups. Although the origins of the national question in Spain differed greatly from the situation in Yugoslavia, the Spanish Civil War highlighted the fate of the Catalans and Basques, who had been given significant autonomy under the Republic and were fighting against the centralised state envisioned by the Nationalist side. Surprisingly, Maček and the HSS, the alleged defenders of national rights, remained silent on the fate of the Catalan and Basque peoples in spite of the parallels with the situation of Croats in the Yugoslav state.
While Hrvatski dnevnik and Seljački dom occasionally expressed sympathy with the Catalan and Basque peoples, especially the peasantry, these mouthpieces of the HSS never explicitly condemned Franco or showed solidarity with their national movements when their autonomy was stripped away by the Nationalists. A Spanish diplomat in Belgrade even wrote a letter to the editor of Hrvatski dnevnik, criticising the paper for publishing ‘untruths’ and ‘pro-Franco lies’.Footnote 24 Rather than address the fate of the Basque provinces in 1937, which were subjected to merciless air attacks such as the bombing of Guernica and a devastating Nationalist ground offensive, the HSS press carried only sporadic reports on the situation in the Spanish countryside. ‘Thank God Croatia is not Russia or Spain’, declared an editorial in Seljački dom, repeating the usual warnings about the effect of foreign ideas.Footnote 25 The HSS press likewise implied that the Basques and Catalans had paid the price for aligning themselves with a ‘foreign idea’ in their quest for national sovereignty, namely the communism of the Popular Front. Hrvatski radnik (Croatian Worker) asserted that it was the Popular Front, and not the Nationalist uprising, that ‘precipitated a horrible civil war’ in Spain: ‘Through the fault of the Marxist Popular Front, Spain and the poor Spanish peasants and workers are going to fall victim to fascism.’Footnote 26 Furthermore, because of the Popular Front, the ‘poor Catalan nation experienced the greatest tragedy in its history’.Footnote 27
Although Catalan and Basque nationalists had perhaps miscalculated in siding with the Popular Front, the HSS press simply avoided exploring the background of the national question in Spain. For a party so fervently calling for Croatian national rights this inattention to the Basque and Catalan struggle is quite striking. Croatian communists used the indifference of the HSS towards Spain's national minorities as a way of chipping away at the latter's claim of championing national rights. But because the HSS had always characterised the Spanish Civil War as a struggle between communism and fascism, Maček and other party leaders calculated that they could ignore the plight of Spain's nationalities by remaining neutral without a guilty conscience. They also believed that they had no reason to involve themselves in Spanish affairs when they were busy reorganising after a period of illegality.
However, this unwillingness to look beyond their own immediate interests contradicted the HSS's efforts of only a few years previously, when August Košutić and Juraj Krnjević, two of Maček's closest associates, had lobbied on behalf of Croatia across Europe and in the League of Nations.Footnote 28 In his memoirs Maček noted that the mission of Košutić and Krnjević was to ‘inform the European democratic public as much as possible about the dictatorial regime of King Aleksandar and the aspirations of the Croatian people’.Footnote 29 The HSS leadership certainly felt frustrated that Europe ignored the difficult conditions of the Croats in Yugoslavia, yet Maček and his inner circle were quick to look the other way when a similar situation unfolded in Spain.
The position of the SDS, allies of the HSS, shows that it was possible to be both anti-fascist and supportive of the Basques and Catalans without becoming communist. SDS party leaders spoke out against neutrality as the campaign against the Basques headed towards a Nationalist victory in the summer of 1937. In his article ‘There is No Neutrality’, Većeslav Vilder questioned HSS policy without naming Maček:
If we, as small peoples in a state of flux, who cry out for freedom and justice, do not understand the struggle of the Spanish people, how can others understand us? If in the struggle between the oppressors and the oppressed we wish to be indifferent and neutral, what right do we have to ask the world to be interested in our own misfortunes?Footnote 30
Vilder's conclusion was that one could not be neutral towards the question of war, especially in Spain, and that the consequences of that conflict would have repercussions for Croatia.
Several months later another prominent SDS politician, Hinko Krizman, penned a large front-page article in Nova riječ that declared ‘The End of Neutrality’. For Krizman,
Neutrality as a principle is only an asylum of ignorance. . . That is why any nation will be thoroughly deceived if it believes that only in neutrality will they find security and benefit. The fundamental principle of international law, that one state does not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state, has been abandoned.Footnote 31
Unlike the HSS leadership, which acted as if the Croat question could be resolved only by them and irrespective of international events, Vilder, Krizman and other members of the SDS realised that the war in Spain merely foreshadowed the dark events to come.
Radicalisation and polarisation
In spite of HSS efforts to downplay the significance of the ideological war being waged in Spain, both the radical left and right movements in Croatia engaged in a vigorous polemical battle over the Spanish crisis. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije, KPJ) published numerous newspapers (both legal and illegal), pamphlets, books and flyers in support of the Spanish Republic, emphasising how the Popular Front in Spain had supported the national rights of the Basques and Catalans and could serve as a model for the Croats. The KPJ was instrumental in sending nearly 1,700 Yugoslav volunteers, approximately half of them from Croatia, to fight in the International Brigades; the surviving veterans would later form the core of the communist resistance movement in the Second World War.
Josip Broz Tito, who took control of the KPJ in the wake of Stalin's purges in the late 1930s, directed several articles at the Croatian peasantry, criticising HSS calls for neutrality. In ‘Spain and Croatia’, published in the KPJ's organ Proleter (Proletarian) he asserted that ‘the Croatian people, and naturally the Croatian peasant masses, will best understand the events in Spain if they are explained in the context of their own experiences and on the basis of Croatian examples’.Footnote 32 Consequently, the communists directed considerable pro-Republican propaganda into the Croatian countryside, comparing the ‘military-fascist’ Yugoslav regime to Franco's forces in Spain as a means of building support for a Popular Front and the Communist Party. ‘It must be clear to every sincere champion of Croatian matters’, Tito concluded, ‘that the Croatian people cannot remain neutral towards the events in Spain. It is in their own interest to help those. . . who fight on the side of the legal Spanish government.’Footnote 33
According to historian Ivan Jelić, from 1937 onwards the communists in Zagreb were successful in expanding their organisation to include groups other than workers, in part because of the broader appeal of the Popular Front.Footnote 34 The growth of the communist organisation in Croatia cannot be attributed solely to the KPJ's activities in relation to the Spanish Civil War, but the party's public campaign and propaganda efforts during this period, consistently emphasising democracy and national freedom, were instrumental in expanding its influence among those elements of the Croatian population that had identified fascism as a serious threat.
Extreme Croatian nationalists who opposed Maček's negotiations with Belgrade and who would settle for nothing less than a completely independent Croatia also used the Spanish conflict as means of attacking not only the HSS's passivity, but its democratic ideals. In journals such as Hrvatska smotra (Croatian Inspection), Hrvatska prosvjeta (Croatian Enlightenment), and Hrvatska revija (Croatian Review), right-wing intellectuals increasingly argued that democracy was not a viable option in ‘backward’ countries such as Spain and Croatia, where ‘authoritative’ solutions on a corporative model were necessary to solve the myriad of problems.Footnote 35 The booklet ‘Španjolska u krvi i plamenu’ (Spain in Blood and Flame), authored by the clericalist Ivo Bogdan, used the example of Spain to show how liberal democracies were unable to solve the national question.Footnote 36 During the course of the Spanish Civil War, the fragmented Croatian right gradually coalesced around the ideological position of the Ustaše, who saluted the anti-communism, antisemitism, and militant Catholicism of the Nationalist side in Spain. Furthermore, the right saw the potential for creating an independent Croatia through fascist Italy and Nazi Germany's attacks on the European status quo, of which their intervention in Spain was merely the opening salvo.
The KPJ and Ustaše, marginal movements in the mid-1930s, increased their bases of support at the expense of the HSS by highlighting the Spanish example as a reason for abandoning Maček's policy of waiting. One Western paper reported that the ‘Croatian masses are far more radical than Dr Matchek [sic]. They demand some drastic action.’Footnote 37 In his memoirs Matija Kovačić, the editor of an Ustaša paper, explained how Maček and his inner circle had failed to react to the changing situation in Europe after 1936, putting the HSS out of touch with the common people.Footnote 38 Throughout 1938 the US consul in Zagreb observed that Maček was ‘losing ground, not only with the intellectuals but also with the peasants’, and that Croats were ‘tired of him and his do-nothing policies’.Footnote 39 Journalist C. L. Sulzberger, who was expelled from Yugoslavia for interviewing Maček, recalled that during his trip to Zagreb in 1938 ‘the influence of Hitlerian Europe [was] creeping in’.Footnote 40 The frustration at the HSS reflected the general political context in Europe. By 1939 the liberal democracies appeared weak and on the defensive as the dynamism of the fascist states triumphed in Spain and in central Europe. The Spanish Civil War did not directly cause a greater European conflict, as many contemporary observers had predicted, but it did contribute to the destabilisation of the Versailles status quo and radicalised politics across the continent.
Conclusion
Maček's strong showing in the December 1938 elections as head of the opposition bloc and his successful negotiations for the creation of an autonomous Croatian banovina (a result of the Sporazum of August 1939) seemed to consolidate the HSS's grip on power.Footnote 41 But the Croatian banovina satisfied neither the communists nor the Ustaše, and both continued to agitate against the HSS, which took over the administration of the autonomous unit. As Europe slid into war, KPJ membership grew despite the catastrophic Popular Front policy, and Ustaše organisations spread throughout major Croatian cities. Radicalised youth at Zagreb University fought against each other and the police. The HSS, which had itself suffered under King Aleksandar's dictatorship, began adopting the methods of the Yugoslav regime against its political opponents: police repression, censorship of the press, failure to carry out democratic elections, and the creation of internment camps. Until Maček capitulated along with the rest of the Yugoslav leadership after the German attack in April 1941, the HSS seemed more intent on staying in power than addressing the problems fuelling the growth of radical political movements.
In retrospect, Maček had few options in the turbulent times facing Croatia and Europe in the late 1930s, certainly for the leader of a party committed to pacifism and democracy during an era of violence and radical ideologies. Yet the historian must wonder whether a leader of the largest Croatian political party, who was more decisive and politically savvy, could have forged a different fate for the citizens of Croatia, who are still haunted by the ghosts of the Second World War. As the US ambassador, Arthur Bliss Lane, remarked, ‘Dr Maček is undoubtedly a well meaning farmer and probably a clever politician, but not a man of keen knowledge of international affairs nor of any intellectual standing.’Footnote 42 Maček's position on the Spanish Civil War revealed this lack of understanding of the forces shaping interwar Europe, with the consequence that the HSS lost the political initiative once Yugoslavia was swept up in the maelstrom of the war. In his memoirs there is hardly a passing mention of the war in Spain despite its prominence in European politics, especially during the first year of the conflict. Communists, extreme Croatian separatists, and a few individuals on the left and right wings of the HSS realised the long-term significance of the Spanish conflict and what it portended, and thus sought to ‘draw important lessons for their own struggles’.
Maček, however, made every effort to ignore the war in Spain, blindly insisting on preserving an untenable neutrality amid the reality of a polarised Europe and Croatia. Perhaps it is unreasonable to think that a party devoted to peasant issues could have donned the mantle of anti-fascism, but Maček's moral authority and its broad support among all social groups in Croatia put the HSS in a unique position to do so had the will existed. Maček's provincialism and rejection of ‘foreign ideas’ served the short-term goal of mobilising a Croatian peasantry traumatised by Belgrade's harsh policies, but in the long term failed to create a modern political movement capable of surviving the turbulent upheavals in the 1940s. The HSS leadership's reactions to the Spanish Civil War revealed the implausibility of their ‘isolationist’ rhetoric, as the slogans of democracy and anti-fascism (also foreign ideas according to the HSS's logic) were commandeered by Croatian and Yugoslav communists in the late 1930s and during the successful National Liberation Struggle. While his political moderation is commendable and more palatable than the totalitarian ideologies of his opponents, his political passivity under King Aleksandar's dictatorship, during the Spanish Civil War and, most importantly, in the testing times of the Second World War contributed to the HSS's disappearance for half a century from Croatian political life.
