H. has written a very interesting book in which she achieves at least two important things. First, she contextualises extensively the tenets of a self-professed ‘Eclectic’ philosopher from Alexandria (as summarised by Diogenes Laertius at 1.21). Second, in doing so, she shows convincingly that not all thinkers in the Late Hellenistic Age who refuse to profess allegiance to one of the big schools are closeted Stoics – though without denying the importance of Stoicism in any way. Since the book offers a well-supported challenge to a still widely-held dogma, it should be on the radar of anyone working on the intellectual culture of the Late Hellenistic Era as well as the Early Empire.
The introduction and Chapter 1 are largely devoted to a conceptual history of the term ‘eclecticism’. Observing that it is mostly modern scholars who hand out the label to ancient thinkers they consider confused or hard to pigeonhole, H. signals that the term's derogatory connotations are mostly a Kantian legacy. Before Kant, however, ‘eclecticism’ was considered something quite positive. Diderot is a key name here, but H.'s survey of ἐκλεκτικός and cognates brings to light two conceptions from the Early Empire, neither of which is pejorative. The one involves a priori commitment to a particular thought system but allows elements from other systems as long as these are coherent with the main doctrine (e.g. Clement of Alexandria). The other variant entails the advice to choose the best views and not to commit to any sectarian package deal without thinking for oneself (e.g. Galen, but also visible in Horace and Quintilian). H. suggests that Potamo should be placed in the latter category, as Diogenes Laertius tells us that he established an ἐκλεκτικὴ αἵρεσις. This claim is persuasively substantiated by the rest of the book.
Potamo founded a sect that explicitly moved beyond the canonical sects of the Hellenistic Age. The opening of Chapter 2 argues that this was facilitated greatly by the intellectual ferment that was first-century b.c.e. Alexandria (on dating, see below). The geographical distance from Athens and the breakdown of the schools as physical institutions after Sulla's sack of Athens in 86 b.c.e. made the canonical sectarian landscape less imposing on our Alexandrian thinker. The rest of Chapter 2 lays out in considerable detail the philosophical scene in Alexandria. The discussion is organised by prosopographical subheadings (e.g. Antiochus of Ascalon), but draws out common trends, such as the Aristotelian revival. As H. already mentioned in Chapter 1, the Alexandrian context also included ‘eclectic doctors’, such as Agathinus and Archigenes, who were open to doctrines of all medical sects in order to improve therapeutic remedies (and attract more customers). Here I am wondering whether the Alexandria connection might be pushed further. According to Von Staden (in Meyer and Sanders [edd.], Jewish and Christian Self-Definition III [1982]), the notion of αἵρεσις in the sense of ‘sect’ may have been developed in medical circles in Alexandria (third century b.c.e.). This was probably an Empiricist attempt to define themselves as a group while constructing a common enemy. A subsequent proliferation of sects, with their own designations, may have led philosophers to appropriate αἵρεσις-as-sect. This may make Potamo's Alexandrian setting even more poignant. It would have been of interest to hear H.'s thoughts about this.
Chapter 3 discusses the different ancient references to the name Potamo in connection with philosophy. The Suda is crucial because it tells us that a Potamo who wrote a commentary on Plato's Republic was active around the time of Augustus. Diogenes mentions that Potamo was active πρὸ ὀλίγου, and H. convincingly argues that this should be taken as a point in time much more recent than the rise of the established sects (as in: not παλαιός [?]). H. then decides to work on the assumption that these Potamos are in fact the same Potamo, since there is no reason to hypothesise two of them. She also consciously decides to add Simplicius' Potamo (cited as discussing Aristotle's De caelo) to the mix. Crucially, however, by discussing and contextualising these different references to Potamo in different chapters without insisting too strongly that all must refer to our Eclectic, H. allows her readers to construct their own Potamo.
Chapter 4 is the philosophical meat of the book. H. discusses Diogenes' very succinct reports of Potamo's views under the three subheadings ‘epistemology (logic)’, ‘physics’ and ‘ethics’. In terms of epistemology, there is talk of the κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας, which involve an agent (the ἡγεμονικόν of the soul) and an instrument (ἀκριβεστάτη φαντασία). While the jargon is mostly Stoic here, the bipartition is new, but H. traces a pedigree in Plato's Tht. 184c. The superlative ἀκριβεστάτη may be an attempt to accommodate Sceptic-Academic concerns. The ἀρχαί of Potamo's physics include matter, a productive principle, quality and place. Pointing out that the first two were widely held as first principles, H. pays most attention to quality and place. In order to bring up quality to the level of first principle, H. explores several interpretative avenues, including a transcendental one (Platonic Forms as found in Varro, Augustine, Aëtius) and an immanent one (along Aristotelian lines), while remaining open to Stoic influences. As H. points out, listing place among the first principles primarily raises further questions: why not also time? Does Potamo think void exists? Etc. Finally, the τέλος according to Potamo consists in ‘a life perfect with respect to all virtue, not without (οὐκ ἄνευ) the things pertaining to the body by nature and external things’. The element οὐκ ἄνευ is somewhat fuzzy, and H. suggests a basic distinction between a ‘stronger’ and a ‘weaker’ interpretation, which would bring Potamo closer to the Peripatetics or the Stoics respectively.
Chapter 5 studies Simplicius' citation of our/a Potamo's involvement in mathematical discussions in the context of Aristotle's De caelo. We hear that Potamo considered the mathematical principles limited in number. We also find a demonstration (probably indebted to Pythagoreanism) of how certain geometrical shapes completely fill the space around a point (for which Potamo came up with diagrams), and a demonstration of how certain solids completely fill the space around a line or point. Chapter 6 discusses two references to a Potamo in a not strictly philosophical context, which may however refer to the orator Potamo of Mytilene (active under Tiberius).
The book's conclusions contain a good summary. H. makes the appealing claim that Potamo deliberately used ‘open-ended formulations’ to allow his students to work out interpretations for themselves – i.e. be their own ‘Eclectics’ (p. 181). Since Diogenes' formulation is so succinct, however, not every reader might be convinced.
This book is worth reading for several reasons, some of which are mentioned above. In addition, it is refreshing and exemplary in its approach to intellectual history by focusing on Potamo's intellectual background(s) rather than by trying to map direct and personal dependencies the old-fashioned way (programmatic statements on e.g. pp. 36, 80). H.'s nuanced and detailed contextualisation make especially Chapter 2 an informative and accessible overview for scholars who have ancient philosophy as one among several interests rather than as their major occupation.
