Beiner's discussion of Foucault is grounded in the effort to “deconstruct” Foucault's mask “as a mere historian” (152). Beiner unpacks Foucault's Panopticon of post-Enlightenment society which, in a dynamic of power/knowledge, crafts the soul in a “regime of surveillance and discipline” that “maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (155, 158). Beiner forcefully contends that behind Foucault's language in Discipline and Punish there must be some account of the human being that would prefer to be outside of this seemingly dystopic society—one that is entitled “not to be subject to such a regime of normalization and control” (153). There is something disingenuous, Beiner claims, about Foucault's fidelity to the idea that “his intellectual enterprise [as a historian] requires him to disavow the normative power of his own theorizing” (164). I propose an interpretation that will perhaps rescue Foucault from Beiner's accusation of disingenuousness, and simultaneously establish a kinship between Beiner's lament for political philosophy and Foucault's own. The proposal is that Foucault is a madman.
Foucault begins Madness and Civilization citing Blaise Pascal: “men are so necessarily mad, that not to be mad would amount to another form of madness.”Footnote 1 On the surface, this sets up a typical “Foucauldian” reading: that regimes in history have always constituted and reconstituted madness against reason. We live in a power/knowledge world that can only replace one discourse about madness and rationality with another: “madness and nonmadness, reason and nonreason are inextricably involved: inseparable at the moment when they do not yet exist, and existing for each other.”Footnote 2Madness here seems to be the older brother of Discipline and Punish, establishing the dichotomies and power-discourse that would persist throughout Foucault's thinking.
Foucault is, however, seen too often only as a historian, rather than as a historian and a poet, a rational thinker and also a madman. In interrogating the “reason-madness nexus,” he writes: “where can an interrogation lead us which does not follow reason in its horizontal course, but seeks to retrace in time that constant verticality which confronts European culture with what it is not, establishes its range by its own derangements? What realm do we enter which is neither the history of knowledge, nor history itself; which is controlled by neither the teleology of truth nor the rational sequence of causes?”Footnote 3 This realm—beyond the rational order and history—is the realm of the madman. Beginning not with an historical account but a survey of literature, Foucault writes of the Madman or Fool who, possessing a “forbidden wisdom,” is seen not as a ridiculous “silhouette in the wings,” but stands instead “center stage as the guardian of truth. … In learned literature, too, Madness or folly was at work, at the very heart of reason and truth.”Footnote 4
This poetic madness is not merely the boundary of human reason understood historically. It is precisely a kind of wisdom that transcends immediate context—a derangement to the nomoi of the age. Through madness, Foucault writes, “a work that seems to drown in the world, to reveal there its non-sense, to transfigure itself with the features of pathology alone, actually engages within itself the world's time, masters it and leads by it; by the madness which interrupts it, a work of art … provokes a breach without reconciliation where the world is forced to question itself.” It is a task of “restoring reason from that unreason and to that unreason”—it is the “mixed vocation of the apostle and the exegete.”Footnote 5 This madness must, however, of necessity stand outside of the rational order in which it takes place. The apostolic historical exegete must be a madman, or the unreasonable, in order to expose the logos of the historical or rational order. This is not a paradox in Foucault's thought, but his entire purpose when we read his work poetically rather than rationally. It is what emerges when we read Foucault as opposed to his Foucauldianism. Bernard Williams, like Beiner, has expressed a frustration about Foucault and his fellow historicists: those who deny their own place in the historical narrative as an interpreter hold “up a sign saying that something is true or plausible or worth considering, and then [try] to vacate the spot before the shutter clicks.”Footnote 6 Indeed, I say—they must! Because it is a madman behind the camera.
As Foucault writes: “madness fascinates because it is knowledge. It is knowledge, first, because all these absurd figures are in reality elements of a difficult, hermetic, esoteric learning. … This knowledge, so inaccessible, so formidable, the Fool, in his innocent idiocy, already possesses. While the man of reason and wisdom perceives only fragmentary and all the more unnerving images of it, the Fool bears it intact as an unbroken sphere: that crystal ball which for all others is empty is in his eyes filled with the density of an invisible knowledge.”Footnote 7 Here, then, in Foucault's poetry of the first chapter of Madness and Civilization—titled “Stultifera Navis,” or “The Ship of Fools”—we see the normatively superior madman, whose curiosity and wisdom must stand outside of his historical context, unified instead of fragmented or particularized, providing an intact vision. The “classical experience of madness” is an unmoored ship, led by a madman, and the allusion to Plato's useless ship's captain is not an accident here. In the present time, however, Foucault writes, “madness will no longer proceed from a point within the world to a point beyond, on its strange voyage; it will never again be that fugitive and absolute limit. Behold it moored now, made fast among things and men. Retained and maintained. No longer a ship but a hospital.”Footnote 8
Foucault laments the mooring of madmen, the triumph of a kind of institutional rationalism that stultifies great thinking. It is a tragic acknowledgment akin to the somber suggestion of the impossibility, in Beiner's words, of “philosophy in the epic mode” after the emergence of Rawls. Foucault is indeed not normatively innocent here, and his normative conclusion is far more amenable to Beiner's than Beiner would seem to allow. Perhaps political philosophy is, in fact, just—as Beiner writes—“a bit like Heidegger's waiting-for-a-new-God,” or, if we are attuned to Foucault, like hoping for the emergence of a new madman (235). In classical political theory, gods and beasts stand outside of the polis, or political order—and here the madman may be either or both. “What then,” to return to Pascal, “is to become of man? Will he be the equal of God or the beasts? What a terrifying distance! What then shall he be? Who cannot see from all this that man is lost, that he has fallen from his place, that he anxiously seeks it, and cannot find it again? And who then is to direct him there?”Footnote 9 This is Beiner's call, and it is Foucault's. As Beiner writes, “life isn't livable without the articulation of views of what life should be,” but one would have to be either very bold or extremely mad to take it upon oneself to cross the divide and captain the ship (167).
