Following the Broken Windows Theory’s emergence, courts and scholars devoted greater attention to how the regulation of public property impacted people experiencing homelessness. Beginning in the 1980s, scholars, public interest groups, and civil libertarians increasingly argued that laws that regulate public property violated unhoused persons’ constitutional rights and criminalized the condition of homelessness.Footnote 1 Others disagreed. Certain cities and local governments claimed that civil libertarians ignored the need to regulate public property to maintain its communal purpose and foster its aesthetic value.Footnote 2 Courts sought to balance unhoused persons’ fundamental rights with cities’ need to regulate public property.Footnote 3
This chapter provides an overview of how US and Canadian constitutional law approach homelessness and the regulation of public property. It explores the limited success of constitutional rights and doctrines that are invoked to challenge laws that govern public property and to protect unhoused persons’ fundamental interests. These constitutional rights and doctrines are: (1) the void for vagueness doctrine, (2) the overbreadth doctrine, (3) the fundamental right to travel, (4) the equal protection clause, and (5) the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.Footnote 4 This chapter highlights how these doctrines fail to protect unhoused persons against various forms of actual and potential interference, such as displacement, fines, arrests, and imprisonment. It also discusses how US and Canadian courts have rejected a positive right to housing, which would better safeguard unhoused persons’ basic interests (more on this point in the next chapter).Footnote 5 By exploring the limitations of these constitutional rights and doctrines, this chapter lays the groundwork for later parts of the book that show why unhoused persons tend to lack liberty and political equality.
2.1 Void for Vagueness
The void for vagueness doctrine prohibits unconstitutionally vague or ambiguously worded penal statutes.Footnote 6 There are three justifications for the void for vagueness doctrine.Footnote 7 First, the doctrine promotes fair notice and helps prevent unfair surprises.Footnote 8 Individuals can obey the law and plan their lives more easily when statutes are clearer and more precise.Footnote 9 Second, the void for vagueness doctrine helps deter arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because it constrains police discretion.Footnote 10 Officers enjoy greater police discretion to interpret and enforce vague penal statutes. By limiting police discretion, the void for vagueness doctrine promotes the rule of law and political equality.Footnote 11 Third, the doctrine encourages respect for the separation of powers.Footnote 12 Ambiguous laws require judges to determine which conduct is illegal, which delegates lawmaking authority from legislators to judges.Footnote 13 Precise statutory language can reduce the risk that judges usurp the legislature’s role.Footnote 14
Penal laws must be adequately precise to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The US Supreme Court stated in Kolender v. Lawson that penal statutes must be defined with “sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”Footnote 15 The Supreme Court of Canada, for its part, stated in R v. Levkovic that “the essential elements of the crime must be ascertainable in advance.”Footnote 16 In Canada, a law is unconstitutionally vague where it fails to give “sufficient guidance for legal debate.”Footnote 17 Furthermore, a Canadian court can conclude that a law fails to meet that requirement only when it has exhausted all of its interpretive function yet still cannot ascertain the statute’s scope or meaning.Footnote 18
Following US Supreme Court decisions such as Papachristou, Morales, and Kolender discussed in the previous chapter, civil libertarians argued that some laws that govern public property were unconstitutionally vague.Footnote 19 They argued that statutory terms such as “camping,” “loitering,” and “vagrancy” were unconstitutionally vague and empowered police officers to selectively enforce municipal ordinances against unhoused persons.
In some cases, the arguments succeeded. For example, in the 2007 Supreme Court of Hawaii decision State v. Beltran, a Honolulu ordinance prohibited “what reasonably appears to constitute camping” in a public area “regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging.”Footnote 20 The court held that the ordinance was void for vagueness. In their view, the ordinance vested the police with virtually unlimited enforcement discretion because officers could disregard both the participants’ intent and any activities suggesting that the person was not camping.Footnote 21
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at a similar conclusion in the 2014 decision Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles.Footnote 22 In that case, the court struck down a law that prohibited using a car “as a living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise” because it was unconstitutionally vague.Footnote 23 The court decided that although the ordinance was sufficiently vague to apply to any driver who kept food, clothing, or other belongings in their car, it appeared to be enforced exclusively against unhoused persons.Footnote 24 In the court’s view, the statute conferred too much police discretion and failed to provide fair warning as to the prohibited conduct.Footnote 25
But void for vagueness challenges tend to fail when lawmakers employ precise language in penal statutes.Footnote 26 Legislators responded to the void for vagueness doctrine’s emergence by enacting a greater number of narrowly tailored ordinances that used precise language.Footnote 27 Cities replaced vague loitering laws and urban camping bans with precise legislation that targeted conduct such as staying in a park past its closing hours or sleeping on a subway bench.Footnote 28
Many of these more narrowly tailored laws withstood constitutional scrutiny. For instance, in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision Joel v. City of Orlando decided in 2000, the claimant brought a void for vagueness challenge against an ordinance that prohibited camping on public property.Footnote 29 Joel argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the term “camping” with sufficient precision.Footnote 30 The court rejected that argument. The appeal justices noted that the statute defined camping as “Sleeping or otherwise being in a temporary shelter out-of-doors” or “Sleeping out-of-doors.”Footnote 31 The court also observed that the Most Used City Ordinance Book (MUCOB) – a handbook that governs the enforcement of ordinances – provided additional statutory precision.Footnote 32 The MUCOB stated that a person did not necessarily camp if they fell asleep on public property.Footnote 33 Other indications of camping were required, including whether the individual slept in a tent or sleeping bag, or was covered by materials such as bedrolls.Footnote 34 The court concluded that Joel’s conduct fell within that description.Footnote 35 They also explained that the combination of definitions provided in the ordinance and MUCOB adequately limited police discretion and risks of arbitrary enforcement.Footnote 36
The justices arrived at a similar conclusion in the 2015 California Court of Appeals decision Allen v. Sacramento.Footnote 37 The unhoused plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of an urban camping ban.Footnote 38 They argued that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and permitted arbitrary enforcement by the police.Footnote 39 The justices remarked that the ordinance defined various terms, such as “camp,” “camp facilities,” and “public property.”Footnote 40 Furthermore the court observed that the plaintiffs’ conduct clearly violated the ordinance.Footnote 41 The justices rejected the plaintiffs’ void for vagueness challenge.
Courts have rejected void for vagueness arguments in other cases that involve narrowly tailored laws that employ precise language or define key terms within the statute.Footnote 42 Although the void for vagueness doctrine successfully struck down ambiguous statutes, its usefulness has been constrained by narrowly tailored ordinances that target specific acts, and that can result in displacement, fines, arrests, and imprisonment.
2.2 Overbreadth
Second, the overbreadth doctrine has also been invoked to strike down some laws that regulate public property. Although overbreadth claims generally fail in the United States, they have been one of the most successful types of constitutional challenges to laws that regulate public property in Canada. In the United States, the overbreadth doctrine is used to attack the facial constitutionality of a law that violates a person’s right to free speech.Footnote 43 The doctrine applies in contexts where a law regulates “too much speech that is protected.”Footnote 44 A law in the United States will be unconstitutionally overbroad where its overbreadth is substantial “not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”Footnote 45 Overbreadth doctrine protects individuals against broad laws that chill speech and promote self-censorship.Footnote 46
In the United States, overbreadth challenges to laws that prohibit sleeping, camping, or urinating on public property generally fail.Footnote 47 The main problem is that the statute must limit some form of expression for overbreadth doctrine to succeed. Although certain acts or conduct (such as flag burning) are sufficiently expressive to be protected by the First Amendment, the relevant act must intend “to convey a particularized message” and there must be great likelihood “that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”Footnote 48 In US contexts, those requirements create a major obstacle for claimants who invoke the overbreadth doctrine to challenge laws that regulate public property. Notably, the claimants must pigeon-hole their interest in sleeping or lying down into a First Amendment claim; they must argue that sleeping, pitching a tent, or sitting on public property are expressive acts.Footnote 49 Yet courts tend to reject these claims for two reasons.
First, some courts conclude that sitting or sleeping do not constitute expressive conduct. For instance, in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision Roulette v. City of Seattle, the claimants challenged an ordinance that prohibited sitting and lying on the city’s sidewalks.Footnote 50 They argued that such acts conveyed a message of passivity to pedestrians to whom they were panhandling.Footnote 51 In the claimants’ view, the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it limited that form of expression.Footnote 52 The majority of the court rejected that argument and concluded that sitting and lying down are not “integral to, or commonly associated with, expression.”Footnote 53
Second, even when courts have recognized that sleeping or camping are expressive – for instance, as a form of protest – courts uphold the law when it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling State interest.Footnote 54 The US Supreme Court decision Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) illustrates this point.Footnote 55 The claimants organized a protest where people camped overnight in Lafayette park in Washington, DC to draw attention to the plight of people experiencing homelessness.Footnote 56 They violated a regulation that prohibited camping in certain parks without a permit.Footnote 57
While the Court accepted the premise that the conduct was expressive in the circumstances, it rejected the claimants’ overbreadth argument. The majority noted that the State had a substantial interest to maintain the condition of public parks for the population’s use and enjoyment.Footnote 58 The Court also concluded that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s objective, and that the State can legitimately restrict the time, place, and manner of certain forms of expression.Footnote 59
The overbreadth doctrine plays a different role in Canada. Canadian case law recognizes the principle of fundamental justice that laws cannot be overbroad in a way that deprives a person of their right to life, liberty, or security of the person.Footnote 60 Compared to US overbreadth doctrine, Canadian overbreadth doctrine is more expansive because it applies in contexts other than freedom of speech. An overbroad law regulates conduct that the State did not intend to control.Footnote 61 In Canada, laws are unconstitutionally overbroad when they violate individuals’ right to life, liberty, or security of the person for no reason.Footnote 62 Overbreadth claims have succeeded in certain contexts when unhoused persons challenged the constitutionality of laws that govern public property.Footnote 63 The British Columbia (BC) judicial decisions Victoria (City) v. Adams and Abbotsford (City) v. Shantz illustrate this point.Footnote 64
First, in the 2009 BC Court of Appeal decision Victoria (City) v. Adams, municipal ordinances comprehensively prohibited individuals from erecting temporary shelters on public property despite the lack of available shelter spaces in the city.Footnote 65 At the time of the litigation, there were over 1,000 people experiencing homelessness in the city of Victoria, and 141 permanent shelter beds in the city which expanded to 326 during extreme weather conditions.Footnote 66
The court observed that homelessness was an involuntary condition for most unhoused persons in Victoria, and stemmed from a confluence of economic, structural, and individual factors.Footnote 67 The evidence showed that the temporary shelter ban prevented unhoused persons from protecting themselves against the elements, which subjected them to risks of physical and psychological harm.Footnote 68 The medical experts noted that people experiencing homelessness were vulnerable to frostbite and hypothermia during the winter months.Footnote 69
The BC Court of Appeal concluded that the ordinance violated the claimants’ constitutional right to life, liberty, and security of the person and that it was unconstitutionally overbroad.Footnote 70 In their view, the ordinance was unconstitutional because it prohibited individuals from erecting temporary shelters at all times while there was insufficient shelter space to accommodate the city’s unhoused population.Footnote 71 In the court’s view, the ordinance was overbroad because it was unnecessary for the city to comprehensively forbid individuals from erecting temporary shelters to promote the shared use of public spaces.Footnote 72 Although the purpose of the ordinance was to maintain the environmental, recreational, and social benefits of parks, the court concluded that those objectives could be achieved without endangering unhoused persons’ physical and psychological integrity.Footnote 73 In the court’s view, the ordinance would be constitutional if it proscribed temporary shelters at nighttime and required them to be taken down during the day – an approach that sought to balance the interests of unhoused persons’ and the city.Footnote 74
The BC Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the 2015 decision Abbotsford (City) v. Shantz.Footnote 75 In Shantz, city ordinances prohibited individuals from erecting temporary shelters on public property without a permit despite insufficient shelter spaces for the city’s unhoused population.Footnote 76 Individuals were required to obtain a camping permit using a credit card and pay $15/hour.Footnote 77 The city’s decision to grant a permit was discretionary – the city could refuse a permit if an individual’s proposed use of the park could damage the grounds.Footnote 78 Like in Adams, the court struck down the ordinance and permit requirement because they violated the claimants’ section 7 Charter interests and were both unconstitutionally overbroad and grossly disproportionate.Footnote 79
2.3 The Fundamental Right to Travel
The third type of constitutional challenge to laws that govern public property applies only in the United States. Some courts have decided that laws governing public property can violate unhoused persons’ fundamental right to travel.Footnote 80 This right protects people’s ability to move between states and within one’s own state without being subject to punishment or loss of entitlements.Footnote 81
The fundamental right to travel is justified on various grounds.Footnote 82 For one, interstate travel facilitates federalism.Footnote 83 More specifically, federalism would be hindered if protectionist policies by one state resulted in retaliatory measures by another.Footnote 84 The right to travel thus promotes interstate cooperation.Footnote 85 Second, the right protects individual autonomy and promotes self-actualization.Footnote 86 The right to travel allows individuals to move between states in search of better employment, to be with their romantic partners who live in other states, to pursue better educational opportunities that exist outside of one’s state, or to receive better medical care.Footnote 87 Third, the right to travel protects against discrimination because it helps prevent the government from penalizing certain groups from traveling between states.Footnote 88 For instance, this right allows individuals to escape state laws that they view to be discriminatory or that limit human flourishing.Footnote 89 The right to travel also prevents states from adopting policies that curb the influx of immigration of marginalized groups from other states, and conversely, allows marginalized groups to leave their home state if they construe its laws or policies to be oppressive.Footnote 90 Some US Supreme Court justices have connected the right to travel to the notion of political equality because economically disadvantaged persons can seek better economic opportunities in other states, which reduces the likelihood of social hierarchies.Footnote 91
In rare cases, courts have accepted that laws that regulate public property undermined the right to travel. In the 1992 decision Pottinger v. Miami discussed more below, municipal ordinances prohibited sleeping on public property even though there was only enough shelter spaces for 700 of the city’s 6,000 unhoused persons.Footnote 92 Shortly after the trial and before the court rendered its decision, Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida.Footnote 93 The consequences were devastating: the storm's aftermath left roughly 200,000 additional people without housing.Footnote 94 The court concluded that the ordinances violated the right to travel for various reasons. The laws expelled people experiencing homelessness from the city and forced them to travel somewhere else to comply with the laws.Footnote 95 Additionally, the law deterred unhoused people from other cities from moving to Miami.Footnote 96
Since Pottinger, courts overwhelmingly reject the claim that laws that regulate public property violate the right to travel.Footnote 97 Some courts have concluded that the Pottinger decision was wrong because it misapplied a heightened standard of strict scrutiny to a law that was facially neutral.Footnote 98 Such decisions viewed Pottinger as bad precedent and reasoned that the decision departed significantly from prior Supreme Court case law.Footnote 99 Other courts decided that laws that prohibit camping on public property do not violate the right to travel directly, but instead, impact it incidentally.Footnote 100 According to this view, the right is violated only when a law directly penalizes travel and impacts mobility, or, denies entitlements or necessities because one travels.Footnote 101 Some justices have ruled that camping ordinances do not violate the right to travel because those who camp on public property do not seek to travel but to remain in one place.Footnote 102 For these reasons, laws that govern public property are rarely struck down on the basis that they violate the fundamental right to travel.
2.4 Discrimination and Equal Protection
Fourth, some argue that laws that govern public property are unconstitutional because they discriminate against unhoused persons.Footnote 103 Generally speaking, unconstitutional discrimination implies that the State imposes disadvantages or denies benefits to groups based on their immutable or constructively immutable personal characteristics.Footnote 104 Immutable characteristics imply traits that individuals did not choose and generally cannot change, such as race or age.Footnote 105 In contrast, constructively immutable traits are associated with an individual’s personhood and can be changed only at great personal cost, such as religion, marital status, or citizenship.Footnote 106 Courts and scholars generally distinguish between two forms of discrimination: direct and indirect.Footnote 107 Direct discrimination (or disparate treatment) implies that the State singles out certain groups for adverse treatment.Footnote 108 Indirect discrimination (or disparate impact) implies that the State’s neutrally worded laws adversely impact certain groups.Footnote 109 Equal protection claims have been the least successful type of constitutional challenge to laws that govern public property in the United States and in Canada.
In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause safeguards individuals against unconstitutional discrimination.Footnote 110 The judiciary accords the highest level of judicial scrutiny – strict scrutiny – to legislation that discriminates against a constitutionally protected class (or suspect class).Footnote 111 Notably, the law must pursue a sufficiently important State objective and employ means that are sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve that end.Footnote 112 To date, the US Supreme Court has recognized five suspect classifications that are subject to some form of heightened scrutiny: race, national origin, alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage.Footnote 113 Suspect classification extends to historically marginalized groups that have lacked political power, such that they require additional protection against the majoritarian political process.Footnote 114 US courts apply a rational basis standard when individuals who do not fall within a suspect classification claim that they suffered unconstitutional discrimination.Footnote 115 Rational basis review is satisfied where the disputed law is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”Footnote 116 Statutes that are subject to rational basis review tend to withstand constitutional scrutiny.Footnote 117
US courts have rejected poverty and homelessness as suspect classes.Footnote 118 In the 1973 US Supreme Court decision San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court decided that wealth was not a suspect classification because it lacked the classic indicia of protected classes – such as political powerlessness and a history of unequal treatment – and because its definition was too amorphous.Footnote 119 Some US courts have rejected homelessness as a suspect classification on similar grounds,Footnote 120 while others have rejected homelessness as a suspect classification without providing reasons for that conclusion.Footnote 121 Absent evidence of discriminatory legislative intent – which is rarely established – facially neutral laws tend to withstand equal protection challenges even when they disparately impact unhoused persons.
The 1971 Supreme Court of California decision Parr v. Municipal Court remains one of the few instances where such a claim succeeded.Footnote 122 In Parr, the city of Carmel-by-the-Sea enacted an ordinance that prohibited a range of conduct on public property, including loitering, sitting or lying on steps or lawns, and erecting temporary structures.Footnote 123 The city also issued a Declaration of Urgency that was discriminatory on its face against hippies.Footnote 124 The court struck down the ordinance.Footnote 125 The court observed that the provision and its accompanying declaration were directly discriminatory because they singled out people experiencing homelessness and used pejorative terms such as “undesirable” and “unsanitary.”Footnote 126 Although the targets of the law were not a suspect class, the court nonetheless struck down the law because its purpose was impermissible and expressed hostility and animus, which violated the right to equal protection.Footnote 127
Canadian courts have also rejected poverty and homelessness as constitutionally protected classes.Footnote 128 In Canada, section 15 of the Charter prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of enumerated and analogous grounds.Footnote 129 Enumerated grounds of discrimination are expressly mentioned in section 15’s wording and include personal characteristics such as race, age, color, gender, religion, national or ethnic origin, and disability.Footnote 130 Analogous grounds of discrimination are not expressly mentioned in section 15 of the Charter’s wording yet have been identified by courts as prohibited grounds of discrimination, such as citizenship, marital status, and sexual orientation.Footnote 131 Courts recognize new analogous grounds of discrimination based on a group’s immutable or constructively immutable personal traits, and factors such as a group’s historical disadvantage and lack of political power.Footnote 132
The 2007 Ontario Court of Appeal decision R v. Banks rejected poverty as a constitutionally protected class.Footnote 133 In that decision, a group of impecunious and unhoused persons challenged the constitutionality of a provincial law that prohibited individuals from soliciting money from drivers.Footnote 134 They argued that the provisions discriminated against panhandlers.Footnote 135 The court rejected that argument. The justices observed that panhandling is an activity rather than a constitutionally protected characteristic, and that impecunious persons are an amorphous group that are not akin to other grounds of discrimination.Footnote 136
Later, in the 2013 Superior Court of Ontario decision Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General) (Application), the Superior Court of Ontario rejected homelessness as an analogous ground of discrimination.Footnote 137 In Tanudjaja, the applicants alleged that the federal and provincial governments made certain decisions in the 1990s that decreased access to housing which adversely impacted unhoused persons’ fundamental interests.Footnote 138 One of the applicants was living on public property and in the shelter system.Footnote 139 The other three applicants were living in unaffordable and inadequate housing.Footnote 140 The claimants sought remedies that would require the provincial and federal governments to implement strategies and programs that reduce homelessness and improve access to housing.Footnote 141 They claimed that courts should exercise their supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the governments fulfil such positive obligations.Footnote 142
The court rejected their section 15 Charter argument and concluded that homelessness was not an analogous ground of discrimination for several reasons.Footnote 143 First, the court concluded that it was not possible to determine objectively who fell within the definition of “homelessness” for the purposes of the application.Footnote 144 The court noted that some of the applicants were unsheltered while others were living in inadequate or unaffordable housing.Footnote 145 Second, the court concluded that homelessness was not an immutable or constructively immutable personal characteristic akin to age, ethnicity, or gender, that could be determined by objective criteria.Footnote 146
2.5 Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Fifth, some contend that laws that regulate public property violate the Eighth Amendment because they impose cruel and unusual punishment on people experiencing homelessness.Footnote 147 In the United States, Eighth Amendment claims have been the most successful constitutional challenge to laws that govern public property. The Eighth Amendment limits the State’s criminal law power in three ways.Footnote 148 Notably, the cruel and unusual punishments clause limits the kinds of punishments that the State can impose, prohibits grossly disproportionate punishments, and imposes substantive limits on criminalization and punishment.Footnote 149 Most Eighth Amendment challenges to laws that govern public property fall into this third category. Some courts have decided that the State violates the Eighth Amendment when it punishes unhoused persons’ involuntary need-alleviating acts that stem from their involuntary condition of homelessness.Footnote 150
In the 1992 District Court decision Pottinger v. Miami discussed above, the court concluded that the State imposed a cruel and unusual punishment when it prohibited sleeping in public despite the lack of sufficient shelter spaces for the city’s unhoused population.Footnote 151 The court first concluded that homelessness was an involuntarily acquired condition due to factors such as lack of access to housing, financial hardship, and illness.Footnote 152 The court noted that unhoused persons had to sleep somewhere but did so on public property involuntarily because they lacked alternatives – involuntary conduct that was inseparable from their involuntary condition.Footnote 153 In the court’s view, the punishment was cruel and unusual because unhoused persons had no choice but to sleep on public property, violate the law, and face punishment.Footnote 154
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, where a municipal ordinance prohibited sleeping on the city’s streets, sidewalks, and public ways.Footnote 155 The offense was punishable by a $1,000 fine and/or six months’ imprisonment.Footnote 156 At the time, there were roughly 11,000–12,000 unhoused persons in Skid Row, Los Angeles, yet only 9,000–10,000 available spaces to accommodate the city’s unhoused population.Footnote 157 The court concluded that the ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment.Footnote 158 The majority observed that the defendants did not choose to live on the streets.Footnote 159 The evidentiary record showed that individuals experience homelessness due to a range of individual and structural factors as well as the lack of affordable housing in Los Angeles.Footnote 160 In the court’s view, the ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment because homelessness and the act of sleeping in public were both involuntary and inseparable from one another.Footnote 161 The holding in Jones was, however, vacated when the city reached a settlement with the defendants in 2007.Footnote 162
Lastly, in the 2018 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision Martin v. City of Boise, the majority of the court applied the principles set out in Pottinger and Jones to enjoin the city from enforcing an ordinance that prohibited camping on public property.Footnote 163 The court concluded that the ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment. Point-in-time counts showed that there were over 850 homeless people in Boise, yet roughly 350 homeless shelter spaces and an additional 92 overflow mats.Footnote 164 The majority of the court decided that the State cannot criminalize and punish unhoused persons who sleep, sit, or shelter themselves on public property when there are insufficient shelter spaces to accommodate them.Footnote 165 Other courts have arrived at similar conclusions in similar circumstances.Footnote 166
Despite these successes, courts may reject unhoused persons’ Eighth Amendment claims in other contexts. Eighth Amendment claims may not succeed when defendants challenge a law that comprehensively bans urban camping or sleeping on public property, yet they fail to establish a lack of available shelter space for the unhoused population.Footnote 167 In other cases, courts have rejected similar claims when the defendants did not prove that they applied for social or public assistance that could have secured access to housing.Footnote 168 Eighth Amendment claims may also fail when a municipal ordinance prohibits need-alleviating conduct through a time, place, or manner restriction rather than a comprehensive prohibition.Footnote 169
More recently, defendants have invoked the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause to challenge the severity of fines associated with laws that govern public property.Footnote 170 The clause “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense.”Footnote 171 The Excessive Fines Clause was incorporated into the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in the 2019 US Supreme Court decision Timbs v. Indiana.Footnote 172
Some of these challenges have succeeded. In the 2021 decision City of Seattle v. Long, the defendant was living in his truck, which he parked illegally.Footnote 173 The city impounded the vehicle, issued a $44 ticket, and charged him roughly $950 in impoundment fees.Footnote 174 The Washington Supreme Court decided that the seizure of the truck and the impoundment fee constituted an excessive fine that violated the Eighth Amendment.Footnote 175 Similarly, in the 2020 District Court decision Blake v. City of Grants Pass, a group of unhoused persons argued that an urban camping ban violated the Excessive Fines Clause.Footnote 176 The ordinances were punishable by a mandatory fine of $295 for urban camping, which increased to $537.60 if the fine was unpaid.Footnote 177 The court decided that the ordinances violated the Excessive Fines Clause because the financial penalty was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.Footnote 178 Although the Excessive Fines Clause is still in its early stages, it may play a greater role in invalidating unhoused persons’ excessive fines in the future.Footnote 179
In Canada, the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments has played virtually no role in striking down the financial penalties associated with laws that govern public property. Section 12 of the Canadian Charter prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.Footnote 180 In Canadian law, a punishment is cruel and unusual “if it is grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropriate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender … or if the law’s reasonably foreseeable applications will impose grossly disproportionate sentences on others.”Footnote 181 This latter portion of the test permits a law to be struck down if, according to a reasonable hypothetical, it would impose a cruel and unusual punishment on a hypothetical offender.Footnote 182 As the court explained in R v. Lloyd, gross disproportionality implies that “the punishment prescribed is so excessive as to outrage standards of decency” and is “abhorrent and intolerable.”Footnote 183
The Supreme Court of Canada has concluded that mandatory victim surcharges impose a cruel and unusual punishment that violates section 12 of the Charter.Footnote 184 Prior to the 2018 R v. Boudreault decision, individuals convicted of crimes were required to pay these surcharges, which funded services for victims of crime.Footnote 185 The victim surcharge was $100 for summary conviction offenses (the equivalent of misdemeanor offenses), and $200 for indictable offenses (the equivalent of felony offenses).Footnote 186 Due to the statutory scheme, judges could not modify or waive the quantum of the surcharge.Footnote 187
The Court struck down the mandatory surcharge for several reasons. The financial penalties ignored the defendant’s ability to pay, their level of culpability, and the potentially harmless nature of the offense that gave rise to a surcharge, such as breaching a probation order.Footnote 188 In the majority’s view, the surcharge imposed the equivalent of indeterminate sentences on impecunious individuals who could not afford to pay the fines.Footnote 189 Defendants who failed to pay the fine were also subject to civil collection efforts.Footnote 190 The justices also determined that the threat of detention and imprisonment loomed over those who could not afford to pay the surcharge.Footnote 191 Notably, police officers could detain individuals prior to committal hearings, which assessed their capacity to pay their fines.Footnote 192 For these reasons, the mandatory surcharge constituted a cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court of Canada recognizes that punishments tend to respect the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments when judges have the discretion to mitigate their severity.Footnote 193 Whereas mandatory minimum penalties result in excessive punishments, judicial discretion permits a judge to impose a proportionate penalty that respects section 12 of the Charter.Footnote 194 In Boudreault, the mandatory nature of the victim surcharge – and the lack of judicial discretion to mitigate or waive it – underpinned its cruel and unusual character.Footnote 195 In contrast, some provinces permit judges to waive or decrease the quantum of a fine – a safety valve that largely insulates financial penalties against successful section 12 Charter challenges.Footnote 196 For these reasons, section 12 Charter claims may also fail to protect unhoused persons against financial penalties that can be waived or reduced by judges.
The financial penalty scheme in other provinces may be vulnerable to section 12 Charter claims. Some provinces authorize judges to reduce the quantum of a fine to the minimum amount prescribed by law.Footnote 197 However, the minimum fine may still be excessive given a defendant’s financial capacities. Furthermore, even when judges have discretion to waive or decrease the quantum of a fine, unhoused persons may not contest them due to personal factors such as mental illness, substance use disorder, or unfamiliarity with the justice system.Footnote 198 They may still accumulate significant criminal justice debt from unpaid fines.Footnote 199
2.6 The Positive Right to Housing
Lastly, some have argued that the Constitution provides a positive right to housing.Footnote 200 US and Canadian courts have rejected this claim.Footnote 201 The US Supreme Court expressly rejected a positive right to housing in the 1972 decision Lindsey v. Normet.Footnote 202 In Lindsey, the claimants were renting a single family residence in Portland, Oregon, on a month-to-month basis.Footnote 203 The city declared their property unfit for habitation as a result of substandard living conditions.Footnote 204 The claimants then requested that the landlord make certain repairs to the property.Footnote 205 The landlord responded by making some of the requested repairs but not others.Footnote 206 The claimants subsequently refused to pay the next month’s rent until the landlord made the remaining repairs.Footnote 207
The landlord sought a court order to evict the tenant in accordance with Oregon’s Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Act.Footnote 208 Before the order was executed, the claimants challenged the statute’s constitutionality. They argued that it violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause and sought to enjoin the eviction order from being executed.Footnote 209 The claimants contended that the “need for decent shelter” and “the right to retain peaceful possession of one’s home” were fundamental rights.Footnote 210 They argued that the State could only limit those rights if justified by a compelling interest and narrowly tailored means to achieve the State’s objective.Footnote 211 The majority of the Court disagreed.Footnote 212 Although the Court recognized the importance of housing, they concluded that the Constitution’s wording provided no affirmative right to housing.Footnote 213
The 2014 Ontario Court of Appeal decision Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General) declined to recognize a positive right to housing.Footnote 214 The majority of the justices cited Supreme Court of Canada precedent that rejected a freestanding right to healthcare.Footnote 215 They noted that existing Supreme Court of Canada decisions have not affirmed a positive State duty to ensure that individuals enjoy the section 7 Canadian Charter right to life, liberty, and security of the person.Footnote 216 They also observed that the court would usurp the legislator’s function if it judicially reviewed the government’s public policy approach to homelessness without a constitutional challenge to a particular law or policy.Footnote 217
To be clear, positive economic and social rights have not been foreclosed entirely in Canada.Footnote 218 The Supreme Court of Canada noted that the State may have some positive duties to allocate resources or entitlements in certain contexts, even though such contexts have not yet been recognized.Footnote 219 Similarly, in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Tanudjaja, the majority of the court noted that the Supreme Court of Canada left open the possibility that the State may have positive duties to remedy Charter rights violations in certain contexts.Footnote 220
There are different reasons why courts are reticent to constitutionalize a right to housing that is not provided expressly in the Constitution. First, some courts worry that the recognition of justiciable positive rights erodes the separation of powers.Footnote 221 According to this argument, courts would usurp the functions of other branches of government by second-guessing their priorities and public policy decisions.Footnote 222 Furthermore, some scholars note that the recognition of positive rights raises democratic legitimacy concerns.Footnote 223 Namely, few unelected justices can override the complex public policy decisions made by many democratically elected lawmakers.Footnote 224 Some note that this is problematic because lawmakers are more representative of the population’s diversity compared to judges.Footnote 225 Second, some courts observe that the judiciary lacks the institutional competence to implement or supervise redistributive schemes that involve complex public policy concerns.Footnote 226 Courts lack the information-gathering capacities that other branches of government have.Footnote 227 They also lack the expertise to devise or enforce complicated schemes whose implementation affects other public policy areas.Footnote 228 Finally, courts are concerned that they cannot devise a concrete threshold for what constitutes “adequate” housing and ensure that the government respects that standard.Footnote 229 For these types of reasons, courts have rejected a positive right to housing in the United States and Canada.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided an overview of how US and Canadian constitutional law approach homelessness and the regulation of public property. It analyzed the principal constitutional challenges to municipal ordinances that govern need-alleviating conduct and highlighted their limitations. It demonstrated how constitutional claims fail to protect unhoused persons against various forms of actual and threatened interference associated with these laws, such as displacement, fines, arrests, and imprisonment. This chapter also explained how US and Canadian courts have thus far rejected a positive right to housing that would safeguard individuals against such forms of actual and threatened interference.
The next chapter explores how legal theorists have analyzed the relationship between homelessness, liberty, and property from the standpoint of two theories of freedom: positive and negative. Subsequent parts of this book highlight how these theories provide an important – but limited – understanding of this relationship, and overlook how unhoused persons face different forms of domination that undermine their freedom and equality.
