This is a well-written, scholarly account of the 1918 climactic westfront battle of the Great War, Second Marne, roughly July 15 to August 8, 1918. It is fitted into a description of the entire 152 days of fighting between March 21 and August 8, 1918, the so-called German “Spring Offensive,” which directly threatened Paris for the second time in World War I.

The author intends this to be a revisionist image of the French Army and especially of its commander, Ferdinand Foch. The conclusion, entitled “Honoring Foch,” argues that the French Army of 1918 did not just peter out in mutinies and dishonor, but led a strong resurgence against the last gasp of the German Army, turning the tide once and for all and leading—painfully, slowly, and with horrendous casualties—to Germany's call for terms and the armistice of November 11, 1918. And it argues that Foch was largely responsible. Neiberg's rationale is that French historians from 1919 to 1940 correctly described a successful, even triumphant, French Army as the senior partner in the Allied victory in World War I. This image disappeared, however, following the German invasion of May 1940, the French humiliation at Dien Bien Phu (1954), the failed Suez venture (1956), and the divisive war in Algeria (1961–67). Thereafter, Neiberg argues, a whole generation of French historians turned against France's martial past: they came to see it as a lie.

This was particularly true for World War I. By rereading the primary sources, Neiburg found a discrepancy between the earlier successful image and the later failed one. He discovered that a tired, worn-out, and dejected French Army does not appear in the primary source accounts of the Second Marne. Instead, British and American soldiers who fought alongside the French were full of admiration and praise. Neiberg concluded that something else must have been going on. What he had found was a classic situation in historiography. As Louis Gottschalk wrote, “the past, having happened, had perished forever, with only occasional traces.” Attempts at reconstructing Second Marne initially got it right, but this original image was then badly derailed by the impact of later events.

It appears that Nieberg has got something here. Foch and his armies do deserve better than they received from French historians of “the generation of 1968.” Moreover, the author gives valid credit to the entry of the Americans into combat. Noting that this is the subject of much debate, he emphasizes the paucity of research: this is clearly a work in progress. It is also worth noting, however, that the quality of the German Army had changed substantially by the spring offensive of 1918. It was much smaller and much younger than before. It traveled virtually without supplies, “living off the land.” Thus it was undernourished, racked with disease and sleeplessness, and only reinforced by such troops as those who had spent most of the war as Russian POWs. In short, a poor match for the reorganized, revitalized, and revived French Army. As Hans Delbrueck wrote in spring 1918, the German Army had no business going on the offensive at that point in the war: Germany badly needed to make peace.

Furthermore, as the Germans advanced, they got progressively weaker, while their three opponents got progressively stronger. The further the Germans advanced, the fewer resources they had, of men, equipment, leadership, supplies, and morale. The obverse was true for the Allies, who gained as the Germans lost momentum. Allied intelligence, for example, became so good that by the fifth German attack, begun July 10, the Allies knew the exact time of the opening German barrage, and ten minutes before it was scheduled to begin, the French, Americans, and British began their own barrage, which numbed and shook the Germans, accustomed to taking the initiative. By that time, the Germans fought without tanks, anti-tank guns, or food: they were hungry and demoralized. A week later, as the Allied counterattack moved five miles through German lines, more than half of the 37,000 German “casualties” were neither wounded nor killed: they had surrendered.

So the situation of Second Marne, and indeed of the final nine months of that dreadful war, is the bleeding out of the German Army, fated with poor political and military leadership right from the war's start, coming up against the revived and reenergized French and British forces, aided by American reinforcements pouring into France at the rate of 270,000 per month from May to July 1918. Foch does deserve the credit he once received for leading the battle of the Second Marne; however, the natural weaknesses and disastrous attrition of a greatly depleted German Army in the final year of a national bloodbath must also be taken into account. If all the German dead had been buried at home as they died, Germany would have had roughly 1,300 funerals per day for each of the 1,560 days of World War I.

The Second Battle of the Marne is clearly and poignantly written and based throughout on the most recent research. The spirited writing is supported by six excellent maps and twenty-eight well-captioned photographs.