Mysticism is not a popular term in most scholarship these days. Most scholars use it as a synonym for obscurantism and works that lack a clear rational argument. V. is well aware of this and draws attention to the popular misuse of (and misconceptions about) mysticism several times in this book. His main argument is that Western mysticism is a coherent philosophical tradition which goes back to Plato and Plotinus. In the preface he defines it as ‘direct cognition of a transcendent reality beyond the division of subject and object’ (p. 3). Mysticism entails an experience beyond the everyday boundaries of subject, object and other dualities of language in order to access a more primordial realm that transcends them and so is frequently referred to as divine. V. proceeds to outline the development of mysticism, starting from Dionysius the Areopagite (pp. 4–5), who in turn relied on Plotinus (pp. 6–8) and Plato to turn mystical teaching into a Christian form.
Chapter 1 explores the beginning of the tradition in Plato's dialogues (Phaedrus and Symposium) and Plotinus’ developments (on this see now D.J. Yount, Plato and Plotinus on Mysticism, Epistemology, and Ethics [2017]) and highlights Dionysius’ problems with the mainstream Christian tradition and its dualities (God–believer, heaven–hell etc.). The problem of historical influence makes an appearance with Meister Eckhart, and V. proposes the concept of ‘ahistorical continuity’ (p. 17) to caution that essential traits of mysticism can appear even if one has never read any Plato or Plotinus. He makes a good argument for the via negativa (the negation of all sensory and metaphorical instruments in describing the transcendent) as essential in the work of thinkers described in this chapter: John Scotus Eriugena, Nicholas of Cusa, Meister Eckhart, Marguerite Porete, Simon Tugwell, Henry More, Ralph Waldo Emerson, C.G. Jung and Mircea Eliade.
Chapter 2 charts the modern scholarship on mysticism from the nineteenth century onwards. Many early scholars describe mysticism as a form of Christianity with clear Platonic origins, but soon a new stream appears which sees it as derived from individual psychological experience, ‘in a flash’ rather than engagement with tradition. One of the prominent figures in the latter camp was Evelyn Underhill, whose expansive body of work was particularly influential in shifting the stress from the Platonic to the individual. V. finds that her thinking in fact owes a great deal to Platonism and that her effort to deny this is a result of a conflict between confessional, doctrinal Christianity and the mystical tradition. Chapter 3 describes the subsequent eclipse of the Platonic in writings on mysticism. Authors such as Franklin Merrell-Wolff or Aldous Huxley increasingly stress the oriental currents of mysticism, and in the 1960s and 70s it is used as a comparative category that cuts across the barriers of traditional religions. Soon, mysticism is a ‘floating signifier’ used to describe all kinds of religious experience. V. finds that this is a consequence of a general anti-Platonic current in modern academia, which he links to the prevalence of Marxism and a modern materialistic perspective (the former seems to me rather a reaction against the latter). As an example he singles out the work of Richard Rorty, who is famous for his philosophy of scepticism and rejection of Platonists. It is clear that most postmodern theories cannot accommodate mysticism, but when it comes to Platonic mysticism, I wonder how much of the rejection goes back to older antagonisms, the Aristotelian origins of sciences and humanities (especially the subject–object divide) and his criticism of Plato. In any case, it may be curious to observe that in this respect academia seems to have taken a turn from a spiritual (at the beginning of the university) to a predominantly materialist focus.
Chapter 4 explores what V. calls ‘externalist fallacy’ (p. 78), the notion that religion can be studied only by those who are not its adherents. He makes a good case for the study of religion from the inside and argues it is paradoxical to deny esotericism an approach from the inside as the very notion depends on insider knowledge. Many will find it difficult to accept an insider's approach to religion, but V. does manage to show that the most ardent critics of mysticism (supposedly outside) are more biased than insiders because of their (usually mainstream Christian) beliefs and preconceptions on the topic. A salient example of anti-mystical scholarship is Daniel Dubuisson's criticism of Mircea Eliade's work, a most welcome apologia for the study of comparative religion.
Chapter 5 seeks to present ways in which literature can be read as mystical in the sense that it points to the One as inherent in both the knower and the known, blurs boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and enables a nondualistic empathy. Northrop Frye features prominently because of his division of types of literature based on levels of unity in the work from ‘total metaphorical identification’ to ‘isolated objects’. Here mystical subjectivity comes to the fore as V. admits his belief that the concept of divine inspiration in creativity comes from the artist's ability to convey the ‘realm beyond us’ (p. 97). Blake, Yates and Rilke are used as examples.
Chapter 6 tackles directly the relationship between oriental mysticism and its western counterpart. Elements of similarity between Buddhism and Platonic traditions are apparent, and the Catholic monk Willigis Jäger, who combines the two in his work, makes for a practical contemporary example.
Chapter 7 addresses the subject of transcendent art. The requirements are not strict: ‘by observing it, we participate in it, and that participation is also exaltation beyond our limited self’ (p. 122). Examples refer mostly to works of the Italian and the American Renaissance.
The conclusion ties the threads of the book together and disputes most cognitive approaches to religion because they ignore the special place of mysticism (in which there is no personified ‘agent’). V. proposes we should consider abandoning the traditional label of ‘religion’ because mysticism is in fact defined as what it is not, it is by its very nature apophatic.
Aristotle famously said that nothing should be defined by negation, which brings us back to the opposition between mysticism and Aristotelian origins of modern science (unexplored in the book): the objectification of the thing under investigation is a methodology shared by sciences and humanities, which makes mysticism difficult to accommodate because it blends subject and object. Another subject that merits more discussion is the conflict between mainstream Christianity and mysticism (which is frequently referred to). John of the Cross is referenced several times; it is interesting that he, along with several other mystics (e.g. Catherine of Siena and Theresa of Avila), received the venerable title ‘doctor of the Church’ though Roman Catholics are not usually encouraged to follow the devotion of these figures. To be fair, V. makes it clear that his task is not to survey every single figure but to show the Platonic and Dionysian current running through Western mysticism. The book is clearly successful in this aim and makes for a short and readable account of Western mysticism with a stress on its Classical roots. The endnotes point to further scholarship in which the present study is well situated. The only typo that caught my eye is Plato's τὸ ἕν misspelled as τοεν (p. 11), a blend that may curiously fit the metaphysical implications of the concept.
