The Question at Stake

Is Origen of Alexandria the inventor of the eschatological doctrine of apokatastasis— of the eventual return of all creatures to the Good, that is, God, and thus universal salvation? Certainly, he is one of its chief supporters in all of history, and he is, as far as we know, the first to have maintained it in a complete and coherent way, so that all of his philosophy of history, protology, and anthropology is oriented toward this telos.Footnote ¹ There are, however, significant antecedents to his mature and articulate theorization, at least some of which he surely knew very well, and there is even a possible parallel. For this conception did not appear ex nihilo, but in a cultural context rich in suggestions and premises, and in a philosophical framework of lively discussions concerning fate, free will, theodicy, and the eternal destiny of rational creatures.

Premises in Early Christian Apocrypha: Intercession, Postmortem Conversion, and Christ's Role

I shall argue that a few early Christian apocryphaFootnote ² are extremely significant for understanding the background to Origen's concept of apokatastasis. The most important of these are above all the Apocalypse of Peter and the Sibylline Oracles, in addition to the Apocalypse of Elijah, the Epistula Apostolorum, and the Life of Adam and Eve. Some of these works were well known to both Origen and Clement of AlexandriaFootnote ³ and were considered by them to be inspired writings. Thus, even though these texts do not present a full-blown theory of universal salvation, they are likely to have constituted a common ground and source of inspiration for the development of the doctrine of apokatastasis.

The Apocalypse of Peter (Apoc. Pet.),Footnote ⁴ which was probably read in a liturgical context, attests to the doctrine of the intercession of the blessed for the damned in the eschatological scene, a conception that returns, in almost identical terms, in the Apocalypse of Elijah and in the Epistula Apostolorum. The Apoc. Pet. seems to be particularly ancient, as its Christology is extremely archaicFootnote ⁵: It can be placed in an Alexandrian or Egyptian milieu, ca. 100–135 c.e., according to Müller.Footnote ⁶ According to Norelli,Footnote ⁷ it may represent an important oral tradition independent of those of the canonical Gospels. As Heinrich Weinel observed, the Jewish Antichrist who persecutes Christians mentioned in chapter 2 may be an allusion to Bar Kochba.Footnote ⁸ The dating of the Apocalypse to the Bar Kochba war is upheld by a number of scholars,Footnote ⁹ although not by all.Footnote ¹⁰ James supposed that the Apoc. Pet. might be as ancient as that of John.Footnote ¹¹ In any case, the Apoc. Pet. is the earliest Christian document to describe the kingdoms of the other world with its attendant rewards and punishments.Footnote ¹² Its terminology is specifically Judaic, and so is the use of “just” in reference to the good and the blessed, which comes as no surprise given the connection of this document to the tradition attached to Peter, who in Rome introduced Christianity ritu Iudaico according to Ambrosiaster.Footnote ¹³ The presence of this Petrine tradition in Egypt in an early period is also related to the Egyptian tradition of Mark, Peter's disciple and “interpreter” (ἑρμηνευτήϛ).Footnote ¹⁴ An Egyptian origin of the Apoc. Pet. would explain: 1) the reference in it to Egyptian elements, above all the Egyptian cult of animals (e.g., cat and reptile idols); 2) the synthesis of Jewish and Orphic traditions (and, I would add, Platonic traditions, given the allusions to the Phaedo that I shall mention shortly), which, as Jan Bremmer posits, most likely took place in Alexandria;Footnote ¹⁵ 3) the mention of the angel Tartaroukhos, unattested in classical literature but occurring in a Cypriote and an Egyptian tablet;Footnote ¹⁶ 4) Clement of Alexandria's knowledge of the text shortly after its composition, and echoes of it in the Passio Perpetuae;Footnote ¹⁷ and 5) the presence of both Jewish and Hellenistic motifs, such as the use of the term “just” and allusions to PlatoFootnote ¹⁸ respectively, which seems to me to point to Hellenistic Judaism (compare Philo) and to Alexandria in particular. Not only did Clement know the Apoc. Pet., but he also considered it an inspired writing, like those of the New Testament. For this reason he commented on it in his Hypotyposeis, as attested by Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 6.14.1), who states that in this work Clement commented on all the books of the New Testament, “without omitting… the so-called Apocalypse of Peter.”Footnote ¹⁹ It is probable that Origen too considered this document to be very authoritative.

Several elements in the Apoc. Pet. are relevant to our question and can be seen as premises of the doctrine of apokatastasis. One such element is Christ's descensus ad inferos,Footnote ²⁰ which is well attested in “Petrine” texts such as 1 Pet 3:19–21—where Christ is said to have announced salvation even to the wicked who had perished in the flood and are a type (τύποϛ) of the non-baptized—and the Gospel of Peter, datable to the second century like the Apoc. Pet. Another element is the emptying of Hades, related to the descensus; a third is the idea that spiritual development is always possible, even in the other world.Footnote ²¹ Most important, however, is the notion of the final salvation of sinners together with the blessed, so that, after a longer or shorter period of suffering in the afterlife, sinners too will be able to enjoy communion with God and the saints, thanks to their own conversion after death or to the intercession of the blessed on their behalf. Moreover, in Ecl. 48 Clement quotes a passage from the Apoc. Pet., ascribing it to Peter himself (“Peter in his Apocalypse says that…”) and at 41 he even quotes a section from this Apocalypse assigning it to “Scripture” (“Scripture says that…”), just as Methodius, an author deeply influenced by Clement and Origen, did a century later in Symp. 2.6 (“It has been handed down to us in divinely inspired Scriptures that…”). Since the passages corresponding to Clement's and Methodius's quotations are also found in the Ethiopic translation of the Apoc. Pet., which constitutes its widest recension,Footnote ²² we can conclude with certainty that they actually belong to the Apoc. Pet.Footnote ²³

In the Ethiopic text, Christ affirms that he personally baptizes and saves and endows with eternal life those for whom he is supplicated, even after their death, and he says that he will be happy to do so: “Then I shall give to those who belong to me, the elect and justified, the bath and the salvation for which they have implored me, in the Acherusian valley, called Elysian Fields, and I shall go and rejoice together with them.Footnote ²⁴ I shall have the peoples enter my eternal Kingdom, and I shall do for them that which I and my heavenly Father had promised them.”Footnote ²⁵ The parallel Greek Rainer fragment, which is far more ancient than the Ethiopic version and dates to the third century,Footnote ²⁶ runs as follows: “I shall grant to my summoned and elect all those whom they ask me to remove from punishment [παρήσομαι τοῖϛ κλητοῖϛ μου καὶ ἐκλεκτοῖϛ μου ὃν ἐὰν αἰτήσωνταί με ἐκ τῆϛ κολάσεωϛ]. And I shall grant them a beautiful baptism in salvation [καλὸν βάπτισμα ἐν σωτηρίᾳ] in the Acherusian Lake, which is said to be in the Elysian valley, a sharing of justice and justification with my saints [μέροϛ δικαιοσύνηϛ μετὰ τῶν ἁγίων μου]. And I and my elect will go and rejoice together with the Patriarchs in my eternal Kingdom [καὶ ἀπελεύσομαι ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἐκλεκτοί μου ἀγαλλιῶντεϛ μετὰ τῶν πατριάρχων εἰϛ τὴν αἰωνίαν μου βασιλείαν], and with them I shall keep my promises, made by me and by my Father who is in heaven [καὶ ποιήσω μετ’ αὐτῶν τὰϛ ἐπαγγελίαϛ μου ἃϛ ἐπαγγειλάμην ἐγὼ καὶ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν τοῖϛ οὐρανοῖϛ].”Footnote ²⁷ The Ethiopic text is secondary, and it is significant that precisely in the passage corresponding to the Rainer fragment it plainly underwent modifications, in all probability due to the fact that the reviser tried to eliminate the patent reference to the salvation of the damned (and, according to some scholars, even universal salvation).Footnote ²⁸ However, these are all limited modifications, which did not prevent scholars from recognizing the original version even before the discovery of the Rainer fragment.Footnote ²⁹ The mention of the Acherusian Lake as a place passing through which the sinners will obtain salvation in the afterworld is remarkable because, even in such an early text, it is a clear reference to Plato's Phaedo. In Phaedo 113D—which is, notably, included in Eusebius's lengthy quotation—the sinners are said to be purified in the Acherusian Lake, which frees them (ἀπολύω) through expiation; in the Rainer fragment, this very lake is present and functions in the very same way.Footnote ³⁰

The Ethiopic translation of the Apoc. Pet., being complete, helps us to place the valuable Rainer fragment in context. In chapter 12 the description of the sinners' torments ends with the river of fire creating a wheel which will “turn numberless times.” Chapter 13 states that the just watch the punishment of the damned, which is described as “eternal,” but the Greek Vorlage surely had the scriptural expression κόλασιϛ αἰώνιοϛ, indicating not an “eternal” punishment, but rather, one that lasts for an indefinite period in the world to come.Footnote ³¹ The conclusion of chapter 13, in fact, runs as follows: “The aiōnios punishment is for each one according to his or her deeds.… The angel Tartaroukhos will come and instruct them with punishment, telling them: ‘You repent now that there is no time left for repentance, and you have no life left.’ And they all will say: ‘God's judgment is right. We have heard and known that his judgment is good, because we have paid each one according to his/her actions.’ ” The “aiōnios punishment” is the ultra-mundane punishment, not the eternal punishment, and its aim is therapeutic and pedagogical, a conception that is stressed in Clement, Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa.Footnote ³² Although some passages in the Apoc. Pet. speak of “eternal” punishment for the damned, in chapter 14 Jesus unequivocally announces their final salvation. There is no contradiction here, however, since behind the Ethiopic “eternal” stands the Greek αἰώνιοϛ,Footnote ³³ which in the biblical lexicon signifies “eternal” only when it refers to God; otherwise it means “ancient,” “remote,” “enduring,” “divine, heavenly” or “pertaining to the future world.”Footnote ³⁴ The adjective αἰώνιοϛ for punishment and fire and future death, both in the Bible and in the Apoc. Pet., does not imply their absolute eternity and does not contradict the salvation of the damned expressed in chapter 14. Already at the beginning of Jesus' revelation to Peter (chs. 3–4), when Peter, worrying about the sinners' fate, says to Jesus: “O my Lord, please permit me to quote your own words concerning these sinners, namely, ‘Better if they had never been created,’ ” Jesus immediately reminds him of God's mercy: “O Peter, why do you say that not having been created would have been better for them? It is you who oppose God in this way! But you certainly do not have more mercy than God has, who created them.” If Peter pities the damned, but God is said to have even more mercy than Peter has, it is already possible to foresee an outcome of salvation. Immediately after this, Jesus, who is about to speak of the eschatological perspective, tells Peter, who is worrying about the damned, that “there is nothing that perishes for God, nothing that is impossible for him” (4.5).Footnote ³⁵ In 5.8–9, infernal punishment is described through traditional images employed in the Gospels, such as the “fire that cannot be put out” (πῦρ ἄσβεστον) and the “gnashing of teeth.” These punishments are evidently not deemed to be opposed to the eventual salvation of the damned anticipated in chapters 3–4 and proclaimed in chapter 14, where it is asserted that Jesus will pull the damned out of the torments. This is all the more remarkable in that the Apoc. Pet. is a coherent text, endowed with a strong unity;Footnote ³⁶ already at the beginning we find hints of the notion of the salvation of the damned.

The fundamental role of Jesus as Savior of the sinners is evident when he liberates them from the torments and plunges them into the Acherusian Lake. This is why as early as 3.5 he is called “the Savior” in the discussion concerning the ultimate fate of sinners. The cross that precedes him on his Parousia in 1.6 indicates the salvific power of Christ's sacrifice, which will be revealed only in the eschatological scene. This is thus not in sharp contrast with passages such as 6.6: “They will prepare for them a place where they will be punished ‘eternally,’ each one in conformity to his own sin,” where the Greek had αἰωνίωϛ, “indefinitely, in the world to come”; 6.9: “They will be burnt together with them in the ‘eternal’ fire… they will punish them ‘eternally,’ ” where the underlying Greek was the New Testament expression πῦρ αἰώνιον, the fire of the world to come, which lasts indefinitely, αἰωνίωϛ, and 7.8: “We didn't know that we were to come to the ‘eternal’ punishment,” where the Greek Vorlage surely had κόλασιϛ αἰώνιοϛ, the only biblical phrase that corresponds—for there exists no κόλασιϛ ἀξ03ΧΑ; διοϛ (eternal punishment) in the Bible, no θάνατοϛ ἀξ03ΧΑ; διοϛ (eternal death), no πῦρ ἀξ03ΧΑ; διον (eternal fire).Footnote ³⁷

The Ethiopic translation of the Apoc. Pet. is found within the Ethiopic version of the Pseudo-Clementines,Footnote ³⁸ in which a long dialogue between Peter and Jesus is entirely devoted to the problem of sinners' salvation (139rb–144rb). The result is the final salvation of sinnersFootnote ³⁹ after their torments. In this case, it is Jesus himself who intercedes for them, rather than the blessed. Peter asks Jesus to reveal to him the fate of the sinners on the last day and is upset at the thought of the second death (139rb–140ra). Jesus answers that sinners will not repent if they understand (140ra), that is, if they know that they will eventually be saved in any way. This is an idea that Origen, who read and knew the Apoc. Pet., would develop: he was convinced that awareness of universal salvation might facilitate sin, especially in morally immature persons who need to be motivated by fear in order to do good. (Origen expresses this concern several times and says that it is better to believe in eternal damnation and repent than not to believe in it and remain in sin.Footnote ⁴⁰) Peter intervenes as a defender, observing that he is the first sinner because he denied the Lord three times (140rab). Jesus replies that it will be up to the Father to grant mercy (140rb–140vb): “Because the mercy of my Father is like this: as the sun rises and the rain falls in the same way, so shall we have mercy and compassion for all of our creatures” (140rb). When Peter asks him to speak clearly, Jesus answers that upon his return he will destroy the devil and severely punish the sinners (140vb–141vb). Peter then expresses his concern about the “second death” consisting in other-worldly punishment for sinners (141vb), but Jesus replies: “You will have no more mercy on the sinners than I do, for I was crucified because of the sinners, in order to obtain mercy for them by my Father.” The Lord will have mercy upon them and will give each of them “life, glory, and kingdom without end,” in that Jesus will intercede for them, but this ought to be kept secret, in order not to provoke sin (141vb–142bv). This was a real concern, which must have been felt also by those who believed in the ultimate salvation of all.Footnote ⁴¹

Peter thanks Jesus for the explanation and says that he now can believe without doubting any more, after knowing that only Satan and the demons will descend to Sheol (143vb–144ra). Peter concludes by describing the various orders of saved humanity according to Paul's words in 1 Cor 15, on which Origen comments as well: “each one in his/her own order.” This dialogue is reported by Peter to Clement with the recommendation to keep this mystery secret: truth concerning the ultimate salvation of the damned should not be communicated overtly, because this might encourage sin.

Thus, the Apoc. Pet. seems to have been a good basis for the doctrine of apokatastasis, even though it does not yet maintain it expressly, and it certainly was known to both Clement and Origen. Moreover, it stresses the indispensable role of Christ's sacrifice in the final restoration of the sinners, an important trait that will be emphasized by Origen, according to whom the apokatastasis is made possible by Christ's cross.

But the Apoc. Pet. is not the only ancient “apocryphal” text that contains such suggestions. Other texts, some of which depend on it, express a similar idea of intercession for the damned, which paves the way for their salvation. The Coptic Apocalypse of Elijah, a text that is related to Jewish apocalypticismFootnote ⁴² and likewise derives from the Egyptian region, dating to the second or third century c.e., includes a passage that bears a close resemblance to the conception expressed by the Rainer fragment. Here it is the just, already blessed, who intercede for sinners,Footnote ⁴³ just as in a text of apostolic tradition which originated in Syria in the first decades of the second century,Footnote ⁴⁴ the Epistula Apostolorum 40.Footnote ⁴⁵ Another example is the second book of the Oracula Sibyllina,Footnote ⁴⁶ which derives from the Apoc. Pet. and dates to the mid-second century. (The first two books of the Oracula are closely connected to one another and are Christian).Footnote ⁴⁷ The Oracula are well known in early Patristics and are quoted by Justin, Clement, and Origen.Footnote ⁴⁸ They contain a paraphrase of a long section of the Apoc. Pet. in Greek hexameters. Indeed, some editors include Oracula 2.190–338 as an appendix to the Apoc. Pet.Footnote ⁴⁹

The context of the relevant portion of the Oracula is eschatological. Soon after describing the terrible torments of the damned, which are abundantly represented in the Apoc. Pet. as well, the Oracula depict the dwelling place of the blessed.Footnote ⁵⁰ Immediately after comes the relevant passage (2.330–38): “And to these pious persons immortal and omnipotent God will grant another gift: when they will ask him, he will grant them to save the human beings from the fierce fire, and from the αἰώνιοϛ gnashing of teeth, and will do so after having pulled them out of the imperishable flame and removed them, destining them, for the sake of his own elect, to the other life, that of the world to come, for immortals [ἀπὸ ϕλογὸϛ ἀκαμάτοιο ἄλλοσ’ ἀποστήσαϛ πέμψει διὰ λαὸν ἑαυτοῦ εἰϛ ζωὴν ἑτέραν καὶ αἰώνιον ἀθανάτοισιν], in the Elysian Fields, where there are the long waves of the Acherusian Lake, imperishable, which has a deep bed.”Footnote ⁵¹ The correspondence with the Rainer fragment of the Apoc. Pet. is striking. Moreover, it is remarkable that the intercession of the just frees the damned not from purgatory, a subsequent theological construction, but from hell itself, according to its evangelical description (gnashing of teeth, unquenchable flame, etc.). It is significant that in the manuscript tradition, in correspondence to this fundamental passage, some iambic verses of uncertain date protest against the doctrine of apokatastasis that their author found expressed here and rightly connect this passage to Origen's doctrine.Footnote ⁵² The closeness of these passages in the Apoc. Pet. and the Sibylline Oracles to Origen's doctrine is patent, and I deem it probable that such texts influenced the Alexandrian theologian in the elaboration of his hypothesis.

Another apocryphal text is very interesting in this connection. In the Greek recension of the Life of Adam and Eve 37.3–6,Footnote ⁵³ Adam is forgiven by his Lord and brought into heaven before the Final Judgment, for which he waits together with Eve. He is washed three times by a seraph and is introduced by Michael into paradise. In this way, the text indicates that even after death, and even for the original sinners, it is possible to obtain forgiveness and salvation. Above all, in a Latin codexFootnote ⁵⁴ that is particularly close to the Greek text, God assures that in the end he will have mercy on all, by way and for the sake of his Son. He addresses these words to Michael: “Put him [Adam] in Paradise, in the third heaven, until the day of dispensation, which is called oikonomia, when I shall have mercy upon all, through my most beloved Child” (pone eum [Adam] in Paradiso in tertio caelo, usque in diem dispensationis qui dicitur economia, quando faciam omnibus misericordiam per dilectissimum Filium meum). The term omnibus is particularly relevant, since in the documents I have analyzed so far it is not expressly stated that all the damned will be saved, whereas here it is said that God's mercy will be bestowed upon all.Footnote ⁵⁵ Here, as in the Apoc. Pet., the central role of Christ in universal salvation is manifest (per dilectissimum filium); this core idea is shared by Origen, who ascribes to Christ a crucial function in the apokatastasis, as I think should be stressed.Footnote ⁵⁶ By way of example, I limit myself to quoting one significant text, Comm. Rom. 4.10, from which it is clear that Origen has the apokatastasis depend on Christ, and in particular on his sacrifice: “I declare that the power and effectiveness of Christ's cross and of this death of his are so great as to be enough to set right and save, not only the present and the future aeon, but also all the past ones, and not only this order of us humans, but also the heavenly orders and powers.”Footnote ⁵⁷ In Cels. 8.72, too, it is Christ-Logos who determines the apokatastasis, which is made possible by the complete elimination of evil: “The Logos is more powerful than any illness that may exist in the souls: he applies to everyone the necessary therapy, according to God's will, and the end (τέλοϛ) of all will consist in the elimination of evil.”

Antecedents in Clement: Pedagogical Perspective and the Ubiquitousness of God's Providence

Seeds of the theory of apokatastasis were already present in the writing of Clement of Alexandria,Footnote ⁵⁸ who, as I mentioned, knew at least the Apoc. Pet. and considered it inspired just like the other texts that subsequently constituted the canonical New Testament. Clement, who, like Origen, stressed each human's free will and responsibility,Footnote ⁵⁹ insisted on the pedagogical and therapeutic value of all suffering inflicted by GodFootnote ⁶⁰ and on God's salvific will and providence for each and every creature (πρὸϛ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου σωτηρίαν τῷ τῶν ὅλων Κυρίῳ πάντα ἐστὶ διατεταγμένα καὶ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρουϛ), since “God is good and from eternity and eternally saves through his Son” and “the task of salvific justice is to lead each being to what is better” (Strom. 7.2.12; see also 1.17.86.1–2). This is why the necessary instructions (παιδεύσειϛ) are not retributive punishments, but are inflicted by God out of goodness (ἀγαθότητι), not only in preliminary judgments, but also in the final judgment, and “they force even those who are extremely hardened to convert” (ἐκβιάζονται μετανοεῖν) (Strom. 7.2.12). Indeed, according to Clement, salvific repentance (μετάνοια) is always possible, “both here on earth and on the other side,” because God's goodness operates absolutely everywhere (Strom. 4.6.37.7; see also 6.6.45–47). Clement states that God's providence operates in two ways, either through good deeds or through punishment, but the end of both is salvation through conversion from evil to virtue (Strom. 1.17.173).

Moreover, as will be the case in Origen's thought, the main agent of this salvific providence is Christ-Logos, who always “encourages, admonishes, saves” (Protr. 1.6.2; see also 9.87.6). Above all, in Strom. 2.22.134.4 Clement, on the basis of Rom 6:22, identifies the “end” (τέλοϛ) with life in the other world (ζωὴ αἰώνιοϛ) and expressly affirms that Paul teaches that this end is the hoped-for apokatastasis (τέλοϛ διδάσκει τὴν τῆϛ ἐλπίδοϛ ἀποκατάστασιν). In 7.10.57.1–4, moreover, he describes the apokatastasis as the passage from unbelief to faith and from faith to knowledge (γνῶσιϛ), which yields love (ἀγάπη)—which will be closely related to apokatastasis by Origen as well—and leads to the restoration, explicitly named ἀποκατάσασιϛ and described as peace and rest (ἀνάπαυσιϛ).Footnote ⁶¹ Indeed, in 7.10.56.2–5 Clement explains that the apokatastasis, which he nominally mentions again, will come after the necessary purification of all our sins through a “salvific instruction (παίδευσιϛ)”; then we shall enjoy “the apokatastasis in eternal contemplation.” To be sure, Clement did not develop a consistent and thorough theory of apokatastasis, but all this clearly paved the way to the theory of universal salvation.

If Origen drew inspiration from Clement for his conception of the apokatastasis, Clement and Origen seem to me to have been inspired by Philo, although Philo did not believe in universal salvation.Footnote ⁶² In Her. 293 Philo interprets Gen 15:16 (τετάρτῃ δὲ γενεᾷ ἀποστραϕήσονται ὧδε) allegorically, observing that this was said “in order to present the perfect restoration of the soul” (ὑπὲρ τοῦ τελείαν ἀποκατάστασιν ψυχῆϛ παραστῆσαι), that is, its return to its original perfection, unsullied by sins. In fact, as Philo explains in 293–99, at the beginning it is like a wax tablet without any mark, but soon it begins to acquire evils (κακά), sins (ἁμαρτήματα), and passions (πάθη). This requires the intervention of philosophy in its therapeutic function (ἰατρικὴ ϕιλοσοϕία) with its reasoning bringing about health (λόγοιϛ ὑγιεινοῖϛ καὶ σωτηρίοιϛ). As a result, vigor and strength grow in the soul, which will be steadfast in all virtues. This is the apokatastasis of the soul, which, from sin, returns to its original purity (ἀποστραϕεῖσα τοῦ διαμαρτάνειν) and inherits wisdom (κληρονόμοϛ ἀποδείκνυται σοϕίαϛ). This apokatastasis is also described as a restoration of the soul to health (ὑγίεια) after the abandonment of evil (ἀποστρεϕόμενοι τὰ ϕαῦλα). This therapeutic and medical imagery, too, will be dear to Clement and Origen as well.

Both Clement and Origen, as I have mentioned, knew at least the Apoc. Pet. among the Christian “apocrypha” that seem to have anticipated, to some extent, the theory of universal salvation, and they considered the Apoc. Pet. to be an inspired writing. In this regard, it is important to highlight that the main supporters of the doctrine of apokatastasis, especially Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, in their writings continually based it on Scriptures—what became the “canonical” Scripture—especially on Paul (their favorite passage is 1 Cor 15:26–28),Footnote ⁶³ but also on many other passages from both the Old and the New Testaments. Indeed, they regarded the entire Bible as full of hints of universal salvation, which they noted in their exegesis, and they believed that the foremost antecedents to the doctrine of apokatastasis were to be found in Scripture.

Bardaiṣan's Parallel: Apokatastasis and Defense of Human Free Will

Among the precursors of Origen in supporting universal salvation, the hellenized Syrian philosopher Bardaiṣan of Edessa—who probably knew at least the Oracula Sibyllina passage concerning the eventual salvation of the damned, and perhaps also the Epistula Apostolorum and some of the other early Christian apocrypha that are a prelude to the doctrine of apokatastasis—is the one who presents this theory in its most developed, coherent, and philosophical form, closest to that of Origen. Indeed, a deep and impressive connection exists between Bardaiṣan's and Origen's eschatological doctrines, which, to my knowledge, has never been pointed out by scholars: Origen and BardaiṣanFootnote ⁶⁴ both held the same doctrine of apokatastasis, in addition to both writing in defense of human free will against deterministic theories. Both were Christian philosophers and teachers of philosophy, deeply engaged in the controversies of their own day, and deeply committed to scriptural exegesis.

Bardaiṣan, a very learned Christian philosopher and theologian, had a school in Edessa where Greek philosophy was studied just as it was at the school of Origen, both in Alexandria and in Caesarea.Footnote ⁶⁵ Bardaiṣan, like Origen, was later accused of Gnosticism, but this allegation in both cases was ultimately unfounded: although both these Christian philosophers were notoriously objects of harsh polemics, reflected respectively in the heresiological reports on Bardaiṣan and in the so-called Origenistic controversy,Footnote ⁶⁶ both wrote against gnostic and Marcionite doctrines,Footnote ⁶⁷ above all against the Valentinian theory of predestination, with its anthropology of differentiation into categories of human beings, and against astrological determinism; their position was to be inherited by Gregory of Nyssa.Footnote ⁶⁸ Han J. W. Drijvers and other scholars have presented Bardaiṣan as a philosopher,Footnote ⁶⁹ following Ephraem who called him “the Aramaic philosopher,” and surely there are good reasons to do so, although Ute Possekel has rightly called attention to the remarkable theological aspects of his thought,Footnote ⁷⁰ without denying that he also used many philosophical categories. Surely the distinction between philosophy and theology is more a modern than an ancient idea, and in patristic philosophy it is hardly correct, from an historical and methodological point of view, to speak of philosophy as separate from theology and vice-versa. Possekel's assessment, however, is well grounded in Bardaiṣan's way of presenting and understanding himself, his ethics, his doctrine of the resurrection, the communitarian organization of his school, etc., and is perfectly true: Bardaiṣan considered himself primarily a Christian who tried to render his faith acceptable from an intellectual point of view. This characterization, I believe, is also perfectly suited to Origen, a Christian philosopherFootnote ⁷¹ who played an essential role in making Christianity acceptable even to the most intellectually demanding, among whom were many gnostics.Footnote ⁷² Origen and Bardaiṣan played the same role in the intellectual landscape of the late second and early third centuries, when Christianity was endeavoring to acquire a cultural, and even specifically philosophical, credibility.

Bardaiṣan (154–222 c.e.) lived somewhat earlier than Origen (ca. 186–255 c.e.), which would assign him priority in the formulation of the theory of universal salvation. However, his doctrine of apokatastasis is attested in the so-called Liber legum regionum, which is preserved in a single Syriac manuscript and was probably written by a disciple of Bardaiṣan. Eusebius, who excerpts this dialogue in Praep. ev. 6.10, says that it was composed by Bardaiṣan himself and attests its original title, Περὶ εἱμαρμένηϛ διάλογοϛ (Hist. eccl. 4.30).Footnote ⁷³ In fact, it is a Platonic dialogue, and, again according to Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 4.30), it was dedicated to an “Antoninus” whom Jerome identifies with Marcus Aurelius, the philosopher emperor (Vir. ill. 33: liber quem Marco Antonino de fato tradidit). This would situate this dialogue within the lifetime of Bardaiṣan: the persecution that Eusebius places under “Antoninus” perfectly fits the great anti-Christian persecution that took place under Marcus Aurelius.Footnote ⁷⁴ This is further supported by Epiphanius's attestation that under this emperor Bardaiṣan was, if not a martyr, certainly a confessor of the Christian faith.Footnote ⁷⁵ Scholars, however, tend to think that the addressee was Caracalla or Elagabalus (although no persecution occurred under their reigns) and that the dialogue was written by a disciple of Bardaiṣan.Footnote ⁷⁶ In any case, the Liber, which expresses Bardaiṣan's thought, is an important example of hellenization in the Edessan milieu. John Healey admits that “Bardaiṣan forms a prominent peak of Hellenism” in the landscape of the early Edessan environment of Syrian Christianity, and that he had a group of supporters and followers who shared his interests, although “it is not clear that he is the tip of an iceberg of any great significance” in that landscape.Footnote ⁷⁷ In fact, notwithstanding that in those days Edessa was a sort of detachment of the Roman Empire and its rulers were at home in Rome,Footnote ⁷⁸ a better parallel for Bardaiṣan, his intellectual activity, and his school seems to be constituted by Origen's activity and his school in Alexandria (and later in Caesarea),Footnote ⁷⁹ rather than by the Osrhoene environment, as I shall endeavor to demonstrate. Moreover, Bardaiṣan, just like Origen according to Eusebius's biographical account,Footnote ⁸⁰ received a Greek education in liberal disciplines and philosophy.Footnote ⁸¹

In this connection, the most interesting features of the Liber are its main philosophical doctrines: that of free will, held against astrological determinism, and, at the very end of the dialogue, that of apokatastasis, which, surprisingly enough, has never been realized by scholars. This theory is here expressly attributed to Bardaiṣan, who is by far the main character of the dialogue. Let us briefly analyze both these doctrines, which are strongly interrelated in Bardaiṣan's thinking and constitute a close parallel to—and perhaps an anticipation of—Origen's conception of apokatastasis and rational creatures' free will.

The doctrine of free will is the core thesis of the dialogue, which Bardaiṣan, the protagonist, supports, arguing that human beings do not depend on the influence of stars in their choices. Their habits vary from nation to nation and from religion to religion, but do not depend on celestial bodies or on the astrological zones (κλίματα). The doctrine of free will, which was already stressed by Clement of Alexandria (e.g., in Strom. 1.1.4; 2.14.60–62; 2.16.75; 4.24.153, etc.), was elaborated at length and strongly defended by Origen, like Bardaiṣan, against both astrological determinism and the Valentinian tripartition of human beings into classes, which asserts their predestination “by nature.” Origen develops his polemics in many passages and especially in Book 3 of his De Principiis, which is devoted to free will and the philosophical and theological problems connected to it, an issue that was hotly debated in the philosophy of his time.Footnote ⁸² In the very preface to Book 1 of De Principiis, 5, he argues against astral determinism that the church maintains as a dogma that every rational creature is endowed with free will and is not subject to necessity. In several commentaries on Old Testament books (such as Hom. Judic. 3.3; Hom. Jes. Nav. 7.4) and in Philocalia 23, largely based on his lost Commentary on Genesis, Origen continues his critique. Against both gnostic and astrological determinism, he insists that God is not responsible for the different conditions of the rational creatures (λογικοί), that he is no “respecter of persons” (Rom 9:14; Origen, Princ. 1.7.4), and that there is no unrighteousness with God. Present sufferings must be explained either as pedagogical strategies applied by God, or as a result of one's demerits in an existence previous to the present, or as a choice of some generous souls who are willing to suffer in this life in order to assist the process of salvation (Princ. 2.9.7).Footnote ⁸³

Indeed, my hypothesis is that the doctrine of human free will was at the very basis of Origen's theoretical elaboration of the doctrine of apokatastasis, as is evident, again, in Book 3 of his De Principiis. Here, indeed, he begins by contrasting the mainly ValentinianFootnote ⁸⁴ deterministic theory of the threefold division of humanity into “fleshly,” “psychic,” and “spiritual” persons (σαρκικοί, ψυχικοί, and πνευματικοί), destined respectively to damnation, an inferior salvation, and perfect salvation; then he goes on to argue that the Bible supports the doctrine of free will everywhere, and he explains away such passages as the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, which would seem to contradict this doctrine, by invoking God's pedagogical care and the conciliation of universally saving Providence and individual free will. At the same time, he also polemicizes against the gnostic and Marcionite distinction between the Old and New Testaments and between the justice and goodness in God. Thus, he paves the way for the doctrine of apokatastasis of all rational creatures after the purification and instruction needed by each one, as the glorious triumph not only of divine justice, but also of divine goodness. It is precisely with this doctrine that he concludes this strongly coherent book, which constitutes a complete argument and significantly begins with the polemic against the opponents of the doctrine of human free will. In this way, Book 3 of De Principiis seems to provide an “archaeological” reconstruction of the theoretical genesis of Origen's argument for the apokatastasis as not at all undermining each human being's free will, but indeed grounded in his defense of it against predestinationism.Footnote ⁸⁵ Moreover, that the theoretical basis, grounded in theodicy, of Origen's doctrine of apokatastasis is his defense of human free will and of the coincidence of justice and goodness in God was well seen by Rufinus, who in Apol. Hier. 2.12 remarked that the supporters of apokatastasis—especially Origen—intended “to defend God's justice and counter those who maintain that all is determined by fate or chance… eagerly wishing to defend God's justice… it becomes that good, immutable, and simple nature of the Trinity to eventually restore all of its creatures into the same state in which they were created at the beginning, and, after long sufferings, enduring for whole aeons, to finally put an end to torments.”Footnote ⁸⁶ The theoretical motive of the apokatastasis, according to Rufinus—who of course knew the third book of Origen's De Principiis perfectly well—is the defense of both God's goodness and God's justice against determinism.

Now, both the polemic against determinism and the separation of justice and goodness in God and the doctrine of apokatastasis markedly characterize Bardaiṣan's philosophical reflection as well. Bardaiṣan too, in the same period as Origen and very probably a little earlier than he, maintained the very same theory of apokatastasis, which is clearly stated at the end of the Liber legum regionum, albeit briefly. Indeed, after a long confutation of astrological determinism typical of Chaldaic doctrines, and after arguing that God is both good and just and has endowed each rational creature with free will, Bardaiṣan offers a final perspective in which he expounds what is evidently the doctrine of apokatastasis. Thus he, like Origen, links the defense of free will and the polemic against the separation of justice from goodness in God to universal salvation, and grounds the apokatastasis in the theory of free will. This is the relevant passage, in the closing section of Bardaiṣan's Liber:

Saving divine Providence (the plans conceived by God to help all creatures), the total eviction of evil—a state in which it is impossible that any being can remain forever—the instruction and purification of the wicked, their voluntary renunciation of rebellion, and the apokatastasis are here clearly foreseen. According to Bardaiṣan's argument, each creature endowed with reason is free, and its free will is not conditioned by the stars, but God does not allow this freedom to bring the creature itself to total perdition: Till the end of time (αἰῶνεϛ), the divinity lets the creatures govern themselves by their free will, but in the end, on the basis of its own plans conceived in order to help them, it will annihilate all evil according to its purely negative nature from the ontological point of view. This is why being in evil is being, not in force, but in weakness and error, and such a state cannot endure forever. As a consequence, all creatures, once purified and set free from evil, through persuasion and teaching and the filling of all lacks, will adhere to the Good, that is God, voluntarily. “The fools will be persuaded,” not forced into submission.

Now, all these ideas are present both in Bardaiṣan's and in Origen's thought. Furthermore, the apokatastasis is expressly characterized by Bardaiṣan as a free gift of God (“a gift of the Lord of all natures” or beings), just as it is conceived by Origen, who, quoting St. Paul, affirmed in Comm. Rom. Catenae 22.11: χάρισμα τοῦ Θεοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιοϛ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἡμῶν· Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον. (The true “life aiônios,” in Origen's view, is, on the spiritual plane, ultimate salvation, according to the polysemy of “life” and “death” that is typical of both Origen and Bardaiṣan).Footnote ⁹⁰ Again, the apokatastasis is described as complete peace by Bardaiṣan, in the very same way as Origen depicts it, for example, in Hom. Luc. 36: God “has not yet established peace… there is still war due to the existence of evil, but there will definitely be an absolute peace”; Comm. Jo. 10.39: “when peace will be perfect, after the years of the oikonomia” (ὅταν ἡ εἰρήνη τελειωθῇ μετὰ ἔτη τῆϛ οἰκονομίαϛ). One of the closest resemblances between Bardaiṣan and Origen is that according to both, Providence does not force our free will, but acts in harmony with it, and yet does not fail to achieve its objective, which is universal salvation. Bardaiṣan speaks of “things that are done and plans that have been conceived [by God] in order to help the creatures”; Origen says that “Providence is applied [by God] to all, in accord with each one's freewill” (Cels. 5.21). Both employ a theological passive and express the very same thought: God's Providence respects human free will, but it infallibly leads all rational creatures to salvation.Footnote ⁹¹

Ultimate annihilation of evil is one of the main metaphysical pillars of the doctrine of apokatastasis, and it is clearly asserted by Bardaiṣan, by Origen, and subsequently, thanks to Origen's influence, by all the supporters of this doctrine, especially Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius.Footnote ⁹² Moreover, both Origen and Bardaiṣan maintained the centrality of Christ in soteriology. Indeed, Bardaiṣan, who considered Jesus Christ to be generated by God and by the Virgin (as attested by Ephraem and Philoxenus of Mabbug), thought that, just as he intervened as Logos in the creation (as attested by Moses Bar Kepha), he plays a core role in redemption and salvation, and ascribed a universal salvific effect to his cross.Footnote ⁹³ In fact, in his treatise on India, ap. Porphyry, De Styge fr. 376 Smith (= Stob. 1.3.56), he described a statue located in a place where all possible sins are tested, representing the whole universe with all its inhabitants, including the angels, in the shape of a human being, standing with its arms outstretched in the symbol of the cross (ἀνδριάϛ… ἑστὼϛ ὀρθόϛ, ἔχων τὰϛ χεῖραϛ ἡπλωμέναϛ ἐν τύπῳ σταυροῦ). This cross, representing Jesus Christ's crucifixion in its cosmic value,Footnote ⁹⁴ is further related to Christ-Logos through the Logos's activity in creation, since (in a manner reminiscent of Plato's Timaeus) it was given by the Father to the Son as a model for the creation of this world (δεδωκέναι τὸν θεὸν τῷ υἱῷ, ὁπηνίκα τὸν κόσμον ἔκτιζεν, ἵνα θεατὸν ἔχῃ παράδειγμα). Thus, just as it is evident in Origen, in Bardaiṣan, too, Christ-Logos plays an essential role both in creation and in soteriology—and the latter, in Bardaiṣan just as in Origen, culminates in the apokatastasis. In the thought of both these authors, as will be the case with Gregory of Nyssa as well,Footnote ⁹⁵ the apokatastasis, far from being a pagan doctrine—as it has been repeatedly accused of being especially in the course of the Origenist controversy—is firmly grounded in Christology.

All these convergences in thought between Origen and Bardaiṣan revolving around the doctrine of apokatastasis are striking. It is not unlikely that Origen actually knew Bardaiṣan's thinking to some extent, just as many of his followers did, as I shall show. One possibility, among others, is that Clement may have brought to Alexandria the knowledge of Bardaiṣan's ideas. Indeed, the Syrian man (τὶϛ τῶν ’Ασσυρίων) whom Clement mentions in Strom. 1.1.11.2 as a Christian teacher whom he met in the ἀνατολή, just before meeting Pantaenus in Alexandria, may well be Bardaiṣan. (It has also been suggested that it was Tatian, but I find this very unlikely, because Clement criticizes Tatian, especially for his encratism, whereas he speaks of his teachers, including his Syrian teacher, as blessed persons, worthy of veneration, who received the traditionFootnote ⁹⁶ from the apostles through oral transmission, and we know from the testimonia that Bardaiṣan based his ideas on Scripture but also on an esoteric tradition.Footnote ⁹⁷) This would explain the knowledge and admiration of Bardaiṣan on the part of Origen and his followers, although, of course, certainty is difficult to reach, and there are many other ways in which Origen may have learned of Bardaiṣan's ideas, particularly given that Bardaisan's writings were soon translated into Greek by his disciples (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 4.30) and that he knew and used Greek as well as Syriac (Epiphanius, Pan. 56). Origen also corresponded about scriptural exegesis with Julius Africanus,Footnote ⁹⁸ who remained for a long time in Edessa at Abgar's court as an instructor of Ma‘nu, king Abgar the Great's son, and in that city knew and frequented Bardaiṣan, as Julius himself attests in his Κεστοί 1.20.Footnote ⁹⁹ Thus, he too may well represent a good trait d'union between the Alexandrian and the Edessan thinker.

It is very probable that such knowledge existed and that there was a relationship between these two Christian philosophers and exegetes and their schools.

Further Relations and Confirmations: Origen's and Bardaiṣan's Followers and Environments

It is no accident, I believe, that Bardaiṣan was appreciated by Eusebius, who speaks well of him in Praep. ev. 6.9.32Footnote ¹⁰⁰ and in Hist. eccl. 4.30.1–3, where he praises his extraordinary capacities and excellent dialectic skill and his refutations—exactly parallel to Origen's—of the Marcionites and other “heretics” among whom there surely were some gnostic groups.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Furthermore, Eusebius preserves very long passages from the Liber translated into Greek in Praep. ev. 6.10.1–49. Eusebius was a fervent admirer of Origen and a disciple of the holy martyr Pamphilus, who wrote a vibrant apology for Origen while he was in prison waiting to be martyred (307–310); Eusebius helped him to compose this apology and wrote the sixth and last book himself.Footnote ¹⁰² And in his Hist. eccl. 6 he devotes a remarkably extensive treatment to Origen along with many praises,Footnote ¹⁰³ which he also bestows on Pamphilus and his master Pierius, a convinced Origenist, who wrote in praise of Pamphilus and was called “Origen the Younger” according to Jerome (Vir. ill. 76)—such was his admiration for Origen. It even seems that Eusebius was not hostile to the theory of apokatastasis itself (Marc. 2.4; Eccl. theol. 2.8; 3.14–16, 18–20; Comm. Isa. 1.85).Footnote ¹⁰⁴

It is notable, likewise, that Didymus the Blind, another deeply committed Origenist and a supporter of the doctrine of apokatastasis, including the restoration of the devil,Footnote ¹⁰⁵ presents Bardaiṣan in a fully positive light, in contrast to many other sources which curse him as a heretic or even a pagan. In a passage in his Commentary on the Psalms he depicts Bardaiṣan as a convert from Valentinian gnosis to Christian orthodoxy, when he became a presbyter.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ This piece of information is similar to that offered by Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 4.30), who also speaks of Bardaiṣan's passage from Gnosticism to the church and his subsequent refutations of Gnosticism,Footnote ¹⁰⁷ but Didymus presents Bardaiṣan in an even more positive light: His priestly dignity is not mentioned by Eusebius. Indeed, Didymus is the only source, aside from Theodorus Bar Konai, to attest that Bardaiṣan was a presbyter, like Origen; according to Theodorus, however, in Liber scholiorum,Footnote ¹⁰⁸ Bardaiṣan then abandoned the church, whereas Didymus praises him saying that he remained in the orthodox church as a presbyter until his death, just as Origen did. In fact, according to Pamphilus's Apology, Origen “was a teacher of the Church and grew old inside the catholic [sc. universal] Church.”Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Many other sources are very negative and depict Bardaiṣan as an utter heretic; Didymus, a close follower of Origen's, instead presents the Christian philosopher and theologian of Edessa in a very positive light, and agrees with him about the eventual apokatastasis of all.

It is highly significant, too, that Eusebius closely links Bardaiṣan and Origen when he quotes ample sections of Bardaiṣan from the Liber legum regionum in Praep. ev. 6.10. Immediately after these excerpts, he also quotes Origen on the very same subject—human free will (Praep. ev. 6.11). This strongly suggests that Eusebius was perfectly aware of the similarities between Bardaiṣan's and Origen's thought. Moreover, he is one of the few sources favorable to Bardaiṣan, and it is no accident, in my opinion, that precisely all the favorable sources on him, and only these, turn out to be represented by admirers of Origen, such as Julius Africanus, Didymus the Blind, Eusebius himself, and the early Jerome, who in Vir. ill. 33, drawing inspiration from Eusebius's portrait of Bardaiṣan, praises his mind, his dialectical ability, and his literary activity against heresies (notably, the same that Pamphilus commended in Origen).Footnote ¹¹⁰

A confirmation of the long overlooked connection between Origen's and Bardaiṣan's doctrines of apokatastasis comes, to my mind, also from a dialogue composed more than a century after Bardaiṣan, the Dialogue of Adamantius on the Orthodox Faith in God, probably written in Greek by a disciple of Methodius who was deeply influenced by Origen and even took part in the philosophical debate on free will.Footnote ¹¹¹ The Dialogue seems to have been reworked in Greek toward 330 c.e. and was ascribed to Origen himself by the redactors of the Philocalia, and for this reason translated into Latin by Rufinus at the end of the fourth century, perhaps with some Origenistic additions (Rufinus directly identifies Adamantius and Origen).Footnote ¹¹² Now, in the eschatological section, the orthodox position is represented by Adamantius, who bears Origen's second name and holds the opinions that Methodius in his De resurrectione attributed to Memianus, an opponent of Origen; it is patent that Rufinus, through the identification between Adamantius and Origen, aims at presenting Origen as fully orthodox. Most relevant to my argument, the character who, in the Adamantius dialogue, re-proposes the ideas that in Methodius's dialogue were supported by Aglaophon, who denied the resurrection of the body, is Marinus, who is a follower of Bardaiṣan;Footnote ¹¹³ thus, he was perceived as an Origenist, and even more radical than Origen.Footnote ¹¹⁴ I think that this Marinus is to be identified with Bar Yammâ, a character who appears in the Liber legum regionum as an interlocutor of Bardaiṣan: Bar Yammâ in Syriac means “Son of the Sea” and Marinus is the best translation of this Syriac name into Latin. The conclusions, drawn by Eutropius as a judge, are in line with Origen's own thought. This dialogue confirms that both in Bardaiṣan and in Origen the eschatological question was central, and that Bardaiṣan's views, in this respect, were felt to be even more drastic than Origen's.Footnote ¹¹⁵

In this connection, it is significant that an Alexandrian contemporary of Origen and Bardaiṣan, Achilles Tatius, in his novel on Leucippe and Cleitophon, clearly draws inspiration from two passages of Bardaiṣan's writing on India,Footnote ¹¹⁶ thus confirming the knowledge of Bardaiṣan's work in Alexandria. In his De Styge PorphyryFootnote ¹¹⁷ quotes or paraphrases two passages from Bardaiṣan's treatise on India, a text based on direct testimonies of ambassadors from India. Both passages concern an ordeal involving the Brahmans. It is significant that Bardaiṣan, consistently with his own view, which is very similar to that of Origen, praises the Brahmans because they did not put the convicted sinner to death, but rather had him instructed and educated (παιδευθῆναι χωρὶϛ θανατικῆϛ καταδίκηϛ). Indeed, Bardaiṣan shares Clement's, Origen's, and Gregory of Nyssa's conception of the therapeutic and pedagogical aim of punishments, as is clear both from this passage and the concluding section of the Liber legum regionum, where, as I have shown, he speaks of instruction and persuasion of the fools in the end, rather than of their destruction or eternal chastisement.

In the second passage on India, Bardaiṣan's words are quoted by Porphyry κατὰ λέξιν. Again emphasis is put on the didactic and therapeutic treatment of the sinners, who, far from being punished against their will, confess their sins and ask the others to pray for them, and are purified by fasting (οἵτινεϛ βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δοκιμαστηρίου ἐξομολογοῦνται ἐπὶ τῶν ἑτέρων εἴ τι ἥμαρτον, δέησιν ποιοῦνται ἵνα οἱ λοιποὶ εὔχωνται περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ νηστεύουσι χρόνον τινὰ ἱκανόν). Moreover, here an Indian statue is also mentioned, which Bardaiṣan presents as a paradigm of the world given by God to his child while he was creating the world (δεδωκέναι τὸν θεὸν τῷ υἱῷ, ὁπηνίκα τὸν κόσμον ἔκτιζεν, ἵνα θεατὸν ἔχῃ παράδειγμα). This seems to be an echo of the Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus; the androgyny of the statue itself, whose matter was unknown to anyone (μηδένα εἰδέναι ποίαϛ ὕληϛ ἐστίν), was a symbol of the union of the Monad and the Dyad, the two supreme principles of Plato inherited by the Platonic tradition.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Now, the tests by ordeal described by Bardaiṣan apud Porphyry show close analogies with the ordeal described by Achilles Tatius in his novel (8.12.9 and 8.6.12–14). I believe, with Camplani, Boll, and partially DrijversFootnote ¹¹⁹ and Castelletti,Footnote ¹²⁰ that Achilles was quoting not Porphyry—who lived several decades later and would imply a date toward the end of the third century at least for Achilles—but Bardaiṣan himself, who, according to Epiphanius, knew Greek, too,Footnote ¹²¹ and whose works written in Syriac were soon translated into Greek by his friends and disciples (Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 4.30). Achilles, according to the Suda, his manuscripts, and the etymology of his name Τάτιοϛ—probably related to the Egyptian deity Tat—was from Alexandria, which would constitute a further very interesting case of knowledge of Bardaiṣan's work in the late-second to early-third century on the part of an Alexandrian intellectual. This seems to be meaningful in light of the deep analogies between Origen of Alexandria's and Bardaiṣan of Edessa's thought that I have underscored, and of the Origenists' esteem for Bardaiṣan, so different from the accusations of virtually all other sources.

Another indication of a relationship between Origen and his school, on the one hand, and, on the other, Bardaiṣan and his school in Edessa, may be offered by Porphyry himself. This neoplatonist knew Origen in his youth, probably when the latter had already left Alexandria and moved to Caesarea.Footnote ¹²² Porphyry (apud Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 6.19) attests that he saw and heard Origen and criticizes him for embracing Christianity and living “against the laws” (παρανόμωϛ), while reasoning as a Greek (Platonic) philosopher in metaphysics and theology and applying Greek (Stoic) allegorical method to Scripture; he also offers us remarkable details on Origen's readings in philosophy,Footnote ¹²³ on which he manifestly was very well informed, probably thanks to his direct acquaintance with Origen.Footnote ¹²⁴

I even wonder whether Origen himself, who met Porphyry several years after the death of Bardaiṣan,Footnote ¹²⁵ might have brought Bardaiṣan's work to his attention. Porphyry cites Bardaiṣan not only in his De Styge, as we have seen, concerning the Indian ordeals and statue with approval of the pedagogical attitude of the Brahmans, but also in De abstinentia 4.17.1–2, where he speaks of the ascetical life of the “Indian philosophers,” the Gymnosophists, the Brahmans, and the Σαμαναῖοι (Sanskrit śramana). After introducing them, he goes on to expound what he learned about them from Bardaiṣan, who in turn had learned it from Indian ambassadors led by Dandamis.Footnote ¹²⁶ What Porphyry borrows from Bardaiṣan perfectly suits Origen's interests and way of thinking, too.

Indeed, I suspect that many connections between the two are still waiting to be traced and investigated. Surely there seem to be many theological, philosophical, and historical elements that connect Origen to Bardaiṣan, the most important of which is the theory of apokatastasis, which for both of them appears to be related to the defense of human free will, and the polemic against predestinationism and separation of justice and goodness in God. The investigation of the relationship between these two Christian thinkers casts much new light upon the origins of the doctrine of apokatastasis, where Bardaiṣan too played a significant role, thus far completely neglected by scholars.

Conclusions: Contribution to Research

It emerges from this investigation that the conception of apokatastasis had a variegated background and certainly did not emerge with Origen all at once. It was present toward the end of the second century and at the beginning of the third in different Christian philosophical environments such as those of Alexandria (Didaskaleion) and Caesarea (school and library of Origen), and that of Edessa (Bardaiṣan and his school). All these connections, which shed new light on the origin of the doctrine of universal salvation, seem to me worthy of reflection and close analysis. Origen is usually seen as the initiator of this theory, and indeed he was the first Christian philosopher who expressed it in a complete and fully coherent form, making it the essence of his theoretical system.Footnote ¹²⁷ But as Clement and, even more, Bardaiṣan suggest, Origen's insight did not emerge in a vacuum. It was evoked by reflection on human free will and its relationship to God's justice and goodness and love, in a polemic that was directed above all against predestinationism. The same polemic against determinism and predestination—on the part of an author who, just like Origen, wrote against Valentinian and Marcionite theories, as several testimonia and the Liber itself indicate—was the basis for the development of Bardaiṣan's thought concerning human free will and apokatastasis. It is remarkable that almost at the same time both Origen and Bardaiṣan, one in Alexandria and the other in Edessa, held the very same doctrine of apokatastasis. Bardaiṣan may even have supported it somewhat before Origen. The latter certainly found important premises for his doctrine in Clement's conceptions and in the necessity of arguing against determinism, which Bardaiṣan too had to face.

My hypothesis is that both Origen and Bardaiṣan developed this doctrine in polemic with determinism, particularly Valentinian and astrological predest-inationism. This is indicated, respectively, by Princ. 3, as I have argued, and by the whole argument presented by Bardaiṣan in the Liber. In order to oppose such forms of determinism and, as Rufinus realized, to deny that everything depends either on fate or on chance, they created an alternative theodicy by postulating the very same nature for all rational beings, their free will, and its consequences during the worlds or aeons (αἰῶνεϛ) (i.e., the different conditions in which the intellectual creatures [νόεϛ] are found to be during the aeons, depending on their own choices and regulated by God's justice) and at the same time posited providential action on God's part that is respectful of each individual's free will but leads all to salvation as a gift of grace and as a consequence of the final eviction of evil.

Both Origen and Bardaiṣan supported the doctrine of apokatastasis against determinism and predestinationism, just as, one and a half centuries after them, Gregory of Nyssa supported it against “Arianism,” especially in his In Illud. Tunc et Ipse Filius and elsewhere.Footnote ¹²⁸ This doctrine was formulated and promulgated in a polemical framework at the philosophical and theological level. Indeed, the first emergence of the theory of apokatastasis in Clement, Bardaiṣan, and Origen shows that this theory took shape in the context of philosophical discussions on free will, fate, theodicy, and the eternal destiny of rational creatures.

I think that a comparative study of Origen and Bardaiṣan leads to a better, deeper, and wider understanding of the historical and theoretical roots of this doctrine, which was stimulated by a philosophical framework rich in debates on free will and theodicy. These seem to have influenced its first clear and coherent expositions in Christian philosophy, that is to say, not only Origen's formulation, but also that of Bardaiṣan. Even though Origen's codification is more important and extensive, that of Bardaiṣan, which is strikingly similar for many aspects I have endeavored to point out, may have shortly preceded it, and perhaps even had an impact upon it. Moreover, premises are to be found in Clement and, even if in a narrative and not theoretical form, in some early Christian apocrypha, some of which were surely known to Clement—who regarded the Apoc. Pet. as inspired Scripture—Origen and Bardaiṣan. They are very likely to have influenced them, in addition of course to what subsequently became the canonical Scripture, to all of which Origen and Nyssen continually have recourse in order to buttress their doctrine of universal salvation.