The contemporary home built around the nuclear family would seem to provide a respite from the public gaze, a zone of safety and privacy. Yet, as Jeannie Suk demonstrates in At Home in the Law, the home also can be, and has been, cast as a place of confinement, vulnerability, and danger − for women.
Suk's book is intriguing both for what it says and for what it ignores. Suk surveys and analyses the changes wrought by feminist legal activism in the United States over the past four decades, changes she both applauds and finds worrisome. With a PhD in literature from Oxford and then a JD degree from Harvard, Suk is well placed to situate her work at the crossroads of the humanities and legal studies. In order to unravel the cultural message conveyed by both feminist legal writings and changes in the law over the past four decades, she focuses not just on case-law and its implementation, but more subtly on the cultural discourses of the law, especially the shifting meanings of value-laden key terms such as home, rights, autonomy, subordination and protection. Suk's book explores the legal and existential ramifications of these shifts, attending always to the cultural meanings which such changes in law depend on and in turn institutionalise. Above all, she analyses the ways in which the meaning of privacy, safeguarded by the notion of the home as an inviolable space, has been challenged in recent decades, with the result that boundaries between the public and the private have become ever more porous.
The modern American home, she argues, has been redefined in the wake of the ‘domestic violence revolution’, by which she means the feminist project that sees women as needing protection from the violent actions of men, especially the men with whom they live. This has been achieved by way of a complete reversal of the notion of home that had prevailed for centuries. Rather than a place of safety and privacy in which intimate relationships are constructed and maintained, the home has come to be seen as the locus of women's subjection at the hands of their warden-husbands. In short, the home today is more readily seen as a woman's prison than a man's castle.
Suk tracks five major effects of the domestic violence revolution: (1) the archetypal home crime is no longer burglary − in which an outsider invades the home − but has been thoroughly recast as domestic violence, in which the criminal is already in the home; (2) criminal law has supplanted the misdemeanour definition of domestic violence, to the point where the state now imposes ‘de facto divorce’ through its enforcement of easily obtainable protection orders; (3) women's right of self-defence in the home has expanded, linked to post-9/11 anxieties about homeland security; (4) property rights have been redefined in recent Supreme Court decisions that uphold state interference in the home; and (5) privacy has been re-imagined as a vulnerable woman, needing protection from men.
At Home in the Law is intended to sound a warning about the decline of both privacy and autonomy entailed in feminist-inspired legal changes, which have redistributed power away from the individual and toward the state. Since about 1970, Suk argues, feminists have transformed the way the home, as a legal institution, is viewed, above all by using the criminal justice system. Feminist ideas have resulted in such a massive transformation that they are now always ‘at home in the law’ − whether we realise it or not.
The version of feminist critique according to which home privacy is coterminous with violence and abuse has been successfully woven into our legal system (p. 6). A corresponding redefinition has taken place in the very notion of ‘crime’. Forget home sweet home and home is where the heart is, Suk says. These days, home is where the crime is (p. 5).
Suk is at her best when dissecting the consequences of considering domestic violence as the paradigmatic home crime. She argues that we have moved from insufficient attention to the problem of domestic violence, which for a long time was considered non-criminal conduct when it occurred within the home, to the opposite extreme, in which a woman's complaint is no longer even necessary for the police to take action. ‘The home boundary that once shielded the abuser from criminal law is now drawn by the criminal law to exclude him’ (p. 34), she notes. This reallocation of boundaries and power means that ‘the abuser is out, and the state is in’ (p. 34).
The key manoeuvre here is that of casting partners who violate protection orders in the role of intruding ‘strangers’ or ‘superstrangers’, subject to much harsher penalties than the law would otherwise provide for violation of a protection order. Thus a call by a neighbour or spouse in a heated moment sets the legal machinery in motion, meaning that mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies can determine the fate of a relationship. The protocol designed for dealing with dangerous batterers is thus imposed in misdemeanour cases which by definition involve little or no physical injury. Suk notes that protection orders have acquired enormous power, useful as strategic threats in intimate relationships, divorce proceedings or when divorce is merely contemplated, not to mention in custody disputes. Unlike a civil protection order obtained at a woman's initiative, the criminal protection order cannot be lifted on her motion. Thus the ‘strategic victim’ (p. 46) quickly loses control of the situation − if she had it to begin with, since police intervention resulting from a neighbour's overhearing an argument is encouraged (and is more likely to occur in poor neighbourhoods where walls are thin and housing more crowded). The net result is not greater empowerment of the woman: the state gets to decide whether or not an intimate relationship may continue.
Using as an example Manhattan, considered to be in the forefront of the struggle to combat domestic violence, Suk analyses the legal changes that have expanded criminal law to the point where the state controls the home and prosecutors are authorised to use criminal court procedures to end intimate relationships. She calls this ‘state-imposed de facto divorce’ (p. 11), and notes that both married and cohabiting couples can be subjected to it. And this is so despite the fact that the vast majority of domestic violence cases in fact involve misdemeanours. Suk asks whether compelling partners to separate violates the fundamental right to marry (p. 48), an issue that has not inspired much litigation, perhaps because there is no obvious group to challenge the law here.
Domestic violence cases, in other words, trigger a mandatory domestic violence protocol, not applicable to other crimes, even crimes of violence. The ‘violence’ in domestic violence has been redefined down and the consequences have been redefined up. This is because domestic violence these days is seen as a prelude to murder, and prosecutors are under pressure to prevent more serious violence. Arrest is mandatory not only if there is reasonable cause to believe domestic violence has occurred but also for violation of a protection order, regardless of the alleged victim's wishes. The District Attorney's office then follows a no-drop prosecution policy, again regardless of the victim's willingness to co-operate. In this way, Suk says, the police and prosecutors demonstrate the seriousness with which they treat any charge of domestic violence, irrespective of its severity. This is in part because they have accepted the feminist view of women as victims, too fearful and intimidated to co-operate. So broad are the rules now that more than half of all domestic violence cases result in dismissal − because, Suk explains, arrests are made in far too many cases.
The way round the likelihood of dismissal is for temporary orders of protection (i.e. no contact) to be obtained at the initial arraignment, that is, at the defendant's very first court appearance. Defendants often accept plea bargains that seem to resemble dismissal, without understanding the consequence of the protection order that has become a standard part of the plea bargain. These orders, imposed with little attention to the facts of a particular case, are routinely and rapidly granted, and then prevent the defendant from entering the alleged victim's home or having any sort of contact with the victim (usually his wife), or his children.
Suk's important point is that this process shifts the emphasis away from the admittedly laborious procedure of punishing offenders to the quite different arena of controlling intimate relationships in the home. The protection order in effect turns the home itself into an extension of the courthouse. Couples find their relationships deemed illegal, in the service of demonstrating the state's commitment to combating domestic violence. Any violation of the protection order − even a phone call, letter or email − then constitutes a fresh crime. Even if the victim initiates contact with the defendant, the police in their routine unannounced visits can arrest the violator of the protection order. In this way the prosecutor and the criminal court effectively impose de facto divorce on couples, but without the benefits of family law provisions that would be activated in cases of actual divorce. All this shifts power away from the supposed victim, as if women cannot be trusted to understand their own interests.
While Suk makes this argument in an interesting (if somewhat repetitive) way, citing relevant cases that demonstrate the redefinition of crucial categories leading to the current situation, and clearly names legal feminism as a key agent in this process, she fails to ask questions about the underlying feminist ideological commitments that have led to the situation she describes.
Suk notes that the feminist view of domestic violence as ‘gendered subordination in the marital relationship’ has been accepted by prosecutors, police and judges. If marriage is the root of domestic violence, the logic seems to be, then the state should end marriages that have signs of domestic violence. What Suk does not explore, however, is the extensive feminist literature that treats marriage and the home themselves with hostility, a view now codified into law.
In turning to self-defence in the home, Suk again focuses on the distinctive meanings of gender, home and crime that are now embedded in self-defence law. Here she draws substantially on the work of Richard Maxwell Brown (who really should have been named in the book, not merely salted away in the endnotes). Brown's Reference Brown1991 book No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society discusses the transformation in traditional English common law's Castle Doctrine with its centuries-old imposition of a ‘duty to retreat’, which allowed self-defence against an attacker only as a last resort. In late-nineteenth-century America this duty was abandoned by the majority of American states: the Castle Doctrine was extended so that a man could protect himself in his own house even if it meant killing an intruder. Brown links this transformation to the American view of a ‘true man’ − a term Suk adopts and transforms.
Suk's point is that this extension of the Castle Doctrine raised problems given that the most common experience of violence in the home is considered that of women at the hands of their husbands. In order not to allow women licence to kill their husbands in the name of self-defence, the new Castle Doctrine restricts the right to self-defence against a person who has the legal right to be in the home by allowing that right in the face of a violation of a protection order. But, as Suk has shown, such orders are routinely given through a variety of mechanisms, and thus the right to defend oneself has increased the possibility of violence in the home. Suk invents a new (perhaps ironic) designation for this legally constructed woman, ‘the new true woman’, always understood as a victim. Far more tenuous is Suk's effort to link the expansion of self-defence laws to 9/11 and the conflation of anxieties about enemies both foreign and domestic.
Intriguingly, Suk notes, the traditional Castle Doctrine could have been applied to women claiming self-defence against battering. But instead a very different concept was installed: that women could kill without retreating because they lacked the capacity to retreat (p. 56). Thus the home was redefined. No longer a ‘stronghold against invaders’, it became ‘a prison where a woman was subordinated by the man of the castle. In this vision, the home was a space of subordination and crime was subordination in the form of violence’ (p. 57). But much feminist writing treats subordination itself as violence (p. 72) − as can be seen also outside the home in the micro-management of the relations between men and women in school and workplace, through speech codes and harassment policies that accept expansive definitions of terms such as harassment, abuse and rape, matched by the ever narrowing definitions of consent (see Patai, Reference Patai1998; Reference Patai and Patai2008a).
Although Suk is worried about the loss of autonomy that results from the new dispensation, she does not deal with the larger ideological framework of feminist critiques. Instead, she takes at face value the ostensible goal of providing much-needed protection for women from the violence they experience, which had been largely ignored by the law because it occurred in the private sphere and between intimates.
Suk's hesitation to criticise feminism overtly perhaps explains why her book does not deal with feminist extremists who have had important roles in the legal changes that worry Suk (see Patai Reference Patai1998; Reference Patai and Patai2008b). As a result of this omission, Suk presents ‘legal feminism’, not only within the book but also on the book jacket and in her introduction and conclusion, as entailing some ‘unintended consequences’ that leave her uneasy, such as the assault on privacy. She quotes (in notes, not in the text) statements by feminists showing their view of the public/private distinction as a ‘villain’ for feminists (p. 192, n. 86), but she does not consider whether the worrisome consequences of the legal frameworks feminists have brought about may well be intended rather than inadvertent.
Suk's reticence here is matched by her avoidance of a more fundamental question: are feminist representations of domestic violence accurate? Or might feminist legal activism be contaminated by ideological commitments that ignore data incompatible with the larger feminist project?
One would not know from reading Suk's book that extensive and well-documented research exists on domestic violence initiated by women against men, as well as on violence in same-sex relationships. This research demonstrates that the problem is not in fact one of male aggressors and female victims. In many feminist circles − including educational ones − there is simply a refusal to acknowledge whatever data might challenge the feminist position. Dutton and Nicholls (Reference Dutton and Nicholls2005), for example, conclude after an exhaustive survey of research in this field that feminist theory on domestic violence is seriously flawed. They argue that feminists cannot accept the well-documented reality of female violence, opting instead to view male violence as never justified and female violence as always justified. They argue that the data do not support this double standard. They too, however, attribute good intentions to feminist reformers, and assume that their ideological blinders result from anxiety that resources available to women would diminish if the onus were not strictly on men as perpetrators. But this research is never even mentioned in Suk's book, though she does comment on the law's acceptance of legal feminism's representations of men and women and the roles they allegedly play in their private households.
Apart from the matter of accurate data, a paradoxical and incoherent portrait of women emerges from feminists' legal efforts, as entirely competent to make their own decisions (regarding, say, abortion at any age and stage), and simultaneously entirely incompetent to know their own best interests or even desires when it comes to their intimate relationships (see Patai Reference Patai and Patai2008a for extensive documentation). The logic of these contradictions is in fact easy to discern: when feminist extremists approve of the decision, they applaud and defend women's autonomy; when they disapprove, they want state intervention to enforce their views. And behind this contradiction lurks not only antagonism toward heterosexual relations but also profound suspicion of the private sphere in which intense attachments, unapproved by these feminists, take place.
All legal reforms affect distribution of power, both actual and symbolic. Reflecting on the home allows Suk to identify and appraise these effects and their possible future. She asks whether we are happy with the direction that the erosion of boundaries between the home and public sphere is taking (p. 7). But she fails to ask who ‘we’ are. For no evidence exists that feminist legal activists represent the views of most women. Suk hints at this when she questions whether feminist legal activism has truly advanced women's interests. She applauds the reforms that no longer allow violence within the home to go unpunished, but she also, tentatively, urges awareness of the consequences of these reforms, which ‘have begun to create a legal reality that seems in some ways untenable and incompatible with valuable autonomy, privacy, and even security’ (p. 7).
Instead of looking at the broader feminist ideology driving legal reform, however, Suk devotes her last chapter to a literary analysis of the metaphors used by Supreme Court justices in discussing privacy in several important cases. While interesting and imaginative, the chapter − which matches Suk's initial chapter with its excessive play on the words heimlich and unheimlich − does not add much to the problems currently faced, as Suk's Epilogue seems to acknowledge. There, she again expresses her concerns about the ever-increasing transformations in the distribution of power and autonomy among citizens and the state.
Lurking in Suk's book is the awareness that the ‘domestic violence revolution’ may one day be seen as a significant step in the feminist struggle to use the law to control not only relations between men and women but the very existence of the private sphere itself. Once ‘subordination’ − a notoriously slippery concept − is conceived of as a crime, no longer necessarily associated with violence but itself standing in for violence, a good part of the feminist agenda will have been put in place. ‘The personal is political’, it will turn out, was never just a rallying cry but rather an entire activist programme for either recreating the private sphere in terms acceptable to feminists or abolishing it altogether. Suk's book helps us gauge how far along we are in that process.
