Introduction
In the aftermath of the Korean War armistice agreements of 27 July 1953, Beijing was anxious to emerge from diplomatic isolation. China suffered 900,000 to 1.5 million casualties in the Korean War, a grim testament to the effectiveness of American firepower, the futility of the People's Liberation Army's human-wave assaults, and the corresponding lack of modern weapons supplied by the Soviets to the Chinese communists.Footnote 1 As the Chinese fought against an American-led UN coalition, it was punished with UN economic sanctions in May 1951. More importantly, the issue of China's entry into the UN was put on hold.Footnote 2
Beijing was bitterly aware that Washington shunned compromises.Footnote 3 During the Four Nations Berlin Conference (25 January–18 February 1954), it was agreed to hold the Geneva Conference on 26 April 1954 to discuss both the ‘Korean question’ and the ‘question of restoring peace in Indochina’.Footnote 4 Yet the United States insisted that the forthcoming Geneva Conference would not constitute a de facto recognition of the People's Republic of China.Footnote 5
Chinese diplomatic background guidance stated explicitly that China faced formidable and adverse Western opinion. Negative publicity generated by the West had the effect of shoring up support for an American-led ‘United Action’ put forth by Secretary of State J. F. Dulles on 29 March 1954.Footnote 6 Indeed, the United States resolved to have a ‘plan for defensive arrangements in Southeast Asia’.Footnote 7 Such a plan which would involve ‘Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and such parts of Vietnam as could be saved from Communist control’. As the United States ‘could be subjected to every kind of pressure to agree to some kind of compromise’ in Geneva, Washington hoped to counter this with a security arrangement.Footnote 8
Conventional English-language interpretations emphasize the prevalence of tensions and misperceptions in Chinese foreign relations in the 1950s.Footnote 9 Regarding events leading up to the Geneva Conference, numerous accounts tend to emphasize how Washington's posturing might have prompted the Chinese to be reasonable in Geneva. Historian George Herring speculates that the spectre of possible ‘military involvement [via United Action] . . . may have helped bring about a settlement’.Footnote 10 Analysing the subsequent Taiwan Strait crises, Richard Betts notes that communist China had the dubious distinction of being the target of most American nuclear threats, especially by President Dwight Eisenhower. According to Betts, Eisenhower's nuclear threats during the 1958 crisis came about as ‘he saw little danger that war would occur and force the issue’. The White House was definitely not ‘pussyfooting’ over nuclear attacks, but responding pragmatically.Footnote 11 Betts’ analysis dovetails with other accounts of how the United States succeeded in forcing Beijing to back down through its deterrence strategy or other tactical means.Footnote 12 Other recent accounts stress Chairman Mao Zedong's domestic imperatives in launching two Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s.Footnote 13
Interestingly, orthodox Chinese accounts used the tensions inherent in this period to highlight how the Chinese achieved their diplomatic breakthrough during either the Geneva Conference or the Bandung Conference through deft planning and enterprise. For example, from Liu Wusheng's account, one goes away with the impression that Zhou Enlai was the Promethean genius in the Bandung Conference. Pei Monong, on the other hand, explains the effectiveness of China's ‘twin wings’ diplomacy as resulting from cultural relations and economic aid to Afro-Asian countries. Tao Wenzhao gives credible coverage of the two Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s, but makes little mention of the reactions of China's neutralist allies.Footnote 14 Even an account based on recently declassified Chinese documents, written by the then Chinese Foreign Ministry archives deputy director, selectively stresses the ‘achievements’ of Chinese diplomacy, spilling much ink on the ‘breakthroughs’ that occurred on various fronts. But the overall effect tends to reinforce prevailing Chinese interpretations of that era.Footnote 15
Clearly, such glaring discrepancies in these interpretations lay bare the controversial nature of China's foreign relations in the 1950s. Through the use of newly available Chinese and American sources, this article argues that insufficient attention is given to the importance of the contesting of world opinion undertaken by the People's Republic of China. The opinions of allied and neutralist countries influenced the relative positions of China vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. Although this article agrees with more recent Chinese scholarship which highlights China's successful international debut in Geneva and Bandung, this article will contribute further by elucidating the texture of China's successful international forays, which was facilitated by a strategy of combining cultural blitzkrieg and realpolitik. More importantly, this article shows that little attention has been paid to how such manipulation of world opinion became increasingly difficult for Beijing after that initial success.
This article will present its arguments in three main sections. The first section investigates how China's desire to break out of international isolation led it to take up a position of ‘reasonableness’ in Geneva that disarmed many potential antagonists and improved China's diplomatic standing. It will also examine how China sought to prevail over Asian countries through a combination of cultural blitzkrieg and realpolitik. The second section discusses the relatively unknown fact of Beijing's courting of neutralist elements in Asia in the immediate aftermath of the first Taiwan Strait crisis.Footnote 16 It will examine Beijing's wide-ranging propaganda offensive which aimed to placate neighbouring countries. By deftly writing the Taiwan problem into a script that tapped strongly into the discourses of nationalism and sovereignty in the wake of decolonization in Asia, Beijing made it extremely difficult for Washington to marshal world opinion and brand Beijing as the aggressor. Beijing appreciated the effectiveness of third-party negotiators in prodding Washington towards direct negotiations. The Bandung Conference became a choice forum for signalling the formal winding down of the crisis. The last section will investigate how, in the wake of the second Taiwan Strait crisis, China worked towards gaining international support for its actions. China's courting of fraternal communist countries and neutralist nations will be analysed. The article will scrutinize how and why China closely guarded its tacit accommodation with the Americans and dismissed third-party proposals. Building on recent insights and new sources, it argues that Beijing paradoxically found its friendship and prestige with Asian neutralists a hindrance to its tacit understanding with Washington, as the neutralist countries were overly eager to become Beijing's mediators.
China's international debut: the Geneva Conference
China's desire to break out of international isolation led it to take up a position of ‘reasonableness’ that disarmed many potential antagonists and improved China's diplomatic standing. In March 1954, Premier Zhou Enlai spelled out clearly the broad aims that China should achieve in Geneva:
We should adopt a policy of actively participating in the Geneva Conference, of enhancing diplomatic and international activities, in order to undermine the policy of blockade, embargo, and expanding armaments and war preparations by the US imperialists, and of promoting the relaxation of the tense international situation. Even though the United States will try everything possible to sabotage reaching all kinds of agreements favourable to the cause of peace, we should still go all out at Geneva Conference to strive for some agreements, even agreements only temporary [in nature] and limited [in scope], so as to open the path to resolving international disputes through discussion and negotiations by the big powers.
The Geneva Conference was the international debut for China and Zhou stressed the need to establish a ‘path’ for resolving international disputes. The premier ordered China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ‘prepare other materials and opinions concerning China, the Far East, and peace and security in Asia’. Zhou also wanted China to reach out to other countries. Ironically, Beijing set very low expectations for other communist gains and did not expect much progress beyond the Korean armistice. Beijing also calculated that Hanoi might have to pursue ‘negotiating while fighting’ in the long run, a policy that China had advocated earlier. Should conditions allow, China much preferred a more stable ‘division along a demarcation line between south and north, such as the 16th parallel’ rather than ‘an on-site ceasefire’.Footnote 17
Reflecting on the Geneva Conference 30 years later, Wang Bingnan, one of China's negotiators in Geneva, explains just how ‘unexpected’ was the way in which ‘paths’ were forged:
Formally, the Geneva Conference was an arena of conflict where delegations from various nations read their prepared statements and enunciated their official positions. Privately, the conference served as a channel of communication and understanding which helped bring about a tacit agreement on many an issue (moqi de qudao 默契的渠道). Much inside information was revealed during chats in the bar. The comrades of our delegation actively circulated among, and made friends with, a large group of people. . . . Before the Geneva Conference, we had no idea that it was to open the door to China-US negotiations.Footnote 18
Beijing's newfound reasonableness disarmed the West. One Chinese delegate, Shi Zhe, noted that the Canadians privately approved of Zhou's reasonable position.Footnote 19 In his memoirs, Canadian delegate, Chester Ronning, supported this view and noted that the United States had adamantly refused to compromise.Footnote 20 Privately, the Canadians blamed the ‘rigidity’ of the United States for the failure to even gain a ‘compromise’ statement on the talks over Korea. The Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, was also tired of American intransigence. ‘Spaak, who had been indignant over the treatment given to the Soviet proposal,’ reported the Canadian delegation to Ottawa, ‘exploded over the [American refusal to entertain the] Chinese suggestion.’Footnote 21
Even Bedell Smith, the American representative in Geneva, was not immune to the Chinese. Prior to the conference, he privately revealed to V. M. Molotov, the Soviet minister of Foreign Affairs, that the American position (i.e. that of Dulles) was ‘unrealistic’.Footnote 22 Smith disagreed with the direction that Dulles was taking in Geneva. He also frowned upon the petty stunts that Dulles seemed to favour vis-à-vis withdrawing the American team from Geneva.Footnote 23 ‘Presumably US Del would be kept informed by French and Associated States,’ argued Dulles on 17 June, ‘but we would avoid official participation in day-by-day Committee discussions which would mould decisions from which we might find it awkward subsequently to disassociate ourselves.’Footnote 24 Eisenhower did not agree and the idea dissipated.Footnote 25 Ever the practical man, Bedell Smith undertook ‘personal diplomacy’ towards the end of the Conference by engaging Zhou's translator, Pu Shouchang, in small talk about ‘China's ancient civilization’ and Pu's ‘beautiful’ spoken English. The Chinese communists ‘were impressed with Smith's extraordinary gesture, given the adversarial relations between the two nations’. Smith subsequently continued in the same vein about Chinese ‘civilization’ and ‘Chinese porcelain’ with Premier Zhou.Footnote 26 Finally, Smith took the initiative on the last day of the Geneva Conference to ‘shake the sleeve of the Premier [Zhou]’. That even as a veteran diplomat, Wang Bingnan should so vividly recount this little episode 30 years later shows the significance that China placed on sincere gestures, however rendered.Footnote 27
Zhou highlighted the ritualistic symbolism of China's role in Geneva: ‘This is akin to Mei Lanfang's operatic performance . . . every role must be complete, and the entire endeavour has to be flawless.’ Roles were play-acted and press conferences were rehearsed. Huang Hua, the spokesman for China, had to endure three rounds of grilling in China.Footnote 28 Sparing no effort in managing its international image, China rented one of the grandest chateaus available—the ‘Grand Mont-Fleuri’. The chateau was transformed into a museum as antiques were shipped from China to decorate its rooms and corridors.Footnote 29 Zhou calculated that the international and media curiosity about China would make the chateau a beehive of activities and elicit informal visits from foreigners. Chinese press attaché, Xiong Xianghui, later estimated that 505 international groups and 3,800 people had visited China's premises.Footnote 30
To demonstrate China's progress, Zhou screened a documentary of the People's Republic of China's 1952 National Day celebrations to a full house. The choreography, the mass movements, and the weapons parade impressed many. ‘The Chinese sense of theatre’ was in overdrive.Footnote 31 Xiong recalled with pride that some foreign reporters opined that ‘it is no longer possible to view the PRC through the pre-1949 lens’. Nevertheless, some American correspondents claimed that the military parades were a sign of China's growing militarism.Footnote 32 Zhou was unfazed, again referring to China's ability to be flexible: ‘We are like Mei Lanfang's opera; we can deliver whatever roles demanded.’Footnote 33
To combat negative views, Zhou also held the overseas screening of China's first colour feature film, Liang Shanbo yu Zhu Yintai 梁山泊与祝英台 [The Butterfly Lovers], during the Geneva Conference. The film belied negative perceptions of communist China as a faceless totalitarian regime, and showcased such ‘Asian’ values as the importance of education and filial piety. More importantly, the film transmitted such universal tropes as unrequited love and fidelity beyond death.Footnote 34 It was hardly possible to demonize China when the first feature film they showed overseas ruminated weepy love. The audience was enthralled by this version of an ‘Eastern Romeo and Juliet’. Molotov was moved to comment: ‘I finally understand [the] Chinese concept of proprieties and its standard of morality: to see one's love, but to be restrained from a touch, a kiss and a hug!’Footnote 35 One Indian reporter further noted: ‘[that] China could shoot this movie in the midst of the Korean War and Land Reform signalled in spades just how stable the régime was’.Footnote 36 In addition, Zhou made use of the screening of the film to provide a neutral meeting space for the Laotian, Cambodian, and North Vietnamese representatives.Footnote 37
Acquiring friends was the diplomatic mantra of the People's Republic of China. When Laotian foreign minister, Phoui Sananikone, openly denounced China for harbouring ‘imperialistic’ intentions,Footnote 38 Zhou instructed Wang Bingnan and Shi Zhe to wine and dine the Laotians. First, the Chinese diplomats had a tête-à-tête with the Laotians in a beautiful garden, impressing upon the guests the ‘reason-ableness’ of the Chinese communists.Footnote 39 Later, on 21 June, Zhou had dinner with them. Zhou reported to the Chinese Communist Party that the stance of the Cambodians and the Laotians showed ‘significant improvement’ from 22 June onwards.Footnote 40
China's biggest target was India. India's special envoy in Geneva, Krishna Menon, was impressed with Zhou. When Jawaharlal Nehru invited Zhou to visit India, Menon said: ‘[E]ven if it was for a day, the impact on the world would be great.’Footnote 41 Mao immediately cabled Zhou that ‘the opportunity should not be passed up’.Footnote 42 As Eden was attentive to Nehru, there was no better conduit to Britain. Moreover, India took the initiative to sound China out; Beijing could hardly miss this golden opportunity. By the time Zhou and Nehru issued a joint statement on 28 June 1955, based on the Panchsheel Treaty (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence), Nehru had decided he could do business with the Chinese communists.Footnote 43
Zhou waved aside all cultural references to China being a dominant power. Tep Phan, the Cambodian foreign minister, stated in his first meeting with Zhou on 20 June that ‘China is a big country, we hope that China can continue to help our small nation to peacefully co-exist.’ Zhou graciously dismissed such hierarchies and insisted that the ‘blood’ relationship between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia was akin to that of xiongdi xiangchu 兄弟相处 [a brotherly relationship].Footnote 44 Similarly, Zhou used the ‘blood ties’ gambit in his meeting on 23 June with Laotian foreign minister, Phoui Sananikone: ‘I have said that eastern nationalities have some blood ties, hence we should be more respectful of each other's independent sovereignty and unification.’Footnote 45 Zhou reassured the Laotians on the eve of the Geneva Accords that China had no designs on Laos. ‘Perhaps you will think that China is a big country and will be anxious [about us]. However, after the peace agreement has been reached, the Kingdom of Laos will be a unified country through elections,’ promised Zhou. He continued, ‘. . . The Five Principles [of Peaceful Coexistence] we referred to before can also apply to the relationship between us.’Footnote 46 China's charm offensive thus pervaded all quarters of the Geneva Conference.
Interestingly, appeals to cultural and affective ties were often raised first by the Cambodians and Laotians, suggesting attempts by the weaker parties to stress their commonality with the stronger party. Tep Phan informed Zhou that he still possessed his Chinese grandfather's ancestral worship artefacts and averred that: ‘We are very close to China . . . three out of four Cambodians have Chinese blood in them.’Footnote 47 Phoui Sananikone talked about his visit to China and about the fact that the ethnic roots of Laotians could be traced to the Tibetan highlands. Given this implicit understanding, Beijing did not have to assert its position too strongly.Footnote 48
Underlying China's cultural approach was a solid foundation of realpolitik. Mao's moves were rooted deeply in domestic considerations and fears of containment by the United States. Although North Vietnam was a fraternal ally, Beijing did not hesitate to press Prime Minister Ho Chi Minh for concessions to safeguard China's borders. When it was time to apply pressure, the Soviets and the Chinese communists did not falter. By June, with the North Vietnamese stubbornly resisting making any concessions, the head of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Southeast Asia Department, K. V. Novikov, harshly berated Premier Pham Van Dong for having ‘no clear ideas on the plan for division of zones [in Laos]’. That a mere departmental head was allowed to publicly castigate a foreign premier signalled the exasperation of the Soviets.Footnote 49
On the Vietnam problem, Chinese diplomat, Li Kenong, concluded that Dong had finally come round to the idea that ‘the minimum goal is the 16th parallel’. Wang Bingnan recalled the burning issue: ‘At that time, some people in Vietnam hoped that they would unify Vietnam at one go. However, judging from the relative strength of both sides, we realized that this was impossible.’Footnote 50 Shielding the Vietnamese from further humiliation, China moved this critical issue to the remote Liuzhou Conference (which took place from 3–5 July), away from prying eyes. No less than eight strenuous rounds of negotiations were needed to secure the deal. Zhou stressed to Chairman Ho Chi Minh, Ambassador Hoang Van Hoan, and General Giap that the danger of the Indochina situation was that the conflict had been ‘internationalized’. Zhou elaborated:
In Vietnam, the imperialists feared the expansion of China; therefore it would not allow the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a big-scale victory. If we insisted on too much, Indochina would not gain peace, the US will intervene, the conflict will be internationalized, and this will be detrimental to us. The problem of Indochina is not restricted to three nations, but it affects the entire Southeast Asia, it will have impact on Europe and the world situation. We now have only one mission, to fight for peace.
Zhou promised that the barest minimum for the division line would be ‘Route Nine [close to 17th parallel]’. But with regard to Laos, China believed that realistically only the northern provinces would be under communist control. In Cambodia, there was not much chance for any separate administration.Footnote 51
Strong-armed by the Chinese, Ho observed that the West ‘would at most concede territory to the 17th parallel’.Footnote 52 Ho conceded: ‘We must help Mendès-France, ensure that he does not fall, this is the best bet for us.’Footnote 53 But it was only on 20 July that Pham Van Dong reluctantly accepted the inevitable. ‘The French had already revealed their bottom line; they just want a face-saving and honourable exit from Vietnam,’ counselled Zhou, ‘whereas Vietnam will still belong to the Vietnamese.’Footnote 54
Just how contentious the Liuzhou decision was can be gleaned from Mao's personal intervention. Mao stamped his approval on China's Geneva policy in the enlarged Politburo meeting held on 7 July 1954.Footnote 55 He commended Zhou's efforts: ‘Our activities for the last two months are very good . . . We, the Soviets, Korea and Vietnam have cooperated well, our policy is correct and our activities have gained results.’Footnote 56 Mao elaborated further that the ‘peace slogan’ had isolated the United States: ‘In negotiations, things which can be compromised, we should compromise, things which we should insist upon, we must be firm.’ In sum, the act of forcing concessions out of the Vietnamese communists was justified in view of world developments and subsumed in the greater interests of China.Footnote 57 The world situation was so positive that ‘to shut the door is no longer possible’. This ideal situation encouraged China to ‘venture out’ to gain more international allies.Footnote 58 Mao advocated an intense diplomatic effort to win over countries like India and Burma. Finally, Mao reminded his colleagues that China's desire to uphold peace was solely for the purpose of ‘protecting our country, protecting socialism and to strive for building up a great socialist country’.Footnote 59
Beijing's diplomatic efforts were not misplaced. Nehru fully supported the admission of China into the UN, asserting on 12 July: ‘The international unrest for the past four years from the Korea conflict to the chaos in Southeast Asia boils down to not letting the PRC into the UN.’ Burmese dailies termed the American actions a ‘conspiracy’. An editorial in the Mandalay People's Daily speculated that the United States was trying to ‘salvage a modicum of victory from the failure of its position in the Geneva Conference’. The Yangon Daily scoffed at the American Congress's threat to withdraw the United States from the UN. Indonesian editorials were also of the general opinion that China's presence in the UN would have a ‘definite effect on world peace’, spelling the end of the troublesome ‘international embargoes’.Footnote 60
The Chinese charm offensive
China's grand international debut at the Geneva Conference was a chequered success.Footnote 61 Zhou's diplomacy had successfully ensured the passage of the Geneva Accords. That Hanoi was strong-armed by its fraternal allies into accepting the 17th parallel was downplayed.Footnote 62 The only blight on the Accords was the non-participation of the United States.Footnote 63 Nevertheless, Zhou noted jubilantly: ‘The agreements that we have achieved . . . will enable the people of the three states of Indo-China to engage in the construction of their respective countries in a peaceful environment.’Footnote 64 Zhou distilled the wisdom of his success in a five-point summary and specifically emphasized the value of compromises.Footnote 65
Washington's disregard for the Geneva Accords took the shine off Beijing's diplomatic achievements. Beijing was unhappy with the United States’ continued insistence on non-recognition for China but was encouraged by the support of Asian neutralist countries as well as China's relatively successful international debut in Geneva. However, China was frustrated with the formation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization and the likelihood of a potential defence treaty between the Republic of China and the United States, which it regarded as directly targeting China. Coupled with the continuation of Republic of China commando raids and the looming danger of ‘two Chinas’, China launched massive bombardments on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu on 3 September 1955, thereby setting off the first Taiwan Strait crisis.
In the wake of this crisis, Beijing launched a battery of domestic and international propaganda efforts to justify its actions. Besides appealing to its domestic audience, China worked hard to present its case to the communist bloc, Japan, neutralist countries (especially India and Burma), and Britain. Such efforts in the international arena were facilitated by the success of China's earlier attempts to break out of diplomatic isolation following the Korean War and could be seen as a continuation of China's quest for international recognition and participation.
With the Japanese, who were American allies, Zhou dug hard into the shared cultural and affective domains to establish Beijing's sincerity. Would China threaten Japan? Zhou declared: ‘I can guarantee to everyone, we are definitely on the side of world peace . . . this is . . . our fundamental policy.’ Zhou further stated: ‘Compared to our several thousand years of shared history, sixty years [of Japanese aggression] is nothing.’ Historically the Japanese and the Chinese had mutually beneficial relations 共存共荣 and mutually shared common cultural roots 同文同种. Turning to Japan's non-recognition of China, Zhou stated that China's ‘feelings were very hurt’. But he quickly quoted legislator, Yamaguchi Kikuichirō (1897–1981), who claimed that the ‘fault lay not with China’. Zhou attacked Washington instead: ‘I also know that basic difficulties reside not with the Japanese government because on top of the Japanese government's head is another overlord, the Americans.’Footnote 66
The Chinese communists assiduously courted neutralist countries. Nehru, for example, received an unprecedented welcome in Beijing. In Mao's conversation with Nehru on 19 October 1954, Mao praised India because ‘India had the courage to stay away [from the South East Asian Treaty Organization]’.Footnote 67 In a meeting on 23 October, Mao went quickly to the root of his concerns: ‘Do you think that US wants war and would use war to achieve its interests?’ Nehru pointed out that ‘many in the civilian administration do not [think in terms of war]’.Footnote 68 Mao was clearly daunted by atomic weapons, but he made a show of philosophizing away the threat. But Nehru pointed out that if China's population were killed off in large numbers, China could not ‘easily start again’. Mao conceded to Nehru's logic: ‘We have just started our Five-Year Plan. Should there be a war, all our plans will be destroyed.’Footnote 69 Thus, Beijing wanted Nehru's sponsorship in China's search for peace. In a critical section, which is missing in the Chinese sources, Mao asked Nehru's advice for ‘convening a World Peace Congress’. Zhou had raised this issue in an earlier meeting: ‘We support the . . . Afro-Asian Conference . . . because this conference is for Afro-Asia peace in the context of a larger world peace; not only would this conference expand the peace process, it would also ease international tensions.’Footnote 70 Mao also reaffirmed China's interest: ‘Over a hundred nations all over the world can participate, and there should be a sort of treaty for peace and non-aggression.’Footnote 71
Beijing acted quickly to placate its neighbour's fears. In the first meeting with Burmese prime minister, U Nu, on 1 December 1954, Mao freely endorsed Sino-Burmese trade agreements and even invited the Burmese to inspect Yunnan.Footnote 72 Mao also endorsed the role played by the Burmese in organizing the Bandung Conference. In a subtle quid pro quo, Mao requested: ‘We hope to attend this conference, if that is agreeable to the other countries.’ Presented with such generous hospitality, U Nu formally extended the Bandung invitation to China the next day. Zhou ‘heartily’ accepted, saying: ‘This meeting will facilitate a common meeting place for countries with hitherto no relations with each other. This will build up mutual appreciation and remove misunderstandings and estrangements.’Footnote 73
Mao intuitively understood that Beijing's reassurances to Yangôn were a clear statement about the reality of China's burgeoning hegemonic status in Asia. Mao waved aside U Nu's verbal posturing in his statement ‘I shall listen to their suggestions with the humbleness of a younger brother toward his elder brothers’ and insisted that China and Burma were ‘brothers born in the same year’.Footnote 74 Mao further reassured U Nu that ‘revolution cannot be exported’ and ‘we do not organize a Communist Party among overseas Chinese’. Citing the Central Intelligence Agency coup in Guatemala, Mao promised that the Chinese ambassador, Yao Zhongming, would never instigate such a dastardly act. Even when U Nu invited the Chinese Communist Party to send a delegation to Burma, Mao refused as it might have upset other political parties in Burma.Footnote 75 However, Beijing's overtures via India and Burma were rejected by the United States. In January 1955, Dulles dismissed U Nu's appeals for direct talks between China and the United States.Footnote 76
China also adroitly strove to persuade heavyweight international figures to take up its cause. UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was the first candidate in the search for mediators by the United States and China to resolve their diplomatic impasse. Although Hammarskjöld was ostensibly talking to China over the issue of detained American airmen, Zhou decided to use the UN secretary-general for his own means. To the chagrin of the United States, Hammarskjöld returned from his visit to China (which took place from 5–10 January) reporting that ‘Chou is relating the question of the flyers to the whole complex of questions which he guesses is regularization of the whole situation.’Footnote 77 Indeed, Zhou talked about ‘harmonizing the tense situation’ in the Taiwan Strait on 6 January. The next day Zhou stressed the ‘Geneva spirit of 1954’ and pointed out that the United States was ‘only interested in making hay out of the spy case [airmen POWs] in order to distract the world's attention from the hostile and invasive intentions of the Sino-US Mutual Defence Treaty’.Footnote 78
However, the United States decided that Hammarskjöld had taken his job too seriously.Footnote 79 Hammarskjöld urged that actions aimed at providing ‘momentum’ for the negotiations over the prisoners should be coordinated and defended his stance, saying that it was only ‘natural’ that his talks with the Chinese should include ‘this whole issue to peace’.Footnote 80 Washington was frustrated that Hammarskjöld's talks had ranged beyond ‘the simple issue’ of the detained prisoners.Footnote 81 Hammarskjöld's initiatives paradoxically caused the United States to be hoist by its own petard: now it appeared to be the obdurate party and Dulles confided in a subordinate ‘We are in a mess.’Footnote 82 Dulles was so ‘mad’ that ‘he does not know what to say to H [Hammarskjöld]’.Footnote 83
In contrast, Zhou adroitly used Hammarskjöld to air China's grievances. Apart from reiterating that the Taiwan Strait crisis was an internal affair and that China did not have a seat in the UN, the main thrust in Beijing's first official letter to the UN on 3 February was all about peace: ‘All genuine international efforts to ease and to eliminate the tension created by the United States in this area and other areas of the Far East will receive the support of the PRC.’Footnote 84 Zhou elaborated on the ‘easing of tension’ to Hammarskjöld in another letter dated 5 February. Zhou's offer in this follow-up letter was strikingly similar to the one Zhou would announce in Bandung three months later: ‘China would not refuse to negotiate with the USA on this question. If the USA has the slightest wish to negotiate they should accept direct negotiations and give up their war threats.’Footnote 85
Nehru was so won over by China's cause that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference became a major venue debating the Taiwan issue. Both Ceylon and India provided Beijing with critical information on developments at the Commonwealth Conference. One Indian source confided that Britain urgently requested India to ‘pull its chestnuts out from the fire’. Nehru carefully remained non-committal towards the British request, citing ‘he had not conjured up a plan yet’.Footnote 86
Beijing reinforced its foothold in Asia by adopting anti-colonial nationalism. The Indians saw China's actions in the Taiwan Strait as striking a blow against the West for the East. The post-colonial feeling against Western ‘bullying and threatening tactics’ was strong in India. Just as Nehru scored points for Asia in a wholly ‘white’ Conference, China was perceived as demonstrating similar verve militarily. One unnamed Indian defence attaché spoke glowingly of China's actions in the Taiwan Strait as ‘filling the Asia people with pride and elation’. This outspoken Indian defence attaché even boldly suggested that China should ‘fully prepare to finish it once and for all’.Footnote 87 Beijing also became aware of that the Americans ‘dislike Nehru thoroughly and did not wish to let him be their front man’.Footnote 88 Eisenhower had also explicitly told Eden how much he detested Krishna Menon and ‘had no use for his methods’.Footnote 89 To spite the United States, it also made good sense for China to use India.Footnote 90
Nehru was a genuine voice for Asian interests during the Commonwealth Conference. Macmillan recalled that Nehru's opening speech was ‘very anti-American and pro-Chinese in sentiment’.Footnote 91 The Canadian prime minister, Lester Pearson, was less charitable.Footnote 92 When Nehru made known his sympathy for China, Pearson depicted that as a purblind posture:
Nehru was quite bitter about American policy, and resented, as an Asian, their bullying and threatening tactics. He obviously doesn't feel the same resentment when Chou bullies and blusters, because Chou is not so much a Communist as an Asian!Footnote 93
By April, Beijing had come to believe that a conciliatory approach at the upcoming Bandung Conference would present immense advantages and on 23 April Zhou thus announced to the astonished Asian delegates that:
As to the relations between China and the United States, the Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States. We are willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means. If those of you here would like to facilitate the settlement of disputes between the United States and China by peaceful means, it would be most beneficial to the relaxation of tension in the Far East and also to the postponement and prevention of a world war.Footnote 94
Zhou's invitation to delegates was intended to put additional pressure on the United States. Zhou's dramatic peace announcement in Bandung put Dulles on the defensive. Earlier, on 14 March 1955, the Indian ambassador to the UN, Krishna Menon, had approached Washington with an offer to act as ‘the go-between’. However, Washington saw this as excessive Indian interference.Footnote 95 To Washington's chagrin, a Pakistani diplomat, Mir Khan, then suggested that an exchange of ‘diplomatic notes’ could seal the deal and pave the way for a ‘personal meeting with Chou’, preferably in ‘Karachi’.Footnote 96 American ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, perceptively recognized that ‘Chou will use Menon for nuisance value, he is not building up Menon as a go-between . . . Chou thinks his interests are best served by direct talks with the United States.’Footnote 97 Dulles viewed such channels as ‘a typical Chinese trick—they will take whoever has the most to offer—which negotiator is most successful’.Footnote 98
Ironically, with this abundance of emissaries, China proved to be fastidious about their choice of spokesperson. For example, Beijing hesitated over Nehru's ‘weak character’ based on some wild rumours. One Chinese attaché reported that, ‘It is said that Nehru is Countess Mountbatten's old lover . . . Many major political decisions were decisively influenced by the Countess.’ For the prudish Chinese, Nehru's alleged adulterous affair amplified their perception of the Indian leader as a ‘weak character’ and explained the vacillating nature of Nehru's diplomacy. Subsequently, the Chinese came round to thinking that it could also pressure the malleable Nehru.Footnote 99
In another instance, Hammarskjöld's deft approach and ‘silent diplomacy’ overwhelmed the Chinese embassy in Stockholm.Footnote 100 ‘Hammarskjöld's nonessential digressions were numerous and unceasing,’ complained the Chinese embassy severely, and ‘Ambassador Geng Biao had to put up with this by listening intently without much comments [sic]’. The Chinese diplomats wryly noted the clear intentions of the UN secretary-general: ‘If we do not release the US airmen earlier, he would be put in a tight spot.’ The release of the airmen was thus transformed into an issue of Hammarskjöld's personal prestige or saving ‘face’.Footnote 101 However, Beijing specifically instructed Geng to be ‘reasonable’ as Hammarskjöld was ‘not representing the US and the UN’Footnote 102 and therefore releasing the airmen would enhance China's relationship with Hammarskjöld and give China the moral high ground. When China released the 11 airmen in August, it stated that ‘they were being released in order to maintain friendship’ with Hammarskjöld, and also hoped that ‘contacts with Hammarskjöld would continue’.Footnote 103
Unpredictable Chinese allies: frustrations and measures
Zhou's conciliatory gesture at the Bandung Conference was followed by other initiatives to nudge the United States towards bilateral negotiations. On 11 July Eisenhower decided to proceed with the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks (August 1955−December 1957) to be held in Geneva. Although the bilateral talks represented progress, from a framework of tacit communication towards tacit accommodation between the United States and China, the limitations of such an accommodation became apparent during the negotiations over the issues of the American airmen and the Taiwan Strait, and different expectations led to inconclusive results by the end of 1957. After the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks ceased in December 1957, further talks were suspended indefinitely. The United States appeared infuriatingly tardy in responding to China's demands for the resumption of ambassadorial talks and the Republic of China continued with its onslaught of commando raids.Footnote 104 In a show of defiance, on 17 July 1958 the Chinese Politburo agreed to proceed with further bombardments on Quemoy.Footnote 105 On 23 August 1958, China again bombarded Quemoy and Matsu, igniting the second Taiwan Strait crisis.
In the international arena Beijing deliberately adopted an ambiguous stance to disguise its limited aims. On 31 August the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee issued detailed instructions on the Taiwan Strait crisis to all Chinese diplomats. Whether China would ‘land and overrun’ the offshore islands would remain undefined; however, they were instructed to firmly assert three political points. One, that ‘liberation and unification’ was a national ‘historical mission’ and China did not wish anyone to question its ‘sacred’ and ‘righteous task’ nor hazard a deadline on the accomplishment of the mission. Two, the bombardments were a ‘punishment’ for all the Republic of China's harassments and provocations. Three, the master culprit was the United States, which should withdraw its troops from Taiwan and the offshore islands to ensure peace in the Taiwan Strait.Footnote 106
China communicated its political aims directly to fraternal countries, highlighting four areas where there would be no negotiation: the ‘One China’ policy; stopping aggression from the United States; a state of perpetual civil war with the Nationalists; and grounds for a ‘ceasefire’ between China and the United States. Footnote 107 However, Beijing's rhetoric was muted. To the Bulgarian ambassador, General Petar Pavlov Panchevski, Zhou downplayed the Taiwan Strait crisis: ‘. . . the situation is really not so tense. The United States is making use of the tense situation to scare people. Although we are willing to relieve the tensions, we are also not afraid of them.’ Significantly, Zhou's statement was the first admission to a pro-Soviet foreigner that China was willing to negotiate.Footnote 108
For neutralist countries, Beijing adopted yet another posture. China recognized that the ‘fear of war’ had ‘prompted in some a blind adherence to peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait’. Towards such countries, China advocated the soft approach: ‘According to different circumstances one must use suitable persuasions to let them understand that to reduce the tension in the Taiwan Strait, the United States must withdraw and stop interfering with the domestic politics of the PRC.’Footnote 109 Beijing's bottom line was to guard against attempts to bring the settlement of the conflict to the UN or to be pressured internationally for a peaceful settlement.Footnote 110
China received strong communist fraternal support for its Taiwan Strait actions. This critical element is missing from existing scholarship on China's foreign relations. On 4 September, the Mongolian Foreign Ministry informed China that its military delegation wanted to find out during their forthcoming visit to the country ‘if there is anything the Mongolian People's Army could do to support China’.Footnote 111 Fraternal countries also pressed Moscow to take a more active role in aiding China. The North Korean ambassador emphasized the importance of the recovery of China's territory. The Hungarian and Czech ambassadors said that the recovery of Taiwan was ‘a joint enterprise for all fraternal countries’. An official statement from Mongolia dated 10 September said it best: ‘The US provocative actions against our great fraternal brother China are against the world's peace-loving people. This also meant that their provocations are against the Mongolian people.’ The warning was clear: should you provoke one of us, you would upset us all.Footnote 112
The prevailing jingoistic mood ironically put China in a difficult position. The Chinese embassy in Hanoi was swamped by ‘enthusiastic’ inquiries. Some bolder Vietnamese comrades even questioned the timing of the bombardments, making it clear that they thought it should have been done earlier. Yet, such sound and fury seemed directed more at the Vietnamese body politic, and was intended to drum support for its ultimate unification with the South.Footnote 113 In an official statement on 10 September, Vietnamese prime minister, Pham Van Dong, cleverly tied the Taiwan Strait crisis to American interference in South Vietnam.Footnote 114 When the threat of a possible war between China and the United States had passed in mid-September, this prompted even bigger demonstrations of Sino-Vietnamese fraternity. The Vietnamese organized a 50,000-strong mass rally, which the Chinese embassy enthusiastically reported was the ‘most popular’ rally in living memory. Personnel from foreign embassies from Indonesia, North Korea, the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and other countries were also present.Footnote 115
Fraternal support shielded Beijing from Soviet criticisms. Beijing was able to retain such support for its independent foreign policy through regular briefing sessions conducted by senior Chinese officials. Beijing also drew on a variety of themes to stiffen the resolve of the Soviet bloc. Vice-foreign minister, Zhang Wentian, averred that the crisis was not without its benefits since the United States would face the ‘opposition of the world’, especially ‘the opposition to US imperialism’. Zhang then repeated Mao's ‘noose’ analogy: the Taiwan crisis had been transformed into a noose around the Americans’ neck from which there would no easy release. Left unsaid was the implication that the crisis would not be allowed to get out of hand. China also tried to show that the American threats were all hollow: ‘Don't be alarmed by its bared teeth and sharp claws, . . . be steadfast and determined, [the US] really has no other means, hence we call it the paper tiger.’Footnote 116 Elsewhere, vice-foreign minister, Ji Pengfei, had admitted the cautious tacit acquiescence of the Americans, seen in their calculation of China's three miles of territorial waters from Quemoy rather than the mainland.Footnote 117
Conventional scholarship has stressed the belligerence of China in comparison to the caution of the Soviet Union.Footnote 118 However, as the above analysis has demonstrated, Mao's actions had elicited strong fraternal ritualized support. As the communist countries’ belligerent attitudes went against Moscow's advocacy of peaceful coexistence, this raises the question whether Mao and China represented the sole example of an ‘aggressive stance’ in this period of international communism.
Toward neutralist Asian countries, Beijing adopted a policy of adroit rhetoric and pressure. On 30 August, vice-foreign minister, Zhang Wentian, informed the Indian ambassador that friendly Asian countries had a role to play, asserting that Asian countries should recognize, ‘object and oppose the American conspiratorial attempts to create tension in the Far East’. Although Zhang was pugnacious in stating that it was China's hallowed mission to recover the offshore islands and Taiwan, this was presented more as a matter of ‘policy and determination’ than actual occupation of territory.Footnote 119 In response, Afro-Asian countries in the UN reportedly began to play the same tune as Beijing.Footnote 120
China's ritualized script of the Taiwan Strait crisis involved conflating its historical role of being the perennial victim with creative embellishments. Zhang gave the following sanitized version of events to the Indian ambassador: ‘On 23 August, Chiang Kai-shek's clique was sending supplies to Quemoy. To give cover to the supply ships, the Quemoy commander fired upon us. Hence, we returned fire. That is how things developed.’ Zhang trivialized the event that triggered the crisis and proceeded to condemn the American response of sending two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait as disproportionate.Footnote 121
To distant, and presumably ignorant, allies, Beijing affected a tough posture, as seen in Chen Yi's conversation with the United Arab Republic ambassador: ‘For the sake of our safety and the freedom of shipping, we must liberate Quemoy and Matsu . . . We have already blockaded the Strait, and controlled access to Quemoy and Matsu. We will force the Nationalists’ 80,000 army troops to retreat or surrender.’ However, Chen Yi's verbal overkill was quickly punctured by the ambassador who asked if reports that the United States had already broken the blockade were true. Chen Yi then switched to defending the principle of the ‘liberation of Taiwan’ and the offshore islands and back-pedalled at the end of his conversation: ‘One cannot just achieve one's goal [liberation of the offshore islands or Taiwan] by today or tomorrow.’Footnote 122
The shrewd tailoring of China's diplomatic pitch to different countries demonstrated a shrewd realpolitik outlook on international relations. The inflation of the crisis to Middle East allies made for good propaganda at little cost, and in the face of any astuteness displayed by distant allies, the belligerent rhetoric would be dropped.Footnote 123 For critical communist-bloc countries and other neutralist Asian allies, Beijing reverted to the ‘reasonable’ stance. Zhou carefully hinted in letters to Cambodian King Sihanouk and Krishna Menon that the People's Republic of China was concerned more with the ‘sacred and inviolable’ principle that China had every right to recover Taiwan and the offshore islands than with physical attempts to do so.Footnote 124
However, to Beijing's chagrin, the United States demonstrated adroit handling of Afro-Asian nations as well. Dulles showed a high degree of flexibility and reasonableness towards the South East Asian Treaty Organization ambassadors on 4 September, in the hope that Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines would relay the peace message to the other countries in the UN. A Ceylonese source reported: ‘If China's military manoeuvres are restricted to the offshore islands and not towards conquering Taiwan, Dulles hoped to use a peaceful solution to resolve the Taiwan Strait crisis.’ Dulles offered four suggestions. One, the UN would be invited to handle the situation. Two, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China would hold talks. Three, talks should also start between China and the United States. Four, India or the Soviet Union could be the third-party arbitrator. Dulles’ moves succeeded in temporarily deflecting negative world opinion of the United States.Footnote 125
On 18 September, Dulles publicly requested in the UN that talks between China and the United States be continued on the condition that the Chinese communists called a ceasefire in the Taiwan Strait. In turn, the United States promised to further discuss ‘cessation of provocations against Mainland China’.Footnote 126 Referring to the Afro-Asian countries, Zhou conceded that as these countries had requested a ceasefire and in order for Chiang to withdraw from the offshore islands, China would adopt a three-pronged approach to resolve the conflict: participate in negotiations in Warsaw, gather support among sympathetic UN members in New York, and continue barrages upon Quemoy.Footnote 127
Moreover, international opinions on the Taiwan Strait crisis appeared to be shifting. Initially, the American's militant actions had few supporters. But the American peace offensive—launched by Eisenhower's 11 September speech and Dulles’ 18 September speech in the UN—changed the international dynamics. Zhang acknowledged: ‘Some are blinded by the peaceful gestures into thinking that it would really resolve the crisis.’ Therefore, Beijing prudently decided to support the Warsaw negotiations because ‘while there would be acts of war, there would also be peaceful processes’. The Kuomintang on the offshore islands would also have to be pounded, but the Chinese communists ‘would not strike the Americans, if they did not attempt an invasion’. Zhang concurred that this zone of contest and period of probing would be around for a ‘considerable time’.Footnote 128
Beijing had difficulty with neutralist Asian responses to the Taiwan Strait crisis. One, China was alarmed at how susceptible neutralist Asian nations could be to American propaganda. Beijing had observed that Indonesian President Sukarno was captivated by American attention during his trip to the United States in May–June 1956. Sukarno had even ‘innocently’ suggested a ‘two-China policy in the UN’ during his visit to China in September–October 1956.Footnote 129 Paradoxically, the United States was similarly complaining about how easily swayed neutralist countries were by communist influence.
Two, neutralist Asian nations had sprung upon Beijing uninvited diplomatic initiatives that did not fit within the intricacies of China's strategic manoeuvring. The Burmese foreign minister had told a Romanian diplomat that Chiang should evacuate the offshore islands to ‘preserve the peace in Asia’, leaving ‘the Taiwan problem to be discussed later’. When the shocked Chinese ambassador found out on 25 September that the enthusiastic Burmese had decided to inform the United States of its position, he could only insist weakly that ‘the US is making use of the Warsaw negotiations to create a “ceasefire” fallacy to cover up its aggressive intentions’.Footnote 130
Three, Beijing was very suspicious of any neutralist country that leaned towards Washington. In 1958 all signs indicated that India was in the United States’ pocket.Footnote 131 On his visit to India in January 1958, United States Army chief general, Maxwell D. Taylor, had officially offered to ‘modernize the Indian Army’. The Chinese embassy reported that the 1958 American loan to India amounted to US$225 million and the United States was now more flexible on the Kashmir issue, even though it had rendered implicit support to Pakistan. The Indians were reportedly reciprocating by adopting a ‘hands-off’ attitude to the conflicts between China and the United States and disarmament talks. Wary of ‘offending the Americans’, they were also reluctant to attend another neutralist conference in Belgrade. India was playing off the great powers against each other and benefiting from the windfall of American and Soviet aid.Footnote 132
By October, the momentum among Western allies to abandon Chiang gathered speed. Selwyn Lloyd, British foreign minister, openly proposed that China should declare a ceasefire for just long enough to let the Nationalists evacuate the offshore islands.Footnote 133 Rejecting the British initiative, Beijing explicitly instructed Wang Bingnan, China's representative in the Warsaw negotiations, to keep the negotiations going. Should Warsaw fail, the stakes were high as Britain would intervene as an arbitrator or the United States would call in the UN.Footnote 134 The Soviets fully backed Beijing: if Moscow could not have its Ten-Nation Summit, neither would Washington be allowed to court world opinion.Footnote 135
More importantly, Beijing was confident that the United States understood several major points: ‘we do not wish to fight a war’; ‘we will not liberate Taiwan immediately’; ‘the US does not wish to fight with us over Quemoy’; ‘the US is trying to persuade Chiang to leave the islands so as to extricate itself from this area’. In view of the above considerations, China decided that it would be ‘more advantageous to leave Chiang on Quemoy’. Zhou ruminated:
Even as we demand that the US leave, and have confrontations with them, it is beneficial for Chiang to remain on Quemoy. This can be used to educate everyone in the world, especially our fellow Chinese. The Americans wish to extricate themselves, but we refuse to let them. So when we wish to increase tension, we will pound them. When we wish to relax, we will loosen up . . . We can have talking while fighting . . . For the moment, we shall not recover these offshore islands. After five to seven years’ time, we can recover these offshore islands, Pescadores and Taiwan all at one go.Footnote 136
However, it was the friendly Afro-Asian countries that were causing Beijing major problems. Beijing received the stunning news that Indonesia, its strongest ally in Southeast Asia, had proposed in the UN on 2 October, seconded by Ceylon and Burma, ‘a need to resolve the Far East crisis peacefully’. China viewed this as a public relations disaster as such unwanted help would only lend credence to the United States’ calls for a ‘ceasefire’, when it was China's official position that no state of war existed between it and the United States.Footnote 137
On 4 October, the sponsoring countries for the Indonesian proposal had grown to an alarming eight. This prompted Beijing to act. On 5 October, Minister Chen Yi turned down the offer by the Afro-Asian community to make an additional UN statement on the Taiwan Strait crisis. Krishna Menon's subsequent offer to address the UN was also rejected by Zhou, who suspected American machinations behind it.Footnote 138
The perplexity of this unintended situation was reflected in a rare critical directive from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee: ‘. . . the US is concocting another new conspiracy, stating that it is even willing to force Chiang Kai-shek's army off Quemoy and Matsu as a pre-requisite for any “ceasefire” to take effect, thus establishing the “Two-China” outcome’. As the onus would be on Beijing to accept the offer, the Committee then decided to alert all diplomats that the erstwhile pro-People's Republic of China ‘Afro-Asian countries would be used by the US to push for the issue to be settled in the UN’. All diplomats must hence emphasize two points to thwart all such unwelcome suggestions and attention. One, the UN was not a viable recourse as ‘the ongoing Warsaw negotiations are precisely undertaken to resolve outstanding Sino-US contentious issues’. Two, as the Taiwan Strait crisis was an ‘internal domestic affair’, one of the ten principles of the Bandung Conference— ‘mutual non-interference in each other's affairs’—should be invoked.Footnote 139
Paradoxically, then, Beijing became a victim of its own successful diplomatic encounters with neutralist Asian nations. Beijing's powerful propaganda following the Bandung Conference—that China was a reasonable power—was simply too attractive. Beijing was subsequently swamped by fraternal communist countries and neutral Afro-Asian politicians eager to be its intermediary to clear up the ‘ambiguity’ of the position of the offshore islands. While Beijing had initially benefited from world opinion at the United States’ expense, it now found itself bound by it, with Washington appearing more ‘reasonable’.Footnote 140
Beijing subsequently adopted a formula that would both placate the Afro-Asian chorus for peace and assuage any bruised egos resulting from China's firm rejection of any intermediary. Mao's abrupt announcement of a ceasefire on 6 October was a pre-emptive strike against any incommodious unilateral move by friends or foes. The second step consisted of invoking the amorphous ‘Spirit of Bandung’. Although China was only interested in ‘mutual non-interference in each other's affairs’, they soon discovered that Bandung meant different things to different people. Indonesia was effectively neutralized by Beijing's Bandung move. As the former host of the Bandung Conference, Indonesia was very proud of the ten principles that had been established. When China mentioned respecting the principles of Bandung, it sounded to Jakarta like praise for Indonesia's foreign policy achievements. According to the Indonesian papers, Foreign Minister Subandrio was reportedly pleased that the Warsaw negotiations were taking place and, by virtue of Indonesia's proximity to the Strait, Subandrio claimed that the crisis was a ‘good opportunity’ for Jakarta to ‘bring the involved protagonists together’.Footnote 141 Zhou fulfilled the Indonesian's need for a role in world diplomacy by personally thanking them for voicing concern at ‘US armed provocations and war threats’ and stated that China should have ‘its rightful place in the UN’. Zhou also reiterated how important it was that ‘the Indonesian Government holds that the US should follow the ten principles adopted by the Bandung Conference to settle the international dispute between China and the US in the Taiwan Strait’.Footnote 142
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China took every opportunity to showcase its new ‘public face’ to counter American attempts to make a pariah out of China. One such occasion was the 1954 Geneva Conference where world opinions were receptive to the ‘reasonable’ face presented by the communist regime. This new reputation was enhanced at the 1955 Bandung Conference. This article agrees with recent scholarship which argues that China made a successful international debut at both the 1954 Geneva Conference and the Bandung Conference. It further illustrates the creativity with which China plotted its re-emergence onto the world stage and elaborates on the unexpected outcomes that such diplomacy generated. The energy with which China went about managing world opinion belied its diplomatic inexperience as a new sovereign nation.
One outcome of China's public relations campaign was that friendly Afro-Asian leaders voiced their opinions, more often than their Chinese counterparts considered acceptable, on issues such as Asian security, China's economic development, and the Taiwan problem. During the first Taiwan Strait crisis, China tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc opinion to work to its advantage. Their efforts were successful as there was no lack of volunteers to air dissent regarding American foreign policy, but these new allies also wished to mediate between the United States, the Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China. At times such efforts were perceived by China not to be in accord with its domestic and strategic outlooks. China then embarked upon the active ‘management’ of disparate world opinions, which was an entirely new endeavour. Although China tried to provide a sanitized ‘script’ for its new friends, most had their own ideas.
The volume of third-party interferences grew during the second Taiwan Strait crisis. Overwhelmed by such international attention, China responded by rejecting these unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded instead outright condemnation of the United States. Thus, ironically, along with its growing prominence on the international stage, China found itself unbearably burdened by world opinion, a position previously held by the United States. One is left with the insight that the achievements of China's new international strategy were mixed, an important corrective to any attempts to eulogise China's foreign policy successes in the 1950s.
