A plethora of books continues to result from the decades of crises in Afghanistan. Three new offerings from European sources (two British and one French) provide new observations and some cogent analyses, albeit also some pessimistic viewpoints of the unfolding tragedies and political missteps from all sides in that benighted country. It seems that as soon as one problem in Afghanistan is overcome, yet others emerge to fill the void. G. Dorronsoro (Revolution Unending), C. Johnson and J. Leslie (Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace), and P. Rogers (A War on Terror) have given us fresh perspectives on seminal world events, based either upon their extensive travels and interviews and/or upon assessments of the layers of complexity that surround the turmoil. It is perhaps too much to hope that parts of these books can provide insights that, if recognized by decision makers, could help reduce tensions in the region.
G. Dorronsoro, a political scientist from the University of Paris, originally prepared Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present as an academic thesis based upon his extensive travels and researches in Afghanistan since 1988. His first two chapters in part I on the origins of the Afghan revolution set the stage with a fairly thorough and useful historical summary, especially for those who need background context. Part II on mobilizations details the commanders and the many mujahideen or jihadi parties that developed after the Communist coup in Kabul in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 1979. Part III focuses on the dynamics of confrontation between the Kabul regime and the guerillas, and part IV is on the Taliban. Part V, the last section in the book, concerns the American invasion after 9/11 and the return of political fragmentation to present-day Afghanistan. In the concluding chapters, the author presents useful observations on the pragmatic changes in policy of Pakistan in response to the changes in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan's important ongoing role as an uncontrollable haven for the remnants al-Qa

ida and the pro-Taliban movements. The perhaps critical ongoing crossborder movements of people and commerce are also featured. If one wishes at least a minimal understanding of the complexity of the events leading up to the manifold changes in Afghanistan for the past three decades, this is the book to read.
It was not ethnic differences that produced the conflict, Dorronsoro argues; true ethnic cleansing was never carried out, despite some brief outbursts of such barbarity. Instead, class structure and competition for education and employment, coupled with differences between urban and rural sensibilities, and political organizations with ideological objectives so polarized Afghanistan that the two-decade war became inevitable.
The discussion of the difficult period of Taliban rule is especially good. Much about the Taliban will be forever unknown because of their own disorganization, opaque decision making, and lack of records, but Dorronsoro has well captured and interpreted much of what is known of them. The association and education of many Taliban as Afghan refugees in the madrasas of Pakistan has been recognized by others before but is presented well here. The author presents excellent information on the status of women throughout time in Afghanistan, especially as it varied among different ethnic groups and under Taliban misrule.
In his concluding remarks, Dorronsoro suggests that, despite its overwhelming technological superiority, there is nothing to suggest that the United States will achieve stabilization in the short term. As has been noted by a number of other authors elsewhere as well, failure in Afghanistan will have serious consequences for America as a power; thus, the issues involved extend far beyond the destiny of Afghanistan itself. This is an essential concept that seems slowly to be achieving some recognition by decision makers in Washington.
Dorronsoro presents to the uninitiated a somewhat overwhelming plethora of names of people and movements critical to understanding the complexities of recent Afghan history, but the book is marred by a less than comprehensive index that would enable everything to be found with ease. A comprehensive glossary explains the meaning of many of the most common words. Transliteration of names is, however, a bit eccentric and may reflect transcription differences of uncommon names from French to English. The book has a wide variety of tables and small-scale maps that list and depict various ethnicities, political allegiances, and factional territory control, and other geographically useful information; all this adds to understanding and enables the reader to envision parts of exceptionally fluid historical situations.
In Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, Johnson and Leslie have drawn on their experience of a decade and a half of living and working for Oxfam and the United Nations throughout Afghanistan. Their unusual NGO perspective is reinforced by the authentic voices of the many Afghan people they interviewed. The resulting book is a refreshingly different view of the myriad problems of the country, although the assessment is marred by their noncritical view or failure to address the many problems caused by the Afghans themselves. Instead, the authors have expended most of their criticism, admittedly well placed, on the policies and machinations of the external powers that have so long played out their rivalries or aspirations on the Afghan body politic. This critical bias is, however, too much one way, almost an apologia for the Taliban, with little recognition of the culpability that so many Afghans share for destroying their own country or of the willful backwardness of so many people who wished to return to an imagined past that never existed. The authors have also made a few outright gaffes in their weak political analyses. That said, the book still presents valuable insights that could be considered where appropriate by the international intervention forces in Afghanistan.
To begin with, the authors note that, rather than engaging in hardheaded thinking about what was necessary and possible at the immediate postwar stage of Afghanistan's history, the international community went on a fantasy tour in imagining a participatory democracy that could not possibly exist, with full representation, gender sensitivity, and other trappings of the Western democratic rule of law. Cultural and political change at the point of a gun did not work for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, nor do the authors think that it will work for the United States or the International Security Assistance Forces, who now nominally control only parts of Afghanistan. As a result, the authors note that the country has been slipping back into a familiar anarchic pattern, with the new state in effective control of only the capital and a few other towns, and with tenuous negotiated control over the roads that link them. This book was written, however, in the perhaps overly pessimistic times before Hamid Karzai was elected president, and before parliamentary elections in which at least 27 percent of the seats are constitutionally reserved for women. The optimist might predict that the future of Afghanistan in the next few years may be a very different situation than that which Johnson and Leslie were able to foresee when they wrote this book.
The book is not only a strong critique of U.S. policies in Afghanistan but also, surprisingly, of Johnson's and Leslie's U.N. employer. The authors believe that the United Nations has failed in Afghanistan because it is not structurally adapted for the role in nation building it has been called upon to play. The authors, because they have operated from within the U.N. for a considerable time, have been able to make observations of staff incompetence, obeisance to U.S. desires, misguided pursuit of a failed-state model, and its being “singularly ill-equipped to meet the challenges presented by a radically different political landscape” (p. 213).
Johnson and Leslie present good assessments of the perhaps ultimately flawed remaking of Afghanistan into an American puppet state, or of a Shura-e Nazar (Northern Alliance) state in which the former Pushtun political dominance has been unwisely suppressed. They note increasing unrest and lack of control in the Pushtun heartland of the south and east, although the obvious connections between Pushtun suppression and loss of control are not well made by the authors. They also note that Afghanistan has been made into a sort of corporate grab bag wherein the profusion of contractors and all too often incompetent NGOs are more in it for themselves and their profits than for any possible good for the Afghans. The oilmen in power in Washington are seen by Johnson and Leslie as not only molding the Middle East to maintain the flow of oil to the West, but also remaking Afghanistan to encourage access to hydrocarbons in Central Asia. Private sector economic growth in Afghanistan, seemingly to the exclusion of all else, was seen by the authors to be chosen as the main engine of beneficial change, whether or not it will take root in a country where it hardly ever has before. Nonetheless, it should be noted in opposition to Johnson and Leslie's thesis that private Afghan corporate interests have been suppressed by state monopolies for a very long time, and it may be that the natural instincts of Afghans as traders in an ancient traveler's crossroads will ultimately be reasserted in a major beneficial way. It is too soon to tell and too soon to agree with Johnson and Leslie's pessimism.
This book also makes several important assertions that do have a ring of unpleasant truth about them, given the haste with which so much seems to have been done in attempting to reconstruct postwar Afghanistan. Especially striking to me, who was asked several years ago to provide topographic information on the location of mass graves, was that Johnson and Leslie noted any recognition of past atrocities has been suppressed so as not to embarrass some of those in the present government. This apparent expediency in the squelching of what in most other countries has been a valuable healing process, as well as important justice done to help ensure a more equitable future, is not good news for this country. Johnson and Leslie can be commended for pointing out this unfortunate factor.
Conversely, although problems with rebuilding schools and providing adequate books and educational supplies are mentioned briefly by Johnson and Leslie, too little attention was paid by them to the all important refurbishment of the educational system in Afghanistan. Probably because they had no experience with the rather limited but improving prewar educational system in the country, they did not recognize that the two-decade hiatus in elementary, nonreligious education in the country has left such a vacuum of school resources that substantive improvement will take time.
An important chapter is devoted to the great problem of the dramatic increase in opium production in Afghanistan, in some case into areas (Hazarajat) where it was rarely ever seen before. Johnson and Leslie point out that this cash crop represents a means by which a desperately poor people can achieve some minimal measure of self-sufficiency in troubled times. If realistic crop replacements and internal peace and security are ever to increase beyond mere tokenism in the country, then perhaps this scourge can be overcome and Afghanistan can cease to be the narcostate that it now is. The authors wryly note, however, that many Afghans rightly see the West as responsible for sending the weapons that caused the country so much misery; opiates are thus seen as a fair export payback.
Finally, the book, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, has a useful who's who of important figures in the past and present of Afghanistan, a list of a few of the important political parties of the past few decades, and a chronology of some of the more important historical events since 1839. Overall, the book presents just enough history of the recent years so that the newcomer to Afghan affairs can make sense of it. In addition, the book is a useful introduction to a difficult subject, with enough clever anecdotes and valuable insights to offset the overt pessimism.
A War on Terror: Afghanistan and After by P. Rogers is a somewhat tedious recitation of events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia between 15 October 2001 and 4 December 2002. Published in 2004, much of the book is dated in apparent “dispatch” form from the “front” and written in the present tense. This is probably meant to provide a sense of immediacy or excitement, but all it really does is jar the reader and produce a sense of true datedness. It seems very old news now and could have benefited from severe editing and updating.
In addition to this current-events approach, the book is conflated with many other newsworthy events that occurred isochronously elsewhere in the Middle East, especially Israel and Iraq, which the author wanted to make somehow relevant. Whatever limited analysis is available in the book is sprinkled throughout in this dated, “be-here-now” approach that Rogers has taken. The collateral current events presented here may assist some scholars in relating events in Afghanistan to the greater regional contexts of the time, but it is unlikely that many will appreciate this. The book has no glossary, illustrations, footnotes, or references and does not present very well as a scholarly book. Although I did not attempt to validate any of the historical references, I found no reason to suspect inaccuracies in any of the events portrayed. Instead, it appears more as a slim volume of op-ed pieces that are linked into a current-events genre by the author.
In the triptych of books reviewed here, none of the authors paid much attention to some of the other important problems or explanations of why events in Afghanistan have played out as they have. In particular, they ignored the problem of rampant illiteracy in the local languages, as well as in the Arabic of the Qur

an, that has allowed so much vicious interpretation and prejudice to be promulgated among Afghans. In addition, another of the unaddressed problems is a better understanding of past events and attempting to predict at least part of the future. The overarching controlling factors can be quite masked from the authors as events play out. For example, for several decades my Muslim students have carefully and privately brought up notions of a difficult Islamic reformation under way. The works of the authors reviewed here have given us much useful new material and understandings, but perhaps others in the future will be better able to put the events into a truer causative focus. Other such seminal events in the Middle East and Southwest Asia may yet be put into a more analytical context encompassing the ongoing discord within Islam. These books do not do that, but they do provide some useful background that scholars may wish to use for their own syntheses.
