Karen Taliaferro's The Possibility of Religious Freedom: Early Natural Law and the Abrahamic Faiths is modest in size but ambitious in scope. Taliaferro argues that we should expand “our conception of law to incorporate not only human and divine but also natural law” and make use of natural law as a mediator between human law and divine law” (xiii). Her argument is clear, lucid, and forceful. One of its major strengths is its interfaith dimension. It examines the natural law tradition in the three Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. Natural law is teleological. Natural law reasoning seeks to discern “the end, or telos, of a given entity, then direct action toward that end” (xv). Natural law reasoning relies on reason to discern the natural end to which all human action ought to be directed. The end is natural because it is naturally given: “The good life is not something that each person can define wholly for him or herself, but rather something which follows from human nature, from the application of right reason to observations of what conduces to flourishing and living well” (133).
Taliaferro illustrates the clash between human law and divine law, and the potential role of natural law in mediating that clash, through the story of Antigone. She argues that “the play portrays a truly tragic clash of human law, represented by Creon, and divine law, represented by Antigone” (32). She then suggests that a possible resolution of that conflict lies in an appeal to natural law, which is “a form of justice that is distinct from the law of the gods yet transcends the human law” (35). According to Taliaferro, there is “a natural law of justice that commands that family be allowed to bury their kin” (59), and that requirement of natural law “is found in the very nature of the world” (53). She then examines the conceptual architecture of natural law in the three Abrahamic faiths through a careful reading of the works of Maimonides, Ibn Rushd, and Tertullian. In a particularly memorable line, Taliaferro says that “Christianity has its Aquinas, Islam its Ibn Rushd, and Judaism its Maimonides” (62), who all in their own ways “sought to harmonize their medieval faiths with Aristotelian philosophy” (63).
The story of Antigone is both illustrative and instructive of the taxonomy that Taliaferro is working with. Taliaferro's trichotomy could be simplified into a dichotomy: positive law and natural law. Human law and divine law are both positive law: the former is posited by humans, while the latter is posited by the gods. On this dichotomous reading, Antigone and Creon are both positivists. Creon follows human positive law, while Antigone follows divine positive law. In contrast to them both, Taliaferro is advocating for a natural law alternative, which neither Antigone nor Creon recognizes, for they are both positivists. This dichotomous reading is consistent with what Taliaferro argues elsewhere in the book. Positive law is law “as declared by a legislator (whether human or divine)” (87), and “revealed in an historical instance” (97). In contrast, natural law is not posited. Instead, natural law “finds its basis in nature”: it is the “always-already-there aspect of law” (96).
The question that I have relates to the range and reach of Taliaferro's argument. Is her argument that natural law should be resorted to generally in all areas of law, or resorted to only where there is a clash between human law and divine law in religious freedom cases? If natural law is as wonderful as she claims it is, then there is no reason to limit it to the latter. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. If natural law is as good as she says, then surely it should apply to all areas of law. Although the book is framed with reference to the law of religious freedom, Taliaferro sometimes seems to be making a more wide-ranging claim about law generally. She advocates for a “thicker understanding of law as something human, natural, and divine” (140). She wants to include “natural law as part of our conception of law” (141), such that “at every stage in legal life—legislating, interpreting, and executing—one would ask what we can know from the nature of the thing in question” (136). Legislators should take into account “the natural ends of things” when crafting legislation, while judges should use natural law as “a lens of interpretation” (136–37).
These general claims about law move the proposal from specific jurisprudence (philosophy of the law of religious freedom) to general jurisprudence (philosophy of law). Taliaferro explicitly positions herself against legal positivism as a general philosophy of law. She challenges the “ascent of legal positivism [which] paralleled the ascent of philosophical rationality” (3). She criticizes “our late modern notion of law as something more or less purely positive” (141). Given that Taliaferro herself recognizes H. L. A. Hart as the leading positivists of the last century,Footnote 1 it might be helpful to consider what Hart himself has said about natural law, even if it is to disagree with him. Hart was not oblivious to natural law. In fact, he has much to say about natural law. It was Hart who commissioned John Finnis to write the book on Natural Law and Natural Rights, which is now a seminal text in natural law theory in contemporary general jurisprudence.Footnote 2
In chapter 9 of the Concept of Law, Hart dedicates an entire section to natural law and legal positivism.Footnote 3 Hart distinguishes between physical natural law and moral natural law: “the former, which can be discovered by observation and reasoning, may be called ‘descriptive’ and it is for the scientist thus to discover them; the latter cannot be so established, for they are not statements or descriptions of facts, but are ‘prescriptions’ or demands that men shall behave in certain ways.”Footnote 4 Physical natural laws cannot be broken (“[I]f the stars behave in ways contrary to the scientific laws which purport to describe their regular movements, these are not broken but they lose their title to be called ‘laws’ and must be reformulated”Footnote 5), while moral natural laws obviously can be broken and often are. Moral natural laws are broken when humans do not act as these laws prescribe, but that does not nullify the moral force of these laws. Hart's understanding of moral natural law is broadly in line with Taliaferro's definition of natural law. According to Hart, the classical theories of natural law assert that “there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason.”Footnote 6 Natural law presents a “teleological conception of nature as containing in itself levels of excellence which things realize.”Footnote 7 On this teleological view, the level of human excellence “is not man's good or end because he desires it; rather he desires it because it is already his natural end.”Footnote 8 So far so good, for up until this point, both Hart and Taliaferro are on the same page.
Where Hart and Taliaferro part company is in the different usages of the word law. The word law is ambiguous, as the same word might embed within it very different concepts. The law of gravity (physical natural law), the law of compassion (moral natural law), and the law of contract (positive law) all use the word law, but they refer to very different things. Analytic clarity is attained by carefully excavating these different senses of the word law to reveal the different concepts that are buried in it. Moral natural law is a moral theory. It is a specific type of moral reasoning; hence, it is sometimes called natural law ethics. There are other types of moral reasoning, for example, utilitarian ethics, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics. The semantic use of the word law in natural law should not obscure the conceptual fact that it is, in essence, a moral theory, indeed a comprehensive moral theory. If Taliaferro's claim is that there is a necessary connection between positive law and moral natural law, then that claim is really a claim that positive law has a necessary connection to morality, which is the standard antipositivist position in contemporary general jurisprudence.
Just as Hart was the leading positivist of the last century, so Ronald Dworkin was the leading antipositivist. Dworkin famously argued that legal reasoning is a form of moral reasoning.Footnote 9 If moral natural law is a type of moral reasoning, and if Taliaferro's claim is that positive law should proceed on a natural law basis, then the claim is a reiteration of the Dworkinian point that legal reasoning is a form of moral reasoning. Dworkin's argument has been the subject of various and numerous counterarguments by positivists, which have in turn elicited equally various and numerous rebuttals by antipositivists. This is a well-trodden path in general jurisprudence. Given the long-running course of this debate, most logically conceivable positions have been canvassed and championed by one legal theorist or another. There are two ways to reframe Taliaferro's suggestion analytically and position it within general jurisprudence. The first is to go down the route of Dworkinian antipositivism and say that legal reasoning is necessarily a form of moral reasoning. The second is to go down the route of inclusive legal positivism and say that the legal system should alter its rule of recognition to include a recognition of natural law ethics as a valid source of law. Inclusive legal positivists accept that legal norms can incorporate moral norms, including the moral norms of natural law ethics. The fact that Taliaferro's suggestion can be reframed either in terms of inclusive legal positivism or in terms of Dworkinian antipositivism is no accident, for the former was developed as a direct response to the latter.Footnote 10
The intersections between Taliaferro's argument and the ongoing conversation in general jurisprudence shows the broader relevance of the book beyond the topic of religious freedom. Taliaferro plugs into larger debates about the nature of law and the relationship between law and morality. On its own terms, Taliaferro's book is already ambitious in scope. Its actual scope might turn out to be even more ambitious than that.
