The lack of enthusiasm for the European Union and its proposed constitution among the European people surprised the political elite of Europe. Codifying common beliefs and values seemed to be a good way to represent the European identity in written form. The signing of the constitutional treaty should have become an important symbolic act, demonstrating the willingness of the people to bond together. Instead, a so-called Reform Treaty was passed in Lisbon in 2007 (to be ratified by all member states by 2009) that specifically abandoned any allusion to symbolic forms of European representation such as the term constitution, the flag, or a European anthem.
Representation and symbols play an important role in supporting political identities and loyalties. A vast amount of literature underlines the importance of the emotional attachment engendered by symbols, rites, and rituals for political communities and their stability. Symbols, used as prototypes of socio-political realities, contribute to making political identities and communities fathomable in everyday life and ultimately unquestionable. They are organizational elements of, and therefore are critical for, inter-subjective experiences of identity, since representation can be described as being “simply a way of talking about collective identities” (Kuper Reference Kuper1999, 3; on the importance of enacting symbolic worlds see Rahner Reference Rahner, Höfer and Rahner1963, 1,244–5; Soeffner Reference Soeffner, Oelkers and Wegenast1991, 66; Elias Reference Elias1991, 2–3; Edelmann Reference Edelmann1990, 5; Liszka Reference Liszka1989, 215; Featherstone Reference Featherstone1995, 23; Breuilly Reference Breuilly and Schmidt-Hartmann1994, 64–6; Hülsse Reference Hülsse2003, 168; Tickner Reference Tickner1987, 60, 151, 161; Helle Reference Helle1980).
The key characteristic of political symbols is that they appear to be inalienable constituents of group identities. Going one step further, symbols, rites, and rituals (i.e., representation in general) can be understood as a group's property. The group owns them by giving a certain intellectual and specific meaning to each of them. The symbol is communicated internally and externally as belonging to the group within this specified context. In this regard, Harrison (Reference Harrison1995) describes symbols as strategic assets to represent symbolic capital; they are to express immaterial values such as prestige and power. Thus, the function of representation can be described as displaying and binding symbolic capital, thereby endowing the group's political identity with capital, that is, with prestige. In light of this economic analogy, symbols are objectified things, which can be accumulated, owned, and engaged to ensure a strong group identity (Harrison Reference Harrison1999). In the language of institutional economics, symbols are representations of the process of signaling, which deals with the problem of asymmetric information between principal and agent (Akerlof Reference Akerlof1970; Coleman Reference Coleman1988; Reference Coleman1990; Spence Reference Spence1973; Reference Spence2002; Stigler Reference Stigler1961). Hereby, the agent (e.g., the state) makes an investment to produce a signal containing information (e.g., branding a national symbol) that the principal (e.g., the citizen) can understand and use to lower his or her uncertainty regarding the actions of the agent. This enhances the stability in interactions.
In this respect, the idea to surround the symbolism of a constitution with the act of voting and the ritual of signing the eventual treaty had seemed to bear witness to an unconscious understanding of how important it is to create a natural bridge between reason and emotion through the use of symbolic representation. Highlighted by the comparatively diverse groups that participated in the constitution-drafting process, the symbolic value of the constitution seemed to be much greater than the content itself, especially since much of the proposed document was not new (Sbragia Reference Sbragia2006, 238). The constitution was supposed to become a body of written words representing the shared values, beliefs, and aspirations within the European Union—a strong symbol that would drum up emotional enthusiasm and rally the citizenry of the European nation-states behind the prospect of a truly united European Union.
This, however, was not the case. The constitution did not evoke a unifying response among all the peoples of the EU. To understand this phenomenon, this paper draws upon anthropological studies on symbols as assets, their role in acquiring political prestige and legitimacy, and the conflict potential inherent when their ownership is controversial. Thus, I will explain why a conflict over symbolic ownership is at the heart of the failure to rally the European nation-states' citizenry around a European constitution. The discussion might help to shed light on the ambivalence, if not outright opposition, towards the European constitution that should have been, but was not, expected.
Struggles over Symbolic Proprietorship or, Who Owns the Constitution?
A constitution is a strong symbol of the nation-state era. Even though the idea of a constitutional political order has a provenance as old as Western political thought, its modern revival accompanied the emergence of the nation-states of western Europe (Gordon Reference Gordon1999, 2). Since then, constitutional architects have tried to encapsulate a national identity that will move the group from a conceptualized idea of a nation to a realized state (Hanafin and Williams Reference Hanafin and Williams1999, 2). As far as its historical elaboration and its symbolic associations are concerned, the constitution as a state-centric idea gains additional symbolic power in a world where the majority of countries have the institutional structures of nation-states (Castles Reference Castles2005).
Volumes have been written about the birth of nation-states and the inventiveness regarding their symbolic spectrum (Hobsbawm and Ranger Reference Hobsbawm and Ranger1983; Smith Reference Smith1995). In order to cultivate a separate identity, a political nation, or more precisely the nation-state's political management elite, had to develop specific forms of symbolic representation, which differed visibly from other nation-states' representation. At the same time, this spectrum had to meet the general requirements of nation-state representation. This invention of national identities can best be described as a contest of innovation. The nation-states had to prove their equality to other emerging states, while they also had to claim their distinctiveness, or even superiority, through the provisions of representation. Mutual identification as well as competitive differentiation, both via representation, characterized the era of emerging nation-states.
To summarize, in the words of the aforementioned theory on symbolic capital, the relative allocation of symbolic capital among political actors (i.e., among the nation-states) could be considered critical for the strength of the nation-states' respective political identities. The result of this competition is a plethora of representative forms, which are specific for each nation-state, but still have to fit into the genre of national representation (Harrison Reference Harrison1995). The concept of a constitution per se can be seen as such a generic example for the nation-state genre; the actual shape of the constitution and how embedded it is within the symbolic context of each nation-state are part of the competitive process to distinguish one nation-state from the other. One could say that the use of constitutions as symbols for nationhood endowed the nation-states with the symbolic capital necessary to strengthen their prestige and identity through their distinctiveness.
If we apply the logic of this argument to the matter of the proposed constitution for the European Union, using the constitution as a means of representation for the EU challenged the nation-states' symbolic property. The European Union's attempt to own the symbol of the constitution triggered a proprietary contest over the distribution of symbols between the nation-states and the EU itself. In a contest about symbolic ownership (Harrison Reference Harrison1995), representative forms and symbols of identities are appropriated and monopolized by other actors. The prestige conveyed by the symbols is thereby supposed to be absorbed by the new identity. This happens by first expanding the meaning of symbols through discourse management beyond the original context before transferring them to other political identities (Featherstone Reference Featherstone1995, 29). The recent discussions in political science (see for example Weiler and Wind Reference Weiler and Wind2003) on how to disentangle the notion of constitutionalism and the nation-state might be seen as a way to expand symbolic meanings and contexts in order to change the description of constitutionalism as the property of the nation-state.
A conflict over important symbols, their ownership, and their proprietary use can easily be understood as a competition for power, legitimacy, and prestige—the immaterial values that the symbolic assets are supposed to express and accumulate. It is easy to see that the potential for conflict over the forms of representation such as the constitution, which originally “belonged” to others, is substantial. The symbols' characteristics as property appear most clearly when their ownership is in dispute (Harrison Reference Harrison1992).
In the case of the European Union's identity, the appropriation of one of the nation-states' symbols—the constitution—was not successful. The people, i.e., the citizenry of the EU, did not buy into the idea of an old nation-state symbol being used in a new European context. However, without a mutually shared understanding of what a symbol should stand for, it cannot fulfill its task as an emotional building block of identity. An agreed-upon discourse regarding the symbol is therefore critical for its success. This implies that the European Union's political elite could not simply decide that the EU should “own” the prestige of the constitutional symbol without the consent of the Union's citizenry, many of whom did not find its use in a new European context convincing.
Ultimately, the decision against the constitution as a symbol for the European Union reveals the democratic characteristic of symbols. Legitimacy of their ownership cannot be created by merely monopolizing and appropriating an old symbol and deploying it in a new context by way of a political management decision. On the contrary, the legitimacy of the European Union's ownership of the constitution was tested and failed, since legitimacy would have included the right to employ the symbol publicly and have it thus approved by the people, that is, by the EU's citizens. Powerful symbolic capital is a scarce resource, since the process of acquiring widely accepted symbols is costly and not necessarily guaranteed to be successful. However, once symbols are accepted as representations of an identity, they are expansive. The capability of mass multiplication of an accepted symbol contributes to strengthening the prestige of the identity it stands for and to making the symbol itself more compelling.
Symbolic Representation of the European Union and the Problem of Mutual Exclusiveness
At this point, one could attribute the events surrounding the constitution to a management failure by the political elite and encourage better change management for another, hopefully less conflict-laden, round of constitutional ratification so that the European Union will win the ownership contest next time. However, the main question would remain unanswered, which is: should the European Union's identity strive to engage in a symbolic conflict with the identity of the nation-states at all? Especially if one is in favor of the process of European unification, the answer to this question has to be no after looking closely at what the theory of symbolic conflict over symbolic assets really means to the European Union and its identity.
First of all, a battle for ownership of representation between the EU's identity and those of the nation-states as a natural result from the proprietary characteristics of symbols runs contrary to the political concept of the European Union, which stresses a non-adversarial approach towards the nation-states. The nation-states are constituent parts of the EU, and the EU's idea of “Europeanness” is not built on the adversarial notion that a constitution for the Union would, or should, usurp national ones. However, it is barely conceivable how two different identities should draw from the same representative base in the long run and not face an ownership contest at some point. Struggling over the same set of symbols and their strategic value for accumulating prestige continues to depict the EU and the nation-states as mutually exclusive. Ultimately, following this strategy of symbolic appropriation and mutual exclusiveness could only be successful if the European Union's political elite were to aim to erase both the nation-states' symbols, such as the constitution, and thus their symbolic capital.
Secondly, by using symbols of a mutually exclusive character, the EU is taking a step backwards and is defining itself as a nation-state instead of bringing the concept of supra-national identity to life. Looking at the No Campaign in France, for example, one could see that the concept of the mutual exclusiveness of Europe and France was at the center of the public campaign. Jean-Marie Le Pen's statements regarding the vote against the constitution, for example, highlights the fact that once more Europe was perceived as a type of a nation-state that would take power and prestige away from France by adopting a constitution. In general, the French state has been vocal about the need to defend French culture and identity during the process of Europeanization (Berezin Reference Berezin2006, 270–1). Critics fear that the “existential statehood” of a constitutionalized European Union would be detrimental to national sovereignty; they see the constitution as a clear sign that the EU is becoming one state in the institutional, and not merely in the functional, sense (European No Campaign 2005b). Some politicians enhanced this fear with their remarks. Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgian prime minister, said in The Wall Street Journal Europe: “the European Union acquires all the instruments of a federal state … The capstone is the Constitutional Treaty” (Verhofstadt Reference Verhofstadt2003). However, describing the EU as a nation-state increases the intensity of the symbolic contest, since it reduces the proposed shift in meaning and successful appropriation of the constitutional symbol by a new political identity, in this case a supra-national EU, to the appropriation by merely another state.
Thirdly, continuing to use the symbols of the nation-state at the EU level, and thereby provoking a symbolic contest, exacerbates the problems inherent in the process of European integration rather than promoting solidarity and cohesion. Since symbols of the nation-state have such a strong foothold in the lives of citizens, the citizens might be inclined to perceive the use of the same symbols in a larger EU context as an obstacle to the full expression and realization of their own national identity (Harrison Reference Harrison2002, 228). Therefore, if forced to pick one interpretation over the other, the European Union's interpretation of the symbol is doomed to lose due to the fact that the symbol is entrenched in a centuries-old and encompassing symbolic and mythic nation-state discourse. In this respect, it was much easier for the No Campaigns to gain ground than for the advocators of the constitution. The British newspaper The Guardian comes to the conclusion that “the lack of an overriding principle or a grand idea to the constitution”—beyond the nation-state discourse of constitutionalism—“is, however, the principle weakness of the yes campaign” (Jeffrey Reference Jeffrey2005). In addition the political elite started to realize a potential problem with the yes vote only late in the process, as the BBC quoted the complaint of a Dutch citizen (BBC News 2005), and thus missed developing a sound communication strategy to sell the constitution in a non-adversarial manner.
Empirically, this theoretical assumption is underlined by the findings of Hooghe and Marks (Reference Hooghe and Marks2006). In their study, the commitment to national symbols and the defense of one's national identity is found to be associated with skeptical attitudes towards European integration by the citizens of the nation-states. Also, Berezin's study (Reference Berezin2006) states that, in France, the “attachment to national identity” has general resonance with the citizens voting no. EU citizens, who describe themselves as exclusively national rather than national and European, European and national, or European only, are considerably more likely to express Euro-skeptical opinions than those with inclusive identities. Parties appealing to an exclusive national identity could easily take the initiative in public debate, since the people as opposed to the well-informed elite are less inclined to evaluate all facets of the issue and are more easily swayed by appeals to identity than the attentive minority (Hooghe and Marks Reference Hooghe and Marks2006).
Fourthly, using a nation-state symbol such as the constitution within an EU setting might even trigger anew the process of mutual differentiation among the individual nation-states. With their respective constitutions being assets for symbolic capital, the political elite of each nation-state want to make sure that their own constitutional elements are properly represented on the EU meta-level in order to win the support of their citizens and to maintain their national prestige. The No Campaign in the United Kingdom quotes the French government's description of the European constitution as “the crowning of the French vision for Europe, against the Anglo-Saxon vision” (European No Campaign 2005a). The Dutch feel a threat to their “liberal values, or loss of sovereignty and national identity” by the constitution (Mulvey Reference Mulvey2005). In this respect, the struggles of the past few years to eventually agree upon a permanent text body for an EU constitution can be understood as quarrels over symbolic capital between the political elite of the nation-states on a European level. Thus, the attachment of the national citizenries to their national constitutions is not quite so different from the national political elites' adherence to their national goals within the constitutional process. Only when they found their identities represented to a sufficient extent in the constitution did they agree on the text. Often enough, the discussion regarding the constitutional process of the European Union has identified winners and losers by whose constitution and constitutional beliefs were represented in the European treaty. When talking about winning and losing ground in determining the content of constitutional paragraphs, the asset characteristics of symbols as capital become visible most prominently.
With the European political elite adopting a symbolic strategy of mutual exclusiveness, the success of the European Union's identity as a building block of political stability is contingent upon who can maintain a more powerful representation, the European Union or the adversarial intra-European forces (the nation-states). Europe's long history of nation-states and the projected future, consisting exclusively of nation-state representation, are then to be seen as the true enemies of a European identity (Mikkeli Reference Mikkeli1998, 233). The constitution and its failure are but one example where the European Union solely relies on the genre of nation-state representation, which will always pose the problem of mutual exclusiveness as far as public acceptance of a symbol is concerned. As Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxembourg, was quoted by the German magazine Capital: “Ich weiß nicht, welches Biest uns gebissen hat, den Vertrag Verfassung zu nennen” (I don't know what drove us to call this treaty a constitution) (my translation; Capital 2007, 56).
However, a change of public understanding and identification with the EU can only come about if the symbolic experiences with the European Union run complimentary and not contrary to national ones. The task of translating constitutionalism into a truly post-national European context still lies ahead. Managing this task without challenging the nation-states' symbolic capital as a building block of their prestige and identity might take effort, and different notions still need to be found in order to conceive of European constitutionalism at all.
The Challenge: Finding Forms of European Representation
The European Union is still yearning for symbolic capital based on the creation of representation that extends beyond appropriations from the nation-states. However, without inter-subjectively shared symbols and symbolic discourse, the EU's citizens cannot experience the Union as part of their everyday lives. The positive ramifications for European identity and stability, stemming from a plethora of strongly anchored symbols, rites, and rituals owned by the European Union, cannot realize their potential. The lack of political symbols genuinely possessed by the EU makes it difficult to create emotional attachments beyond a rational understanding of why European integration is a worthwhile project and to win the hearts and minds of the people who have been groomed to define themselves in terms of their nation-states (Hedetoft Reference Hedetoft and Ulf1998).
Obviously there have been numerous attempts at rewriting European history without nation-state borders. However, overlapping European representations used to construct an imagined European community can easily highlight diversity rather than create unity. Truly pan-European popular traditions, values, and symbols are hard to define without alienating at least one nation-state's citizens (Smith Reference Smith1995; Van Tartwijk-Novey Reference Van Tartwijk-Novey1995, 147). The number of schoolbook projects trying to find a way to teach a truly European history bears witness to this challenging task (Zowislo Reference Zowislo2000).
Furthermore, wishing for a grand European narrative with its own set of symbols does not abandon the same essentialist notion of identity that already belongs to the nation-state world with its transcendent myths of unity and origin. Apparently, the nation-state era has so far only been able to reinvent the European idea as an image of its own (Delanty Reference Delanty and Ulf1998). Striving for an EU narrative and political constitution mirroring the setup of national constitutions are just expressions of desperately trying to come to terms with a political project that evades one's descriptive traditions and the symbolic worlds one is accustomed to.
To date the political elites' management failure of the EU is not because they were unable to forge a European narrative or make the constitution, the flag, and the European anthem work as rallying points for political loyalty—revealingly, allusions to these symbols were left out of the Reform Treaty 2007 (Treaty of Lisbon) replacing the rejected constitution (Beste and Hammerstein Reference Beste and Hammerstein2007)—but in foregoing the chance to develop new symbols of representation that actually mean something to the individual and would not engender an exclusivity contest with individuals' feelings of national identity. It is not helpful that the political elites within the European Union, the “managers” of Europe's meaning and identity, project different concepts and intentions onto the EU—in each case corresponding to their respective national ideals. The managers of Europe are at once both political representatives of the EU and part of the socio-cultural national fabric they come from (Wood Reference Wood1998, 33, 46).
Without representation and symbols, strong identities are difficult to maintain. Representation engenders a hyper-reality, a culture of appearances, and a symbolic underground, by which political identity becomes fathomable, conceivable, and even firmly maintainable. However, with forms of representation that generate competition of mutually exclusive symbolic settings, it will be all the more difficult to find ways to reconcile political communities such as the European Union and the nation-states with each other as multiple identities based on nonexclusive concepts. If the European Union's political elite cannot propose forms of representation beyond the nation-state context the citizenry of the EU might agree upon, the European identity might remain caught up in a fight over symbolic capital with the nation-states instead of proactively and positively exploiting the opportunities that symbolic representation yields for strengthening identities, loyalty, commitment, and, eventually, political stability.
After all, the failure to appreciate the European constitution as a symbol is a chance to understand that the European Union still lacks a political idea that can easily be expressed in democratically accepted and, therefore, legitimate and valid symbolic forms. As the No Campaign web site states: “the creation of a constitution and a European Union with many of the characteristics of a state cannot constitute the creation of a single European people” (European No Campaign 2005b). Or as another comment points out: “How can one vote for an incomprehensible constitution on something that doesn't even exist?” (BBC News 2005). In other words, the lack of legitimate symbolic representation of the EU is a result of, and is proof of, a lack of clarity regarding what the European Union really is supposed to be, if not a version of and a competitor within the nation-state world.
