Introduction
The rights of nature (RoN) and the animal rights (AR) movements are “sister[s]”Footnote 1 —but they were initially not on speaking terms. Recently, they started a conversation.Footnote 2 The deepening of this conversation will be mutually enriching and will help to cure some (not all) of the flaws of the respective frameworks in isolation. Such a mutual opening will, in particular, expose the blind spot in the RoN debate: domesticated animals.Footnote 3
Mapping
RoN are on the agenda of the United Nations, notably as an element of an “earth-centered” approach to sustainable development on the national and international levels for acceleration of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.Footnote 4 If we look at concrete progress around the world, RoN seem more real than AR. RoN figure in the constitution of Ecuador, while the constitution of Bolivia invokes “sacred mother Earth” in its preamble and grants a “right to a healthy, protected, and balanced environment” not only to humans but also to “other living things, so they may develop in a normal and permanent way.”Footnote 5 The state spells out the content and enforceability of the rights of nature in two statutes.Footnote 6 RoN are also proliferating in hundreds of national laws, sub-state, city, and local ordinances, and tribal legislations in all regions of the world.Footnote 7 They have been espoused and fleshed out by several constitutional courts and other case law, articulated in civil society declarations, and they figure in private sector governance.Footnote 8
In contrast, not a single legislative text anywhere in the world enshrines AR. Rather, AR have been recognized by the judiciary in several countries.Footnote 9 Notably, all of these judgments have been issued in countries of the Global South. Most of them were issued by lower courts (in particular in India, Pakistan, and Argentina). In 2017, the Colombian Supreme Court granted habeas corpus to the spectacled Andean bear Chucho, but the decision was overturned by the Colombian Constitutional Court whose majority ruled that habeas corpus is not available for animals.Footnote 10 Of all the world’s apex courts, only two have espoused AR. In 2014, the Indian Supreme Court read animal rights into the Indian Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act and elevated them to the status of fundamental, constitutional rights, derived from the duty of every citizen to have compassion for living creatures (Article 51A(g) of the Indian Constitution) and from the constitutional right to life (Article 21).Footnote 11 In 2022, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court ruled favorably on a monkey’s right to life—deriving it from the constitutional rights of nature.Footnote 12 In other countries, notably in the United States, animal activists have so far sought in vain to obtain positive court rulings on animal rights or animal standing, often through the petition of habeas corpus.
I suspect that RoN are relatively more dynamic and successful not mainly because of the huge Indigenous mobilization that promoted them but because this movement has left out what humans harm most but to which most humans cling: the animals bred, confined, and killed for food. RoN has therefore so far been a cheap “win,” but has done little to improve the fate of billions of living beings. In order to become more than a largely symbolic reform, RoN would have to change, and it can change by listening to AR.
Grounding
RoN and AR have different intellectual origins and they rely on different and even partly antagonistic arguments. Many AR defenders have made the “me too” argument: animals deserve rights to the extent that they have similar traits as humans. Most elaborations still (if only implicitly) hook onto human rights theories and have, following those theories, shifted focus from the mind (intelligence, sociability, self-awareness) to the body (sentience, vulnerability, capabilities). However, the “extension of the circle,” i.e., the abandonment of the idea of exclusively human rights (rights only for humans) to rights for humans and non-humans has not overcome the fundamental anthropocentrism of the human rights framework. Rights for animals are still rooted in traits all humans share but which are also displayed by non-human animals.Footnote 13 This approach has delayed moral and legal consideration of other lifeforms who are less similar to humans.Footnote 14 For example, animal rights have been litigated for great apes, cetaceans, and elephants but not for insects, reptiles, and fish.
In contrast, RoN have been grounded in three major and overlapping lines of arguments. The first, “Indigenous” reasoning is based on ancient and contemporary philosophies and religions of Indigenous communities mostly in Latin America, New Zealand, and Australia that consider and venerate landscapes, stones, rivers, and the like, as being animated, sacred, or agentic. For example, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala cited the United Nations special rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, who explained that water is sacred and cannot be turned into a commodity, and must be kept pure for the present and future generations and for the rest of creation.Footnote 15 These worldviews have been—in my opinion happily—combined with Western modernist ideas of “rights” and with a more abstract conceptualization of “nature,” and have found their way into state laws.Footnote 16
The second intellectual reservoir of RoN are basically “Western” legal approaches of the twentieth and twenty-first century such as “Wild Law”Footnote 17 and “Earth Law.”Footnote 18 Where they propagate rights for nature and natural entities, they build on a stark dichotomy between two distinct spheres: “Nature” and “the wilderness” in opposition to the (man-made and artificial) sphere of culture. Nature is here depicted as positive (pristine, innocent, virgin-like, intangible, etc.). In these accounts, rights of nature have been grounded in Christian belief (reminiscent of the Christian garden Eden), some also in amalgamation with Asian philosophies, for example in Thomas Berry’s Earth law.Footnote 19
The third generative force for RoN is modern natural science that has made the interdependence of all forms of life measurable and has given rise to disciplines such as ecology, and concepts such as ecosystems, ecosystem services, food-chains, or co-extinction. For example, the Spanish law of 2022 that grants Mar Menor and its basin the status of a legal person refers to “life sciences” in its preamble.Footnote 20
Despite these differences, RoN and AR ultimately seek to express the same idea: legal rights are the juridic legal expression of a value of the rights-holder (the legal person or legal subject) that cannot be expressed by a price tag on a market. While the source of this value is controversial, the message is identical: both the RoN and the AR approaches “aim to transform the exploitative relations that existing legal structures underwrite.”Footnote 21
Importantly, this grounding distinguishes RoN and AR from the rights of corporations, churches, ships, and potentially robots that have been devised and paired with duties and liability as a practical tool to facilitate the functioning of those entities on the market. The shared grounds and objectives of RoN and AR allow bonding of the two movements.
Bonding
In fact, RoN and AR have sometimes been combined in practice. The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court’s Mona Estrellita judgment of 2022 was the first judgment on RoN that dealt with an individual (wild) animal. The Court derived habeas corpus for a chorogo monkey, a “wildlife specimen,” and her right to life from the constitutional RoN.Footnote 22 The judgment framed this (wild) animal as one of the “members or singular elements” of nature.Footnote 23 However, it is not certain that the Court also considers animals produced and raised for food to be within the scope of the constitutional right, especially because the Court explained (with a dubious naturalistic argument) that humans are allowed to breed and kill animals for consumption.Footnote 24
Examples of legislation mentioning RoN and AR in one breath are two laws in the state of Panama, with the first “recognizing the rights of Nature and the obligations of the State related to these rights” in 2022Footnote 25 and the companion law of 2023 “establishing the conservation and protection of sea turtles and their habitats in the Republic of Panamá.”Footnote 26
This nascent practice of combining AR and RoN could serve as a model if the benefits of such integrations are understood. The question thus is what RoN can learn from AR and the other way round, and whether a complete amalgamation is possible and desirable. Several, overlapping insights and debates in AR might offer inspiration for the RoN discourse.
First, AR theory can help to sharpen the focus of RoN and add legal sophistication in several respects Currently, RoN encompass entities such as forests, river basins, and animal species (especially those threatened by extinction) while AR draws attention to individual animals. In animal law, the question of animal personhood and the putative added value of acknowledging animals as persons entitled to rights as opposed to protecting animals as objects (things) has been deeply explored. The insights from these debates (including the controversy between animal “welfarism” and “abolitionism”) can help to distinguish the RoN approach from traditional environmental law in which the environment is merely an object of protection.Footnote 27
Secondly, animal law can sensitize RoN to the downsides of focusing on the whole (nature as such, a species, an ecosystem) and not on individual animals or plants. The risk is that the concern for animals and plants as members of a species or a component of a biotope leads to sacrificing the well-being of an individual (animal, plant, and even human) for the sake of the well-being of a greater whole—be it a species or an ecosystem.Footnote 28 This tendency has been dubbed “environmental fascism.”Footnote 29 In contrast, AR builds on a normative concern for individual living beings. It does not allow guiding decisions about the treatment of an individual rights-holder by a mere appeal to aggregative considerations, such as a contribution to the stability of an ecosystem.Footnote 30 Thereby, AR can teach RoN that each individual being counts, and thereby help mitigate holistic approaches. For example, the AR sensitivity leads to reconsidering extermination campaigns against so-called invasive species conducted without consideration for the suffering of the individual members of such a species.
Thirdly, AR theory could inspire RoN to reflect more on possible distinctions of legal status for living and non-living elements of nature. The premise of many animal rights theories is that the capacity for suffering, with “sentience” as a threshold, is a reason for recognizing rights. This casts doubts on the idea of rights for rivers, volcanos, and glaciers, for example, but also encourages reflection on the legal relevance of scientific distinctions that differ from religious beliefs on animate nature. Conversely, an understanding of the legal practice of such rights for non-sentient entities could raise questions about the centrality of sentience and the science-based approach in the AR debate, which has led to problematic exclusions, for example of fish (whose sentience was denied until as recently as around 2010).
Fourthly, the RoN discourse learn from intense conceptual work done in the field of AR on questions such as who should hold rights (what counts as “nature,” which entities?), what are the exact functions of rights, what is their added value, and how to identify the permissible restrictions on the enjoyment of rights? While AR theory struggles with these issues as well, the debate in animal law seems more advanced and sophisticated and can provide inspiration.Footnote 31 For example, the animal rights to life and liberty have not been conceptualized in the case law as limitless and absolute, but need to be balanced against competing rights of humans.
Fifthly and most importantly, a recalibration of the RoN debate toward non-endangered animals and especially toward animals in the industrial agriculture sector will help the RoN movement to reach its own goals.Footnote 32 The conceptual argument for extending RoN to farmed animals is that in the era of Anthropocene, nature is no longer split off from human activity that is transforming the entire planet. Rather, everything forms part of “natureculture.”Footnote 33 In practical terms, it is obvious that industrialized animal farming harms nature directly and indirectly.Footnote 34 This begins with the deforestation driven by the enormous demand for terrestrial surface for fodder crops, continues with the ecological damage created by fertilizers and pesticides, the greenhouse gas emissions of the livestock sectors, the water and soil pollution by huge amounts of manure, the anti-microbial resistance, the loss of plant and animal biodiversity, and ends up in mass extinctions. A RoN approach that does not look at this hugely harmful industry falls short of its own ambitions to protect nature.
Concomitantly, AR can learn and benefit from RoN. First of all, the key message of “rights”—namely to express an intrinsic value independent of a price tag—has been better and more clearly expressed in RoN practice, both in legislation (for example in New Zealand’s Whanganui River Claims Settlement ActFootnote 35 ) and the case law (for example by the Colombian Constitutional CourtFootnote 36 ). Obviously, this message is more difficult to accept for domesticated animal individuals compared to a river or a forest, because these animals have been brought into being by humans, are fed and sold by them, and are thus completely commodified. RoN can help to overcome AR’s obsession with promoting animals to “honorary humans”Footnote 37 in order to prove their inherent value.
Secondly, in several jurisdictions, a RoN approach has already led to institutions and procedures for the representation of natural entities and to functioning governance arrangements. These practical examples might be usefully applied to represent animals, too.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the AR movement can learn from RoN to decenter the human. RoN builds on and has brought to the fore the non-hierarchical view of human-in-nature. For example, the Constitutional Court of Colombia writes (when recognizing the legal personality of the Atrato River) that “human populations are those that are dependent on the natural world—and not the other way around.”Footnote 38 The Mona Estrellita court speaks of “a vital community in constant interrelation and evolution.”Footnote 39 A recognition of such interdependent existence and relationality of all life forms, with humans as just one element, embedded in the large web of life, gives deserved credit to Indigenous worldviews. This is an enormously important antidote to the posture of human dominance (e.g., over farmed animals), that has already been proven to be to some extent illusionary, as the shared problem of anti-microbial resistance shows.
Delivering
The insight that RoN and AR are “two sides of the same coin”Footnote 40 has the potential to refine our understanding of rights (which might also lead to rejecting the rights-idea for some entities or actors) and will deliver better outcomes.
The comparison between relatively easy acceptance of RoN and still very strong reservations against AR exposes the emptiness of most professions of RoN. Lawmakers, courts, and democratic societies are ready to grant rights to nature because doing so, in reality, remains non-committal and for most people does not make a difference for lifestyle, especially not for what humans have on their dinner plates. AR are the real test for overcoming this hypocrisy. Moreover, assessing the legal operation of rights in both fields—nature and animals—can help us to see better their potential and limits. As a legal technique, rights facilitate and improve legal protection in three respects. First, rights shift the burden of explanation and justification and place this burden on humans whose activities interfere with the existence and integrity of a rights-bearer. Second, rights establish a legal barrier against limitless extraction and exploitation—although this endpoint is not obvious or fixed but needs to be identified in political processes. Third, rights—as applied and protected by courts—are an institution that compensates for the absence of political representation (be it for disenfranchised minorities, future generations, or nature and animals) in democratic lawmaking processes.Footnote 41
To conclude, RoN and AR should team up, but not be fused. RoN should especially embrace AR’s concern for domestic animals, because any movement that neglects them amounts to the organized hypocrisy of symbolic rights-giving without changing modern human lifestyle. The relationship need not and should not end in a “bad marriage” in which maybe one side dominates the other.Footnote 42 Rather, a more open relationship will facilitate both mutual learning and introspection which in the end bears potential for a better legal protection of animals and nature—the beginning of a beautiful friendship.
