The publication of Emmanuel Faye's Heidegger in France in 2005 opened up a whole new front in the Heidegger wars that have periodically raged since 1946 and that have been unabated ever since the publication of Victor Farías's Heidegger and Nazism in 1987. Now that Faye's work has appeared in English, the war has continued across the Atlantic, where, as he is in France, Heidegger is a fixture in Continental philosophy, generally recognized as one of the greatest twentieth-century philosophers, a worthy heir to Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. Faye, however, does not simply dispute such a reading, but makes the sweeping claim that Heidegger was not a philosopher at all, indeed that his whole project was about “the introduction into philosophy of the very content of Nazism and Hitlerism” (7), the seeds of which were already present in Heidegger's breakthrough work, Being and Time of 1927. Moreover, Faye warns us that there is a danger for the uninitiated in even reading Heidegger as a philosopher, “that it is therefore of the utmost importance at the present that we realize the danger of the dissemination of Heidegger's works” (315). And so, lest Heidegger's writings corrupt or “captivate minds” (322), Faye seriously advises that the books “cannot continue to be placed in the philosophy section of libraries,” though he hastens to add that they “should be open to all scholars” (319).
Faye's Heidegger, both in France and now in the Anglophone world, is having an impact far beyond the academy and philosophical disputation. It has entered the world of political journalism and the “public space,” in the form of reviews from which bits and pieces of Faye's argument are picked up by those who may never read a word of Being and Time, but for whom the charge that Heidegger was a Nazi will resonate even as it becomes integrated into the popular culture or “mind.” The accounts of Faye's findings, amidst an especially overheated rhetoric in both the New York Times (November 9, 2009) and The Chronicle of Higher Education (“Heil Heidegger!” October 18, 2009), are emblematic of what is at stake when the Heidegger wars are fought journalistically. Yet it is on the research and writings of a philosopher such as Faye, filtered through political and popular journals, that the spread of the Heidegger wars beyond the academy ultimately rests, and it is to the actual claims that he has made that we now need to turn.
Let us begin, then, by trying to understand on what basis Faye has decided that Heidegger's works—not aspects of them, not the writings, speeches, courses, and seminars from the period of the Gleichschaltung, or the alignment of the universities with the Hitler-state, when Heidegger was the Nazi rector of Freiburg University, but virtually the totality of his writings from the mid-1920s to the very end of his life in 1976—were all about “the introduction of the very foundations of Nazism and Hitlerism into philosophy” (299). Faye is a scholar of French Renaissance philosophy, especially Descartes, and it is the latter's philosophy, and its basis in an ego cogitans and a certain metaphysical individualism, that Faye sees as the principal target of Heidegger's Being and Time, and the project that it initiated. It is specifically the Heideggerian concept of Geschichtlichkeit (historicality), and Heidegger's focus on the Umwelt and historical existence, with its rejection of universality and the ahistorical “I,” and with its shift “from the individual to the people,” from “‘What is man?’ to the question ‘Who is man’” (89), that Faye sees as the veritable basis of Heidegger's Nazism. As Karl Löwith discovered at his meeting with Heidegger in Rome in 1936, his former teacher was quite open about his Nazi political engagement having its basis in his concept of historicality. Heidegger may indeed have seen Geschichtlichkeit as the basis for his commitment to the Hitler-state, but can a focus on human being, Dasein, as arising from a lived factical situation as opposed to a metaphysical essence, be tantamount to Nazism? Indeed, can a rejection of the Cartesian self, even construed as a subjectum, necessarily lead to Nazism and racism? For, Heidegger aside, so much of the tradition of philosophy, both Western and non-Western, is predicated on such a rejection of anything resembling the Cartesian cogito. Can one, as Faye does, forge an integral link between “community,” even a “community of the people,” and Nazism (318)? Indeed, can the concept of Gemeinschaft as an ideologeme simply be conceded to the Fascists? Certainly Nazism appropriated the concept of “community,” as it did that of the Volk or “people,” but again, is the concept of Volk to be glossed as “race,” which is how Nazism understood it, or can it, like “community,” have other meanings, meanings that contrast with metaphysical or political individualism, but are contrary to right-wing understandings, too? It is just that possible range of meanings that Faye has foreclosed here.
For Faye, however, concepts such as “historicality,” “community,” and Volk or “people” can have but one meaning: the meaning that Nazism, and, unfortunately, for a time at least, the political meaning that Heidegger, imparted to them. And with respect to Gemeinschaft and Volk, that meaning was indeed racial. It is here that those designated as the Heideggerei—those for whom an absolute separation between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics can be made, or for whom Heidegger's Nazi engagement was short lived, confined to little more than a year (1933–34), or those for whom Heidegger was never a racist or anti-Semite, a “defense” mounted by an appeal to Heidegger's well-known rejection of biologism—must be confronted no less forcefully than one must confront Faye's attempt to reduce Heidegger's Denken to Nazism. And here Faye's use of several of Heidegger's seminars from 1933–34, still unpublished and perhaps never to be published, as well as his use of three lecture courses from the same period, only recently published, with copious extracts from the texts themselves, provide ample evidence of the extent of Heidegger's commitment to the Hitler-state and his linkage of community and people to race, to Rasse and Stamm. These seminars, to which Faye has called our attention, beyond the doubts they certainly raise about Heidegger's own well-crafted efforts to minimize his support for Nazism, need to be published. Heidegger's own standing as a thinker will be hurt more by efforts on the part of the Heideggerei to cover up that aspect of these important texts than by making them available. However, the totalizing nature of Faye's reduction of Heidegger to just a Nazi raises the prospect that his valuable research into the extent of Heidegger's involvement in the academic Gleichschaltung, and his enthusiasm for the “National Revolution,” will be too easily passed over, even as those who are determined to read Heidegger simply as an unrepentant Nazi will not look beyond the writings which Faye has unearthed. With respect to the issue of biologism, Faye shows that within Nazism, at least until the late 1930s, and the triumph of Nordicism within the NSDAP, an anti-Semitism not predicated on biologism was quite acceptable, and no less racist than the biological versions of the same “theory.” With respect to the term “race,” Faye shows that here Heidegger's preference for Germanic words, in this case Stamm, as opposed to Latin ones, in this case Rasse, had served him and his defenders well, inasmuch as his writings and speeches are not as peppered with the term Rasse as are those of many Nazi thinkers and propagandists. Faye, then, provides us with more than enough evidence to refute the claim that Heidegger was never a committed Nazi. That said, however, one must still be careful about archaism, inasmuch as while today the word Stamm will be read simply as “race,” and probably in a biological sense, the word also means “tribe,” “family,” or “clan,” and Heidegger himself often used it in such a sense, as when he spoke of a Schwäbische (Swabian) Stamm, which certainly entails a rootedness in place, but not the xenophobic element so clearly present in racism.
However, the tale does not end here, and Faye's account of a Heidegger who always remained a committed Nazi can, it seems to us, be challenged at several points. In the years before the outbreak of the war, as well as during it, Heidegger articulated a view of Machenschaft (machination) as the hallmark of the modern world, a view that would emerge as the reign of das Ge-Stell (enframing), or technological nihilism, in the postwar epoch. From the Beiträge through the Bremen lectures in 1949, Heidegger concretized his sense that Stalinist Russia, Americanism, and Nazi Germany were metaphysically the same; that in contrast to Hölderlin's vision of Gemeinshaft and polis, the three modern systems were different embodiments of Gesellschaft and “Leviathan,” which contained the distinct possibility of the total devastation of the world. Though Faye cites several of these writings, he sees nothing of a critique of Nazism as an expression of planetary nihilism here. One obstacle to such an acknowledgment may lie in the fact that despite an incipient recognition that the Hitler-state was a manifestation of Machenschaft, Heidegger's commitment to the German Volk, and its purported destiny within the history of the West, meant that he remained firmly committed to German nationalism. It is just that combination of insights into the nihilism that Nazism expressed, and the unrelenting espousal of nationalism—indeed the inability to see the connection between the two—that constitutes for us a conundrum for thinking.
Meanwhile, when it comes to the postwar Bremen lectures, where Heidegger does speak of the Nazi genocide of the Jews, all Faye can see is “ontological negationism,” a denial of the specificity of the Holocaust, indeed a negation of the very horror of the mass death itself (305–6). Heidegger raised the question with respect to the victims: “Hundreds of thousands die en masse. Do they die? They perish. … Do they die?” For Faye this is a negation of their death (quite apart from the numbers, not hundreds of thousands, but millions). First, the victims were slaughtered, and then Heidegger tells us that in so perishing they were not even permitted to die. But isn't Heidegger's insistence that the victims were denied a meaningful death—denied an opportunity to confront death, to grapple with their being-towards-death, their extermination as a hallmark of the immanent tendencies of modernity and its giganticism—reason to see in Heidegger a thinker who has something important to tell us about our historical world? And haven't those horrors occurred not just at Auschwitz or Babi Yar, but also at Hiroshima, in the firebombing of Hamburg (so painfully recounted by W. G. Sebald), on the killing fields of Cambodia, in Rwanda, and in Bosnia, too?
Beyond his reductionism, his insistence that there is nothing in Heidegger but the introduction of Nazism into philosophy, Faye expresses the conviction that there is one, and only one, way to read Heidegger; that there is only one “correct” interpretation of Heidegger—his. That it is possible to read Heidegger in new and different ways; that one can read Heidegger differently than he wanted to be read; that even the purported authority of the author is not final; that different readers will have different interpretations and different insights; that the orthodoxy of one era will be challenged by the heterodoxy of another—none of this is even hinted at by Faye, entertained as a possibility. Far greater than any danger that young minds could be corrupted by a “Nazi” is the danger that thinking will stagnate and die if it is not nourished by confrontation, and by a modesty that eschews the claim to eternal truths and rejects closure. Unfortunately, the aim of Faye's Heidegger seems, to us, to be to close the discussion.
