Elie Podeh dives right into the contentious heart of the Arab–Israeli conflict. On a topic where every historical moment is rife with controversy, Podeh expertly tackles a central element: What were the opportunities to end the conflict and move toward peace? And when those diplomatic efforts failed, as they often did, who was to blame? Podeh looks at twenty-eight episodes from the Faysal–Weizmann agreement (1919) to the Abbas–Olmert talks (2008) and concludes that no single party is at fault across time. Arab States, Israel, and the Palestinians missed opportunities, though about half the time he argues that no one missed an opportunity.
Missed opportunity is the crucial notion that drives this work. Podeh's prologue tells the story of attempting to track down the origins of the most famous use of the term in the conflict, allegedly by Abba Eban, an Israeli foreign minister. But the more important point is that Podeh constructs a theoretical framework to define and operationalize the notion of a missed diplomatic opportunity for conflict resolution. First, he notes whether there is a plan or initiative and a window of opportunity due to events such as wars or changes in government. Second, he asks if it was feasible for the warring parties to have taken advantage of the opportunity that presented itself. On this point, Podeh weighs the strength of the leaders, the historical interactions, and the role of third parties, if any, as facilitators and mediators. He offers an important reminder that the impact of these episodes may not only be success or failure, but also a legacy, or impact on the future conduct and content of plans and negotiations.
As is often the case when theorizing a commonly used term, a gap emerges between the common use and the theoretical frame. Leadership failings, in Podeh's thinking, are seen as evidence that an opportunity was not missed; they demonstrate the initiative had less potential for realization. But it is precisely those leadership failings that could be the subject of popular reimaginings in the general idea of missed opportunities. If only the leader led a stronger government, had or properly spent political capital, or understood the adversary better, the result would have been an agreement. At a deeper level, it hearkens back to Podeh's discussion of the use of counterfactuals in scholarly work. How many variables should we think of as manipulable as we construct our alternate historical pathways?
How one reacts to this book, I would suggest, will likely turn on two factors: the extent to which one accepts Podeh's definition and use of the idea of a missed opportunity and the fit, or lack thereof, of one's own view with Podeh's reading of the many historical sources on which he draws to retell the story of each diplomatic episode. Podeh has digested a tremendous amount of material covering about ninety years of history. That will not immunize him against claims that he got the story of this or that episode wrong—and I will nitpick later in this review—but such disagreements are inevitable. One cannot read Laura Z. Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Fred Khouri, Benny Morris, Yezid Sayigh, Avi Shlaim, Charles Smith, and Mark Tessler, to mention a few of the many historical and analytical tomes Podeh consulted, and not realize the deep divisions over each historical moment. Now multiply that by twenty-eight, not including Podeh's postscript.
In that spirit, let me turn to a few of the book's many historical case studies. Podeh wisely includes not only the many failures but also the two big breakthroughs, or what he considers opportunities not missed, the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty (1979) and the Israeli–Jordanian Peace Treaty (1994). By doing so, we see that even when a historical opportunity exists and all the leadership and other factors suggest the likelihood the parties can take advantage of the opportunity is high (highly feasible), success is not guaranteed, as we learn from comparable cases of the Jarring mission (1971), Israeli–Syrian talks (1991–2000), and the Arab Peace Initiative.
While one virtue of the book is attention to cases great and small, one defining moment in the Arab–Israeli conflict comes early in the book, Chapter 3 on the UN Partition Plan (1947). Had this case turned out differently, much of the last seventy years would have unfolded differently.
On the Camp David (2000) period, Podeh overemphasizes the importance of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's determination “to reach a deal” (p. 296). Yes, Barak wanted a treaty, but the prime minister lacked understanding of the minimum that Palestinian negotiators would accept, for example, on Jerusalem, almost as if he believed through the force of his own will he could compel them to accept something less. Moreover, Podeh notes that Barak's difficulty standing by his previous commitments to the Palestinian side “called into question his readiness to reach a permanent status agreement” (p. 298). In terms of the Clinton Parameters, presented in December 2000, Podeh pins blame on Yasir Arafat by downplaying the Israeli reservations to the plan. Yet both sides expressed significant reservations to the plan that, if taken at face value, would likely have made its implementation impossible.
My argument with Podeh's treatment of the Camp David period is part of the virtue of the book. Podeh's clarity and comprehensive treatment of the sources gives the reader ample opportunity not only to learn but also to constructively debate about how to understand the key decisions and episodes across decades of attempted peacemaking. This book is an excellent resource for those interested in the Arab–Israeli relationship or conflict resolution writ large.
