Introduction
In its advisory opinion on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) derived the right to a healthy climate from the right to a healthy environment protected under Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), recognizing rights of Nature (RoN) as an element of both.Footnote 1 This essay argues that these developments mark a paradigm shift from an anthropocentric approach to an ecosystemic perspective, the latter understood as an interpretive lens recognizing human beings as part of (and not separate from) interdependent ecological systems. The recognition of RoN is the legal articulation of that shift. The essay then highlights the importance of this alternative approach in the context of the climate emergency, arguing that it enables preventive legal protection at the level of ecosystems themselves and allows reparations aimed at restoring ecological integrity even where harm is cumulative and diffuse and no specific human injury can be shown. We also identify avenues for attributing and adjudicating responsibility for violations of RoN in future contentious cases, anchored in ACHR Articles 26 and 29, and outline elements of a minimum core of RoN capable of guiding their application within the Inter-American human rights system (IAS).
The Path to an Ecosystemic Perspective and RoN in the Advisory Opinions of the IACtHR
Although the ACHR does not explicitly mention environmental rights, the IACtHR has protected such rights through different avenues of judicial interpretation, gradually transitioning from an anthropocentric to an ecosystemic perspective, that is, from an interpretation of the treaty that understands human beings as separate from Nature to one in which humans form part of an interdependent ecological whole.
In the landmark decision Lagos del Campo v. Peru, the Court recognized the direct justiciability of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights (ESCER) through a novel interpretation of ACHR Article 26. Under that provision, states commit to achieving the full realization of the rights implicit in or derived from the economic, social, and related standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS). In subsequent jurisprudence, the Court has looked to the Charter to identify, on a case-by-case basis, the rights protected under Article 26, thereby allowing protection of rights not expressly named in the Convention.Footnote 2 This paved the way for the direct justiciability of environmental rights in the IAS.
In its 2017 advisory opinion on The Environment and Human Rights, the Court analyzed the environmental obligations of states under various Convention rights and recognized an autonomous right to a healthy environment protected under ACHR Article 26, owed to present and future generations, which protects the components of the environment as legal interests in themselves.Footnote 3 The Court emphasized that Nature and the environment must be protected not only for their usefulness to human beings or to avoid impacts on individual rights, but because of their importance to all other organisms with whom the planet is shared. It also noted a regional trend in domestic court judgments and constitutions of recognizing legal personality and, consequently, rights to Nature.Footnote 4 These were the first steps within the IAS toward an ecosystemic approach to treaty interpretation.
In its 2025 advisory opinion on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights, the Court derived an autonomous right to a healthy climate (RHC) from the right to a healthy environment (RHE) it had previously recognized under Article 26. It also recognized RoN as a cross-cutting element throughout the opinion, including in its analysis of both the RHE and the RHC, and in its treatment of procedural rights and reparations,Footnote 5 as discussed below. Importantly, the Court treated RoN differently under the RHE and RHC.
RoN Within the RHE
First, the Court reiterated its prior jurisprudence on the RHE. It then consolidated an ecosystemic understanding of environmental protection, grounded in the premise that human beings are not separate from, but part of, complex and interdependent systems whose integrity is essential for the continuity of life.Footnote 6 On this basis, the Court affirmed that recognizing Nature as a subject of rights provides a coherent legal framework for addressing the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. This recognition was presented as a “fundamental” step to prevent existential and irreversible harm before it materializes.Footnote 7
The Court noted that this legal approach is fully compatible with the principle of progressive realization governing ESCER under ACHR Article 26; the obligation to adopt domestic measures contained in ACHR Article 2; the pro natura and pro persona principles; and an evolutive interpretation required by ACHR Article 29.Footnote 8 Within this framework, the Court identified concrete state obligations not only to refrain from causing significant environmental harm, but also to adopt measures aimed at the protection, restoration, and regeneration of ecosystems.Footnote 9 Further, given that the climate emergency is an existential threat, the Court held that the obligation to preserve the common ecosystem is a peremptory international obligation (jus cogens).Footnote 10
RoN Within the RHC
Second, in its analysis of the RHC, the Court stated that this right has both an individual and a collective dimension, the latter protecting present and future humanity and Nature.Footnote 11 In doing so, it situated the protection of Nature itself within the structure of a justiciable right and potentially opened the door to future adjudication.
The Court did not explicitly state that domestic recognition of Nature as a subject of rights is itself mandated by the ACHR. However, it nonetheless affirmed that the “reciprocal interdependence between climate stability and ecological equilibrium reinforces the need for [an] integrated legal approach, capable of uniting the protection of human rights and the rights of Nature.”Footnote 12
Procedural Obligations and Reparations for the Protection of RoN
Consistent with this understanding, the Court’s interpretation of “Environmental Democracy” and procedural “access rights” to information, participation, and justice are treated as structural guarantees for the effective protection of Nature, sustainable development, and the RHC.Footnote 13 Accordingly, in the advisory opinion, the Court called for the adaptation of access to justice, standing, and evidentiary standards to make the protection of ecosystems practically enforceable.Footnote 14
Finally, the Court determined that reparations must be adapted in the context of the climate emergency to reflect the characteristics of the harm, including its effects on both individuals and Nature.Footnote 15
The Ecosystemic Turn
Taken together, the Court’s cross-cutting analysis of RoN in its 2025 advisory opinion reflects a shift from an anthropocentric approach to an ecosystemic perspective.
Yet this interpretive shift did not emerge in a vacuum, or without doctrinal debate. During the advisory proceedings, at least two amicus briefs encouraged the Court to recognize Nature as a subject of rights, arguing that effective environmental protection in the context of the climate emergency required moving beyond anthropocentric frameworks. At the hearings, several judges expressed interest in exploring this proposal, generating a substantive exchange later reflected in their respective concurring and partially dissenting opinions, with competing positions on the legal basis, implications, and necessity of such a step, as well as the Court´s competence to take it.Footnote 16
In the following section, the authors briefly explain why we view recognizing RoN as necessary in the context of the climate emergency and how such rights can be operationalized as an Inter-American legal response, identifying doctrinal pathways for attributing and adjudicating responsibility in future contentious cases.
RoN in the IAS: From Recognition to Responsibility and Adjudication
The recognition of RoN in the IAS responds to the reality that all human beings depend on—and are part of—the ecological systems that sustain life, rendering the protection of humanity inseparable from the protection of Nature.
Environmental law has traditionally developed within an anthropocentric framework. Its primary objective has been to regulate human activities in order to prevent or mitigate environmental harm insofar as it affects human well-being, resources, or property,Footnote 17 often “permitting” or managing “acceptable” levels of pollution in furtherance of productivity goals.Footnote 18 Access to courts has typically depended on demonstrating harm to individuals or communities in order to establish legal standing. This architecture limits the capacity of environmental law to address ecological harm that primarily affects ecosystems themselves or to intervene before such harm becomes evident in human terms.
The recognition of RoN responds directly to these structural limitations. By recognizing natural entities as holders of rights, the doctrine enables claims to be brought on behalf of Nature itself and orients remedies toward restoration and ecological resilience rather than merely compensating human injury.Footnote 19
The RoN framework is particularly relevant to the climate emergency, where cumulative, transboundary, and systemic ecological disruption cannot easily be framed as localized harm or traced through linear causation.Footnote 20 Recognizing Nature as a subject of rights allows the law to protect the integrity of ecological systems (such as forests) that act as carbon sinks regulating the Earth’s climate. An ecosystemic approach thus aligns legal protection with the scientific reality that climate stability depends on the functioning of these systems.
The recognition of RoN also provides a basis for future contentious cases, in which the Court can further clarify state obligations and establish responsibility under the Convention. One pathway is through the use of ACHR Article 26 as interpreted in Lagos del Campo. Article 26 protects rights derived from the standards contained in the OAS Charter, particularly its provisions on integral development. While the Court relied on Articles 30–34 of the Charter when recognizing the right to a healthy environment in the 2017 advisory opinion, Articles 35–38—on development policy, the regulation of economic activity, interstate cooperation, and the sharing of scientific and technological knowledge—can also address the ecological dimensions of the climate emergency.Footnote 21 Once incorporated into ACHR Article 26, the standards set out in the Charter fall within the ESCER regime and, as such, give rise to both immediate and progressive obligationsFootnote 22 to prevent environmental harm and to protect, restore, and regenerate ecosystems essential to sustainable development and climate stability.
In this context, the recognition of RoN may be understood as a further development of the Convention’s ESCER framework, effectively extending it into what may be conceptualized as ESCER-N (or DESCAN, its acronym in Spanish), in which Nature is integrated into the evolving catalogue of economic, social, cultural, environmental, and related rights protected under Article 26.
ACHR Article 29 provides an additional component to this interpretive pathway. Section (b) of the Article prohibits interpretations of the ACHR that restrict the enjoyment of rights recognized in domestic law or other international instruments binding states. This clause has particular significance for RoN, which have increasingly been recognized in the domestic legal orders of states in the region.Footnote 23 They are also reflected in international initiatives, including the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, which acknowledges the relevance of RoN for countries that recognize them, the UN Harmony with Nature Programme, and relevant UN General Assembly resolutions. Where such approaches exist in domestic or international law, Article 29 offers a basis for giving effect to those protections under the ACHR.
This interpretive pathway would allow the Court to articulate a differentiated, yet coherent, methodology in future contentious cases. Where a state has already recognized RoN within its domestic legal order, the Court could rely on Article 29 to ensure that the Convention’s interpretation does not restrict such protections, while Article 26 would provide the normative basis for assessing whether state conduct complies with the obligations derived from the Charter. In this manner, the Court would be able to clarify both the immediate and the progressive obligationsFootnote 24 that arise from the ESCER-N regime.
Anchoring RoN within the framework of ACHR Article 26, Articles 30–38 of the OAS Charter, and ACHR Article 29 would therefore allow the Court to translate the ecosystemic perspective articulated in its advisory jurisprudence into operational legal standards applicable in future contentious cases. It would also provide an opportunity for the Court to further develop its eco-reparations jurisprudence under ACHR Article 63(1) and to order measures aimed at protecting and restoring natural entities themselves, without requiring that every ecological harm necessarily be traced to a specific injury suffered by human victims.
The Emerging Content of the RoN
The 2025 advisory opinion did not delineate the minimum normative content of the RoN. Articulating such a core, however, would enhance legal certainty and guide the doctrine’s future application within the IAS. The concurring opinion by Judges Mudrovitsch, Ferrer, and Pérez offers a starting point, as they suggest that the core of RoN lies in the preservation of ecological balance.Footnote 25 The concurring opinion clarifies that ecosystems do not hold rights intrinsic to the human condition (such as freedom of expression), but require rights tailored to their characteristics and ecological processes. The judges identify the emerging content of RoN, including the right to existence, the right to maintain and regenerate ecological processes, and the right to restoration.Footnote 26 However, they leave the broader articulation of RoN to future doctrinal development.
We propose a minimum core of RoN derived from comparative legislation, jurisprudence, and doctrine. The categories below reflect our synthesis of this emerging practice and identify general rights applicable to ecosystems and natural entities as such:Footnote 27
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1. Right to existence;
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2. Right to perform essential ecological functions;
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3. Right to evolve;
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4. Right to regeneration;
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5. Right to preservation;
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6. Right to conservation;
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7. Right to restoration and ecological rehabilitation;
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8. Right to legal protection;
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9. Right to legal representation and access to justice; and
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10. Right to integral reparation (eco-reparations).
These general rights form a conceptual baseline. Comparative practice also reflects more specific rights tailored to particular ecosystems or natural entities, such as the rights of rivers to flow.Footnote 28 The development of such rights will necessarily remain context-dependent and should evolve incrementally through jurisprudence and legislation informed by ecological science.
A further concern is legal standing. As with other legal fictions that are the subjects of rights, natural entities cannot act on their own and therefore require representatives or guardians to ensure that their rights are effectively exercised and defended, including through legal action.Footnote 29 Comparative practice reveals a range of institutional models to fulfill this function. Some systems establish formal guardians, trustees, or mixed collegial bodies responsible for representing natural entities, while others allow individuals, communities, or public institutions with a legitimate interest to act on their behalf, facilitating more effective ecological justice.Footnote 30
Conclusion
The recognition of RoN in the 2025 advisory opinion reflects a paradigm shift in legal thought, responding to the growing awareness of the limitations of strictly anthropocentric frameworks in addressing planetary ecological crises. Existing mechanisms, while significant, include preventive tools and ex post compensation, but remain structurally oriented toward human injury, limiting their capacity to address diffuse, cumulative, and ecosystem-level harm characteristic of the climate emergency. Among international tribunals, the IACtHR is a particularly suitable forum for adjudicating climate-related cases and advancing eco-reparations, given the possibilities afforded by the text of the ACHR. As comparative developments unfold, the IAS can continue to play a central role in articulating legal standards to protect the ecological systems upon which climate stability and human life depend.
