Global integration increased dramatically between 1850 and 1914. The trend has generally been attributed to the cooperation of Western nation-states, embodied in numerous international trade agreements. This view has been supported by the observation that global trade decreased significantly in the wake of WWI. The Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration presents a more complicated narrative of this period of globalization by highlighting the role of non-state actors and non-Western states in international institutional development. This narrative suggests that the period following WWI was not one of decreased global integration but rather represented a shift in how that integration was structured. The volume is composed of 11 chapters, presented in three sections.

The first section challenges the notion that nation-states were the sole drivers of economic integration during the period leading up to WWI. Frequently, nation-states did not have the incentives to cooperate; they were mostly concerned with maintaining power. While all relevant parties were in favor of international bankruptcy agreements, Jérôme Sgard argues that nations did not form these agreements because they were unwilling to cede national control over judicial procedures. However, non-state actors had the incentives to establish effective ways to conduct international trade and the knowledge of trade necessary to do so. As discussed by Niels P. Petersson, early twentieth century merchant associations developed arbitration procedures partly because nations were unable to form agreements on international contract enforcement. Rowena Olegario describes the private institutions in several countries that provided subscribers with information on merchant credit, ranging from mercantile credit reporting agencies in the United States to the mutual protection societies of Great Britain and Germany.

Non-Western countries have often been perceived as having been forced into global integration during this period. The second section gives several examples that cast these countries in a less passive and the colonial powers in a less successful light. While Australasian colonial borrowers on the London Stock Exchange were forced to adjust to Western notions of creditworthiness, Bernard Attard shows that the Exchange also adjusted its rules to accommodate for these new borrowers. Bernd- Stefan Grewe suggests that Britain suffered more than South Africa when London exploited the South African gold mining industry in an attempt to maintain power in the world gold market. As discussed by Christof Dejung, British firms were unable to adapt to Indian commercial culture and, as a result, suffered from low quality cotton production. On the other hand, Claude Markovits argues that Indian trade networks were able to successfully work in parallel with Western trade due to their existing knowledge. Finally, even the international agreements between large industrialized countries around the turn of the century may have held little power over smaller countries. Pierre-Yves Donzé describes how Japan only gradually and selectively adhered to patent protection agreements between 1893 and the 1930s. While many countries experienced extreme exploitation at the hands of colonial powers, this section reveals a more complicated view of how Western and non-Western countries experienced global integration.

If European nation-states were not the sole drivers of globalization during this period then there is reason to doubt that WWI truly led to a decline in international trade and cooperation. Isabella Löhr explains that the Berne Convention of 1886, an intellectual property agreement for literary and artistic works between several belligerent countries, persisted throughout the war partly because it was firmly supported by market participants. Bunge & Born, a multinational grain trading company based in Argentina, continued to trade throughout the war, despite being blacklisted by Britain, and flourished after the war as well, as described by Phillip Dehne. International trade certainly decreased during and immediately following the war but these chapters in the final section, and some data presented in the introduction to the volume, suggest that the war did not cause a complete break down of global integration. In the years following the war, nation states seem to have acknowledged the importance of market participants to the success of global integration, as evidenced by the reliance of the League of Nation's Economic and Financial Organisation on non-state actors. However, as argued by Michele d’Alessandro in the final chapter of the volume, they seem to have swung too far in the other direction and the EFO eventually failed due, in part, to this overreliance on experts outside of governments.

This volume presents several challenges to the standard view of globalization between 1850 and 1930. The chapters come together to form a convincing argument. Unfortunately, some of the chapters lack the evidence required to argue that particular institutions or actors affected global integration. These authors should look to the example set by Isabella Löhr, who quantitatively demonstrates that the participation of non-state actors in the Berne Union had a positive impact on trade. This volume is an ideal read for scholars seeking an overview of some of the major problems with the existing literature on the history of globalization.