¹ Seminal papers include Kramer, Gerald H., ‘On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule’, Econometrica, 41 (1973), 285–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Plott, Charles R., ‘A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule’, American Economic Review, 57 (1967), 787–806Google Scholar; McKelvey, Richard D., ‘Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control’, Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976), 472–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McKelvey, Richard D., ‘General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models’, Econometrica, 47 (1979), 1085–112CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schofield, Norman, ‘Instability of Simple Dynamic Games’, Review of Economic Studies, 45 (1978), 575–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cohen, Linda, ‘Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models’, Journal of Economic Theory, 20 (1979), 1–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Riker, William H., Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982)Google Scholar, for a clear exposition of assumptions and results. For a geometric explanation of key proofs, see Feld, Scott L. and Grofman, Bernard, ‘Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Majority Winner in n-Dimensional Spatial Voting Games: An Intuitive Geometric Approach’, American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987), 709–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Riker, , ‘Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics’, in Finifter, Ada W., ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983), p. 55.Google Scholar

³ Shepsle, , ‘Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models’, American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2 (1989), 131–48.Google Scholar

⁴ Caplin, Andrew and Nalebuff, Barry, ‘On 64%-Majority Rule’, Econometrica, 56 (1988), 787–814CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Caplin, and Nalebuff, , ‘Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem’, Econometrica, 59 (1991), 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Shepsle, Kenneth and Weingast, Barry R., ‘Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice’, Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feld, Scott L. and Grofman, Bernard, ‘Majority Rule Outcomes and the Structure of Debate in One-Issue-at-a-Time Decision-Making,’ Public Choice, 59 (1988), 239–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ Riker, , Liberalism Against Populism, p. 239.Google Scholar See also his The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986).Google Scholar

⁷ Riker, , Liberalism Against Populism, pp. 246–53Google Scholar; see also Riker, William and Weingast, Barry, ‘Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures’, Virginia Law Review, 74 (1988), 373–401CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Riker, William, ‘The Justification of Bicameralism’, International Political Science Review, 13 (1992), 101–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Critics of Riker's normative conclusions include Miller, Nicholas R., ‘Pluralism and Social Choice’, American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 734–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weale, Albert, ‘Social Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory’, British Journal of Political Science, 14 (1984), 369–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Coleman, Jules and Ferejohn, John, ‘Democracy and Social Choice’, Ethics, 97 (1986), 6–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Pildes, Richard H. and Anderson, Elizabeth S., ‘Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics’, Columbia Law Review, 90 (1990), 2121–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Most of this work focuses on the ‘uncovered set’ of outcomes, a concept introduced by Nicholas R. Miller. The literature in this area is already prolific; for a relatively accessible exposition, see Miller, Nicholas R., Grofman, Bernard and Feld, Scott L., ‘The Geometry of Majority Rule’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989), 379–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Basic papers include Miller, , ‘A New Solution Set for Tournaments and Majority Voting: Further Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting’, American Journal of Political Science, 24 (1980), 68–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McKelvey, Richard D., ‘Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice’, American Journal of Political Science, 30 (1986), 283–314CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feld, Scott L. et al. , ‘The Uncovered Set in Spatial Voting Games’, Theory and Decision, 23 (1987), 129–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cox, Gary W., ‘The Uncovered Set and the Core’, American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987), 408–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For another approach, see Niemi, Richard G., ‘Why So Much Stability? Another Opinion’, Public Choice, 41 (1983), 261–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Feld, and Grofman, , ‘Partial Single-Peakedness: An Extension and Clarification’, Public Choice, 51 (1986), 71–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ Examples include Riker, , Liberalism Against Populism, chap. 9Google Scholar; The Art of Political Manipulation, passim; ‘The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice’, American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 1–16Google Scholar; Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Weingast, Barry A., ‘The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power’, American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 85–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and an outstanding body of work in progress by Barry Weingast on the nineteenth-century United States. A notable exception is Lewin, Leif, Ideology and Strategy: A Century of Swedish Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Lijphart, Arend, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar New Zealand also serves as an archetypical case in Taagepera, Rein and Shugart, Matthew, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

¹¹ Jackson, Keith, The Dilemma of Parliament (Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987), chap. VIII.Google Scholar

¹² In 1908 and 1911, the plurality rule was temporarily replaced by a second ballot (majority-orrunoff) system, and from 1887 up to 1902 the four major cities (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin) were three-member constituencies; see Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Towards a Better Democracy (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986)Google Scholar, Appendix A (‘The Electoral Law of New Zealand: A Brief History’); and Hamer, David, ‘The Second Ballot: A New Zealand Electoral Experiment’, New Zealand Journal of History, 21 (1987), 97–111.Google Scholar

¹³ Siegfried, André, Democracy in New Zealand (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914 [original French edition published in 1904]).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Except for a reversal of emphasis, my formulation is the same as Lewin's: ‘we will view history from the standpoint of the potential loser’ (Ideology and Strategy, p. 13Google Scholar). Riker's position in ‘The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making’ is compatible: ‘creativity on both sides emanated from the will to win in the face of prospective loss’ (p. 15, emphasis added); but elsewhere his phrasing is less qualified: ‘The dynamics of politics is in the hands of the losers … Losers are the ones who search out new strategies and strategems and it is their use of heresthetics that provides the dynamic of politics’ (‘Political Theory and the Art of Heresthetics’, pp. 62–3).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Burdon, R. M., The New Dominion: A Social and Political History of New Zealand, 1918–1939 (Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1965)Google Scholar; Bassett, Michael, Three Party Politics in New Zealand, 1911–1931 (Auckland: Historical Publications, 1982).Google Scholar

¹⁶ The analysis that follows especially depends on David Hamer's splendid The New Zealand Liberals: The Years of Power. 1891–1912 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1988).Google Scholar Other sources include the standard general histories of New Zealand: Oliver, W. H., The Story of New Zealand (London: Faber and Faber, 1960)Google Scholar; Oliver, W. H. with Williams, B. R., eds, The Oxford History of New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; and Sinclair, Keith, A History of New Zealand (New York: Penguin Books, 1980).Google Scholar (I should note that these excellent New Zealand historians already think in terms quite consistent with social choice analysis, which means that this study owes much to them, whereas they will learn little from it, other than some new terms and a more general theoretical context.) Other useful sources include two major biographies: Burdon, R. M., King Dick: A Biography of Richard John Seddon (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1955)Google Scholar; and Sinclair, Keith, William Pember Reeves: New Zealand Fabian (London: Oxford University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; biographical collections: Burdon, R. M., New Zealand Notables, Series Two (Christchurch: The Caxton Press, 1945)Google Scholar; and Scholefield, G. H., ed., A Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1940)Google Scholar; and basic reference works: McIntyre, W. David and Gardner, W. J., eds, Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History (Wellington: Oxford University Press, 1971)Google Scholar; McLaughlan, Gordon, ed., New Zealand Encyclopedia (Auckland: David Bateman Ltd, 1984)Google Scholar; and Wilson, J. O., New Zealand Parliamentary Record. 1840–1984 (Wellington: V. R. Ward, Government Printer, 1985).Google ScholarLipson, Leslie's The Politics of Equality: New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948)Google Scholar remains a useful comprehensive study of New Zealand politics by a political scientist. Important contemporary accounts include Bryce, James, Modern Democracies, vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1921)Google Scholar; Siegfried, , Democracy in New ZealandGoogle Scholar; Reeves, William Pember, The Long White Cloud: Ao Tea Roa (London: Horace Marshall and Son, 1899)Google Scholar; Reeves, , State Experiments in Australia & New Zealand, 2 vols (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1902)Google Scholar; and LeRossignol, James Edward and Stewart, William Downie, State Socialism in New Zealand (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1910).Google Scholar The books by Reeves and Stewart are interesting not only for detailed descriptions of programmes, but also because they were written by leading participants on opposite sides. Reeves was the first Liberal Minister of Labour and Education, and Stewart became a Reform Cabinet minister.

¹⁷ Labour received 55.8 per cent in 1938 and 51.3 per cent in 1946, and National won 54.0 per cent in 1951.

¹⁸ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 40.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Oliver, , Story of New Zealand, p. 154.Google Scholar The style and ideology of ‘populist majoritarian’ politics that Seddon and the Liberals inaugurated has persisted throughout the twentieth century. ‘New Zealand's democratic theory is one tending toward radical democracy, based on the idea of popular power … [and] majoritarianism. Society's general will should prevail’ (Vowles, Jack, ‘Liberal Democracy: Pakeha Political Ideology’, New Zealand Journal of History, 21 (1987), pp. 200, 222Google Scholar). See also Mulgan, Richard, Democracy and Power in New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1984).Google Scholar

²⁰ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 11.Google Scholar

²¹ Grimshaw, Patricia, Women's Suffrage in New Zealand (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1972).Google Scholar Two other structural reforms, both in the electoral system, occurred later in the Liberal era and will be treated in a separate paper on the Liberals' demise. Disaggregation of the urban three-member constituencies, which took effect with the 1905 election, clearly had a destabilizing effect by encouraging separate Labour candidacies; and the short-lived shift to a second ballot in 1908 and 1911 failed to prevent the Liberals' decline in the latter election.

²² Black, Duncan, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Boston, Mass.: Kluwer, 1987)Google Scholar; Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).Google Scholar

²³ Lijphart, , Democracies, pp. 17–18.Google Scholar

²⁴ Note that Lijphart's characterization applies only to durable divisions between major parties, omitting three other types of issues that can influence voters' choices: those on which major parties agree but differ in perceived ability to perform, those on which they disagree just temporarily and those on which they divide within their own ranks.

²⁵ Miners, among the most militant of workers, were mostly located in rural areas. (Seddon represented a mining constituency.) Conversely, many of the bourgeoisie, especially in country towns, depended upon farmers' prosperity. Thus the correlation between geographic location and economic interest is far from perfect.

²⁶ Totals do not match, because some MPs had more than one occupation and are counted twice; the occupations of eight others are unspecified. For profiles from which these tallies were derived, see Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, pp. 361–7.Google Scholar

²⁷ Lipson, , Politics of Equality, pp. 68–9.Google Scholar

²⁸ McIntyre, and Gardner, , Speeches and Documents, pp. 201–3.Google Scholar

²⁹ Lipson, , Politics of Equality, p. 200, quoting Reeves.Google Scholar

³⁰ Siegfried, , Democracy in New Zealand, p. 189.Google Scholar

³¹ See, for example, Kadane, Joseph B., ‘On Division of the Question’, Public Choice, 13 (1972), 47–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Miller, Nicholas R., ‘Logrolling, Vote Trading, and the Paradox of Voting: A Game-Theoretical Overview’, Public Choice, 30 (1977), 51–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ferejohn, John, ‘Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation’, in Wright, Gerald C. Jr., Rieselbach, Leroy N. and Dodd, Lawrence C., eds. Congress and Policy Change (New York: Agathon, 1986).Google Scholar

³² Hamer, , The New Zealand Liberals, p. 40.Google Scholar

³³ Hamer, , The New Zealand Liberals, p. 65.Google Scholar

³⁴ Hamer, , The New Zealand Liberals, p. 40.Google Scholar

³⁵ The characterizations of groups' policy preferences that follow are based primarily on the author's reading of Hamer, , The New Zealand Liberals.Google Scholar

³⁶ Fairburn, Miles, ‘The Rural Myth and the New Urban Frontier: An Approach to New Zealand Social History, 1870–1940’, New Zealand Journal of History, 9 (1975), 3–21.Google Scholar

³⁷ Burdon, , New Zealand Notables, p. 78.Google Scholar

³⁸ Holt, James, ‘The Political Origins of Compulsory Arbitration in New Zealand: A Comparison with Great Britain’, New Zealand Journal of History, 10 (1976), 99–109.Google Scholar

³⁹ Oliver, , Story of New Zealand, p. 141.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Bryce, , Modern Democracies, p. 272.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Grey, who served as British governor in South Australia and South Africa as well as New Zealand, once remarked of Seddon, , ‘I never met a manlier man’Google Scholar (Burdon, , King Dick, p. 106).Google Scholar

⁴² Lipson, , Politics of Equality, p. 299.Google Scholar

⁴³ Bryce, , Modern Democracies, p. 274.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, pp. 206–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Lest this portrait and the account that follows appear too one-sidedly favourable, I should note that Seddon had serious flaws, especially by standards that prevail today. Like many men of his time, he was a jingoist, a sexist and a racist. Though forceful and long-winded. Seddon was devoid of eloquence (a gap in his talents that substantiates Riker's distinction between rhetorical and heresthetical political skills). Despite his admiration for the New Zealander's political strengths, Bryce ultimately concluded, ‘it is a misfortune when a nation's most forcible and most trusted leaders do not represent something more ideal than did Richard Seddon’ (Modern Democracies, vol. II, p. 324).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ He did not always succeed, however. One of his notable failures led to the enfranchisement of women.

⁴⁷ The distinction is not meant to imply that micro-heresthetics cannot also have historic consequences. The failure to pass a vital bill, or its passage in an unacceptable form, may bring down a government or fatally weaken its electoral support. ‘For want of a nail…’

⁴⁸ Riker, , Art of Political Manipulation, pp. 150–1.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Riker, , Art of Political Manipulation, p. 66.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 115.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Bassett, Michael, ‘In Search of Sir Joseph Ward’, New Zealand Journal of History, 21 (1987), 112–24, at p.119.Google Scholar

⁵² Bryce, , Modern Democracies, p. 273.Google Scholar

⁵³ Hamer writes that Stout ‘had not been previously known for any great devotion to prohibitionism’ (New Zealand Liberals, p. 115).Google Scholar However, I am indebted to Keith Jackson and Mark Francis for pointing out evidence that Stout had a consistent history on the issue.

⁵⁴ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 114.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Sinclair, , Reeves, pp. 178–9.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Burdon, , King Dick, pp. 114–16Google Scholar; Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 118.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 80, p. 528Google Scholar; vol. 81, pp. 170, 500–1; and Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 118.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Nagel, Jack H., ‘Wets, Damps, Drys, and Wowsers: Reconstructing Voter Preferences from Approval-Ballot Liquor Referendums in New Zealand, 1896–1908’ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Political Science Department, 1992).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Stout continued what Reeves called a ‘curious five years duel’ with Seddon until 1898, when he resigned to attend to his law practice once again. The next year, Seddon ensured that Stout would not return to plague him by appointing his adversary Chief Justice. As Reeves commented, their struggle ‘strangely complicated New Zealand politics, … and is the key to much political manoeuvring with which it might seem to have nothing whatever to do’ (Long While Cloud, pp. 362–3).Google Scholar After Stout's departure, the intense Christchurch prohibitionist T. E. Taylor took up the cause against Seddon, harassing him with intemperate personal attacks and sensational accusations. Nevertheless, when Seddon died, the ambivalent Taylor confessed, ‘I did admire the man. The outstanding feature of his career was his dramatic success. He was incomparably the ablest man who has ever touched New Zealand politics, and his persistency was like death itself’ (Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 209).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 119.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Separate prohibitionist and regular Liberal tickets had contested the Christchurch and Auckland districts in 1893 (Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, pp. 111–12).Google Scholar

⁶² Nagel, , ‘Wets, Damps, Drys, and Wowsers’.Google Scholar

⁶³ By 1908, fourteen of seventy-six districts were dry. In 1910, the law was changed to institute a triennial nationwide referendum. In 1919, national prohibition fell just short of the 60 per cent required for adoption. Subsequently, its support declined sharply, perhaps due to the unfavourable example of Prohibition in the United States, although it was also the case that drunkenness had become much less prevalent as a social problem. See Fairburn, Miles, The Ideal Society and its Enemies: The Foundations of Modern New Zealand Society, 1850–1900 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989), p. 207.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Seddon, 's role in 1893–1896Google Scholar was analogous to that of Lyndon Johnson after the death of John Kennedy.

⁶⁵ Maslow, Abraham, ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’, Psychological Review, 50 (1943), 370–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁴ Burdon, , King Dick, p. 160.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Burdon, , King Dick, p. 160.Google Scholar

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⁶⁹ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 149.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 140.Google Scholar A correspondent reported the statement to Reeves, for whom the advice was equally apt.

⁷¹ Reeves, , State Experiments, vol. II, chap. II.Google Scholar

⁷² Graham, Jeanine, ‘Settler Society’Google Scholar, in Oliver, , ed., Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 132.Google Scholar

⁷³ LeRossignol, and Stewart, , State Socialism in New ZealandGoogle Scholar, chap. X.

⁷⁴ Burdon, , King Dick, pp. 313–14.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Siegfried, , Democracy in New Zealand, p. 195.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 357.Google Scholar

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⁷⁹ Bassett, Judith, ‘A Thousand Miles of Loyalty: The Royal Tour of 1901’, New Zealand Journal of History, 21 (1987), 125–38, at pp. 133, 136–7.Google Scholar

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⁸² Ward, Benjamin, ‘Majority Rule and Allocation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5 (1961), 379–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hamada, Koichi, ‘A Simple Majority Rule on the Distribution of Income’, Journal of Economic Theory, 6 (1973), 243–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁸⁴ Note that the locus of instability during this period was primarily in Parliament, rather than at the electoral stage.

⁸⁵ Oliver, , Story of New Zealand, p. 129.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Reeves, , Long White Cloud, p. 259.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Burdon, R. M., The Life and Times of Sir Julius Vogel (Christchurch: The Caxton Press, 1948), p. 96.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Lipson, , Politics of Equality, p. 134Google Scholar. Lipson allowed himself poetic licence; there were eighty-eight House seats at the time.

⁸⁹ Burdon, , Julius Vogel, p. 84.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ As Albert Weale has pointed out, these actions might be considered manipulation of incentives rather than the manipulation of issues implied by the concept of heresthetics. The distinction lies in the size of the group affected by an action. A pure incentive can be given to or withheld from an individual – for example, a job, nomination or portfolio - whereas an ‘issue’ affects a group. The extreme case of distributive politics occurs when there are no ‘issues’ other than individual gain, and the welfare of each participant becomes a separate dimension of evaluation. However, many distributive questions do involve some degree of aggregation, as when the welfare of an electorate or region is at stake. Such questions are more likely to become ‘issues’ in the normal political sense. For example, during the Stout-Vogel and Atkinson Ministries of the 1880s, constituents in several South Island districts demanded to have a railway built across the Southern Alps. Members from this area exploited their pivotal position in parliament to extract appropriations for the project. Its extravagance during a time of retrenchment infuriated the rest of the country. An observer commented, ‘There is no doubt the city of Wellington is in flames from hatred and fear of the south. The men there are so excited they would about knife you over the question.’ See Rosanowski, G. J., ‘The West Coast Railways and New Zealand Politics, 1878–1888’, New Zealand Journal of History, 4 (1970), 34–53Google Scholar, quotation at p. 45. Of course, the principles according to which patronage, nominations and other individual goods are allocated can also become important ‘issues’.

⁹¹ Lipson, , Politics of Equality, p. 132Google Scholar. At about the same time, the Liberal government of Italy depended on the similar practice of ‘traformismo, the process by which deputies who were elected as opponents of the government were “transformed” into its allies once they were granted patronage’ (Shefter, Martin, ‘Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy,’ Politics and Society, 7(1977), p. 443).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹¹ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 77.Google Scholar

⁹³ LeRossignol, and Stewart, , State Socialism in New Zealand, p. 109.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 223.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ LeRossignol, and Stewart, , State Socialism in New Zealand, p. 197.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Burdon, , King Dick, p. 140.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Sinclair, , History of New Zealand, p. 190.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 114.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ LeRossignol, and Stewart, , State Socialism in New Zealand, pp. 198–201, 210–12.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, pp. 108–12.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Richardson, Len, ‘Parties and Political Change’Google Scholar, in Oliver, , ed., Oxford University of New Zealand, p. 202Google Scholar; Oliver, , Story of New Zealand, p. 158.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Lipson, , Politics or Equality, p. 244.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Dalziel, Raewyn, ‘The Continuous Ministry Revisited’, New Zealand Journal of History, 21 (1987), p. 49.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, pp. 126–8, 202.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ For Seddon, loyalty was a two-way street. He never fired a minister, and in electoral contests, he normally endorsed sitting members (Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, pp. 204–5, 249, 252)Google Scholar. The possibility that the last added member of a coalition receives as payoff its full marginal contribution plays an important role in game theory as the basis of the Shapley value and its well-known application, the Shapley-Shubik index of voting power. See Riker, William H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), chap. 6Google Scholar; Shubik, Martin, Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), chap. 7Google Scholar. Social systems sometimes operate consistently with this principle, as is evident from American professional baseball under the free agent system, universities that pay faculty according to their willingness to test the job market, and the history of New Zealand politics before 1890. All three examples demonstrate that rewarding the disloyal encourages churning of personnel and organizational disequilibrium. Seddon's success in harnessing particularistic incentives to enforce party unity and policy stability shows that there is nothing inevitable about distributive disequilibrium.

¹⁰⁶ Burdon, , King Dick, p. 319.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Riker, , Liberalism against Populism, p. 192.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Riker, William H. and Brams, Steven J., ‘The Paradox of Vote Trading’, American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), 1235–47, quotation at p. 1240CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Riker, , Liberalism Against Populism, pp. 157–67Google Scholar, and Brams, , Paradoxes in Politics: An Introduction to the Nonobvious in Political Science (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 91–111.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Hardin, Russell, ‘Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma’, Behavioral Science, 16(1971), 472–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁰ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 202.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Stewart, , ‘Introduction’ to Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand, pp. x–xi.Google Scholar

¹¹² The image of Seddon as the people's servant occurs often in contemporary accounts and in his own rhetoric. The Webbs, for example, wrote that ‘The common people throughout the colony feel that he is working for them — that he is their servant…’ (Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 199)Google Scholar. After his 1902 election victory, Seddon exclaimed, ‘You are my masters, and we are getting on very well together!’ (Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 200).Google Scholar

¹¹³ Siegfried, , Democracy in New Zealand, p. 100Google Scholar. Siegfried makes this observation in the context of portraying Seddon as a pragmatist who did not worry about socialist ideology.

¹¹⁴ Kadane, , ‘On Division of the Question’Google Scholar; Shepsle, , ‘Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models’Google Scholar; Feld, and Grofman, , ‘Majority Rule Outcomes and the Structure of Debate in One-Issue-at-a-Time Decision-Making’.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Riker, , Liberalism Against Populism, pp. 189, 192.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Nagel, , ‘Wets, Damps, Drys, and Wowsers’Google Scholar. Of course, after they became a majority, prohibitionists continued to be thwarted by the supermajoritarian 60 per cent requirement.

¹¹⁷ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 46.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Burdon, , King Dick, p. 299.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Burdon recounts a celebrated example in which Seddon turned a potential disaster into a personal triumph by winning over a hostile crowd. Afterwards, he boasted, ‘I played on them like a pianner’, but in fact he had restored his personal popularity by artfully bowing to their demands (King Dick, pp. 274–80).Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, p. 206.Google Scholar

¹²¹ New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 90, p. 571.Google Scholar

¹²² The overall social state achieved in this way may or may not maximize social welfare, as Riker and Brams show in ‘The Paradox of Vote Trading’. When it does not, the policies produced by a coalition of minorities may be normatively preferred on utilitarian grounds.

¹²³ Hamer, , New Zealand Liberals, pp. 103–4.Google Scholar