‘Another God’ (D 55–62)

Justin answers in three ways Trypho's request (D 50.1) for proof of the existence of ‘another God’: that he was given the divine name, shares a divine substance and also participated as Creator. First, Justin demonstratesFootnote ⁹ that one other than the Father appeared to Abraham (D 56.4), Jacob (D 58.3, 9, 10) and Moses (D 59).Footnote ¹⁰ He also elaborates, though briefly, on the nature of Christ using metaphysical categories. While the theological vocabulary for articulating the ontology of the Son's relationship with the Father is evidently limited during Justin's time, he elaborates that the nature of this unity is grounded in the fact that he was begotten of the Father (D 61). The two analogies – human utterance of a word and the enkindling of a fire – are used to stress the distinct identity of the divine Persons, but also the unity of substance shared between them. The Son is ‘begotten () from the Father . . . but not by abscission (ἀποτομή) as if the substance (οὐσία) of the Father has been divided . . . [And this] enkindled fire is distinct from that [original fire], from which many can be kindled is by no means diminished (λασσόω)’.Footnote ¹¹ Beyond this, Justin cites Proverbs 8:21–36 without any commentary bearing upon matters such as how the Son was begotten or the mode of his existence prior to his generation.Footnote ¹² Nonetheless, he is clearly asserting on the one hand Christ's distinction from the Father without division or separation, but also by implication on the other hand, Christ's unity with the Father by virtue of the same divine substance they share.

Now, one might ask even more to the point: ‘Does Justin attempt to communicate this sharing of the divine substance without any metaphoric analogy?’ In fact he does. This is to be found in the use of the word γνώμη (mind) in his brief but explicit assertion about the unity of the Father and the Son:

The word γνώμη had a variety of meanings among the philosophers during Justin's time, and its use in the Dialogue is also diverse enough to include four basic categories denoting ‘opinion’ (D 1.6; 35.4; 35.6; 39.1; 68.8), ‘disposition’ (D 44.1; 47.2), ‘will’ as in ‘purpose’ (D 56.12; 95.2; 125.4) and, finally, ‘mind’ as in the ‘organ by which one perceives or knows’Footnote ¹⁴ (D 56.11; 93.4; 127.4). Only the last category, as cited above, refers to the faculty out of which the first three operations ensue.Footnote ¹⁵ For early evidences of γνώμη as combining the notion of ‘intellect’ and ‘will’ we could go back to Heraclitus who defines wisdom thus: ‘to understand γνώμη (intelligence) that guides everything in every way’ (fr. 41), but later, Aristotle also defined γνώμη as the faculty which helps one to judge righteously in society.Footnote ¹⁶ Christian precedents are noted in which the word was similarly applied to God; for instance, believers are exhorted ‘to perceive . . . the γνώμη (mind) of the goodness of our Father’ in the Epistle of Barnabas (2.9). But, most significantly, Justin's use of the word for the relationship between the Father and the Son is clearly reminiscent of Ignatius whose idea of unified divine purpose and thought is explicit: ‘For even Jesus Christ our inseparable life is the mind (γνώμη) of the Father . . .’Footnote ¹⁷ Moreover, since Homer, the notion of the mind or will of Zeus was often ‘the Master Mind’ representing the will of a plurality of gods expressing the unified divine purpose.Footnote ¹⁸ Juxtaposing this idea current in his day, it is likely, then, that Justin uses the concept of divine purpose to express the organic unity between the Father and the Son, so that the Father is the source of deity and the Son an outflow from the Father: they have the same mind (γνώμη) (D 56.11) or substance (οὐσία) (D 128.4).

Having shown the divine name for Christ and explicated how the Father's divine substance is shared by the Son, Justin moves on to another aspect of Christ's deity, his participation in the Father's act of creation, a topic that follows naturally from Proverbs 8 he just cited. Since his most frequent title for God the Father is the ‘creator of all things’ or ‘creator of the world’,Footnote ¹⁹ it is not surprising that reference to the Son's involvement in creation is limited to a few instances in the Dialogue.Footnote ²⁰ At D 61, however, Justin's exegesis focuses on the account of the creation of man in Genesis 1:26–8 and specifically points to the plurality of the expression ‘Let us make’ to assert Christ's involvement in creation (D 62.2). Although he does not take pains to speak of the Holy Spirit,Footnote ²¹ perhaps for reasons of simple apologetics, he merely says that there are revealed at least (λάχιστος) two in number in the expression ‘as one of us’ in Genesis 3:22 (D 62.3; Marcovich, 177). He rejects an interpretation by a Jewish heretical sect,Footnote ²² or any other which maintains that the Father was speaking to angels, or that the angel was responsible for the creation of man's physical body. As Skarsaune notes, Justin's polemic is possibly directed here against Tannaitic and Philonic interpretations.Footnote ²³

Now if Justin is aware of the writings of Philo, which Boyarin adduces as one of the key points of evidence that most Jews were binitarians, perhaps a more nuanced explanation for Justin's charge against the Jewish teachers’ unbelief concerning the Logos could be expressed in a two-fold way – as a lack of specificity and therefore also of certitude. As Boyarin recognises,Footnote ²⁴ the uniqueness of Christianity was in identifying the Messiah in the particular person Jesus. This same logic can be applied to Jewish teachers’ understanding of Logos’ identity as well. While the hermeneutic role of the Logos/Torah, i.e. for interpreting scriptures, may have been generally emphasised in Judaism, this Logos has not been sufficiently and specifically identified with a particular personFootnote ²⁵ in the Jewish scriptures (e.g. as one who appeared to the patriarchs, D 56–62); certainly, Philo pointed to the plurality in ‘let us create . . .’ (Gen. 1:26) or ‘as one of us . . .’ (Gen. 3:22) as a reference not to the Logos, but rather to ‘unspeakable number of powers’ (Opif. 24; Conf. 33–4).Footnote ²⁶ As such, what Justin calls ‘the mystery of Christ in the scriptures’, i.e. the notion of connecting the Logos precisely with the coming Messiah, would be even more difficult to believe. Wherever specificity is absent, any belief would remain little more than tentative speculation at best.

Christ was virginally born (D 63–78)

Trypho is actually convinced of (D 60.3), and admits that Justin has proved his point on, the existence of another God:

Now, Trypho is also challenging Justin for evidence concerning three other claims about the life of Christ which he perceives to be more difficult to believe; they are virginal birth, crucifixion and ascension. Justin complies with the first and the last respectively, but reserves the topic on the crucifixion until the end.

From a list of various passages from the Psalms and the prophets cited by Justin, it was Isaiah 7:10–17 that advances Justin into a long debate with Trypho when the latter protests on three different grounds: (1) the text says ‘young woman’ not a ‘virgin’, (2) the whole prophecy refers to Hezekiah, not to Christ, and (3) any story of a virginal birth is as mythical as the story of Perseus born of Danae (D 67.1–2). Although Justin has periodically to pull himself up to resume his argument, he takes these three objections and responds to them one at a time in reverse order (D 69–70, 77–8 and 84).

This extensive discussion on the birth of Jesus, continued over to the second day,Footnote ²⁸ is clearly a segment where worship of Christ is treated in the most emphatic way. First, this is intimated because among a variety of terms used for worship,Footnote ²⁹ Justin's favourite word προσκυνϵ ´ω as worship to Christ is more densely employed here than elsewhere in the entire Dialogue: more than half of all forms of προσκυνϵ ´ω as references to Christ are found in this small section which constitutes only about one tenth of the book.Footnote ³⁰ Second, the context of D 63–78 for the argument of Christ's virginal birth parallels Justin's emphasis on the worship due Christ. Justin opens with this theme on worship due to Christ (D 63) and closes with the assertion that indeed Christ, even as a babe, had been rightfully worshipped by some (D 78). We can also easily trace in these chapters how Trypho's series of different objections (D 64, 65, 69–70, 71–3, 74 and 77) were triggered by Justin's pressing the issue every so often that Christ must be worshipped (D 63.5; 64.1; 68.3).

Christ will come as judge over all creatures (D 79–83)

What began as Trypho's angry reaction to Justin's assertion that even angels have sinned leads into a discussion about the end of the world and the role of Christ as the judge over all creatures including angels. Further, Trypho's incredulity about the rebuilding of Jerusalem and joyful gathering of all the saints around Christ (D 80.1) allows Justin to re-engage on the topic concerning the expectation of the Messiah (D 31–4). This time, however, he is able to develop the theme of Christ as judge in an extended way within the context of a more comprehensive eschatological discourse, still grounded in his schema of the two comings mentioned earlier (D 34.2; 39.7). Accordingly, the humiliated Son in the first coming does not yet possess his eternal kingdom, but the exalted Son who has overcome all humiliation of his earthly lifeFootnote ³¹ shares with the Father this divine sovereignty over all creation. This idea is best depicted through Psalm 110 which he cites again here.

In the previous discourse that relates Christ as the eschatological judge (D 31–9), Justin had explained the phrase ‘Sit at my right hand’ (Ps. 110:1) as pointing particularly to the resurrection of Christ (D 32.3). Upon Justin's further elaboration with passages from Daniel 7 and other psalms, Trypho concedes that these prophecies concerning his coming again are all foretold in the scriptures (D 39.7). Yet, Trypho reiterates the gist of his objection, namely, against Justin's claim that none other than this crucified JesusFootnote ³² is the Messiah spoken of in the scriptures. To the Jewish interlocutor's request for further proof Justin consents and promises to comply, but at a more proper place (προσήκοντι τόπῳ).Footnote ³³ Our section D 79–83, then, seems to be Justin's keeping, at least in part, his earlier promise.

The δύο παρουσίαι schemaFootnote ³⁴ (D 110.2), therefore, is the basis for Justin's second attempt to prove the identity of the one sitting at the right hand of the Father (Ps. 110:1); this he endeavours within the context of a comprehensive discourse concerning the end of the world recorded in D 79–83. He speaks about fallen angels (D 79), the millennium and the resurrection (D 80–1), judgement of unbelievers (D 82) and culminates with the identity of the one who ‘sits at the right hand of the Father’ (D 83). If we compare his comments here on Psalm 110 (D 83) with his earlier ones (D 32–3), two differences are evident. First, in the earlier account, Christ is called ‘Lord’, and ‘Lord Jesus Christ’, whereas, in the latter, he is simply named ‘Jesus’ and ‘Christ’ (D 83.4). Second, and this seems related to the first, Justin, notwithstanding his longer citation (Ps. 110:1–7), is satisfied to merely bring out the idea of Christ's resurrection in the earlier account: ‘the Father of all led him up from the earth . . . after his rising (ἀνάστασις) from the dead’ (D 32.3; Marcovich, 122). In the latter account, where he cites fewer verses (1–4), Justin adds comment on the phrase ‘sent forth a rod (άβδος) of power into Jerusalem’ (Ps. 110:2): ‘though he has not yet come in glory, this phrase signifies the word of calling and of repentance’ (D 83.4; Marcovich, 214). The significance of this change from the earlier account is twofold: (1) Justin first took the opportunity to stress Christ's exaltation in order to easily connect with the more prevalent Jewish expectation of the Messiah; but after further demonstration with other prophetic passages, Trypho must now be ready also to deal with the burden of new evidence that Christ is the judge to whom accountability of our lives must be given. (2) Christ is not just another judge who comes in power, but one who calls or invites repentance by his ‘provisionary’ rod. This is Justin's important play on the words ‘rod of power’ as signifying both the judgment and the cross. This he amply demonstrates in the following section (D 86) where he explicitly says Christ's ‘return in glory after the crucifixion was prefigured by the tree’, the rod of Moses, of Jacob, of Aaron, of David and of others. In this section, then, Justin's kerygmatic zeal presents Christ the apocalyptic judge and the provider of redemption calling forth repentance.

Christ was crucified for the whole human race (D 89–106)

After listening to extensive arguments on the virginal birth and the second coming of the Messiah, Trypho admits that all the scriptural quotations Justin has adduced indeed refer to Christ. Nevertheless, there is still one other unresolved objection which Trypho expresses as his real point of doubt, that ‘Christ should be so shamefully (ἀτίμως) crucified’ (D 89.2; Marcovich, 225).

As it is Justin's pattern to first remove his listeners’ most immediate and obvious objection (D 45.1; 68.9), he attends to the problem that crucifixion is a curse according to the Mosaic law (Deut. 21:23) before providing an extensive commentary on Psalm 22. Justin's solution is based on what he has explained earlier concerning the scriptures, that some commandments are intended for worshipping God and practising righteousness, but some are given for the purpose of ‘the mystery of Christ’ (D 44.2). Moses’ making the brazen serpent should have been a clear indicator, Justin argues, that this incident is not to be interpreted only literally. The obvious paradoxical nature of God's command that goes against his own command not to make any graven image bespeaks that it is no ordinary event but one that clearly belongs in the category of ‘the mystery of Christ’. And if the mystery of Christ is signified here, Justin asserts that it points specifically to the crucifixion, as he painstakingly demonstrates from numerous prophecies (D 40.1; 43.3; 74.3; 86.6; 91.1–3; 91.4; 94.2–4; 97.4; 106.1; 107.1; 115.1–116.1; 125.3–5; 131.2; 134.5; 138.1–3).

This leads us to a significant observation that Justin points to the cross on each of these fifteen Old Testament passages (out of the eighteen in the Dialogue) which he explicitly identifies as pertaining to the mystery of Christ.Footnote ³⁵ In fact, this is the case even when the passages are generally cited as proof-texts for the pre-existent Logos (D 43.3; 125.3–5). Several other textual pointers can be offered as evidence for our claim that crucifixion is central to the Dialogue. First, the crucifixion of Christ is also by far the longest and most uninterrupted section on a single topic in the Dialogue. Second, the crucifixion has been the most troublesome aspect of Christ to his interlocutor. It is contrary to Trypho's idea of hope (D 10.3), opposed to his concept of the honourable and glorious Messiah (D 32.1), and that this crucified one is claimed to have conversed with Moses and Aaron in the pillar of clouds is nothing less than blasphemy (D 38.1). Even after acknowledging that the Messiah would suffer (D 89.2), the mere thought of attributing this shameful manner of death accursed by the law was unbearable to Trypho (D 90.1). Third, as previously noted, Trypho had requested as evidence concerning the claims about the life of Christ, i.e. his ‘virginal birth, crucifixion, and ascension’, in this chronological order (D 63.1). Significantly, Justin, despite his own arrangement of the categories so far, which reflects the chronology of the life of Christ from his pre-existent state, breaks away from this natural sequence in the life of Christ. In the light of his usual pedagogic/apologetic reasons, Justin delays the topic of the greatest challenge for his interlocutor, Christ's shameful crucifixion.Footnote ³⁶

One other forceful evidence has to do with Justin's understanding of both the exclusive and the inclusive nature of salvation on account of the crucifixion. This can be seen in his repeated assertions that the Messiah was crucified for all who would believe in him. Thus, even in regard to social behaviour, Trypho is puzzled how ‘setting hope in the crucified man’ (D 10.3) can cause Christians to expect to be approved by God in their non-segregating inclusive attitude towards non-Christians.Footnote ³⁷ Just as he has been attributing the fall into the serpent's deceit as the origin of human sin and evil in the Genesis account (D 79.4; 88.4; 91.4), Justin makes it unambiguous that the mystery of Christ in the brazen serpent incident proclaims the breaking of the same serpent which incited the sin of Adam (D 94.2). The bite of the serpent in the wilderness, therefore, is not merely a picture of the predicament faced by the Jews but of how sin entered the human race through Adam. For Justin, the effect of sin is universal:

No one is excluded from the bites of the serpent, but no one, Justin asserts, needs to be excluded from Christ's salvation either, for Christ ‘proclaimed salvation to those who believe on him . . . to save them from the bites of the serpent’ (D 94.2). Certainly his polemic against the Jews is obvious in the Dialogue, but equally evident are his untiring pleas and exhortations to believe in Christ by repentance (D 35.8; 44; 53.4; 64.3; 92.6; 95.3; 108.3; 118.1; 120.2; 25.1–2; 130.2; 133.1, 6; 134.4; 136.1; 137.2; 138; 139.5; 141.1; 142.2), affirming that God knows that ‘every day some of you are becoming disciples in the name of Christ, and leaving behind the way of error’ (D 39.3).Footnote ³⁸ Justin believes that only the crucified Christ who invites all to believe is the most inclusive means of salvation from the universal curse of sin, and so he is also prompted to say to Trypho that ‘there is no other way’ (D 44.4).

This inclusive soteriology has been Justin's heartbeat and conviction from the start. As we have seen, Justin delineated for us a criterion at the beginning of the Dialogue for evaluating a good philosophy by asking two questions: whether there is one or more gods, and whether they care for each one of us (D 1.4). We have also seen that only the first category, that there is ‘another God’, concerns the former question, while the last three categories relate to the latter question. This emphasis on the salvific providence is already foreshadowed in the remainder of this first chapter (D 1.4–6) through Justin's utter concern for one's destiny in the afterlife, lamenting that most philosophers were ‘neither fearing punishment nor hoping any benefit from God’ (D 1.5). It is in response to this remark that Trypho then invites Justin to explain his personal view on this subject (D 1.6–2.1). After relating his conversion story, Justin claims that Christianity is exclusive on the one hand, since he ‘found it alone to be the sure and profitable philosophy’ (D 8.1), but inclusive, since everyone including the Jews is also invited to personally have ‘regard for [one]self, care about, and eagerly seek salvation’ (D 8.2).