Sir John Rankine Goody (b. 1919) is nothing if not an academic superstar. Knighted for his academic accomplishments in anthropology, the author of close to thirty books, and a member of (among others) the National Academy of Sciences, he has achieved basically every honor an academic could ever wish for. Yet there are no signs of a slowing down of productivity. In the past three years, he has published two more books, Islam in Europe (Polity Press, 2013) and The Eurasian Miracle (Polity Press, 2010). Economic historians will know him particularly for his work criticizing “Eurocentrism,” a term whose derogatory significance can be compared to “bourgeoisie” in Marxist circles. While its precise meaning is never quite made clear, it is generally agreed to be something bad. The book under review mercifully mentions Eurocentrism only occasionally. Despite its title, its main focus is neither metal, nor culture, nor capitalism. It is primarily a book about the emergence of long-distance trade since the beginning of civilization. While metals technology and uses do come up from time to time, they seem to interest Goody primarily because of the stimulus they provided to long-distance trade. River valley areas, where Bronze Age civilizations started, had few local sources of metals needed for civilian and military purposes, and imported them from other areas. Consequently, these regions produced export goods in exchange. Thus technological progress and the growth of trade went hand in hand, and trade was itself a civilizing process. Goody illustrates this point again and again in a wide-ranging survey that extends over many centuries and much of the Eurasian continent. He is especially fascinated by the commercial success of Venice (to which he devotes a chapter and a half), a bit odd perhaps for a declared opponent of Eurocentrism. He stresses the importance of metals in Venetian trade, which is worth emphasis. His knowledge of Venice seems to be on substantially firmer ground than that of China (the city of Kaifeng, the center of the iron industry in Song China, is never mentioned in the book).
Quite often, however, he loses sight of metals and digresses into descriptions of trade in textiles, glass, spices, and whatever comes to his mind. At times, such digressions can be outright disconcerting. On p. 215 in the middle of a discourse on Venetian trade, he finds it necessary to remind the reader that the crusades were seen by Arabs in a similar way to the establishment of the Zionist state in Palestine, which, he reminds the reader “was reinforced by the attempted (sic) extermination of the Jews in Germany (sic).” Surely any reader trying to follow a narrative on the development of European silver and lead mining (which starts on the previous page) will scratch his head over this thoughtful insight. Elsewhere this eminent social anthropologist observed, apparently to his shock, in a traditional Israeli (sic) synagogue “women confined to the gallery upstairs” which, he feels necessary to explain, was due to an “Abrahamistic religion in which males assumed a special place in conducting the service to a male God” (p. 184). The real question, perhaps, is why Cambridge University Press could not put a competent editor to work on the manuscript to weed out such statements.
On the whole, this book, while based on very extensive and wide-ranging scholarship, reads like a more or less unedited compilation of notes the author took while reading a diverse but unsystematic list of books in historical geography and global economic history. It is disorganized to the point of being chaotic, leaping merrily hundreds of years and thousands of miles back and forth within a single paragraph. Many details are repeated over and over again, whereas many other rather obvious details are missing altogether and leave gaping holes in this (very) roughly chronological account. For instance, Goody is rightly fascinated with Agricola's De Re Metallica, which he discusses at length, but never mentions the name of Paracelsus, Agricola's contemporary and one of the founders of modern metallurgy. In a discussion on the importance of metalworking for armaments in the nineteenth century, he discusses standardization and mass production without ever mentioning interchangeability of parts.
Had the book employed some theoretical structure, such an eclectic approach might perhaps have made some sense, but for a book so obsessed with long-distance commerce it is uniquely devoid of any analytical framework short of the relation between the demand for raw materials and the rise of trade. It never even bothers to reflect how long-distance trade came to be without any third party contract enforcement, and how it overcame informational and other difficulties. Much of the modern literature on the institutional foundations of markets and exchange proposed in the writings of Douglass North and the subsequent literature have passed Professor Goody by. Instead, he spends many pages summarizing works in historical geography and archaeology. Much of it reads like endless lists of region i trading good k with region j in year t. The good k is sometimes metals, more often something else. In vain does one search for anything that would make these narratives coherent.
Surprisingly, however, from time to time he presents some disjointed but thought-provoking reflections on the cultural underpinnings of trade and technology, and here the book is more interesting even if not always persuasive. Consider Goody's reflection on the role of Christianity in the medieval economy, pp. 187–88. The view he takes is that “the achievements of the Ancients were not of great concern in the Middle Ages and …the religious took priority over the secular, sometimes even over the technical…until the Italian Renaissance and the equivalent in Islam and Judaism (sic) ‘looked back’ to the classics, reintroduced secular knowledge and went onwards to ‘modernity.’” This is simply an astonishing sentence, fifty years after the first publication of Lynn White's classic Medieval Technology and Social Change. Goody lists White's Medieval Religion and Technology in his bibliography, but it is not cited anywhere and White's resounding refutation of a technological “dark age” in medieval Europe driven by a benighted church seems to have left Goody unmoved.
It is unclear what audience will want to read this book. Its stream-of-consciousness style and the errors in details make it useless for an undergraduate audience. On p. 174 we are told that “the puddling process led to the Bessemer convertor (sic) of 1835.” It often contradicts itself: blast furnaces, we are told on p. 132 were probably already found in Sweden between 1150 and 1350 (p. 132) but “the earliest blast furnace in Europe was at Namur in 1340” (p. 262). Experts looking for a convenient survey of the history of metals will find the lack of references to standard authorities disturbing (the chapter on iron in the Industrial Revolution does not mention the standard works by Charles Hyde and John R. Harris). Many of the ideas are hardly new, but poorly argued. It may well be that all three monotheistic religions in the first millennium AD were a source of technological retrogression, but the issue is too complex for anyone to just declare this as an obiter dictum.
In the final chapter, Goody returns to the topic that dominates many of his earlier books. Europeans were not unique. Global history, he thinks, is an “alternation” between different civilizations within the Eurasian continent. Few people hold today the view that somehow only European culture encouraged invention, but the notion of a “pendular history” (a term coined by a reviewer of one of Goody's earlier books), as a metaphor for technological leadership swinging back and forth between parts of the Eurasian continent is problematic. First, a pendulum denotes some kind of dynamic equilibrium in which the swings are returning and follow identical motions—an idea that Goody himself is uncomfortable with (he prefers “spiral,” p. 293). But more seriously, pendular movement is symmetric, and this symmetry—if it ever existed—was disrupted by the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Goody's notion that technological leadership is temporary, which he presses hard in the final chapter, is not novel (it was proposed by D.S.L. Cardwell in 1972). But whether the exploitation of metals makes for technological leadership or the other way around remains an unresolved question.
