No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Interpersonal and Social Reconciliation: Finding Congruence in African Theological Anthropology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2013
Abstract
Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.
Western scholars studying post-conflict truth and reconciliation commissions often presuppose a sharp divide between interpersonal and social forgiveness and reconciliation. This leads some to question and critique commissions that seek to promote forgiveness and reconciliation at both the interpersonal and the social levels. This project contends that the problem these scholars perceive may be based upon a dichotomy between the individual and the community that is absent in communitarian cultures. African theological anthropologies based on the notions of palaver and ubuntu illustrate that the human person is profoundly formed and preserved by the community, which sustains the individual through the promotion of certain ethical standards. In this context, expressions of interpersonal forgiveness and reconciliation have social ramifications. Cross-cultural discussion with African theologians thus re-situates this debate. African theological anthropology demonstrates the congruence among interpersonal and social expressions of forgiveness and reconciliation based in the community's commitment to the common good.
Information
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The College Theology Society 2012
References
1 It is important to note that anthropology and cultural studies emphasizes the hybridity of cultures. Cultures intermingle such that it is imprecise to refer to “Western” or “African” culture as though these have a pure internal unity that is separate from other cultures. Moreover, African theologians from across the continent have been quick to remind their North American and European counterparts that Africa itself is rather diverse and not culturally homogenous. Nevertheless, in this article the terms “Western” and “African” function heuristically as Weberian ideal types to help clarify real differences in approaches to forgiveness and reconciliation. I do not intend to suggest a perfect unity or pureness to either Western or African culture. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for assistance in articulating this point.
2 Schreiter, Robert J., Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1992), 44Google Scholar.
3 de Gruchy, John W., Reconciliation: Restoring Justice, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 177Google Scholar.
4 Schreiter, , Reconciliation, 60Google Scholar.
5 de Gruchy, , Reconciliation, 170Google Scholar.
6 Ibid., 201.
7 That is not to say that individuals necessarily forgive or apologize on behalf of groups, or that groups accept forgiveness or apologies on behalf of individuals. The ethics of collective agency with regard to forgiveness and reconciliation is not my focus here. Instead, I emphasize how African anthropology extends the scope of forgiveness to encompass not only victim and perpetrator, but also the full community that has been affected by human rights violations. There are social consequences to personal acts of forgiveness.
8 Of particular importance here would be Govier's work on types of forgiveness, particularly her contributions on “invitational forgiveness” (101–03) and mutual forgiveness (103–04) in her book Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable Peace, (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006)Google Scholar. Also invaluable are Chapman's contributions to the volume that she has edited with Hugo van der Merwe, especially her consistent insistence on distinguishing between the theoretical ideal of truth-telling toward reconciliation after human rights violations versus the practical realities of such endeavors, and her observations regarding how multiple understandings of reconciliation can hinder efforts to build peace. See Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver?, ed. Chapman, Audrey R. and van der Merwe, Hugo, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008)Google Scholar.
9 Govier, , Taking Wrongs Seriously, 10Google Scholar.
10 Ibid., 11.
11 Ibid., 95.
12 Ibid., (emphasis in original).
13 Ibid., (emphasis in original).
14 Chapman, Audrey R., “Truth Commissions as Instruments of Forgiveness and Reconciliation,” in Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation, ed. Helmick, Raymond G., S.J., and Petersen, Rodney L. (Radnor, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), 257–78Google Scholar, at 262.
15 “Adversaries need to make a commitment to repairing and reestablishing their relationship. This process can be facilitated by victims' willingness to forgive those responsible for harming them. It may be possible though to promote social healing and accommodation even in the absence of forgiveness at a personal level” (Chapman, 267).
16 Chapman, , “Truth Commissions,” 269–70Google Scholar.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 270.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 265.
21 Bujo, Bénézet, Foundations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality, (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 1–3Google Scholar.
22 Ibid., 5.
23 See ibid., 1–2 for more on this broadly understood notion of community. The African notion of community “is not limited only to the visible community: the invisible community, which is equally important for Africans, embraces not only one's deceased ancestors but also those not yet born and even God.”
24 Ibid., 87.
25 Ibid., 129.
26 Ibid., 90.
27 Ibid., 93.
28 Ibid., 55.
29 A major example of this is Laurenti Magesa whose theology of inculturation depends heavily on the notion of vital force. Indeed, Magesa contends that all African ethics are rooted in the mandate to protect and promote life, thus any authentic African theological ethic must include reference to vital force as a key component. See Magesa, Laurenti, African Ethics: The Moral Traditions of Abundant Life (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1997)Google Scholar.
30 Bujo, , Foundations of an African Ethic, 102Google Scholar.
31 Ibid., 60.
32 Ibid., 3.
33 John, Pope XXIII, Encyclical Mater et Magistra (15 May 1961) (Boston: St. Paul Editions, [1961]Google Scholar, no. 65. See this translation also in Francis Canavan, S.J., “The Image of Man in Catholic Thought” in Catholicism, Liberalism, and Communitarianism, ed. Grasso, Kenneth L., Bradley, Gerard V., and Hunt, Robert P. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 15–28, at 25Google Scholar.
34 Ibid., no. 65.
35 Bujo, , Foundations of an African Ethic, 90Google Scholar.
36 ma Mpolo, Masamba, “Jesus Christ—Word of Life: An African Contribution to the Theme of the Sixth Assembly,” Ecumenical Review 35/2 (April 1983): 165–78, at 169CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37 Ibid., 169.
38 This feature in which ethical norms arise from concrete situations parallels certain aspects of the Western ethical method known as casuistry. In casuistry, comparing a current ethical dilemma to prior cases generates moral principles. Through serious attention to the circumstances surrounding a moral dilemma, casuists allow the specific situation of a moral query to guide the creation of and direction of norms. For more on casuistry and the resurgence it is enjoying in Western moral theology see Jonsen, Albert R. and Toulmin, Stephen, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)Google Scholar.
39 Mpolo, , “Jesus Christ—Word of Life,” 169Google Scholar.
40 Bujo, , Foundations of an African Ethic, 55Google Scholar.
41 Ibid., 23.
42 Ibid., 23.
43 Ibid., 2.
44 Ibid., 6.
45 Ibid., 29.
46 Ibid., 50.
47 Ibid., 112.
48 Ibid., 131 (emphasis in original).
49 Odozor, Paulinus Ikechukwu, “An African Moral Theology of Inculturation: Methodological Considerations” Theological Studies 69 (2008): 583–609CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 594–95.
50 Ibid., 597.
51 Maina, Wilson Muoha, “African Communitarian Ethics in the Theological Work of Bénézet Bujo,” Pacifica: Journal of the Melbourne College of Divinity 21 (2008): 192–209CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 208.
52 For more on feminist theology in African contexts see Amoah, Elizabeth, ed., Where God Reigns: Reflection on Women in God's World, (Accra, Ghana: Sam Woode, 1997)Google Scholar and Oduyoye, Mercy Amba, ed., Transforming Power: Women in the Household of God, (Accra, Ghana: Sam Woode, 1997)Google Scholar.
53 Maina, , “African Communitarian Ethics,” 208Google Scholar.
54 Bujo, , Foundations of an African Ethic, 129Google Scholar.
55 Ibid., 125.
56 Ibid., 24.
57 Ibid., 87.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 92.
60 Ibid., 63.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 63.
63 Ibid., 62.
64 Ibid., 103.
65 Gathogo, Julius, “African Philosophy as Expressed in the Concepts of Hospitality and Ubuntu,” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, no. 130 (March 2008): 39–53Google Scholar, at 45.
66 For a theological treatment of ubuntu, see Battle, Michael, Reconciliation: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond Tutu (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1997)Google Scholar.
67 Mnyaka, Mluleki and Motlhabi, Mokgethi, “The African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha and its Socio-Moral Significance,” Black Theology 3/2 (2005): 215–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 220.
68 Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on The Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes), no. 12, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.
69 John, Pope XXIII, Encyclical Pacem in Terris (11 April 1963), nos. 9–27, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_1041963_pacem_en.html.Google Scholar
70 Gathogo, , “African Philosophy,” 46Google Scholar.
71 Mnyaka, and Motlhabi, , “African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha,” 218Google Scholar.
72 Ibid., 221–22.
73 Ibid., 221.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 223.
76 Gathogo, , “African Philosophy,” 40Google Scholar.
77 Tutu, Desmond, quoted in The Words of Desmond Tutu, ed. Tutu, Naomi (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), 69Google Scholar.
78 Mnyaka, and Motlhabi, , “African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha,” 217Google Scholar.
79 Mandela, Nelson, quoted in Gathogo, , “African Philosophy,” 45Google Scholar.
80 Mnyaka, and Motlhabi, , “African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha,” 224Google Scholar.
81 Nolan, Albert, God in South Africa: The Challenge of the Gospel, (Claremont, South Africa: David Philip Publishers, 1988), 80Google Scholar.
82 Mnyaka, and Motlhabi, , “African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha,” 224Google Scholar.
83 Desmond Tutu describes this “social harmony” as the “ summum bonum— the greatest good.” See Tutu, Desmond Mpilo, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 31Google Scholar.
84 de Gruchy, , Reconciliation, 202Google Scholar.
85 Mnyaka, and Motlhabi, , “African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha,” 226Google Scholar.
86 Netshiomboni, S., Ubuntu: Fundamental Constitutional Value and Imperative Aid (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1998), 6Google Scholar.
87 Mnyaka, and Motlhabi, , “African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha,” 225Google Scholar.
88 Ibid., 225.
89 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response: A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, May 3, 1983 (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1983)Google Scholar, no. 27.
90 Whitmore, Todd D., “The Reception of Catholic Approaches to Peace and War in the United States” in Modern Catholic Social Teaching: Commentaries and Interpretations, ed. Himes, Kenneth R. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 493–521Google Scholar, at 508.
91 Tutu, Desmond quoted in Gathogo, , “African Philosophy,” 45Google Scholar.
92 Battle, , Reconciliation, 47Google Scholar.
93 Tutu, , No Future Without Forgiveness, 31Google Scholar.
94 Mnyaka, and Motlhabi, , “African Concept of Ubuntu/Botha,” 222Google Scholar.
95 Ibid., 223.
96 For example, in exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the TRC, John W. de Gruchy notes that “in its attempt to uncover the gross violations of human rights by perpetrators the TRC let the vast array of beneficiaries of apartheid off the hook” (Reconciliation, 156). This charge constitutes an important cautionary note that institutional violence must be taken into account by truth commissions. Indeed, Audrey R. Chapman rightly argues that the TRC failed to deal effectively with the sustained violence of apartheid as an institutionalized ideology (Chapman, “Truth Commissions,” 273). De Gruchy's and Chapman's critiques are constructive and important; they suggest that to paint a full picture of the truth after violence and promote long-term reconciliation, commissions must view themselves as putting on trial the ideology and the system (in the case of South Africa, white supremacy and apartheid, respectively) that led to human rights violations in the first place.
97 Chapman, , “Truth Commissions,” 268–69Google Scholar.
98 Govier, , Taking Wrongs Seriously, 90Google Scholar.
99 Daye, Russell, Political Forgiveness: Lessons from South Africa, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2004), 153–55Google Scholar; 160–64.
100 Ibid., 13–22.
101 Schreiter, , Reconciliation, 60Google Scholar.
102 Ibid., 71–73.
103 Jones, Serene, Trauma and Grace: Theology in a Ruptured World, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009), 28Google Scholar.
You have
Access
- 1
- Cited by