The mid-twentieth century New Haven School of international law sits curiously at the intersection of notoriety and obsolescence in the American international law tradition. Notable figures of the latter part of the twentieth century—the likes of Rosalyn Higgins, Richard Falk, and Harold Koh—have declared themselves as acolytes.Footnote 1 Yet others suggest that it has been relegated to the dustbins of history, and that its present day memory is false.Footnote 2 It is hard to tell where myth ends and where reality begins in relation to the New Haven School’s influence on American international law.
In this ambiguous terrain, Ríán Derrig sets out to restore the New Haven School’s memory and to investigate its significance for the present moment. Derrig, currently an assistant professor at the World Maritime University, revisits the New Haven School with a view to situating its founders and their ideas in place and time. At the same time, the author is invested in working out the relationship between the New Haven School and the modern-day “rules-based order,” and especially the School’s role in the rise of American global power. Derrig’s historical inquiry does not appear to be motivated by a disinterested, depoliticized perspective, but rather by a keen interest in the origins of the international order as we know it.
The New Haven School can be read as making two main claims. First, that the New Haven School is most usefully seen as a vessel through which broader trends in early-twentieth century legal, political, and social thought were channeled into mid-twentieth century American international law and legal practice (p. 1). Those included psychoanalysis, philosophical pragmatism, and New Deal liberalism. In this review, I will reflect on the New Haven School’s relationship with all three in turn. Second, that the core elements of mid-twentieth century American international law, as reflected by the New Haven School, have persisted all the way to the fin de siècle “rules-based order.” For Derrig, understanding the historical origins, style, and context of those international legal arguments helps lawyers invested in keeping American global power in check today (pp. 2–3). In this review, I will also briefly reflect on the New Haven School’s relationship to the past and present of the international legal order.
The New Haven School as Biography
The New Haven School operates, firstly, as a rich and sensitive biographical account of the School’s founding figures, international lawyer Myres McDougal and political scientist Harold Lasswell. Derrig meticulously traces their upbringing, cultural context, and intellectual influences. The author takes particular care to bring to light the philosophical predispositions of those who surrounded Lasswell and McDougal during their formative years. The reader is thus invited to peek into the life of Progressive Era small-town Illinois, from which Lasswell hailed, and that of rural Mississippi, McDougal’s birthplace; to bask in the cosmopolitan aura of inter-war European capitals, following Lasswell on his sojourns of intellectual renewal; to wander around the corridors of inter-war Yale Law School, at the time a true legal realist stronghold, which offered an institutional home to both McDougal and Lasswell; and to empathize with the concerns and preoccupations of the young men who, like both of the book’s protagonists, took up posts in Franklin Roosevelt’s administrations, committed to changing the system from within.
Crucially for the book’s narrative arc, the first biographical chapters helpfully recover the early intellectual influences and foundational concerns that brought McDougal and Lasswell together and ultimately motivated the rise of the New Haven School. Lasswell is cast as deeply influenced by social psychology and psychoanalysis in his approach to politics. Understanding how public opinion is shaped, how stereotypes arise in collective consciousness, and how anxiety impedes intercultural empathy, just as it impedes interpersonal understanding, animated Lasswell’s early work (pp. 20–21). McDougal appears torn between two versions of philosophical pragmatism: a more “radical” version invested in social critique and social change and a more “conservative” version limited to describing legal phenomena and to predicting legal outcomes (p. 50). The reader might be surprised to discover that, as a result of this intellectual oscillation, McDougal developed an ambivalent relationship with prior generations of legal realists, like Jerome Frank, Underhill Moore, and Max Radin, whom he viewed as overwhelmingly invested in challenging legal orthodoxy and as operating in a destructive or nihilist register, rather than engaging in constructive legal work. He was instead committed to discussing the values, found in the actual experience of life, that would motivate social change (pp. 55–57). Precisely because Lasswell had “something to say about how to build from scepticism in legal realism and how to explain and pursue social values and goals,” McDougal initiated their collaboration (p. 62). The “real problem” that his generation needed to answer was, in McDougal’s own words, the “problem of values” (p. 47).
In detailing the lives of its two protagonists, The New Haven School also demonstrates, though perhaps inadvertently, just how different those characters really were. Lasswell is cast as a cosmopolitan, though somewhat elusive, public intellectual, wholly a product of modernity, who from an early age comfortably acquainted himself with prominent intellectuals of his time, including Hans Kelsen, Alfred Adler, and the Frankfurt School theoreticians (pp. 15, 32). McDougal, by contrast, surfaces as an “unreconstructed Southerner,” constantly navigating the divide between the South’s traditional agrarian lifestyle and the ethos of urban Progressivism (p. 42). The two similarly diverged in their politics: while Lasswell flirted with Fabian socialism and was suspected of being a communist during the Cold War era, McDougal was a New Deal liberal who, like others of his time and age, subsequently espoused the politics of the Cold War (pp. 22, 36–37). Predictably enough, Lasswell’s presence silently recedes as The New Haven School progresses into the post-war era, with McDougal increasingly co-authoring with other scholars in defense of American Cold War positions.
The New Haven School as Intellectual History
Secondly, The New Haven School operates as a new intellectual history, in which “policy-oriented” jurisprudence emerges as the product of the interplay between McDougal’s pragmatism and Lasswell’s psychoanalysis. This foregrounding of psychoanalysis as a driving force for New Haven School thought distinguishes Derrig’s account from prior scholarly readings. Those have traditionally explored policy-oriented jurisprudence in relation to pragmatism—sometimes to confirm and at other times to reject its influence—and to social scientific empiricism.Footnote 3 Other accounts have emphasized the intellectual context of the post-war era as crucial for the rise of the New Haven School. They have portrayed the School as a reaction to post-war international relations realism and its derogatory view of law in international affairs.Footnote 4 In unearthing the impact of psychoanalysis, alongside that of pragmatism, on policy-oriented jurisprudence, The New Haven School challenges this periodization. It instead calls attention to the inter-war era, with its complex array of social, political, and intellectual forces, as a generative moment for American international law.
While psychoanalysis assumes center-stage in The New Haven School, its function appears to shift across the various texts that the book examines. Derrig first offers a careful reading of some of the School’s lesser-known, more theoretical, texts and of McDougal and Lasswell’s 1943 article on legal education.Footnote 5 There, as I discuss in greater detail immediately below, an insightful psychoanalytical approach to law as a potential therapeutic to societal dysfunction abounds. However, as I discuss subsequently, when The New Haven School examines the School’s more doctrinal pieces on international law—which McDougal primarily co-authored with other scholars—those complex psychoanalytical insights are reduced to a bid for intervention and democratization initiatives across the globe (p. 123). When the book eventually revisits McDougal’s international legal practice and later work co-authored with Lasswell, psychoanalysis inspires an argument that the process of interpretation is inevitably subjective, determined by a legal actor’s context and circumstances. While The New Haven School consistently points out the continuities between those works, in the end, not just psychoanalysis but “policy-oriented” jurisprudence itself seems to take on a different meaning depending on the time, context and identity of its proponents.
As The New Haven School details, in their theoretical texts, Lasswell and McDougal spoke of the function of law in therapeutic terms. In their teaching materials for a seminar jointly taught at Yale Law School, they analogized the structure of the social order to the structure of the individual personality (p. 102). They argued that, to reveal unconscious impulses, the collective needed to cultivate self-insight. Law formed part of the ideological apparatus—the collective “super-ego”—that helped the collective psyche cultivate insight and purge itself of its capriciousness. By functioning as an internal limit on capricious behavior, law ultimately minimized societal anxiety, just as limits on the capriciousness of the dysfunctional parent alleviated the anxiety of the child (p. 105). A successful social organization that brought unconscious and conscious parts into alignment helped foster a “democratic character,” of “inclusive” and “expanding” personalities, capable of transcending inter-cultural divisions (p. 108). Accordingly, the task for legal education was to inculcate democratic values among the rising American elite (pp. 69, 106).
In the international law setting, the psychoanalytical insights into the malleability of the self and the interiority of a state’s collective psyche remained relevant, as The New Haven School demonstrates, but seemed to take on a new meaning. They offered a streamlined rationale for Cold War interventionism, as McDougal refashioned international law’s purpose into one of social engineering: to “cure,” i.e., to democratize “distorted” social orders by exposing them to value orders centered around the dignity of the human personality (pp. 112, 114). Human rights law, in particular, reflected the value order of the United States and, as such, he argued, should be exported to counter totalitarian regimes (pp. 114–15). Conversely, McDougal and his associates argued that a legal actor’s ideological life and their internal constitutional value-order should play a role in interpreting their intentions when resorting to the use of force (pp. 116, 118–19). In this way, constitutionalism and rights talk morphed into a criterion for determining whether an actor was pursuing benevolent change on behalf of the international community or was acting for mere self-aggrandizement. In keeping with this alleged responsibility of the First World to impose a value-order centered around human dignity, McDougal and his associates likewise offered broad rationales in favor of humanitarian intervention: factors like a general concern about spreading instability; the involvement of actors that identified with international revolt movements (i.e., communism); and the denial of human rights all provided grounds for the West to intervene (pp. 120–21). In the New Haven School’s doctrinal work on international law, rather than inspire greater inter-cultural empathy, the insights of psychoanalysis were thus reworked to align with Cold War realpolitik objectives.
In McDougal’s international legal practice, which The New Haven School perceives as the most authentic expression of policy-oriented jurisprudence, pragmatism and psychoanalysis informed an anti-formalist legal ethos, centered on an acute understanding of the subjective nature of interpretation. As a practitioner, McDougal derided formal conceptions for their lack of specificity with regard to concrete facts (p. 134). He conceived of law as a continuous process of claim and counterclaim, and was sensitive to the sociological elements of the process of adjudication (p. 128). Where interpretive ambiguity arose, McDougal encouraged legal interpreters to apply the policies (or values) of the respective public order which they served (p. 136). Legal interpreters were inescapably shaped by the context in which they were socialized. Interpretation was inseparable from the interpreter. Positive law was to be given meaning based on the interpreter’s context and identity: “what its interpreters knew” and “who they were” (p. 139). As The New Haven School reveals, those insights into the nature of interpretation, which McDougal eventually transplanted from his practice into international legal theory, elicited some of the strongest critiques against the New Haven School (id.).
While The New Haven School elevates McDougal’s theory of interpretation in the architecture of policy-oriented jurisprudence, it also downplays a certain preoccupation with identifying the values that policy-oriented lawyers needed to follow, in contrast to previous accounts. As Derrig notes, McDougal and his co-authors occasionally included extensive lists of values and policy declarations in their work, which mentioned normative goals such as “the wide sharing of power;” “fundamental respect for human dignity;” “enlightenment;” “access to wealth;” “health and wellbeing” (p. 95, emphasis removed). While those lists consistently appeared in the School’s more theoretical pieces, they largely dropped out of the picture where international legal practice was concerned (p. 128). The book thus challenges prior readings that picture those lists as core to the New Haven School’s theory. While The New Haven School does not reference any particular reading directly, the interpretation that the book advances appears to differ, for example, from that of Harold Koh, who suggests that “eight, empirically-referential value categories” formed part of the School’s focus.Footnote 6 The book also differentiates itself from readings like that of Hengameh Saberi, who attributes an overdetermining role to human dignity and consequently suggests that a contradictory style animated the New Haven School—one in which the law of human dignity cast an overbearing shadow that “crippled” attempts at contextualism and hollowed out the School’s invocations of philosophical pragmatism.Footnote 7 In emphasizing McDougal’s subjectivist takes on interpretation and in shifting attention away from formal lists of values found in his work, The New Haven School instead tips the balance in favor of a solidly pragmatist sensibility.
Pragmatism in Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and in International Politics
The New Haven School arrives at this picture of McDougal as an untroubled pragmatist despite the reactions and criticisms of contemporaries who shared a belief in similar philosophical premises. For instance, the book records Jerome Frank’s epistemological objections to McDougal’s vision of law as a quasi-scientific engineer of social outcomes (pp. 76–77). Frank’s reservations, however, do not appear to influence the book’s intellectual portrait of McDougal. Elsewhere, the book notes that McDougal approached constitutional norms not as indicative of policy preferences but as legal priors from which to infer a state’s intentions when resorting to the use of force (pp. 118–19). The book relatedly records Rosalyn Higgins’s astute remark that McDougal occasionally confused “insisting that decisions be taken in accordance with the policy objectives of a liberal, democratic world community” with “asserting that any action taken by a liberal democracy against a totalitarian nation is lawful” (p. 178, emphasis in original). Such forays into treating liberal values as a priori for deducing legal outcomes appear to have little bearing on the book’s treatment of McDougal, even though scholars like Philip Allott cast doubt on McDougal’s fealty to pragmatism precisely because of his excessive reliance on conceptual a priori.Footnote 8 Others, like Chicago Law professor and McDougal’s contemporary, Allison Dunham, voiced concerns that, in his infatuation with stating policy goals, McDougal might be “substitut[ing] one set of generalities for another” in a way that was “reminiscent of the practices of the ‘old Supreme Court’ and substantive due process.”Footnote 9 When taken together, such observations drive home the point that, likely for a non-negligible audience, McDougal’s style was both controversial and more contradictory than that posited by The New Haven School.
Making sense of the style that McDougal imparted for American international law is especially germane as The New Haven School appears to assign a particular politics to legal style and interpretive method, even while recognizing their historical contingency. Derrig juxtaposes the anti-formalism of McDougal and of his associates, which he more broadly associates with the legal ethos of American global power, with the formalist register of the Global South. As The New Haven School suggests, McDougal’s anti-formalism helped discount formal legal concepts that the decolonizing world used in their defense, such as the inviolability of sovereignty and the supremacy of territorial jurisdiction (p. 165). Anti-formalist legal techniques are still being used by powerful states today, observes Derrig, while less powerful and less affluent states continue to rely on formal legal concepts, a heritage of the legal culture of the 1970s New International Economic Order (p. 166). In this regard, The New Haven School can be read as normatively aligning itself with Martti Koskenniemi’s call, over two decades ago, for a return to a “culture of formalism” as a means of counteracting American global power.Footnote 10
This picture of the politics of legal argument that emerges from The New Haven School is worth interrogating more closely. While the book closely associates American foreign policy with anti-formalism, it is difficult to discount the import of neo-formalism for America’s global presence. In addition to the conceptualism of human rights language, so crucial for liberal internationalist initiatives of the past three decades, the “new formalism” of foreign relations law legally structures America’s conduct in the world in ways parallel to and, at times, more significant than, international legal arguments.Footnote 11 At the same time, the Global South’s predilection for formal legal conceptions has also come into question. Indeed, scholars writing in the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) tradition have made much of the ways in which formal conceptions of territorial independence and nation-state sovereignty, coupled with the anti-formalism of international governance, betrayed the interests of the Third World after decolonization, by reproducing the power dynamics of formal colonialism and thwarting the genuine self-determination of its peoples.Footnote 12 In short, analyzing third-world domination through the lens of competing formalisms and anti-formalisms prevents a more nuanced understanding of the dynamic between law and power. Starting in the post-war era and increasingly so today, power moves through a complex array of legal arguments and legal techniques, not easily reducible to one style or sensibility.
The New Haven School in Relation to the Post-War International Order
In engaging in profuse values-talk as a means of deducing legal outcomes, McDougal may not only have distanced himself from some of his realist counterparts but also from the normative priorities of the post-war order. A vociferous critique leveled against him by Dean Acheson is especially telling in this regard. Acheson, a former secretary of state, “present at the creation” of the post-war international order, and an archetypal legal realist, was a patrician figure in American international law.Footnote 13 In a 1968 address pointedly titled “The Arrogance of International Lawyers,” Acheson vehemently turned against McDougal and W. Michael Reisman. Their cardinal sin, according to Acheson, consisted in supporting the 1965–1966 United Nations Security Council resolutions that exerted pressure, by means of economic sanctions, on the newly decolonized state of Rhodesia to establish majority rule and abolish its racist electoral laws.Footnote 14 Acheson’s grave concern was that these moralizing tendencies threatened to undo the normative principles upon which the post-war order had been founded, namely the prohibition of the use of force and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states: “It took a long time to develop the international precept that peace would be furthered by governments’ having respect for each other’s autonomy…. [T]he draftsmen of the Charter … did not intend to open the way for endless conflict through unbridled impulses to reform.”Footnote 15 Through initiatives like those supported by McDougal and Reisman, the “plain engagements of sovereign states” were being substituted with “ideas that appealed to us as ethical.”Footnote 16 Regardless of what we make of Acheson’s politics, his challenge nonetheless showcases how removed McDougal’s moralism was from the normative priorities of the post-war order as conceived by some of its founders. In that regard, McDougal likely shared more with the “rules-based” order of the 1990s and less with the post-war order, primarily oriented toward the prohibition of aggression, than can be gleaned from the pages of The New Haven School.
Even though McDougal’s moralism arguably distanced him from the specific priorities of the post-war order, it is still helpful to think with The New Haven School about the ways in which his work may have otherwise channeled the spirit of the era, and especially that of New Deal liberalism. Derrig, in this regard, primarily associates the legacies of New Deal liberalism for the New Haven School with a belief in the aggressive assertion of public authority (pp. 65–67). The book has less to say about the economic agenda that McDougal was hoping to pursue through the international exercise of public authority and the extent to which that agenda cohered with the political economy of the New Deal. Historians have extensively documented that New Dealers largely abandoned a more ambitious normative agenda by the outbreak of World War II, and oriented toward stabilization, rather than redistribution.Footnote 17 Several of those who moved to international affairs work during and after the War shared in this abdication of New Deal objectives for social and economic change in their international practice.Footnote 18 McDougal, as can be briefly gleaned from the pages of The New Haven School, appears to have moved in the same direction, exchanging his progressive property reformer impulses for the defense of private corporations against claims of international expropriation (p. 144). It would have been helpful for The New Haven School to explore this change of heart more extensively, especially given the book’s commitment to unearthing McDougal’s impact on the Global South and in light of the fact that one of the pre-eminent scholars of international economic law in the twentieth century, W. Michael Reisman, was his student and close collaborator. This late New Deal legacy of economic retrenchment McDougal likely helped forge, both as a legal practitioner and as a legal theoretician.
Myres McDougal’s legacy then, as is detailed in The New Haven School, remains interestingly ambiguous. On the one hand, McDougal creatively channeled interdisciplinary perspectives into American legal thought, while his vision for law inspired an extensive network of mentees and collaborators, who assumed prestigious positions within the international legal profession. On the other hand, in McDougal’s theoretical and advocacy work, elaborate legal arguments were sometimes made in favor of politically dubious positions, while the complex theoretical insights of psychoanalysis were simplified in the face of political expediency and earlier, relatively ambitious, normative agendas were traded for capitulation. McDougal’s calls for transparency about one’s own values hardly made up for the legitimation those offered to the widespread violence of the Cold War era. In that regard, the New Haven School’s story may even be read as cautionary. At the book’s conclusion, the reader is left to grapple with their own positionality in a world equally bereft of robust normative visions, where violence continues to bear the fig-leaf of moralism. Ríán Derrig has presciently chosen to recover the New Haven School’s story with great care and sensitivity at a ripe moment in time.
