William Kleinknecht's stated objective in this pugnacious 272-page text is to expose the veneration of President Ronald Reagan as pure flim-flammery. Building on books by Haynes Johnson, Michael Schaller, and Garry Wills, The Man Who Sold the World: Ronald Reagan and the Betrayal of Main Street America contends that Reagan's policies were destructive and produced many of today's vexing economic and political problems. Kleinknecht, a reporter for the Newark Star-Ledger, holds that Reaganism is not only partly responsible for the recent subprime mortgage debacle, near meltdown of the financial system, growth of CEO compensation, and also rampant materialism in US society. Reagan left behind a bitter legacy, writes Kleinknecht, the ramifications of which are felt most acutely by the middle class. In his estimation, solving healthcare, income inequality, and other puzzles like immigration and sustainability requires a debunking of the Reagan mythos. The Man Who Sold the World thus aims to loosen the grip Reagan has on the American imagination.
A palpable sense of frustration and urgency runs throughout the text. In fact, it begins with an admission. Kleinknecht confesses he is bewildered by the resilience of Reagan's popularity and exasperated by the nation's unwillingness to address his faults. What, he asks apoplectically, explains such myopia when the evidence against Reagan is so clear and abundant? Reagan's “betrayal of the working people could not have been more complete” (xiv) because, except for those already wealthy, there “was no boom in the 1980s and 1990s” (xv). In addition, Kleinknecht writes, “mergers, deregulation, tax cuts for the wealthy, privatization, globalization” helped “weaken the family and eradicate small-town life and sense of community” (xi). He ends his introduction with a blue-collar, fire-breathing piece of analysis. “With Reagan,” the author tells us, “has come an abandonment of all faith in reason and progress, and it has accrued manifestly to the detriment of the average American” (xxvii).
Chapter 1, “Forgotten Roots,” demonstrates how poorly small-town, Main Street America fared during the 1980s, and it uses Dixon, Illinois, Reagan's hometown, as a case study. It is a woeful tale of change: Dixon's agricultural and manufacturing economy was shattered by Reagan's policies. Businesses left for good, the town's commercial core contracted, and its education enrollment dwindled. In chapter 2, “Two Views of America,” Kleinknecht traces Reagan's intellectual and career trajectory once he had left Dixon and contrasts this story with a contemporary of Reagan's, another Irish American, Democratic House Speaker Tip O'Neill. Theirs was a “battle for America's soul in 1981” (35). Kleinknecht, in his ominously titled chapter 3, “The Invasion,” turns his focus on the persuasive power of politically active moneymen. A new breed of western millionaires (often self-made) rose to prominence in the 1970s and they succeeded in shaping policy and discourse through think tanks and other organizations like the Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce. When Reagan and his backers descended on Washington in 1981, this constituted an invasion. Thereafter, Kleinknecht continues his case against the former president in such chapters as “The Looting of America,” “Merger Mania,” “The Effluvia of Commerce,” “The Great Enabler,” and, finally, “The Second-Rate Society.”
With a true muckraker's panache, Kleinknecht chronicles how various government agencies were systematically weakened by budget cuts, deregulatorily inclined appointments, and scandal. The Food and Drug Administration, for example, was influenced by strident deregulators in the Office of Management and Budget. This led the agency to withdraw important labeling proposals aimed at regulating aspirin and combating Reye's Syndrome; according to Kleinknecht, the resulting 1,470 deaths were emblematic of the Reagan administration's marginalization of regulatory bodies and emphasis on corporate profits over safety and best practices. In chapter 6, this point is again highlighted as the author recounts how the Securities and Exchange Commission, led by John Shad, was aggressively stripped to increase market efficiency and accelerate the formation of capital. The same chapter outlines how James Miller III oversaw shrinkage in budget and personnel at the Federal Trade Commission and a consolidation of big business in the United States. These tales, while significant in their own right, are but the tip of the sword. In subsequent pages, Kleinknecht produces a litany of scandalous examples and wayward behaviour at other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Interior.
The most significant problem with The Man Who Sold the World is the absence of fresh evidence to underpin Kleinknecht's scorching claims. A survey of the citations indicates there is scant original research in his text. The author did not visit any archives, nor conduct any oral interviews. Besides the work of print and Internet journalists, he utilizes only secondary sources to chronicle what he considers a catastrophic period in American history. Aside from this, however, Kleinknecht's book offers a stimulating account of the Reagan years. It is rich with colourful characters, including C. Boyden Gray, John Shad, and Jim J. Tozzi, and challenges readers to reflect critically on the nature of conservatism in the United States. Kleinknecht adds to the debate about the Reagan years.
