This book is a useful contribution to the psephology of British elections, using the 2001 British general election as its test bed. The authors examine the history of “sociological” and “economic” models of voting behavior, test and find them wanting, explaining that movement to issue, party, and leader perception (Worcester 1991) coupled with economic performance assessment (Sanders et al. 2001) is found to be more effective.
The core claim of the book is that although the economic and social context of electoral choice in Britain has changed considerably since the 1960s, the basic calculation of voters' decisions has not, and that valence, the ability of governments to perform in those policy areas that people care about most, that is, salience, crystallized by their perception of party leaders, is the best indicator of voter behavior.
The authors' analyses compare models of electoral choice using the sociological and individual rationality frameworks. They found the latter the more powerful, observing the long-term decline of social class as a key determinant of voting behavior over four decades of studies, accelerated by the emergence of “new” Labour with the election of Tony Blair as leader of the Labour Party in 1994 and his stunning victory, “Labour's Landslide,” in 1997.
Clarke and his colleagues are a cross section of U.S. and British scholars with both political science and economics as their disciplines. Their tools are primarily the 2001 British elections survey carried out by National Opinion Polls, supplemented by a Gallup rolling cross-section telephone campaign survey and follow-up postelection survey.
The project was mainly funded by the British government's Economic and Social Research Council, supplemented by a grant from the National Science Foundation, which provided funding for 1992–99 monthly Gallup surveys that tracked the evolution of party support during the years between the 1992 and 1997 elections and on until the cessation of the monthly Gallup polls in Britain in 1999. In addition, some funding was provided by the authors' universities.
Political Choices in Britain builds on the work of Butler and Stokes (1969) and many other psephological studies since, and even from before, but fails to make use of other freely available relevant data from ICM's and MORI's regular monthly surveys during the periods of their study. Both firms carried on regular monthly tracking after the closure of British Gallup's polling in 1999. Nor did the authors make use of both firms' extensive (and freely available) work during and following the 2001 election. There was also a switch of methodology by Gallup during the tracking period following several years when the monthly Gallup polls, which were being conducted face to face, were clearly out of line with other published polls; when a switch was made from personal interviewing to telephone, the Gallup monthly voting intention figures pulled right into line with other available data. This is not mentioned.
The authors also observe an increase in tactical voting of electors to obtain the outcome they wish to see, keeping someone out rather than voting to keep that person in. In the 2001 election, British turnout fell by around 12 points, from 71.5% in 1997 to 59.3%, which they mainly attribute to large preelection leads in the opinion polls, but do not explain why the large 16% lead enjoyed by Margaret Thatcher in 1983 was accompanied by a higher turnout (72.7%) than in the quite close elections of 1970 (72.0%) and October 1974 (72.8%).
The key sentences summing up their findings are as follows: “Electoral politics is largely valence politics, and public debate and inter-party competition focus on which party and which leader are best able to deliver. Voters in Britain (and elsewhere?) rely on heuristic devices for cues, and party leader images are among the most important of these devices” (p. 326). Elliott (1998) has commented that political scientists always seem to assume rationality in voter decision making, not irrationality. Marketers like J. Sheth and B. Newman have suggested otherwise, and there is not, finally, a clear movement in marketing models taking in more emotional-driven choice.
The book's usefulness is principally in the work that the authors have carried out into motivations of voter participation/turnout. For many of the postwar years, the levels of turnout varied within a fairly narrow band around 76%. The 71.5% in 1997 was at the bottom end of the chart, but a drop of 12 points in 2001 was unprecedented, and so much research has been done on the causes of this. Their work will feed into work in this area, especially as the 2005 turnout in the recent (May 5) election was up only three points, from 59% to 62%, and actually fell by two points, from 39% to 37%, among the 18–24-year-old cohort, where most effort to increase turnout had been targeted.
