Sixteen years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the battle against the jihadi movements still rages on, feeding a vast industry publishing literature of uneven quality. It is hardly surprising that terrorism, in general, and jihadism, in particular, are receiving such attention; they are trending topics arousing policymakers’ determination to find effective yet appropriate responses, scholarly attempts to further our understanding, and the general public's fascination with how human beings can become perpetrators of horrendous crimes.

Events since 2001 bolster the continued interest. The changing nature of the conflict (so evident after the Arab uprisings evolved into destabilizing insurgencies and even full-blown civil wars in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Egypt) has created a legitimate need to think and re-think the nature and scope of the jihadi threat. Moreover, the rise (and presently, fall) of actors such as the Islamic State and the internal dynamic within al-Qaeda produces new questions requiring investigation. Nahed Artoul Zehr's The War against al-Qaeda joins this crowded field, in which standing out is a difficult though not impossible task.

The central contribution of Artoul Zehr's book is the argument that countering jihadi narratives is an essential strategy. But this is not an easy sell. The author emphasizes that jihadi actors — what she refers to as “the al-Qaeda phenomenon” — should be seen as motivated by narratives that provide explanations to the condition of the global Muslim community (the umma) and prescriptions for Islamically legitimate reaction. In other words, The War against al-Qaeda is a book about ideology and how to address it. But some of the best works written in recent years on the Islamic State and al-Qaeda already deal with the role of ideology (for example, the books by Nelly Lahoud and Will McCants). Other blockbusters highlight the interaction between ideas and material interests in intra-jihadi competition (see the books by Brian Fishman and Charles Lister) and challenge the view of the jihadi movement as a unitary actor. Against this background, Artoul Zehr's claims about the importance of ideology do not stand out (and of the four books just noted, Artoul Zehr references only McCants's work); it is the emphasis on states’ responses to jihadi ideology that makes her book unique.

Artoul Zehr's main claim is straightforward: viewing the al-Qaeda phenomenon only through the lens of terrorism and insurgencies is a mistake. Consequently, she demonstrates the weaknesses of state responses that rely solely on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. The author then presents a genealogy of jihadi thought, tracing the ideational origins of both al-Qaeda's worldview and the behavioral prescriptions it produces. Finally, Artoul Zehr maintains that since ideology is central to the operation of jihadi actors, an effective response must also include a counter-narrative. But this is hardly a controversial statement. Even the author notes that the discussion of counter-radicalization (a more comprehensive category that includes countering narratives alongside the social environment producing radicals) is widespread. Furthermore, she qualifies her argument by suggesting that the counter-narrative approach should be seen as merely one part of a comprehensive effort, and that the fight against terrorism requires the simultaneous use of additional tools associated with counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency.

A puzzling shortcoming is Artoul Zehr's use of Just War theory to argue against relying on counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency to defeat the jihadi threat. This is an awkward choice: Artoul Zehr does not need to turn to the Just War tradition to introduce the deficiencies of these strategies. Moreover, while the Just War tradition imposes constraints on policymakers, states’ violations of human rights in the fight against jihadism indicate that we should not put too much faith in the role of ethics in international politics. It is hardly the most persuasive way to promote the counter-narrative approach.

Another weakness is the very limited attention to the implementation in practice of the author's recommended approach. Artoul Zehr begins differentiating the audience of counter-narratives — the Muslim nation — only in the concluding chapter. The move comes too late and does not go far enough. The War against al-Qaeda would have benefited from looking deeper into the myriad ways jihadis reach out and attract supporters, and addressing specific communication strategies that the jihadis use and the corresponding use of a counter-narrative approach. The categorization of Muslims based on their religious views (fundamentalists, traditionalists, modernists, and secularists) allows for only preliminary suggestions for counter-narrative targeting and it fails to address other important features that may shape counter-narratives. Take, for example, the appeal of jihadism to new converts to Islam from Western countries. Many converts are easy prey for jihadi recruiters because they usually possess little knowledge of Islam and lack a strong supportive community that could guide them toward a less shallow and radical interpretation of Islam. Understanding how to apply a counter-narrative approach to such a group, which does not fall neatly under the author's categorization of religious views, would have strengthened the book's argument, giving it more “meat” and greater validity.

The dissimilar conditions giving rise to jihadism in different locations strengthen the need for greater details about the implementation of the proposed approach. After all, Muslim states have different needs, face varying constraints, and can employ tools distinct from those of non-Muslim states. Similarly, variation exists among Muslim states as well: for example, Arab states operate within a different environment than South East Asian countries. Moreover, given the turmoil in the Middle East, one wonders how the counter-narrative strategy should be used in regions undergoing civil wars and in places where jihadis are engaged in governance.

Notwithstanding the book's shortcomings, Artoul Zehr deserves praise for raising the question of whether states — particularly non-Muslim states — should be in the business of defining what is “correct” and what is “misguided” Islam. How can the United States tell Muslims how to interpret Islam and who may count as a Muslim? When Western leaders pronounce the behavior of the Islamic State as un-Islamic, they claim an authority that they do not necessarily possess and may even reinforce the jihadi claims that the West is conspiring against Islam and the Muslim umma. Moreover, relaxing limitations on state involvement in religion — even when carried out in the name of security — has the potential to undermine the separation between church and state, which is a cornerstone of the modern Western state. Artoul Zehr warns that states engaging in countering jihadi narratives must be very careful and restrained so that they will not fall into the trap of making religious claims. The role of the state, in her opinion, must be limited and indirect. Whether states can actually promote counter-narratives effectively, especially when they operate behind the scenes, remains an open question.