Reading Michael Eppel's Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny while the United States attempts to impose democracy on Iraq reminds one how pre-Saddam Iraqi history has been generally ignored by policymakers and political commentators. Perhaps it is because the recent spate of books on Iraq deemphasizes the period of the monarchy and Iraq's early experience in nation building, looking instead to the authoritarian Baעth regime and Saddam Hussein's tyranny in the recent past. As Eppel notes in this political analysis of post World War II Iraq, most histories that do cover the Hashemite period treat the years between 1921 and 1958 as a prelude to the overthrow of the constitutional monarchy and the military coups that followed. They analyze the relationship between the army and Arab nationalism and the role of the army in the revolution of 1958, the overthrow of the Qasim regime, the rule of the Arif brothers, and the subsequent Baעth takeover in 1968.
Covering the same territory in this detailed political narrative, Eppel also seeks to explain why Iraq did not develop a viable liberal base that could counteract the authoritarian rule that followed the fall of the monarchy. He posits that the Iraqi middle class (“stratum”) sought a niche in Iraqi politics as it evolved from Western-educated Ottoman and Iraqi effendiyya during the post World War II era. These products of Iraqi schools propagated Arab nationalism and read, wrote, and advocated the nationalist ideology. However, it is also important to note that, as their numbers increased, they not only filled positions in the bureaucracy that allowed the state to function but they were also concerned with the future. By contrast, with the failure of the Rashid עAli government's war against Britain in 1941, the Iraqi politicians, military, and social elites who returned to power—the “younger brothers of the Sharifians”—were more interested in maintaining the political status quo than with social reform, industrialization, or democratization. As Nuri al-Saעid, prime minister during most of the 1950s, and עAbd al-ءIlah, regent for the young King Faisal II, vied for Iraqi political leadership in the Arab world, using Iraq's oil wealth and symbolic support for Palestinian interests as well as the political system and elections to keep the political and tribal elites in power, they exhibited little regard for the social ills and economic problems of a society becoming more urbanized.
The economic and political crises of the late 1940s and early 1950s catalyzed domestic issues that plagued the monarchy and the political elites. Foreign policy, domestic politics, and economic strife all came together with repercussions that portended increasing centralization of authority and the suppression of political opposition. Occurring in the wake of bad harvests and economic distress, the riots (wathba) that broke out in January 1948 in reaction to the government's renewal of Iraq's treaty with Britain (the Portsmouth Treaty) led to a crackdown on opposition forces, most notably the illegal Communist party. Fears of Shiעite tribes storming the palace—they claimed that the demonstrations were provoked by Sunnis and Communists—were exacerbated by the humiliation of Iraqi troops sent to Palestine in late spring. Instead of political reform, the regime opted for martial law and political suppression. However, the old line conservatives, both Sunni and Shiעi, who led opposition parties eschewed revolution, preferring instead to work within the system without reforming it, thus alienating the activist youth, students, and workers.
By the early 1950s, the lack of land reform, a weak industrial base, little development of an industrial bourgeoisie, and increasing centralization did not provide adequate conditions for the growth of a vital liberal democratic opposition. Maintaining the two-stage, indirect method of elections where Iraqi citizens only voted for the electors from their precincts—generally local traditional notables or persons loyal to them, who, in turn, elected members of parliament—left the same politicians in power to perpetuate land ownership and power over the fellahin by a few families. Failure to reform the system and the intifada of 1952 foreshadowed middle class frustration at exclusion from the political process at a time of academic degree holder inflation and economic difficulty. The inability to effect change and Egypt's replacement of Iraq in its role as the standard bearer of Arab nationalism only exacerbated the political frustration of the newly emergent educated middle class that resulted in its dissipation as a voice in Iraqi politics Without developing a vigorous middle-class opposition in Iraq, as Eppel recounts, there was no real alternative to the regime's dependence upon the support of the army, tribal landowners, and the tribes in general, a situation that enabled the Baעth to take over tentatively after the Qasim regime and become entrenched by the early 1970s.
Drawing on secondary literature, British archives, Iraqi political memoirs, and newspapers of the period, Eppel provides a detailed chronological political narrative that results in a useful amplification of the period covered more succinctly in the histories of modern Iraq by Phebe Marr and Charles Tripp. The use of correct transliteration instead of common spelling (i.e., al-Pachachi becomes al-Bajhaji) is a minor annoyance.
