Averroes is usually considered a commentator on Aristotle, or a source for doctrines of Greek and Arabic commentators whose works, as often as not, have not survived intact. Indeed, his medieval readers regarded him as a most faithful interpreter of Aristotle who, in spite of not reading Greek directly, was able to understand the true meaning of Aristotle better than any of his predecessors. As such he was revered by the majority of European scholars in the Middle Ages, who read his commentaries in Latin and Hebrew. But this approach fails to notice whether Averroes has a philosophical system of his own (irrespective of whether he believes it is Aristotle's or not). Up to now, only in psychology has a distinctly Averroistic doctrine been investigated, following the lead of Averroes himself, who developed a theory of the unity of the potential intellect specifically because Aristotle did not discuss this topic. Thanks to his different commentaries on Aristotle's De anima (Epitome, Middle and Long) leading historians of philosophy Alain de Libera, Marc Geoffroy, Colette Sirat, Carlos Steel and others have been able to establish Averroes's distinctive doctrine in detail.
Ruth Glasner is the first scholar to write a full book-length study on Averroes's writings on Aristotle's Physics, and to discern significant personal doctrines, and developments of doctrines, through time. She describes the material which we are lucky to have in this area: a short commentary, a middle commentary (unlike the middle commentaries to other works of Aristotle this is not a mere paraphrase, but includes substantial analysis) and a long commentary, each of which has been revised, so that the revision of the short commentary is Averroes's ‘last word’ on the subject. Glasner is able to compare the Arabic (where it exists), the Hebrew and the Latin, and shows, inter alia, that the Hebrew is based on a version of the Long Commentary that has been extensively revised by the author, including insertions of whole pages.
While Glasner compares in more detail than ever before the transmission of the Physics, the greater part of the book is concerned with the doctrinal questions involved. These deal with three topics, which she refers to as ‘the breakdown of determinism’, ‘the breakdown of motion’, and ‘the breakdown of the physical body’. The first question hinges on the problem that, in order for anything to move, there has to be a preceding motion or change. This problem bears on the unmoved mover and eternal movement. Averroes was concerned about the implications of this on determinism. In a universe constructed out of sequences of causes and effects, determinism would seem to be the only scientifically viable alternative. But Averroes wished to find a scientific, natural interpretation for indeterminism as well. The solution arises from considering the difference between continuity and contiguity. How can the heavens, in which continuous movement lasts infinitely, be reconciled with the contiguous movement of sublunar objects? This relates to the question whether matter is a continuum, or consists of discrete minimal atoms. Averroes was an heir to two traditions concerning atomism: that of the Greeks (Epicurus and his school), in which indeterminate events are caused by the chance collisions of atoms, and that of Islamic ‘occasionalism’ (belonging to the theological debate, or kalam), in which God determines the outcome of each physical event, and can create or destroy at will. The strongest arguments against indeterminism arose from Aristotle's Physics, Book VIII, in which changes follow from each other in chain reactions. Averroes's task was to work out whether the links in these chains were essential or accidental. His conclusions, which are reached, in his own words, ‘after an intensive inquiry and a long time’ (p. 77), make explicit what he believes can be inferred from Aristotle. The celestial movements are ‘continuous’ and therefore all celestial events are fully determined; these, in turn, regulate the ‘contiguity’ of movements in the sublunar world, which does not entail determinism. Thus the sequence of earthly events cannot be shown to follow in a strict causal chain in the horizontal plane, but rather natural motions can only be produced in the vertical plane, running between the heavens and the earth. Consequently, as Averroes puts it, ‘eternity and perpetuity are essential in the continuous [the heavenly movements] and accidental in the contiguous [the sublunar movements]’ (Long Commentary, VII.56). In order to prove that this is what Aristotle really meant to say, Averroes blames other commentators (such as Philoponus and al-Farabi) for getting Aristotle wrong.
In Averroes's succession of commentaries and revisions of commentaries on the Physics, Glasner searches out the ‘turning points’ in Averroes's own thought, until he reaches conclusions or determinations which can be regarded as both original and based on the soundest arguments. The subtitle of Glasner's book – ‘the turning point in medieval natural philosophy’ – draws attention to the fact that these determinations – these new conclusions on what Aristotle really meant to say – represent a real turning point, too, in the history of medieval natural philosophy. Through the Hebrew and Latin versions of his commentaries, especially, Averroes's writings had a profound effect on how scholars viewed the foundations of the functions of the universe around them. In his preface to his eleven-volume complete edition of ‘all the works of Aristotle … with all the commentaries of Averroes of Cordoba that have come down to us’, published in Venice in 1552, Tomaso Giunta pointed out that ‘the Arabs, not being content with mere interpretations, thought that they had to inspect much more carefully and fully whole material – i.e. the things themselves which were the object of their inspection. This is especially what Averroes is praised for'. Ruth Glasner has corroborated this judgement magnificently.
