In Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, M. Hakan Yavuz explores the phenomenon of radical religious groups becoming moderate, through an analysis of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. His general argument is that rule-based, competitive electoral systems tend to moderate religious movements as religious actors try to appeal to the electorate at large and maximize their seats in parliament. In the Turkish context, however, he also underlines how state repression, in the form of pressure from the secular military and the bureaucracy, pushed Islamic actors to moderate their position and played a crucial role in the emergence of the AKP. According to Yavuz, “the conditions of moderation before and after the parties come to power are not the same” (p. 10). Before an Islamic party comes to power, state repression is a necessary factor for moderation to occur. But repression in and of itself is not a sufficient condition. When repression fragments the Islamic movement, the moderates must be granted the opportunity to compete in elections and, if successful, participate in governing. Yavuz argues that being in government further moderates the Islamic actors because they must act democratically out of self-interest. They comply with democratic rules and defer to systemic constraints (most important in the Turkish case, the requirements of the secularist military) in order to stay in power. Islamic parties become more moderate as a result of learning through such a process (pp. 10–11).
In explaining the transformation of the pro-Islamic parties in Turkey, Yavuz also stresses the role of the new Anatolian Muslim bourgeoisie, which benefited from Prime Minister Turgut Özal's neoliberal policies and the expansion of political and economic opportunities in the 1980s. He describes how this Anatolian bourgeois class sought more representation in the political system and supported the creation of an Islamic public sphere with its own media, educational institutions, consumption patterns, and welfare services. This Islamic sphere not only challenged Kemalist premises and practices but also promoted the development of different conceptualizations of Islam and Islamic practices, serving to fragment Islamic groups and create hybrid forms of Islamic identities (pp. 57–58).
Although Yavuz's book provides a detailed and critical description of the emergence and evolution of the AKP, its theoretical framework is not well developed. The author introduces many different variables to explain the moderation of the Islamic movement in Turkey (such as a free public space, electoral politics, state repression, rise of the Muslim bourgeoisie, free economic market, and Turkey's international ties with the European Union) and does not discuss the relative weight of these variables in leading to a less confrontational political stance among Islamic actors. These variables do not always complement one another. For example, on the one hand, Yavuz emphasizes the role of a free public space and electoral politics in pluralizing the Islamic movement, leading to the rise of more accommodationist actors (p. 47). On the other hand, he points to the role of interventions by the military and the civilian bureaucracy, which resulted in the shrinking of public space and political freedoms, in forcing the Islamic actors to moderate (pp. 64–68). The book does not provide a clear answer to whether moderation would still occur in a free public sphere in the absence of the military's constraints.
Yavuz's book also does not discuss the relevant literature on the moderation of religious or Islamic movements. Although he points out that there is a growing literature on the subject and cites a few sources in a footnote (p. 9), he does not discuss how other scholars answer his main question and how his own book contributes to the debate. His silence on the literature also makes the book more descriptive than theoretical. He calls his approach “an embedded constructivist” one (p. 47) but does not elaborate how his arguments relate to constructivist approaches in political science.
A central problem with Yavuz's account is his contradictory statements about the nature of the AKP and the transformation of the Islamic movement. For example, Yavuz states that “the Turkish Islamic political movement has evolved to a point that it has ceased to be Islamic” (p. xii) and contends that “the AKP cannot be considered a religious party because it does not seek the religious transformation of state and society” (p. 8). However, at another point he argues that Islam is “a source of identity and the main source of legitimacy” for the AKP and that the party stresses the role of Islam in disciplining citizens, promotes “a system in which individual choices are shaped by religio-communal values,” and does not recognize a moral society outside of Islam (p. 96). Another of Yavuz's claims is that “the AKP refuses to promote the previous Islamic political claims of the just order” such as those associated with the head scarf, Imam-Hatip schools (vocational schools that train mosque preachers), and religious courses in public schools (p. 88n19). Yet he goes on to contend that the AKP government sought to lift the ban on the head scarf, promote Quranic schools and easier university access for Imam-Hatip graduates, and criminalize adultery (pp. 163–69). Similarly, although Yavuz points to the Islamic movement's ability “to craft a more democratic and liberal reading of Islam” and “to internalize the global discourse of human rights” (p. 215), he simultaneously underlines the Islamic actors’ instrumental use of liberal-democratic discourse. For example, he calls attention to the conflict between AKP's rhetoric and practice and states, “Although the rhetoric of the AKP is libertarian, its practices are deeply sectarian and intolerant towards different conceptualizations of Islam” (p. 163). These statements are confusing with regard to how the author defines moderation and liberalization within Turkish political Islam.
Despite its problems, Yavuz's book provides a detailed and balanced account of the AKP and is an important source for those who are interested in political Islam in Turkey. It is noted, however, that readers who are not familiar with modern Turkey's political history may find the book hard to follow because it does not provide basic information on many events and institutions before they are discussed. For instance, even though the author presents the 28 February event (the 1997 military intervention that caused the Islamic Welfare Party coalition-government's resignation) as a catalyst for change within the Islamic movement at the very beginning of the book, it is not until page 48 (in a footnote) that readers learn what this event entailed. A more detailed description comes much later on page 64. The writing style of the author is quite scattered, and paragraphs do not always follow one another in a coherent and smooth manner. Finally, there are various spelling mistakes throughout the book and no consistency in the spelling of Turkish words. Sometimes they are spelled with Turkish letters, and sometimes they are not. Such poor editing is rather surprising to see in a book from a major publisher.
