This recent publication by Mario Caravale provides an effective and exhaustive analysis of the development of Italian doctrine relating to the constitutional state, individual rights and the relationship between state and individual. His research is focused on the period from Italian unification until the end of Fascism and the book is organised into five chapters providing a complete in-depth analysis of the relevant sources.
The first chapter deals with the influence of the French and German doctrine of individual freedom in Italy, with emphasis on the role of natural justice. The spread among Italian authors of the major relevant doctrines is acknowledged, including the translation of the Encyclopaedia by Heinrich Ahrens and the main works of Rudolf von Gneist. Particular emphasis is also given to the question of individual rights, including the right to resistance. In this respect, the positions of Vittorio Emanuele Orlando and Santi Romano are duly highlighted.
The second chapter takes into account the development of doctrines on these issues before the First World War. During these years, the coercive power and the authority of the state were increasingly espoused, the main proponents being Sergio Panunzio, Giuseppe Maggiore and Alessandro Bonucci. The author provides clear evidence that during this period the state authority prevailed, overriding the rights of the individual. A detailed explanation is provided of the relevant legal provisions enacted in order to limit individual freedom during the conflict.
Chapter three, discussing the evolution of Fascist rule, focuses on the initial phase of the regime, giving evidence of the anti-individualist positions of the relevant authors. Moving on from an investigation of the position of Alfredo Rocco, who strongly rejected the French liberal-democratic approach, this chapterexplores the opinion of, among others, Ugo Spirito and Giovanni Gentile, who were convinced that individual freedom should be granted not for the benefit of the individual, but in order that the individual may operate for the benefit of the state. In other words, the constitutional state, according to the Fascist regime, was characterised as an ‘ethical’ state. The chapter also outlines the role and the influence of the corporations, which were seen as entities that provided a proper coordination between the state and society.
The fourth chapter follows the definitive achievement of consent by the regime in 1929. Once its institutional reforms had been consolidated, the administration aimed to achieve security, order and general welfare, including through economic progress. The emphasis here is on the return to a more traditional idea of individual freedom, as a right that the state has to grant its citizens, while still maintaining the connection of freedom to the higher interests of the state. In this respect, the author summarises various contemporary doctrines, defining which rejected the validity of the constitutional state and which acknowledged the role of the state as an entity operating through the issuance of rules granting individual rights. Finally, there follows a consideration of whether the Fascist state may be considered a constitutional state, which also provides an in-depth comparative analysis of other totalitarianisms.
The last chapter compares the Italian doctrine with German national-socialism. In this context, the question of the role and power of the state is central. It has to be noted that, in contrast to the German approach, Italian authors continued to legitimate the central role of the state, consequently acceding to the limitation of individual freedom by state law.
The content of the above-mentioned chapters underscores the existence of a plurality of approaches and doctrines relating to the interpretation of the constitutional state. This is clearly seen in the author’s efforts to provide an innovative and detailed comparison of the various currents, based on the study of relevant publications and sources. It emerges that the idea of a constitutional state, of itself, does not protect individuals against state authority and power. Neither does the state’s mere compliance with ethical and moral principles. Only an acknowledgment of individual rights included in a fundamental constitutional text could have protected individuals against a total discretionary state power.
The main purpose of the book is to provide a guideline to understanding the evolution of Italian doctrine in the theory of the constitutional state and the consequent management of individual rights. The critical approach adopted by the author, always faithful to the sources, allows on the one hand an assessment of the influence of French and German doctrines on Italian legislation and, on the other, an understanding of the rationale for the various legal developments in Italy following its unification. In the end, it is not possible to identify a predominant doctrine, since during this evolution, French liberalism eventually gave way to a totalitarian approach.