The nomination of two pro-segregationists to the Supreme Court has long been taken to define Richard Nixon's approach to the Court. Those nominations of course failed, but Nixon succeeded in appointing William Rehnquist, whose strong conservatism was matched by Robert Bork, Nixon's solicitor general. Nixon also famously deployed a racially coded language of “law and order” that did double-duty in mobilizing reaction to urban unrest and antiwar protest. Observers typically count such efforts as those of a counterrevolutionary. Indeed, a standard reading of Burger Court moderation is that of a “failed” constitutional counterrevolution, as Nixon appointments to that Court voted in favor of desegregation (Swann) and abortion rights (Roe).
Nixon was not a counterrevolutionary, however, as Kevin McMahon argues in Nixon's Court, an engaging and wonderfully illuminating reassessment of the president's judicial legacy. Nixon took aim at Warren Court liberalism, but his approach to the Supreme Court has been “misunderstood and misjudged” (p. 5). The failed counterrevolution reading, McMahon explains, rests on a misconstrual. By disaggregating the various dimensions of Nixon's approach to the Court (e.g., criticism of the Warren Court, judicial nominations, amicus briefs, etc.), the author reveals a president who used his power not to wage a full-scale constitutional revolt but to pursue a narrow definition of conservatism.
Nixon conveyed that narrow definition to staff. Explaining his preferences for a judicial nominee, Nixon emphasized that he “must be against busing and against forced housing integration. Beyond that, he can do what he pleases. He can screw around on economics, and et ceteras” (quoted at p. 81). This limited agenda has been obscured, McMahon contends, because observers have overemphasized Nixon's strongly conservative nominations (Clement Haynesworth, G. Harrold Carswell, Rehnquist) and underplayed his “more moderate” (p. 6) selections (Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis Powell). All six nominations, the author insists, were driven by “politics far more than ideology” (p. 6), a distinction he uses to emphasize Nixon's concern with electoral gain as against the advancement of rigid conservatism.
On offer in the book, more generally, is a portrait of Nixon as a “preemptive” president, an oppositional executive who faced a resilient political regime. McMahon borrows that notion from Stephen Skowronek (The Politics Presidents Make, 1993), whose typology of presidential leadership has been generative for scholars of judicial politics. Observing that Nixon “easily fits” the preemptive category, McMahon complicates that classification by charting how the president worked within constraints to halt Warren-era liberalism in two policy areas: desegregation/busing and crime. Nixon was “far more effective with his judicial policy than his preemptive status suggests and conventional wisdom acknowledges” (p. 69).
Likewise, there is a gap between “what the president said” about Warren Court liberalism and what he “actually did” (p. 6). Readers may be surprised to learn that Nixon's first solicitor general (Erwin Griswold, retained from the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration) did not file amicus briefs in major cases on abortion, the death penalty, profanity, pornography, or welfare rights. Even on the matter of desegregation, Attorney General John Mitchell's advice to a group of southern black parents is instructive: “[I]nstead of listening to what we say … watch what we do” (p. 65). McMahon accentuates Nixon's dual move: to place ownership of Civil Rights in the judicial branch, even as his administration acted quietly to enforce desegregation orders in southern districts that engaged in de jure segregation. Busing in the South met with Nixon's approval, though he did not advertise it. Instead, he broadcast opposition to what he called “racial balancing,” while refraining from explicit appeals to white supremacy.
McMahon calls this Nixon's “post–Southern Strategy” (p. 78). While observers generally designate Nixon's use of racially coded language as the southern strategy (and attribute it to campaign aide Kevin Phillips), the author shows how Nixon pursued not just Southerners but also northern, blue-collar, white ethnics and Catholics. Called the “Catholic Strategy” inside the White House (p. 78) and associated with Democratic strategists Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, Nixon targeted white ethnics who resisted busing, felt threatened by the 1968 wave of urban unrest, and blamed protesters for police violence at antiwar rallies. On these issues, we see 1) Nixon's own ideological commitments, 2) public opinion running strongly against Warren Court liberalism, and 3) Democratic backpedaling, a convergence often overlooked in analyses of political realignment. In a tight 1968 race that pitted him against George Wallace and Hubert Humphrey, Nixon aimed to draw votes from both competitors.
The argument that Nixon aimed to split discontented white ethnics from the Democratic fold and thereby destabilize the New Deal coalition is not new (see, e.g., Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era, 1990; Thomas and Mary Edsall, Chain Reaction, 1991). But McMahon builds on that thesis considerably, in part by integrating Scammon and Wattenberg into the story of realignment and in part by presenting data from the National Election Study, which suggests that a segment of white ethnics were “Nixon's Democrats before they were Reagan's” (p. 216).
McMahon's anatomization of Nixon's judicial strategy is thus highly successful on a number of counts: Reintroducing the “Catholic Strategy” brings into focus an underexplored dimension of Nixon's criticism of Warren Court liberalism; retracing his brand of conservatism renders Burger Court cases consistent with his priorities; and charting Nixon's success as a preemptive president effectively complicates Skowronek's standard typology.
At the same time, McMahon's analysis relies on conceptualizations that remain less than compelling. For example, his heavy reliance on the motivational distinction between politics and ideology (i.e., the claim that politics more than ideology drove Nixon's judicial strategy) unnecessarily narrows the meaning and role of the latter. By ideology, McMahon means political or philosophical doctrines, isms (conservatism, liberalism), and what he means to argue is that electoral appeal, not a wide-ranging conservatism, drove Nixon's approach to the Court. Consider McMahon's emphasis on Nixon's narrow definition of conservatism. The politics-not-ideology formulation bars recognition of the meaning and role of Nixon's brand of conservatism, undermining the main claim.
A more expansive conception of ideology is better suited to McMahon's purposes. On his account, the success of the hybrid southern-Catholic strategy was tied to the mobilization of ideas and beliefs about race, social order, localism, and so on. While speech-act theory (J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, 1962) was not developed with an eye toward political realignment, scholars of American political development (Victoria Hattam and Joseph Lowndes, “The Ground Beneath Our Feet: Language, Culture and Political Change,” in Stephen Skowronek and Matthew Glassman. eds., Formative Acts: Reckoning with Agency in American Politics, 2007) take their bearings from the notion that political actors “do things” with words. Analyzing the emergence of modern conservatism, they point to “discursive recombination”—the forging of new political identities and new political alliances through the remixing of multiple ideological systems—as a form of political agency (action). Indeed, what Nixon is doing with his southern-Catholic rhetorical strategy is building a Republican majority at the presidential level. And yet that understanding is in tension with McMahon's distinction between what Nixon said and what he did, which the author employs to argue that the president was selective in policy enforcement.
McMahon's “regime” model also warrants conceptual clarification. For example, he is careful to note that justices are not mere agents of political parties (p. 40), an acknowledgment that is characteristic of partisan entrenchment models (e.g., Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, “Understanding the Constitutional Revolution,” Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 249, 2001). Thus, questions are raised pertaining to McMahon's invocation of “Mr. Dooley's” famous aphorism that the Court follows the “election returns” (p. 10). Certainly, a developmental line can be traced from Nixon to Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the decision that used a “racial balancing” formulation to reject a busing remedy in the Detroit metropolitan area. However, the author leaves unpursued his gesture to the operation of what I call “legal” forms, ideological-historical forms of thought that can be distinguished from strategic/instrumental rationality (see, e.g., Pamela Brandwein, “Law and American Political Development,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 7 [2011]: 187–216).
Moreover, regime models tend to suffer from one-way conceptions of influence, namely, from the dominant regime to the Court. When Nixon's Court is read alongside Steven Teles' account of the rise of legal conservatism (The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement, 2008), there is the possibility that those arrows likewise run in the other direction. As we learn from McMahon, Nixon sought “strict constructionists” and he defined the term loosely, including within its ambit jurists like Blackmun, who later authored the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade (1973). From Teles we learn that conservative lawyers and jurists later developed originalism in part as a response to the perceived deficits of strict construction, made manifest by Nixon's appointments. It thus appears that the Court exerts some (relatively) independent influence on subsequent development. The need for such clarifications emerges, ironically, because McMahon's expert reexamination of Nixon's judicial legacy provides such an abundance of rich material.
