By the 1930s, religious denominations in the United Kingdom had come to represent their particular ‘national character’.Footnote 1 This is true of Northern Ireland where, on one side, many Catholic clerics identified with the politics of Irish nationalism, while Protestants, including Presbyterians, tended to adopt unionist identity politics.Footnote 2 While historians have obviously noted the strong ties between unionism and Protestantism, they have not given significant attention to the variations between denominations. According to Peter Brooke, an ‘Ulster Protestant nation’ existed in Northern Ireland, which permitted an ideological identity in which unionist politics and Protestant religious convictions were interjoined.Footnote 3 Steve Bruce similarly points out the bonds between Protestantism and unionism in Northern Ireland, describing the Ulster Unionist Party ‘as the political voice of the Ulster Protestants’.Footnote 4 One contemporary journalist noted the prevalence of ‘Evangelical Puritanism’, a commonly held ‘fusion’ of conservative Christian values and ‘local political beliefs and emotions’ among Protestants.Footnote 5 Revd Dr James Little not only represented the shared culture of Protestant religious conservatism and Ulster unionist politics of wartime Northern Ireland, but he approached these issues from the viewpoint of Presbyterianism. As an Ulster unionist, and later independent unionist, member of the Westminster parliament for County Down from April 1939 until his death in March 1946, his rhetoric, in the Commons and from the pulpit, combined religious motifs of moral conservatism with unionist political slogans. Despite the prominence of his religious and political discourse in the local press, he has not yet received scholarly attention. Political and religious histories of Northern Ireland often concentrate on broad movements, ideologies, and leading individuals, to the exclusion of figures such as Little who, despite their prominence, did not occupy the most senior political or religious positions.
An examination of Little's career provides an opportunity to explore in some detail religion in Northern Ireland during the Second World War, building upon an historiography which has neglected the significance of specific denominations. No systematic study exists on wartime religion; the standard works on the period give little attention to churches and only occasionally cite clerical opinion or refer to church engagement with contemporary debate. For instance, Brian Barton refers to churches and their leaders primarily in terms of sectarian tensions. He also offers a limited discussion of clerical involvement in moral discourse, emphasising the experience of American troops stationed in the region.Footnote 6 In a similar vein, the work of Leanne McCormick on the interactions between American service personnel and local women mentions the attitudes of church leaders as self-appointed moral guardians.Footnote 7 Furthermore, the historiography of Protestantism in twentieth-century Northern Ireland, whether in denominational histories or in broader works, tends to gloss over the Second World War in sweeping terms. Histories of the three largest Protestant churches (Presbyterian, Church of Ireland and Methodist) merely note the rhetorical and practical support of particular denominations for the war effort.Footnote 8 Characteristic of this trend in religious historiography is a brief summary of Protestant interpretations of the war offered by Alan Megahey. Treating Protestantism as a united entity, he asserts that Protestants tended to view the conflict as ‘a morally justified crusade against evil forces’ and an opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to Great Britain.Footnote 9
The purpose of this article is, primarily through a case study of Little's wartime career as Presbyterian minister and M.P., to outline and explain the interpretation of the Second World War held by many Presbyterian clerics and lay adherents in Northern Ireland. In so doing it seeks to evaluate the strength with which clerics maintained their interpretation of the war, thereby highlighting the potential conflict between political allegiance and religious values. To demonstrate the extent to which Little represented popular Presbyterian and unionist opinion in Northern Ireland, the article begins by setting him in his contemporary context, addressing his place within the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, his position within the Ulster Unionist Party and his representation of popular opinion in his constituency of County Down. The second section discusses Presbyterian attitudes to the war, examining the extent to which unionist identity politics influenced religious thinking on the nature of the conflict. It summarises trends in the prevailing attitudes to the Second World War held by leading clerics in Britain and the United States. It then explores Little's interpretation of the war, presenting a more detailed discussion of Northern Ireland Presbyterian clerics’ attitude to the conflict than has hitherto been offered. This section explores the political motivations behind the interpretation of war shared by Little and his co-religionists, demonstrating how the unionist agenda manifested itself in Little's rhetoric. The third section, by examining Little's rhetoric on morality, scrutinises the strength of Presbyterian commitment to their interpretation of the war effort. It establishes the arguments deployed by church leaders in advocating wartime moral conservatism, showing how they attempted to harness the significance of the war effort in pursuing moral reform. This section also suggests that their support for moral standards brought some clerics into conflict with each other and with politicians who did not share their conservative position.
I
Little was representative of the clergy of the largest Protestant denomination in Northern Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. Born in Rathfriland, County Down in 1868, Little's education and theological development was similar to that of many Irish Presbyterian ministers, having received most of his training in Belfast, first at Queen's College, then at Assembly's College. He was ordained as minister of Dundrod Presbyterian church in 1900, before moving to Knoxland parish church in Dumbarton in 1910. He became minister of Castlereagh Presbyterian church in 1915 and remained there until his death in 1946.Footnote 10 Like many contemporary Presbyterian clerics, he saw preaching as his primary duty and was hailed in the local press as ‘one of the greatest preachers of his day’.Footnote 11 His conservative moral standards were also typical. Finlay Holmes observed that traditions of moral puritanism in Irish Presbyterianism were strengthened through the evangelistic campaigns of Revd W. P. Nicholson in Northern Ireland during the 1920s. Consequently, many Presbyterian clerics and laity placed great emphasis on preserving moral standards.Footnote 12 Little represented that tradition; he frequently lamented a deterioration of moral standards and urged his parliamentary colleagues to enact measures to remedy the situation. Moreover, several clerics of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland had held political office. Little portrayed himself as standing in the tradition of Professor Richard Smyth, Revd John Kinnear and Revd Dr John Simms, all of whom had served in the House of Commons. Simms, indeed, had represented County Down between 1921 and 1931.Footnote 13
On the whole, Little shared the main opinions of contemporary unionist politicians and, to some extent, was a typical member of the Ulster Unionist Party. Like most of its members, he was in the Orange Order and hailed from a middle-class background.Footnote 14 Scholars have argued that a key objective of unionist politicians at Stormont and Westminster was to strengthen the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.Footnote 15 Parity between Northern Ireland and Britain in terms of social service provision was, for many unionists, a crucial stepping-stone in the fulfilment of this agenda.Footnote 16 Populists were prominent within the Ulster Unionist Party and, during the Second World War, they became strong supporters of welfarism.Footnote 17 Little was likewise committed to the preservation of the union and typified the bond between Protestantism and Ulster unionism. Following the death of Sir David Reid, unionist M.P. for County Down in March 1939, Little stood in the resultant by-election. Given that Revd John Simms, a Presbyterian minister, had represented County Down until his death in 1934, it is likely that Little was selected as a certain winner. He was returned unopposed. Little explained that he was motivated to stand for election in consequence of his identity as ‘a Protestant, an Orangeman, and a convinced Unionist’.Footnote 18 At the Belfast meeting where his electoral success was announced in April 1939, he assured listeners of his conviction that ‘the future of Ulster is bound up with our close connection with Great Britain’. Moreover, he publicly resolved to resist any efforts ‘to weaken the influence of our Prime Minister or in any way to interfere with the inalienable rights of Ulster’.Footnote 19
Little was, however, an oddity both within the Ulster Party and the Commons.Footnote 20 Aged seventy-one when he entered politics, Little was older than most of his colleagues, yet lacked their political experience and was consequently somewhat distant from them. The presence of only two other clerics in the Commons exacerbated Little's distinctiveness: Revd Reginald Sorensen was a Unitarian and a member of the Labour Party; Revd James Barr of the United Free Church of Scotland was an Independent Labour representative. The Belfast press reported that since Barr and Little wore clerical collars in the Commons, they cut ‘a distinctive figure’.Footnote 21 Religious references also marked out Little's contributions at Westminster; he implied in December 1939 that he was speaking on behalf of God, much to the derision of his parliamentary colleagues.Footnote 22 Little also continued to practise as a cleric throughout his parliamentary career and made frequent journeys between London and Castlereagh.Footnote 23 As a result, he fostered closer ties with his constituents than the other members of the Ulster Party who spent more time in London. Little was also a distinctive, almost independent, figure within the broader Ulster Unionist Party. He did not, for instance, get on well with Sir Basil Brooke, the minister of agriculture and, from May 1943, prime minister of Northern Ireland. After Little's repeated questions in the Commons on agricultural matters in March 1940, Brooke recorded simply in his diary, ‘Dr Little's activities are annoying’.Footnote 24 Moreover, he was willing to consider sacrificing his unionist principles for a more important cause: the defeat of Nazi Germany. As Britain became increasingly isolated in the spring of 1940 due to the German occupation of western Europe, a minority of unionists began to advocate the entry of Éire into the conflict in return for a united Ireland. This movement accumulated supporters as the precariousness of Britain's position grew. Little, in a letter to the press, suggested that a degree of unity between Northern Ireland and Éire could improve the defence of the island but acknowledged that this view was held neither by his denomination nor constituency.Footnote 25 His suggestion, however, was merely tentative. Little and James Craig, Viscount Craigavon shared the podium at the centenary celebration of Kirkistown Orange Lodge in July 1940. Craig assured listeners that he would not consent to a united Ireland, even in defence of the island. Demonstrating that his hatred of Nazism was fuelled by religious belief, Little accepted that a ‘united front’ against Germany could be useful. Following his earlier willingness to at least consider overlooking his unionism in favour of the war effort, however, Little now asserted that the sacrifice of unionist principles would be ‘untrue to God’.Footnote 26 In 1943, Brooke, then prime minister, attempted to foster greater understanding between unionist politicians at Stormont and Westminster. He arranged for members of the Ulster Party to liaise with cabinet ministers in Stormont, yet Little was absent from many preparatory meetings and was not assigned a cabinet minister to shadow.Footnote 27
Little's lack of engagement with his fellow unionists may have contributed to his deselection before the general election in 1945. As Alvin Jackson argues, it is difficult, given ‘layers of apologetic and spin’, to discern the precise reasons behind the deselection of Westminster unionists in general.Footnote 28 This is true of Little's deselection, yet the incident does emphasise his aloofness from the Ulster Unionist Party. Since Little had been accepted already as one of two unionist candidates for election, his supporters did not attend the selection meeting. At that meeting, however, the Central Committee of the Unionist Associations of Down told Little that he would, in fact, compete with other potential candidates. Little had few supporters at the meeting and he viewed the decision as a personal slight. He resolved, therefore, to stand as an independent. In the following weeks, Brooke, seeking to drum up support for the official unionist candidates, interpreted Little's decision to stand independently as ‘a personal grievance’, arguing that a true member of the Ulster Unionist Party would have supported the candidates selected by the party.Footnote 29
The general election of 1945 demonstrated that Little was extremely popular with unionist voters and represented much of their thinking on political and religious matters. Standing as an independent unionist candidate, Little was sufficiently popular to retain his seat with a sizeable majority. He was returned to Westminster with 46,732 votes; his closest rival, the Ulster Unionist Party candidate, Lt. Col. Sir Walter Smiles, received 24,148 votes.Footnote 30 Following his death in 1946, the Larne Times praised Little as ‘one of Northern Ireland's most able and vigorous advocates’ who ‘spoke boldly for religion and temperance’, and as a ‘champion’ of Protestantism.Footnote 31 Graham Walker notes that successful unionist politicians often won the support of the electorate by emphasising the importance of the links between Northern Ireland and Britain.Footnote 32 This was certainly true in Little's case.
II
Clerical interpretations of the Second World War throughout the United Kingdom were marked by the legacy of the First World War. After the outbreak of war in July 1914, Protestant leaders had quickly concluded that it was not merely a necessary defence against German aggression, but a crusade against a competing worldview. German aggression was, therefore, hastily portrayed by evangelicals as a threat to the Christian civilisation which they believed Britain to represent. For instance, in 1914, the Council of the Baptist Union in Britain asserted that ‘we believe the call of God has come to Britain to spare neither blood nor treasure in the struggle to shatter a great anti-Christian attempt to destroy the fabric of Christian civilisation’.Footnote 33 As the war dragged on, clerics increasingly drew upon this rhetoric in an effort to preserve the nation's morale.Footnote 34 To eradicate the threat of Germany to the Allies, the war would have to be won, no matter the cost.Footnote 35 Most Scottish Presbyterian clerics reflected this interpretation of the conflict, justifying Britain's involvement as an expression of Christian love to the beleaguered small nations threatened by German aggression.Footnote 36 Irish church leaders generally adopted the same standpoint, referring to the war as a conflict between nations which upheld Christian values of liberty, justice and truth, and those which did not.Footnote 37 The broad view of the war, as a struggle between good and evil, in which Britain stood for the values of Christianity, was shared across the denominational spectrum within the United Kingdom. Its widespread popularity and the ease with which it was taken up has been attributed to a combination of ‘Christian militarism and imperialism’, social Darwinism and a sense of rivalry with Germany within British national life.Footnote 38
By comparison, clerical responses in Britain to the outbreak of war in 1939 were more moderate, a testament to the traumatic legacy of the First World War. During the inter-war years, churchmen of all denominations across the United Kingdom condemned war publicly and declared their support for efforts to preserve peace. With the opening of hostilities, however, many church leaders were quick to express approval of the war.Footnote 39 Nevertheless, shocked by the horrors of the previous conflict, the response in 1939 was ‘more sombre, calm, resolute, and much less gung-ho and naïve’ than in 1914.Footnote 40 In his case study of religion in war-time Birmingham, Stephen Parker concludes that the clergy ‘managed a level-headed patriotism’ that welded notions of national repentance with resolute defence of the justice of the British cause.Footnote 41 Many clerics maintained this cautious support for the war effort and justified the conflict in light of contemporary circumstances. By September 1939, most people in Britain had judged Nazism to be evil.Footnote 42 The war, therefore, was interpreted as a just defence of democratic values against a regime which sought to suppress such freedoms. Unlike the First World War, at the outbreak of the second conflict, churchmen eschewed anti-German rhetoric. They recognised that some Germans resisted the Nazi regime, so Nazism, not Germany, was portrayed as the enemy.Footnote 43
German dominance of western Europe, signified by the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk in May–June 1940, provoked an intensification of the rhetoric of some British church leaders, who portrayed the war effort as a crusade.Footnote 44 The theology of crusade drew on Augustine of Hippo, who asserted that a holy war was ordained by and fought in the name of God.Footnote 45 Some ministers employed an interpretation of the war as a crusade in which Britain, appointed by God, fought for the cause of Christian civilisation against the pagan threat of Nazi Germany. Others, favouring a more nuanced approach, maintained the rhetoric of crusade, but cautioned that Britain was not inherently worthy of divinely-granted victory.Footnote 46 Some scholars, however, argue that this interpretation was not commonly held and those clerics who adhered to it seldom voiced their opinion.Footnote 47 The attitude of the other clergymen who served as Westminster M.P.s substantiates that argument. In October 1939, Revd James Barr urged the government to consider all opportunities for a quick peace, thereby avoiding ‘the slaughter of millions and millions’.Footnote 48 Sorensen shared this desire for peace and, as a pacifist, maintained it for longer than many of his colleagues. In February 1940, he asked the government to outline the factors which would induce them to seek a peace settlement.Footnote 49 During a Commons debate on the nature of the war in October 1942, Sorensen outlined his interpretation of the conflict:
It is surely a false syllogism to suggest that because Nazi-ism and Fascism are opposed to Christianity, therefore all who are not Nazis or Fascists must be Christians, which is the assumption that so many people make. It is true that the part is in the whole and that the whole is not in the part, and although it can be said that he who is not against us is for us, surely that does not mean that he who is not against us therefore subscribes to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England.
He also criticised the rhetoric of churchmen which spread the ‘all-too-easy suggestion that this is a simple struggle, as some would have it, between Christianity on the one hand and, by inference, non-Christianity on the other’. Refuting claims that ‘it is a war for God’, he acknowledged that ‘though God moves in a mysterious way I dislike bringing sacred names into the terrible processes of war’.Footnote 50
Interpretations of the war offered by Presbyterian ministers in Northern Ireland bore some resemblance to the views expressed in Britain. Perceptions of Nazism as a threat to Christianity necessitated a crusade to defeat it. The evils of Nazism were clear; its state-exalting ideology was a counterfeit religion which threatened the existence of Christianity. In line with this view, Little deemed the Nazi–Soviet pact a union between ‘neo-paganism and anti-Godism’. He urged his congregation, therefore, to pray that ‘God would vindicate righteousness on the earth by the overthrow of all opposed to it.’Footnote 51 Little abhorred communism for its atheism and as a threat to Christianity.Footnote 52 Nevertheless, the imminence of the Nazi threat took precedence and Little remained largely silent on communism for the duration of the war. During a sermon preached in June 1941, he interpreted the war as ‘one not merely for the subjugation of nations by compelling them to submit to a godless, brutal tyranny’ but ‘an insane, unholy attempt to disown God, dishonour Christ, overthrow Christianity and destroy Christian civilization’. Britain's objective in war, he continued, ‘must be something more than the freedom of the world and the liberation of mankind from the cruelties and barbarities of what their enemies spoke of as the new order, which was one of confiscation and robbery’.Footnote 53 He explained his interpretation of Nazism in more detail in a sermon to his congregation in December 1941, asserting that ‘Hitler and his satellites had their plans laid for putting all Churches in Germany and the occupied countries in a Christless National Church’. Little therefore believed that divine punishment would consequently fall upon Nazi Germany, just as it had in the ancient world: ‘Like Neroism, Diocletianism, and all other wicked isms of pagan Rome, Hitlerism would perish’.Footnote 54
Presbyterian churchmen in Northern Ireland did not wholly reflect the trends demonstrated by their British counterparts. They employed strong crusading language from early in the conflict and failed to distinguish between Germany and Nazism. Only three weeks after the outbreak of war, Little spoke in crusading terms, expressing certainty that God had ‘chosen Britain, notwithstanding all the defects and failings of her people to be His instrument for the advancement of the Kingdom of Christ in the world and the establishment of peace, brotherhood and goodwill among the nations of the earth’.Footnote 55 In June 1940, Revd J. W. Johnston, minister of Townsend Street Presbyterian church, for example, expressed similar sentiments in a poem condemning ‘the Hun’ as ‘the foe of men’. Johnston claimed that ‘We look to none for aid,/ Save to the Guardian Power/ Who forged for us His blade,/ Perchance for such an hour.’Footnote 56 In contemplating victory, the editor of the Presbyterian Herald believed that ‘this humbling of the great German people is in accordance with the just judgment of Almighty God’.Footnote 57
Since Little interpreted the war as a crusade, he advocated regular prayers for victory and was supported by much of his electorate.Footnote 58 Nevertheless, his views on this subject were more bullish than those of many other British clerics. Parker notes that many clergy were reluctant to advocate prayers for the ‘victory of right against wrong’ due to fears that Britain was not worthy of victory.Footnote 59 On thirteen occasions between 1940 and 1944, Little suggested that the government issue a call to national prayer.Footnote 60 The first of these came on 13 February 1940 when Little expressed his desire that the British population unite in prayer ‘for the Divine help to enable us to overcome the enemy and restore a just and enduring peace to the world’. Churchill assured him that the request would be given due consideration.Footnote 61 Reflecting on the ‘Day of Prayer’ held in response to the Dunkirk crisis in May 1940, Little stated that ‘God gave an immediate and direct answer in the miraculous deliverance He vouchsafed to their brave men’. Dunkirk, therefore, was not seen as a defeat, but ‘the first fruits of victory’.Footnote 62 Rather than the prayers for victory so strongly advocated by Little, Sorensen preferred the practice of ‘prayer for peace through justice and charity’.Footnote 63 Barr expressed similar sentiments in February 1940, recommending that national prayer should emphasise repentance. Sorensen echoed this sentiment, urging the government to refrain from ‘the complacent and barbaric identification of the Deity with military victory’.Footnote 64 Other M.P.s were openly dismissive. In March 1942, Robert Morrison of the Labour Party responded to one of Little's requests by asking the government to ‘consider setting aside a day on which clergymen could do some work for the national effort’.Footnote 65 An independent M.P., Austin Hopkinson, observed in July 1942 that prayers for victory were only appropriate if Britain deserved victory.Footnote 66 In 1944, Rhys Davies stated that prayers for victory constituted a ‘descent to Paganism among the Christian Churches’ since ‘Christian clergy in Germany have been praying for victory for German arms’ to the same deity.Footnote 67
Little, like many British clergy, did acknowledge that, if the crusade was to be successful, Britain must be worthy of victory. He therefore regularly set forth the need for national repentance. In July 1940, addressing his congregation at a service for national prayer, he assured listeners that if the population ‘returned to God with penitent hearts, confession of sin upon their lips, handed over their lives to Him to be used as He thought right, and continued constantly in prayer, the sword of the Lord and of Britain would prevail against all their enemies’.Footnote 68 In preparation for the ‘National Day of Prayer’ in September 1940, Little appealed to his congregation and, through the press, the general public to participate in the next day of prayer, making it ‘not only a day of intercession and prayer for victory, but a day of repentance and humble confession of sin, a return to God with humble hearts, and the dedication of the entire Empire to God and His service’.Footnote 69 In one of his regular requests at Westminster for days of prayer, on 18 March 1942 he asked for ‘an appeal to the nation for return to God with humble, penitent hearts and prayer upon their lips seeking His interposition, favour and blessing’.Footnote 70
As a unionist, Little's endorsement of the war effort was motivated by more than religious commitment. Public statements of support for the war, even if somewhat hyperbolic, would demonstrate the importance of Northern Ireland's contribution to the British cause. This was a vital means through which unionists attempted to improve Northern Ireland's lot in the post-war United Kingdom.Footnote 71 This arguably explains why many clerics of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland were more emphatic in their support for the war than British churchmen; theological support for the war carried political capital. On 6 September 1939, Little assured members of parliament that the population of Northern Ireland supported Britain ‘heart and soul’. He claimed as evidence that young men in Northern Ireland had voluntarily ‘rushed to the Colours’.Footnote 72 Both these claims were exaggerated. Many Catholic nationalists were, at best, apathetic towards the war, while some opposed it altogether. The perceived injustice of partition fuelled their interpretation of the war as a British imposition of which they wanted no part.Footnote 73 Moreover, military recruitment from Northern Ireland was indeed relatively high for the first few months of the war but was unremarkable for the remainder, albeit with a brief resurgence in the aftermath of the Dunkirk crisis.Footnote 74 Wartime recruitment from the unionist community, contrary to Little's claims, was poor.Footnote 75
Attempts to have conscription extended to Northern Ireland also reflected the desire of unionist politicians to emphasise the region's significance and equality. Little's colleagues in the Ulster Party attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the British government to extend conscription to Northern Ireland; British politicians viewed the region as a site of potential unrest to be treated with caution. Recommendations that conscription be introduced in Northern Ireland in April 1939 met with opposition from various quarters, including Catholic bishops, northern nationalist politicians and political leaders in Éire. Many Catholic nationalists pledged to resist the imposition of conscription by any means necessary, a sentiment which the Catholic hierarchy endorsed. Fearing unrest, the government chose not to implement conscription at that stage.Footnote 76 In response, the chairman of the Ulster Party, Sir Hugh O'Neill, speaking ‘on behalf’ of the party, warned the British government against continually giving in to the demands of the Irish government. He claimed that ‘you can never buy their friendship by yielding to threats or to ultimatums’.Footnote 77 Referring to the supposed loyalty of Northern Ireland as demonstrated in recruitment figures, he asserted that no other part of the United Kingdom ‘would have given such a response without conscription to the call of King and country’.Footnote 78 Unionist assertions of loyalty and British fear of unrest were evident when the conscription debate reared its head once more in 1941. Following the air raids on Belfast in April and May, three M.P.s, including Henry Harland, the unionist member for Belfast East, asked Churchill if the government would reconsider Northern Ireland's exemption from conscription since it was wanted by the local population. Sir Hugh O'Neill believed that the mutual suffering of Catholics and Protestants in the air raids was a source of unity on which conscription could be founded.Footnote 79 Such claims of widespread support for conscription were, as they were in 1939, exaggerated; unionists emphasised the loyalty of their electorate while neglecting to mention the sentiments of nationalists. Anti-conscription protests, at which pledges to resist conscription were signed, had again been staged throughout Northern Ireland. Catholic bishops condemned the proposals and endorsed the pledges, and Irish politicians warned of the damage which conscription could inflict on relations between Britain and Éire.Footnote 80 In light of potential unrest, Churchill relayed the government's decision that ‘at the present time, though there can be no dispute about our rights or about the merits, it would be more trouble than it is worth to enforce such a policy’. He did, nevertheless, acknowledge the loyalty of Northern Ireland, attempting to placate unionists by saying that ‘no words of praise can be too high’ for the ‘loyal aid and continued and constant support’ of Northern Ireland.Footnote 81
III
Scholars acknowledge the significance of church leaders as spokespeople for educational and moral reform in inter-war Northern Ireland. They emphasise the privileged place of Protestants within society and characterise the state as confessional.Footnote 82 Although the endowment of religious organisations and the existence of state churches were prohibited by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, Protestant churches wielded significant influence and operated in a ‘semi-established’ capacity. The Presbyterian Church in Ireland was the largest Protestant denomination in Northern Ireland and was able to use its position to influence government policy.Footnote 83 Protestant church leaders had a degree of influence over the government. Together with lay representatives, they successfully interacted with Stormont to produce a state-education system which favoured Protestants.Footnote 84 Protestant church leaders regularly urged the government to introduce legislation on moral matters such as alcohol and gambling, with some success. They argued for legislation against the sale of alcohol, Sunday opening of public houses, and licences for vendors of alcohol. They also advocated the introduction of local option. The Northern Ireland parliament passed legislation in 1923 which granted some of these, but since it did not introduce local option some Protestants continued the campaign. They were, however, unsuccessful; the 1923 legislation had provoked opposition from members of the alcohol industry so Prime Minister Craig, whose family had earned its fortune in the distilling industry, decided against further measures.Footnote 85 Regardless of these setbacks, Protestant representatives continued to request government action against alcohol. In 1938, pressure from temperance advocates compelled the government to establish an investigative committee into the production and sale of cheap, adulterated wine. Although its findings did not lead to action, the instigation of the committee demonstrates that Protestant clerics and laypeople, including Presbyterians, had some influence over government action on moral matters between the wars.Footnote 86
Clerics of all denominations strongly advocated conservative standards of morality. David Fitzpatrick notes that ‘most Protestant churches were at least as rigorous in their moral conservatism as the Catholic church in Ireland’. Protestants and Catholics shared a commitment to strict standards of sexual morality and at least temperate consumption of alcohol, while many Protestants also advocated teetotalism and strict Sabbath observance.Footnote 87 Historians have suggested that this conservatism distinguished Northern Ireland from other parts of the United Kingdom. Leanne McCormick points out that ‘all sections of the community in Northern Ireland based much of their identity upon the maintenance of high moral standards’. Politicians viewed their state as ‘morally superior to the British mainland’, an image which they, and local clerics, were eager to maintain.Footnote 88 Though the contrast can be overplayed, it contains some truth, particularly when comparing Northern Ireland and regions of England. Ross McKibbin suggests that England witnessed an increased liberalising of sexual morality during the 1930s and 1940s.Footnote 89 Religious observance on Sundays declined in England during the 1920s and 1930s as leisure pursuits became increasingly acceptable.Footnote 90 By contrast, the interpretation of Sunday as a divinely-instituted day of rest which should be devoted to religious observance and the avoidance of secular entertainments had been a long-standing Ulster Presbyterian tradition.Footnote 91 Northern Ireland was not unique in this regard; Sunday observance remained prevalent in Wales and Scotland through the 1930s and into the war years.Footnote 92 In terms of alcohol consumption, public houses came to be significant sites of social interaction in England; the inter-war years saw a marked increase in the number of new pubs, especially in areas with new housing. Yet in Wales, the temperance movement remained strong until the 1960s.Footnote 93
The desire of local clerics to uphold moral standards was heightened by the outbreak of war. Two linked factors contributed to this stronger emphasis on morality: a widespread perception that the precariousness of life in wartime intensified pleasure-seeking and a sense that those who did not conform to popularly-defined moral standards hindered the national war effort.Footnote 94 At the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland in 1944, the Temperance Committee condemned increased drinking at ‘dances and social functions’ and deplored ‘the almost unrestricted sale of alcoholic beverages’.Footnote 95 In addition, Little and other representatives of the Protestant churches strongly opposed the proposed Sunday opening of leisure facilities. For instance, a meeting of members of various Protestant churches in March 1942 adopted a resolution stating that the requisitioning of a Belfast cinema for troops on Sundays had ‘caused grievous hurt to the conscience and sentiments of a vast multitude of the citizens of this City and Province who are among the most loyal, law-abiding and devoted subjects of the British Crown and Government’.Footnote 96
Little's Westminster rhetoric on moral issues demonstrates that he represented the views of his denomination on such questions. Like many Presbyterians, he believed that alcohol caused a host of social problems such as sexual promiscuity and juvenile delinquency. For instance, Revd J. W. Johnston of Townsend Street Presbyterian church, Belfast, observed more drinking among young people in 1940. He condemned the use of alcohol, arguing that moral decay was inevitable since ‘war, which destroys moral values and warps men's outlook, has almost always an evil effect on the social habits of the people’.Footnote 97 In April 1940 Little urged the British government to ban ‘nude and semi-nude shows’, linking them with alcohol, since ‘the evils of bottle parties and nudity are going hand in hand’ at cabaret performances’.Footnote 98 On 15 March 1940, the Daily Mirror printed a large picture of Little in his clerical collar accompanied by the headline ‘I have never seen strip tease’. Little told of his shock at the contrast between empty churches and large queues outside ‘places of entertainment where nudity is displayed’ in London, stating that ‘we would not tolerate strip-teasing’ in County Down.Footnote 99 He did not, however, comment on interactions between U.S. troops and local women, likely because, like other unionists, he was unwilling to risk offending the American allies by criticising their troops.Footnote 100 In order to protect young people from the ill effects of drunkenness, in January 1944 Little asked the minister of food to authorise the manufacture of ice-cream in Northern Ireland. He believed that ‘owing to the stoppage of the manufacture of ice-cream and the shortage of soft drinks young people are being driven wholesale into places where strong drink is sold’. The request was rejected as it was believed that milk could be better used in producing more essential supplies.Footnote 101
Given his politico-religious interpretation of the war, Little viewed alcohol production as more than a moral issue; it was also a waste of war material. Although popular among Northern Ireland Protestants, proposals for limiting alcohol production were not well received by Little's parliamentary colleagues who viewed alcohol as vital to morale. In October 1940 Little attended a demonstration in Belfast protesting against the supply of raw material to brewers. Addressing the protesters, he complained that ‘our cattle, pigs and fowl may die for lack of food, but the brewers must get their grain. That is not fair play.’Footnote 102 He reiterated his belief that alcohol production hindered the war effort in January 1942, when he proposed that grain be diverted from brewers to farmers in order to ensure adequate food supplies. Since members of government felt that alcohol was beneficial to morale, the request was denied.Footnote 103 In November 1943, he asked the minister of information to ‘use all the means of propaganda at his disposal to impress on people, young and old alike, that indulgence in alcoholic liquors is not only harmful to the individual but also a serious hindrance to the war effort and that national sobriety is essential for achieving the best work towards a speedy victory’.Footnote 104
The issue of Sabbath rest also created a dilemma for Little and his fellow clerics between support for the war effort and remaining true to their moral commitments. In the end, his advocacy of Sunday as a day of rest and worship demonstrates the limitations of his rhetorical support for the war effort. In June 1940, he joined a deputation of representatives of Protestant churches and welfare organisations in seeking the prevention of Sunday opening of cinemas in Belfast. He believed that ‘a great many of the blessings enjoyed by their city’ were divine rewards for the long-standing tradition of Sabbath observance and ‘hoped that nothing would ever be done to impair that proud tradition’. Despite his loyalty to Britain and the concomitant desire to help troops wherever possible, he ‘did not want the introduction of anything which would be contrary to the due observance of the Lord's Day’.Footnote 105 He also expressed his Sabbatarianism at Westminster. In April 1941, although deeming himself ‘no kill-joy’, Little stated that ‘the electors who have sent the representatives of Northern Ireland to this House are most determined and uncompromising in their opposition’ to the Sunday opening of leisure facilities. The Sabbath had been divinely instituted for ‘man's rest, refreshment, spiritual health and bodily recuperation’ and Little believed that music halls and theatres did not satisfy these criteria.Footnote 106
Responses to Little's moralising rhetoric demonstrate a popular perception of Northern Ireland at Westminster as a backwater whose population adhered to outdated moral standards. Callum Brown points out that during the Second World War alcohol consumption and enjoying life to the full were widely condoned in England. Indeed, the pub was often portrayed in films as a vital place where morale could be bolstered.Footnote 107 In October 1941, following a failed attempt to introduce a stricter rationing of alcohol, Little suggested that ‘a more liberal supply of pure water might with advantage be added to the brew’. Suffering amid the scarcity of alcohol, Sir Alfred Knox, a native of Ulster and Conservative M.P. for Wycombe, asked Little if he knew an ‘address where some strong drink could be obtained’.Footnote 108 In attempting to have the legal age for purchasing alcohol raised from eighteen to twenty-one in March 1944, Little painted a bleak picture of the dangers of alcohol. Herbert Morrison, however, believed that Little had been liberal with the truth, pointing out that ‘there is a good deal of exaggeration by people who have, quite legitimately, a cause to further’.Footnote 109 When an Allied victory seemed inevitable, Little asked the government to ensure that victory be celebrated in a morally upright fashion through the ‘cessation of all work and the closing of all licensed premises in the United Kingdom’. Reflecting the intention of many people to celebrate peace with copious quantities of alcohol, James Glanville of Labour quoted ‘a song entitled “I'm going to get lit up, when the lights go on in London”’, reminding Little of how out of touch his views were.Footnote 110
The perceptions of Northern Ireland as a backwater were also reflected in responses to Little's advocacy of Sunday observance. By March 1942 Belfast City Council, influenced by the repeated protests of clergy and laity, had persistently refused to grant licences for Sunday entertainments for troops stationed in the vicinity. On Sunday, 29 March the Hippodrome Cinema was commandeered by troops. An outraged Little protested at Westminster, asking Sir James Grigg, secretary of state for war, why the clear sentiments of the populace had been disregarded by military authorities. He pointed out that since the day in question had been a ‘National Day of Prayer’, the provision of entertainment for troops was especially offensive. Grigg told Little that the council's refusal only pertained to entertainment for members of the public; entertainments organised exclusively for military personnel came under the remit of the General Officer Commanding Troops in Northern Ireland. Grigg's response demonstrates that Little's religious devotion marked him out from other contemporary politicians. Grigg stated that he believed ‘wholesale amusement’ to be fully compatible with ‘the worship of God’ and the ‘defeat of our enemies’.Footnote 111
IV
James Little's views reflected the political and religious thinking of many Protestant unionists in Northern Ireland. As a typical conservative Presbyterian minister, he was popular among the electorate thanks to his commitment to a shared set of political and moral values. His interpretation of the Second World War, held by many of his fellow Presbyterians in Northern Ireland, claimed that Britain had been appointed by God to rid the world of the threat posed by Nazism to Christianity. Unlike many British clergy, who tended to employ this crusading language only after the Dunkirk crisis, Northern Irish Presbyterian clerics interpreted the war as a crusade from the outset. The identification of many Presbyterians with unionism lent fervency to this interpretation of the war. Eager to emphasise their loyalty to Britain, and in hope of securing Northern Ireland's place within the United Kingdom, Presbyterian ministers and unionist politicians extolled the British cause and exaggerated Northern Ireland's participation. Little's efforts to preserve conservative moral standards demonstrates a willingness among Presbyterians to exploit their professed support for the war in seeking restrictions on the alcohol industry. Moreover, Little's attempts to uphold the sanctity of Sundays reflect the clerical dilemma of substantiating their rhetorical support for the war with action which maintained their commitment to religious principle. Rather than accept the opening of Sunday cinemas for the entertainment of troops, some Presbyterians condemned all proposals for Sunday cinemas and forced the military authorities to take matters into their own hands. There remains a need for further consideration of the religious history of wartime Northern Ireland as a contribution to the wider debate about the nature of denominational religion and politics in this ‘confessional state’.
