Thomas: Did you guys read Benatar's paper about sex?Footnote ¹

Eric: Yes. But I didn't agree with him.

T: About what?

E: I don't think the only attitudes about sex are either the casual view or the significance view. For me, it seems more like a sliding scale. If sex is valuable, then take a significance attitude. If sex isn't, then adopt a casual attitude.

T: Well, I agree with you that it's better to call Benatar's views ‘attitudes’ instead of models of sexual ethics. He argues that, on a significance attitude, sex is morally acceptable only when sex expresses (romantic) love (192).

Harvey: What does any of that significance stuff mean, anyway? What counts as love? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of ‘romantic’ love?

T: Exactly. That's why it seems wise to think through models of sex and then think through attitudes about sex on those models.

H: I like the casual attitude since I'm a hedonist. I think Benatar's take is right: sex is ‘morally like any other pleasure and may be enjoyed subject only to the usual sorts of moral constraints’ (192). So I say, if it feels good, do it.

T: I disagree. I think a more traditional view of sex is a better approach. I think there's something immensely special about sex. In fact, I think lots of conditions need to be in place in order for sex to be moral. Sex must be consensual, and it should be enjoyed between two and only two people, and only in the context of a permanent relationship.

H: Wow! I didn't realize you were so religious, Thomas!

T: Look, some people like me think sex is sacred because of religious metaphysics, but others defend traditional models of sex because they inherited views from a culture or tradition that sees sex as a kind of glue that holds marriages together. Regardless, I don't think it's controversial to say that sex is mystical, and a deeply unitive act.

E: Hold on – what's with all the mystical, unitive stuff? I think we should think about sex the same way we think about any other good or service that is exchanged in a market economy.Footnote ²

T: Well, the unitive nature of sex is obvious to me since it's how people get pregnant. Given the need to care for babies, the tie between sex and permanent relationships is normal and natural, as evidenced by the entire history of mankind.

H: I don't know what your problem is, Thomas. It's no big deal … it's just sex.

T: I disagree. Traditionalists like me think there's something really special about sex, and we shouldn't treat it so casually.

H: Did you guys hear about that girl who got raped in that frat house last week? So awful. What do traditionalists think about sexual assault?

T: Well, on the traditional model, rape is awful. When someone is assaulted sexually, rapists take control of victims against their wills and sexual activity takes place outside of the proper context of a healthy permanent relationship.Footnote ³ Hence, traditionalists are justified in thinking that sexual assault is a very serious offense. But for those who adopt casual attitudes towards sex, it seems like it'd be fine to say, ‘Sucks for her.’

H: What?!? Rape is a serious crime!

T: Umm … to borrow a line from the Joker, ‘Why so serious?’ Your angst seems irrational. After all, didn't you just tell me, ‘It's no big deal … it's just sex’?

H: This is different, and you know it. Rape isn't the same thing as sex. It's sexual assault.

T: Well, it's not as different as you think. If you don't think sex is a big deal when two people get it on under normal circumstances, why think it's a big deal when two people have sex under other circumstances?

H: You're not paying attention – this is sexual assault. It's a big deal.

T: Right, but since sex isn't a big deal in the first case, it's not a big deal for the other. So it's not ‘sex’ that makes sexual assault a big deal. You must think ‘assault’ makes rape and other forms of sexual assault bad.

H: Exactly.

T: Well, here's the thing. I don't think all assault is wrong. Like, if a parent spanks a kid, that's a kind of assault, and …

H: First of all, spanking is wrong. Corporal punishment is bad, and the studies show …

T: Fine, whatever. My point is even stronger on your perspective, since you think spanking is wrong. It's a kind of assault, right? But you're not demanding for parents to be locked up for twenty years for spanking a child.

H: Dude, not the same thing at all. Rape is a particularly terrible kind of assault. Besides, spanking is different, because a mom has a kind of authority relationship with her child, and …

T: So you think rape wrong because two people don't have the right kind of authority relation?

H: Well, that's at least part of what's going on.

T: When two fighters get into a boxing ring, they are assaulting each other, and there's no authority relation between them, and we don't think that kind of assault is bad, so …

H: Boxing is different. It's consensual. Rape isn't.

T: It's not just an issue of consent though. Suppose a couple starts having consensual sex before they get married. On the hedonist view, the only consent that matters is provided by the two people.

H: Right, but for group sex, consent of all parties involved is required. But no one's consent is required beyond those participating.

T: Gross. Let's focus on the couple. Suppose they get married, and during a rough patch the husband cheats on his wife with a work colleague. So long as they both consent to the sex, adultery is no big deal, right? I mean, the sex is consensual …

H: Nope. Not okay. Married couples make promises to each other, and he's breaking his promises when he cheats.

T: Wait, I thought you said sex is no big deal. Why would couples make promises about something that's no big deal? And why should promises about something that's no big deal govern their entire relationships?

H: Well, I'm not sure what to say, but they did make the promises, so he's still guilty of not keeping his word.

T: So, since you're keen to insist that sex is no big deal, are you suggesting that adultery reduces to breaking a promise? I mean, if a wife says, ‘I'll be home at six’, and the husband asks, ‘You promise?’ and the wife responds, ‘Yes, I promise I'll be home at six’, but she gets caught up in a project at work and doesn't get home until 8:30, is that really just as bad as her cheating on him?

H: Well, I don't think so, but the kind of cheating you're describing isn't rape, so I don't see what this has to do with sexual assault.

T: It all goes to show that sex is a big deal, and rape isn't wrong simply because it's non-consensual sex, so it isn't just about consent. Think about it: spanking isn't consensual. So you must mean that rape is bad because it's both a kind of non-consensual assault and it takes place without the proper authority relationship.

H: Yes.

T: But even then, what about war? I mean, even under what would be considered a just war, like when the Allied forces ended the Holocaust, there were many instances of non-consensual assault that took place without the proper kinds of authority relationships, right?

H: Yes, but under just war conditions, there are additional moral justifications for those acts of violence, plus there's the doctrine of double effect, and … it's complicated. But none of that applies for rape.

T: Agreed. So, to be clear, on your hedonistic model of sex, what makes rape wrong doesn't really have anything to do with the sex acts themselves. Rather, it's a kind of non-consensual assault that takes place where the proper authority relationships aren't in place, and there are not any other morally justifying reasons that might serve to condone the violence. Would this accurately describe your view?

H: When you put it that way, it doesn't sound like it captures my intuitions very well. Because I do think that there's something about the ‘sex’ aspect of rape that contributes to the badness.

T: Why? I thought that, on your view, sex is no big deal?

H: Well, it's a little more complicated than you're making it out to be.

T: How so?

H: I think consent is an essential component for something to count as sex. Rape isn't consensual, so it doesn't technically count as sex.

T: Are you serious? Isn't non-consensual sex the very definition of rape?

H: Maybe we should define rape as non-consensual, physically invasive assault. On that definition, I can still say sex is no big deal, and I can say that rape is really, really bad.Footnote ⁴

T: That's just playing semantic language games. If you want to define rape that way, fine. But we both know that's not really helping us address what's at issue.

H: Why?

T: Because we're talking about the act itself. As a traditionalist, my claim is that there's something special about that act. So, we should focus on the act itself, since that is what's at issue.

H: That begs the question against my view. I deny that there's anything special about that act. It's the conditions surrounding the act which determine whether or not it's sex, so no big deal, or rape, and therefore a serious crime.

T: You really believe that?

H: Sure! Why shouldn't I?

T: Because then everything boils down to consent!

H: Which has been my point all along! What's wrong with that?

T: Fine. Suppose I slobber on my finger and stick it in your ear. Americans sometimes tease each other this way - it's called a wet willy. This surely counts as non-consensual, physically invasive, and it probably qualifies as assault on plenty of definitions.

H: What's your point?

T: Well, should I go to jail for twenty years for giving you a wet willy?

H: No. Giving someone a wet willy isn't rape.

T: Why not?

H: Because it doesn't involve any genitalia.

T: Thank you! It's obvious that when genitalia is involved, it's different, because there is something special about sex. So the badness of rape doesn't depend entirely on consent alone.

H: Hmmm. I'm still not convinced. Rape is wrong because of the psychological effects that rape has on victims.

T: Let's not change the subject. I'm happy to discuss the psychological effects stuff, but let's get clear on something else first. Let's go back to our definition that was in place before you brought up psychology. Rape is a kind of non-consensual assault between people without any justifying authority relationship and/or any morally justifying reasons, right?

H: Sure.

T: Well, that kind of stuff happens all the time. Remember when we had to bail Bubba out of jail for getting into that bar fight? That was non-consensual assault between people without the proper authority relationships, and without any other morally justifying reasons for the violence.

H: But that wasn't sexual assault.

T: Right, but since you're committed to the idea that there's nothing special about sex, you can't reasonably point to sex as the basis of what makes sexual assault bad.

H: Fine, but what's your point?

T: Only that Bubba got fined $250 and forty hours of community service. Do you think that's an appropriate punishment for rapists?

H: Of course not! I think rapists should go to jail for at least twenty years!!

T: But why? Do you think Bubba should get twenty years?

H: No! All he did was get into a fight. He was in the wrong place at the wrong time. He didn't even start it. It's different.

T: But how is it different? In both cases, we've got an instance of someone being assaulted, non-consensually, without any kind of authority relationship, and without any other morally justifying reasons.

H: But rape is sexual assault.

T: Well, I'm glad you're now admitting that rape involves sex.

H: Okay, I do agree that part of what makes rape bad is that a sex act occurs in the wrong way.

T: Progress! It's the sexual nature of sexual assault that makes rape so bad, which makes perfect sense on a traditional model because traditionalists adopt a significance attitude towards sex. But you don't get to say sex is no big deal in one breath and then turn around and reasonably suggest that sex is so important that it can do all sorts of ethical heavy lifting when it comes to justifying the badness of rape.

H: Fine, so maybe it is the psychology stuff.

T: Okay, now's a good time to go there. But you should know that I think the psychological effects bolster the case for a significance attitude, and thereby undermine a casual attitude towards sex. After all, sex almost always carries psychological effects, whether positive or negative, even when sex is consensual.

H: I acknowledge that. But rape almost always brings long-term, psychologically devastating effects on victims, whereas bar fights usually don't.

T: Well, some people experience devastating psychological consequences from bar fights. It's not just veterans who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorders. When bar fights do lead to particularly bad suffering ways, do you think the offenders should receive harsher punishments?

H: Maybe. Depends on how serious the physical injuries were. I mean, I think a broken nose is worse than a busted lip, so it deserves a harsher punishment, and …

T: You've changed the subject; that's physical harm, not psychological. For what it's worth, I'm in complete agreement that when harm results in more serious injuries, a wrongdoer deserves a more severe punishment.

H: Staying on point, then, the fact that rape almost always leads to so much psychological damage plays an important part in my thinking that rape is really bad, and relevantly different from a bar fight.

T: Your reasoning here is problematic because it's deeply ablest.

H: How so?

T: What about people who are severely mentally handicapped? Suppose someone rapes a person who lacks the cognitive ability to form the kind of thoughts that would be necessary to be damaged psychologically in the way we've been talking about. Don't you think that would still be wrong, perhaps even more wrong, even though there's no psychological damage taking place?

H: Yeah, I guess so.

T: So, psychological damages aren't doing the work for you. But I acknowledge that sexual assault victims suffer from psychological damage in acute fashion. Don't you think that's because there's something special about sex? It seems like every step along the way, you're coming dangerously close to changing your mind.

H: I am finding that my casual attitude towards sex is making it difficult to explain what's so evil about rape. Maybe there is something special about sex. Besides adopting a traditional model of sex, are there any other alternatives?

T: Yep. You could stop making such a big deal out of rape. You can continue saying that sex is no big deal, and agree that we should treat sexual assault the way we treat a bar fight. It's bad, but it's not twenty years in jail bad.

H: No way. I'm not willing to change my mind on that. I'm absolutely certain that rape is deeply wrong.

T: Okay, so here's another way out. Raise the seriousness of and punishment for bar fights. Demand that we treat each and every instance of this kind of assault the same. So, anytime someone assaults another person without their consent, without the right kinds of authority relationships, and without other morally relevant justifying reasons for the violence, demand a prison sentence of twenty years. Then you could still consistently maintain your casual attitude towards sex.

H: Yeah, that'd be consistent, but that doesn't conform to my intuitions very well for two reasons. First, twenty years seems way too harsh for a bar fight. And, after all this talk, it's pretty clear to me that sex is part of why I think rape is so bad. Rape is a violation of something that's supposed to be a special kind of intimacy.

T: Good! You admit that sex is special!

Eric: Okay, I'm jumping in. There's another approach here. An approach to sex based on economic models lines up very nicely with some of what traditional models say about sex. It's not that I think sex is no big deal, it's just that on my analysis, traditionalists end up overpaying for sex.

T: But if we lived in a society where everyone valued sex in the way that traditionalists do, the market price of sex would be way higher, right?

E: Sure. It's simple supply and demand. When supply is high, the price is cheap. It's a basic law of economics.

T: And if people refuse to sell sex apart from a lifetime commitment, you'd be forced to either pay the high price, or forego sex.

E: Oh sure. In fact, until very recently, sex was extremely expensive. Historically, it's been women who sell the promise of regular sex in exchange for three Ps: protection, provision, and the promise of fidelity, and men who purchase at that price. But, we don't live in that society. Since sex is super-cheap these days, I don't have to worry about the three Ps.

T: Maybe not, but your economic model faces the same problem that Harvey's hedonistic model faces.

E: How so?

T: Simple. Since sex is cheap, sexual assault shouldn't carry super-serious consequences.

E: I don't follow. Victims of sexual violence don't get to choose not to be hurt by sexual violence.

T: I'm not talking about the victims. I'm talking about the perps. If your economic view of sex is right, and sex is cheap, then rape is basically misdemeanor theft.

E: No, it's a lot more serious than that.

T: Why? It's not like what's stolen rises to the level of a felony. Even in the case of someone's virginity, we're not dealing with grand theft auto.

E: See, that's where I disagree. The value of sex is different for different people. Some people have a low value of sex, so for them rape might not be a big deal. But for people who value sex highly, rape is a very big deal.

T: That approach doesn't work for several reasons. First, I don't think the rightness or wrongness, or the degree of wrongness, for rape varies. I think rape is really bad, and its badness doesn't depend on who gets raped, or how anyone does or doesn't value sex.

E: I get that this is how things work on a traditionalist model, but that's not the way it works on the economic model. So you're kinda begging the question.

T: Okay, but here's the other problem. Your entire model revolves around the ideas of social construction. The market price of sex isn't determined by an individual; it's determined by an entire society.

E: Sure, that's the market price, but an individual can still choose to sell at that price, or hold out for a better offer in the future.

T: Right. I agree that anyone can choose not to sell. But that decision has minimal impact on the market price of sex, which would be set at the macro-level.

E: Okay. So what?

T: Well, it seems to me that, on your economic model, how a culture treats rape depends on the market price of sex, set at the macro level, not the value that some individual places on sex in a micro-economy.

E: Why think that?

T: For a couple of reasons. First, because laws are made at the level of society, not the level of an individual.

E: Fair point. But why couldn't we just say, then, that society deems rape to be twenty years serious and move on?

T: We can, but there's a deep-seated inconsistency in saying that rape is twenty years bad while saying that the value of sex is set by the cost of a nice dinner date, or even less thanks to Tinder.

E: How so? Remember, there are still lots of people who think sex is really valuable.

T: Yes, but there aren't enough of those people to inflate the market value of sex. At least, there aren't very many sellers holding out for better offers. And that leads me to think that the sentence doesn't fit the crime when we are locking people up for twenty years.

E: So you don't think rape is a serious crime?!?

T: Just the opposite. I think rape is really serious because I don't think the economic model is the right way to think about sex. Actually, let me be more precise. As a traditionalist, I'm deeply committed to a significance attitude towards sex. But because our society approaches sex with an exceedingly casual, laissez-faire attitude, I think the economic model faces problems explaining why we think sexual assault is so bad.

E: What's the problem?

T: Here's a thought experiment. Did you see that a new manuscript of John Locke was recently discovered at St John's College in Maryland?Footnote ⁵

E: I saw a headline about it.

T: Well, there are lots of people who are early modern scholars, and a few who specialize in Locke's work who are obviously very interested in the book. But hardly any of these scholars care about the first edition status of Locke's work. These scholars just want the content.

E: Makes sense, but so what?

T: Imagine that you had the book, and that you were willing to sell it for $1,000,000, but no one is willing to pay that much. Nonetheless, there's considerable interest in the content. Now, suppose someone breaks into your house and takes photos of every page of the book, and then the thief sells the photos to a publisher. A few weeks later, out pop 10,000 paperback copies of Locke's manuscript, on sale for $14.95 each. What do you think that does to the market price of Locke's new work?

E: This is apples and oranges. The paperbacks aren't first editions. The original is more valuable.

T: Maybe, but how much more valuable? Think about it. Most philosophers don't care at all about the special status of the first edition. They only care about the content of the book. Suppose that I intended to buy one of the paperbacks, but they've sold out. Now suppose I bump into you and offer you $20 for your copy, since I don't want to wait three weeks while the book is on back order. Would you sell the original manuscript for $20?

E: No way. Mine is the original, so it's still worth $1,000,000.

T: It's only worth that much if someone is willing to pay that much. So far, no takers. The market price is $14.95. But suppose I'm angered by your refusal to sell, so I just steal it from you, and leave you $20 anyway. If you sue me for $999,980, do you think a judge would award you that money? Or do you think a judge would determine the value of the object by looking at the overall market price?

E: Probably by the marketplace, I presume. But your thought experiment is misleading. Consider the case of a stolen work of art. Suppose I were in possession of an original Rembrandt, but it gets stolen. Suppose also that authorities capture the thief, but only after she sold the original. Surely you don't think I will be made whole with a copy, do you?

T: Well, no, but that's because there's an art market and many collectors are willing to pay big bucks for original masterpieces. But, at least in the US, there doesn't seem to be a similar market when it comes to very high values for sex. And there's another problem …

E: I disagree. There are some people who pay a very high price for sex, and some who refuse to sell except for a very high price.

T: I grant that, but the rare exceptions don't do enough to change the overall market price for sex in a culture. Besides …

E: Well, it certainly does for those individuals, just like the original masterpieces bring much higher prices at auctions than forgeries or prints!

T: And now we come to the other problem.

E: What other problem?

T: The bigger problem with the economic approach to sex is that it commodifies people.

E: No it doesn't!

T: The value of sex depends on what someone is willing to pay. And, since different people pay different amounts, the value of sex isn't fixed.

E: I don't see the problem. Seems like this is a truism – I'd be willing to sacrifice a lot if it meant marrying the perfect woman, but I'm not going to make those same sacrifices for just anybody.

T: I'm not denying that there's something of a market at work in the background. What I'm saying is that, on the traditional model, there's something special about the act of sex itself that doesn't reduce to economics. If it were about economics, then the seriousness of the consequences for raping someone shouldn't be objectively fixed.

E: Please explain. I'm not getting this.

T: If we treat sex like a type of service that's for sale, then we inadvertently turn rape into a kind of theft. Of course, since the value of sex isn't fixed, there's no objective measure of badness for rape. Sex has different values for different people. Think about it:          Bob might value sex differently depending on who he's sleeping with.

E: So what?

T: Well, suppose that Bob has no desire to have sex with Mary. In fact, for the sake of argument, suppose that literally no one wants to have sex with Mary, so the market value of consensual sex with her is zero. On your economic model of sex, if Mary gets raped, has a bad thing happened?

E: Obviously yes.

T: Well, that just goes to show that you aren't thinking about these things in terms of the economic markets. But I'm glad you're not so far gone as those who might say that such rapes aren't serious.

E: Does anyone really think that?

T: Peter Singer has argued that it might not be bad to rape disabled people, and Richard Dawkins has defended mild pedophilia.

E: Unbelievable!! How could anyone think that?!?

T: Well, if you think that raping Mary would be a bad thing, it's not because of market considerations. But let's flip the script. Consider some sex icon, a particularly beautiful celebrity. On an economic model, sex with this individual would be quite expensive. So, considering your artwork analogy, would it be fair to compare such a person to a masterpiece?

E: Following the analogy, yes, I guess so.

T: So then, wouldn't the consequence for raping the celebrity be more severe, given the market value?

E: No, because rape is rape, regardless of who the victim is.

T: But that violates your market-based approach to sex. The whole reason you were saying that you wouldn't be made whole with a print of the Rembrandt is because of the market value of the painting.

E: I see what you're driving at.

T: Good. So, with this in mind, tell me: if the market price of sex is very low, how should a judge rule when sex is stolen without proper payment? On what basis can a judge say that what was stolen is exceedingly valuable?

E: Well, it's not just the sex. It's also the fact that rape is a kind of assault.

T: Right, but remember what we just talked about with Harvey. Rape is definitely assault, but if we treated it like any other assault, we wouldn't be locking rapists up for twenty years.

E: Yeah, fair point. But it still seems to me that if the victim has a really high value for sex, then there's a case to be made for serious consequences.

T: Do you really think that the consequences of rape should depend on whatever subjective value some individual or group of individuals places on sex? Or, like me, aren't you inclined to think that raping someone is bad, regardless of what the market value of sex with said individual might be?

E: I guess what you're saying is that, on the economic model of sex, if sex has a low cost, then rape has a low consequence; and if sex has a high cost (as would be the case in traditional societies), then rape has a high consequence.

T: Bingo. That's exactly what I think economic models of sex yield. And, despite your protests, it doesn't matter what's taking place in any micro-economies. The value of sex in a culture is sex at the macro level. And since we don't make laws at the level of the individual, the consequences are determined by society's macro-level decision. To restate things, if the economic model of sex is right, then rape is a kind of theft. But the value of what's stolen depends on the market value of sex in that particular society. Or, if it varies, it commodifies people in ways that create other problems. I find all this problematic because I think rape is wrong, and I don't think rape's badness depends on how a society values sex, or how much someone is or isn't willing to pay for sex with this person vs. somebody else.

E: On these points, I share your intuitions.

T: Well, then, it seems that you need to make a choice. You could just concede that rape is no big deal.

E: Nope.

T: I didn't think you'd go for that, so you're left with two other options. You could abandon the economic view in favor of a more traditional view of sex, or you could adopt a very high significance attitude towards sex while keeping your economic model. But that requires admitting that the low value of sex in our culture is deeply problematic, at least for everyone who thinks rape is a heinous crime that deserves a serious consequence.