Hans Bethe and Edward Teller, two influential scientist-advisors who played important roles in Cold War nuclear policy, agreed upon relatively little. Scientists in Conflict sets out to compare the “adversarial roles of Bethe and Teller in the shaping of policy during four specific episodes” of the Cold War (ix). These include debate about disarmament immediately after World War II, the development of fusion weapons, the negotiation of a limited nuclear test ban, and missile defense deployment in the late 1960s. In discussing these complex debates, Bird focuses on two themes: the social responsibility of scientists, and the role of scientists in political advising (xi).

Although it is not obvious from the text of the book, historians and sociologists have written extensively about both of these themes, both generally and in terms of their specific emergence in the Cold War. Bethe's and Teller's distinctive views and roles on nuclear policy have also been well discussed. Though Bird appears to have spent time in the archives, the account relies heavily and somewhat selectively upon many of these existing accounts. The result is neither new nor surprising, but it synthesizes Teller's and Bethe's views in a manner that may be of interest to individuals who are new to nuclear history. Historians may also be directed to primary source material that they would not otherwise have considered.

In attempting to combine comparative biography with complex technopolitical history, Bird confronts a daunting task. Each of the debates analyzed were wide ranging. Though Bird attempts to delimit the scope of each debate by confining the discussion to specific periods, none of the debates were so neatly contained. For example, the potential need to conduct nuclear tests for missile defenses was an important part of the controversy over the limited nuclear test ban. This alone does not make the comparison of Bethe and Teller infeasible. However, the book deploys evidence in a manner that tends to lose important pieces of context and in the process tends to undermine both biography and policy history.

In general, the lack of attention to scholarly context may prove disconcerting to other Cold War historians. For example, readers are frequently asked to accept the authority of individuals described simply as “author,” including Robert Jungk (4–5), Anne Cahn (218), and Jennifer G. Mathers (242). However, these individuals wrote in significantly different decades, and for different purposes. This carries implications for the interpretation of these claims. Though Jungk is cited as an authority on scientific norms, the fact that Jungk was an Austrian journalist writing in the 1950s about the American and German atomic bomb projects likely affected his portrayal of scientists’ culture. Jungk's account proved controversial for other reasons, a matter not mentioned. More nuanced accounts of the physicists’ culture and milieu, as well as the role of journalists in popularizing images of physicists, have been written in the decades following Jungk's work. By labeling Jungk an “author,” the book puts him on the same playing field as Cahn, who researched the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) debate for a doctorate in political science in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Another “author” is Jennifer G. Mathers, whose work on the Soviet Union is cited, but whose credentials are not (Mather is an international relations scholar who continues to publish scholarly work in the new millennium). The text might have been improved by an explicit consideration of the relationship between its subject, sources, and potential audiences.

Though the book discusses specific statements and actions of Teller and Bethe in considerable detail, it ultimately provides a relatively shallow understanding of the debates and communities that surrounded them. For example, the formal discussion of the missile defenses in 1964 neglects the fact that events in the late 1950s were crucial to shaping scientists’ views on the ultimate value of missile defenses. It portrays views as static when the actors themselves recall dynamism and change. Bird suggests that pressure to deploy defenses began when the Army was forced to scrap work on Nike-Zeus and begin work on Nike-X. But as other accounts have made clear, the Army perceived Nike-X as a setback, not as a triumph, and pressure to switch to deploy defenses did not become significant until two years later, in 1966. McNamara is described as having “adherence” to a “position” of Rand analyst Kent in 1963. Yet Kent's analysis came in 1964, and reportedly played an important role in shaping McNamara's attitude toward defenses.

At times, individuals are given the wrong credentials. For example, Brennan is described as a “physicist” (219), but his testimony in the missile defense debate reflected his true degree—in mathematics. Wolfgang Panofsky is described as a “radar expert” in the missile defense debate (221). In fact he was a prominent physicist-advisor who, in many respects, played a more active role in the missile defense debate than either Teller or Bethe. The focus on Teller and Bethe tends to overemphasize their influence on issues that were often dominated by others.

Unfortunately, the relatively thin and selective description of a thick and complex debate tends to undermine the biographical aims of the book. For example, though the book announces that “Bethe leads the Anti-ABM Scientists” on page 196, Bethe himself resisted “Pro” or “Anti” labels. Along with other members of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Bethe always favored research and development into missile defenses. He was part of a group that advocated deployment of defenses around missile silos in the period discussed by Bird. The defense debate was much more complex, and Bethe's views were far more nuanced and dynamic, than the book's discussion allows.

The biographical juxtaposition becomes somewhat artificial at times. Bethe's and Teller's adversarial relationship was generally oblique. Though the two men occasionally locked horns, their disagreements were typically voiced in the context of a larger debate, and to a different audience.

This leads to interpretive problems. Bird tends to portray comments of Bethe and Teller as straightforward reflections of their respective worldviews. This overlooks the rhetorical context of statements, as both men also spoke to influence a specific debate or outcome. Occasionally, Bird notes inconsistencies in Teller's position. For example, an introductory chapter summarizes Teller's position as relatively static: he “repeatedly stated that the scientists bore no practical responsibility for the social implications of their work” (xi–xii). Yet as Bird goes on to discuss, Teller was not consistent on this point; in his memoirs he wrote that “as scientists who worked on … the bomb, we bore a special responsibility” (quoted on page 19). Though Bird notes that this comment “directly contradicted” other statements, Teller's revision is not explained. The text notes that Teller's memories of Oppenheimer's role in his actions at Los Alamos were likely “embellished” because of later conflict, but the contradiction itself remains.

In practice, Teller accused opponents of mixing politics and technical matters when he disagreed with their position. He was known to appeal to morality, both publicly and in backroom politicking, when it suited his purposes. For example, consider his highly public praise of President Ronald Reagan's decision to pursue “defensive” research and for providing “the needed basis for a stable, lasting peace.” In his review of Teller's autobiography, Steven Shapin makes the point that Teller separated science and politics (or not) as suited his own interests. Bethe also endeavored to separate politics and science. When accused of doing shoddy science in the name of politics, he and those who agreed with him argued back on technical grounds.

Both men conducted scientific work based upon real convictions. But their views on the relationship between science and politics were always articulated within a particular context and culture. As several scholars have emphasized, experts are asked to be “on tap” but never “on top” in the United States political system. That is, they are asked to render value-neutral judgments, leaving policymaking to elected officials.

These complexities demand greater interpretive attention to audience and rhetoric. By neglecting these issues, Bird may have limited the scope of her own audience. Nonetheless, the book does synthesize some materials in a manner that young scholars may find useful, and that will be somewhat informative to individuals who are unfamiliar with Bethe, Teller, and the debates that consumed their public lives.