This is an ambitious book. Its ambition proceeds at two levels. First, critiquing all existing conceptions of ethnicity and ethnic politics, partially or wholly, Henry E. Hale proposes what he calls a new “relational theory.” Second, arguing that “variation … constitutes the great puzzle of ethnic politics” (p. 1), he deploys the relational view to explain why some parts of the former Soviet Union seceded but others did not.
In the first set of theoretical claims, Hale says that scholars of ethnicity need to establish touch with the discipline of psychology to understand better why ethnicity matters. In recent years, the remarkable explosion of research on ethnicity and ethnic conflict has, if anything, sought an odd alliance with economics, a discipline where passions and emotions have not historically had a secure footing. Ethnic politics, to be sure, has a lot of calculation built into it, but the power of symbols, images, values, honor, myths, and personalities is also undeniable. It is possible to argue that economically inspired research will only produce marginal progress in the field now. Though it is not certain, big advances might come from paying greater attention to a very different mode of reasoning. The author is perhaps right to propose that psychology might be the next great frontier to explore in the field of ethnicity. The idea has an intuitive plausibility, though ultimately, only the results will show the worth of making such a move.
Hale's psychological inclinations take him toward a relational theory: “ethnicity is primarily about uncertainty reduction while ethnic politics is primarily about interests” (p. 3). This twofold theme constitutes the book's theoretical centerpiece and recurs throughout.
As human beings, Hale argues, we need to reduce the enormous complexity of the world around us: “uncertainty reduction is a fundamental human motivation driving the near-universal tendency for humans to divide themselves into groups” (italics in the original, p. 35). This may well be true, but the question remains why the groups have to be ethnic. Perhaps future research—of the psychological kind—will give us a deeper grasp.
The second part of Hale's relational theory says that ethnic politics is not about identities; it is about interests. This is an old debate, and it is not clear that anything strikingly novel can easily be said. Reasonable views on both sides can be found, and there are also good arguments that ethnic politics is about both identities and interests. For issues such as this one, the greatest problem remains as follows: What kind of proof will be required to establish any of the three cases as a universal proposition across time, space, and individuals? Is it possible to say that motivations will vary according to the various stages of ethnic politics (inception and continuation), or types of ethnic politics (movement or rebellion); or different people will have dissimilar motivations; or different parts of the world may have a very different mix of identities and interests in ethnic politics? A plurality of microfoundations simply cannot be ruled out unless we have compelling evidence to the contrary.
The next stage of the book moves from theoretical and conceptual clarifications to explanations of empirical puzzles. The puzzle that hooks Hale's attention comes from the final years of the former Soviet Union. Why did Ukraine, sharing so much culturally with Russia, secede as early as 1991, whereas Uzbekistan, sharing very little ethnically and culturally with the Russians, continued to be in the Union? The Baltic revolt was unsurprising. Hale's Ukraine-Uzbek puzzle grabs attention.
His explanation also does. The step-by-step construction of case materials shows painstaking research. The argument basically revolves around a mixture of interests and credible commitments. Ukrainian leaders could not convince themselves that continuing in the Union, however reformed, would not prevent the center from exploiting them, and Ukraine's level of economic development did not make the leaders desperate for a union. Contrariwise, Uzbekistan was poor and dependent on many central subsidies, and while it was not sure that the center would not be exploitative, it could take the risk, given its economic plight. Other options would have been worse.
There is much in The Foundations of Ethnic Politics that is both learned and enlightening. The problems that remain, as argued here, are basically very hard to resolve.
