A framework to problematize the politics of religious education in Turkey

In Turkey, the intertwining processes of secularization and educational reform have been central to the formation of the Turkish Republic. Under single-party rule, the CHP pursued civilizational ambitions of social and institutional reordering, seeking to sever ties with the Ottoman–Islamic past and forge a new, secular–national subject (Azak Reference Azak2010, 38–40, 91–117). Particularly in the early Republican period, the Kemalist regime adopted a powerful stance against Islam, implementing a form of laiklik/laïcité modeled after its French counterpart, especially through state control over religious education, curriculum content, religious appointments, and representation in public spaces (White Reference White and Kasaba2008).

However, Turkey’s transition to multi-party politics in 1946 altered the political landscape. Secularism was no longer the sole property of the ruling elite but became the subject of open political contestation, with actors like the DP challenging the CHP’s monopoly over both the definition and enforcement of secularism (Azak Reference Azak2010, 120–121, 149–153). Symbolic acts such as the restoration of the Arabic ezan (call to prayer) and expansion of religious education epitomized the DP’s efforts to reconcile secular statehood with religious sensibilities. Yet, the enduring bifurcation – where secular ordering in one sphere prompted countermoves in the religious sphere – not only persisted but intensified after the 1940s (Berkes Reference Berkes1998, 304, 479–481, 495–502). Religious and secular idioms continued to confront each other in everyday politics, with reform and reaction consistently producing opposing poles across political discourse and popular culture. As a result, Turkish religious politics is often framed through persistent dualisms (secular versus religious, center versus periphery, progressive versus reactionary) that have shaped both political narratives and the rhetoric of political actors.

Religious education emerges as a key arena where these oppositions are mapped and sometimes reinforced as its history often focuses on ruptures and resurgences – with periods of assertive secularization by the elite followed by the re-emergence of religious actors (Gökaçtı Reference Gökaçtı2005; Özgür Reference Özgür2012; Öcal Reference Öcal2017; Pak Reference Pak2004). Its politics, in return, revolves around the state’s secular modernization project, marked by recurring anxieties about religious reactionism (Azak Reference Azak2010, 50–54). While influential, this framing can obscure more nuanced dynamics, such as interrelationships between actors, negotiation, adaptation, historical and transnational contexts, and blurred ideological boundaries. Recent research underscores a more layered reality: Lord (Reference Lord2018) critically reinterprets the trajectory of secularism and Islam in Turkey, viewing religious education as a continuous, state-driven process, challenging a strict Kemalist versus Islamist dichotomy. Similarly, Buyruk (Reference Buyruk2021) demonstrates that Imam Hatip schools were arenas of negotiation and modernization. Moreover, Ueno (Reference Ueno2018, Reference Ueno2025) illustrates how different governments strategically defined the boundaries of “acceptable Islam,” and shows that the Islam–nation synthesis was a gradual process since the 1950s, not just a post-1980s phenomenon.

Following a similar path, this article draws on debates about the Kulturkampf, or culture wars, as a historical case of reference for the politics of religious education in Turkey. While the Kulturkampf denoted binary conflicts in the nineteenth-century struggle between the Prussian state and the Catholic Church, broader historical analyses emphasize long-term, negotiated reconfiguration of church–state relations as an ongoing contest over the moral, cultural, and institutional foundations of citizenship and collective identity – struggles that unfold not only between religion and the state, but across shifting definitions of legitimacy, social order, and civic belonging (Bennette Reference Bennette2012; Clark and Kaiser Reference Clark and Kaiser2003). Used in this historicized and qualified sense, the Kulturkampf analogy is particularly revealing in the Turkish case because it redirects attention away from binary actors to processes by which religion is not merely excluded by the modern state, but reorganized, bureaucratized, and rendered functional under dynamics of negotiation and adaptation within transforming ideological and institutional settings (Doğan and Özet Reference Doğan and Özet2023; Gözaydın Reference Gözaydın2009; Grigoriadis and Grigoriadis Reference Grigoriadis and Grigoriadis2018).

Understanding the politics of religious education thus requires attention to ideological mergers, cross-cutting agendas, and negotiated settlements among political actors. Central to this landscape is the role of modern conservatism, which emerged as a distinct twentieth-century formation under Cold War geopolitics and mass politics as a synthesis of liberal and conservative repertoires. Modern conservatism fused market liberalism with a resolutely state-centered politics of order, national unity, and moral authority which turned the United States during the Cold War into a hub exporting fusions of tradition, order, free market, anti-communism, and family-oriented citizenship (Kirby Reference Kirby2003). This global moralization of politics encouraged domestic actors to invoke religious and ethical idioms to secure legitimacy and stability, often while appropriating languages of developmentalism and liberal rights. From the late 1940s onward, Cold War moral repertoires entered the policy toolkits of liberal democracies (Scott-Smith Reference Scott-Smith2002). The evolution of modern conservatism in Turkey can be understood as a specific articulation of these global currents, particularly in its approach to religion, education, and national identity.

Although this global influence did not unfold uniformly, it refracted through distinct national contexts. In Turkey, anti-communist anxieties and developmentalist ambitions elevated moral discourses to the center of politics to be adapted to shifting grounds of conflict and legitimacy (Örnek Reference Örnek2022; Özkan and Gürakar Reference Özkan and Gürakar2021). Özet (Reference Özet, Doğan and Özet2023, 117) reads Cold War alignments in the DP period as a localized form of the Kulturkampf in Turkey where American capitalism and culture were coded as “friends of religion and morality,” while Soviet communism was constructed as the “enemy of religion.” In this context, the modern Turkish variant of conservatism crystallized as a blend of anti-communism, nationalism, and religious sensibility while sustaining a strong state. Especially after the late 1940s, Turkish modern conservatism absorbed elements of liberalism (individual rights, market mechanisms, pluralism) and traditional conservatism (tradition, religious roots, order, morality) to feature managed democratization (Bora and Gültekingil Reference Bora and Gültekingil2003; Uzer Reference Uzer2016).

In this field of negotiation, “educating the people” was a site of contest and accommodation in Turkey. Global trends in spreading literacy and the massification of schooling during the early twentieth century were also instruments of civic and economic uplift, where the very terms of politics, authority, and citizenship were negotiated (Salmoni Reference Salmoni2004). In parallel, the so-called “school wars” – often cast in Kulturkampf terms in struggles over education and religion – should not be understood as domestic or episodic clashes, but as a recurrent and globally influenced fields of contestation (Clark and Kaiser Reference Clark and Kaiser2003). Like modern conservatism, Kulturkampf-like conflicts in Turkey were shaped as much by international influence as by domestic negotiation, involving liberal–conservative mergers across a range of actors. As democratic principles, populist discourse, and economic modernization shape education agendas worldwide, domestic policy and discourse reappear at new conjunctures and are reframed within evolving languages, institutions, and interests. International organizations (e.g. UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], International Labour Organization [ILO]), transnational conferences, and circulating experts supplied intellectual repertoires, technical models, and policy legitimation (Şahin Reference Şahin1996). Over 100 Western education specialists visited Turkey between 1923 and 1960, crystallizing the paradox of modernization that the state navigated, illustrated by the case of John Dewey: the desire to “manage society” while still adhering to pluralism (Biesta and Miedema Reference Biesta and Miedema1996, 12). These transfers were domesticated through bureaucratic redesign, curricular filtering, and legal–institutional recalibration to align with Turkish priorities of national unity, social order, and developmental goals.

The “politics of religious education” in this article is a specific treatment of “school wars” understood as a politically evolving field of moral and civic contestation rather than as a simple clash between two coherent camps. In this view, religious education becomes not merely a reflection of secular–religious binaries or a site of rupture and resurgence, but a negotiated space where visions of citizenship are debated, mediated, and provisionally institutionalized, especially under “statecraft.” By studying domestic discourse and policy within this approach, the article traces changing discourse and policy by a variety of actors regarding legitimacy, state authority, and accommodation in the transformation of religious education.

Modernization of Ottoman religious education: the background to state involvement and the utilization of religious morals

Ottoman education, building on pre-Ottoman Islamic models, ranged from Quranic literacy to advanced theology and sciences in madrasahs (Islamic colleges of higher learning). It was decentralized, supported by religious communities, private foundations, and notables, resulting in a mosaic of institutions and pedagogical aims. With no direct interest in education, the pre-modern Ottoman state relied instead on ulema (“religious scholars”) who dominated higher- and influenced lower-level education.

Although indirect and partial, state control over education gradually expanded after the mid-fifteenth century, especially through the emergence of a scholar–bureaucrat class (Atçıl Reference Atçıl2016). A key site of this transformation was the proliferation of ilm-i hâl (Islamic catechism) texts, initially created for the military and later disseminated widely, reflecting an effort to standardize religious instruction for governance and consolidate the concept of “subjects as citizens.” Terzioğlu (Reference Terzioğlu2013) notes that these manuals paralleled similar catechisms in other religious traditions, aiming to integrate religion and state for social discipline. Their focus on orthopraxy, ethical regulation, and daily practice rather than doctrinal uniformity marked a shift toward Sunnization and a more this-worldly piety.

These changes reflected a broader tendency toward centralization and instrumentalization of education, especially after the eighteenth century, as intermediary bodies lost autonomy and the state connected more directly with its subjects (Bein Reference Bein2006; Fortna Reference Fortna2002). The modern school (mektep)–madrasah divide symbolized this shift: state-led reforms modernized curricula and administration in the new mektep. Nineteenth-century regulations like the Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi (Regulation of Public Education, 1869), particularly influenced by French models, promoted centralized, state-controlled educational frameworks with an increasingly earthlier curriculum integrated into theology (Somel Reference Somel2021).

While ilm-i hâl and mektep education persisted, they were not the only channels through which religious education became increasingly centralized for governing social life. Especially after the early nineteenth century, the role of morality (ahlâk) in educational reform became a pressing issue, as Islam shaped moral guidelines designed to protect the Ottoman Empire from perceived threats (Steininger Reference Steininger2017). The relationship between morality and Islam was widely debated, with figures like Ahmed Cevdet advocating for centralized moral education rooted in both universal ethics and Islamic principles, as reflected in Malumat-i Nafia (beneficial knowledge) (Gündüz Reference Gündüz2016, 558). To counter perceived Western materialism, Ahmet Cevdet proposed to Sultan Abdulhamid II the teaching of ulûm-i dîniyye (the science of Islam) at every level of education (Gündüz Reference Gündüz2016, 232–244). In the late nineteenth century, numerous morality books were incorporated into the formal education system, with Risale-i Ahlâk (treatise on morals) standing out as one of the first state-commissioned texts, emphasizing social discipline through an Islamic morality guided by reason (Gündüz Reference Gündüz2016, 363–368). This trend peaked during the Abdülhamid II era (1876–1908), who sought to synthesize modernization with Islamic piety as a means of safeguarding Islam and increasingly used schools as tools for social discipline. The subject of morals (ilm-i ahlak) was incorporated into the imperial curriculum on the advice of commissions often chaired by Shaikh al-Islam; courses on religious principles, biographies of prophets and ulema, and even fıkıh (Islamic jurisprudence) were recommended for state schools. New textbooks of morality taught the Five Pillars of Islam, quoted hadith, and anchored obedience and loyalty to the Sultan in explicitly Islamic terms (Fortna Reference Fortna2000). In brief, alongside the expansion of state schooling and Quranic education, the centralization of moral education became a key aspect of the Empire’s strategy to manage social transformation while preserving its cultural and religious identity.

The Ottoman state’s growing involvement in schooling, the massification of religious instruction, and both the emphasis on and transformation of moral education reflect a distinctive trajectory of modernization rooted in the state’s own grounds of legitimacy. The history of Ottoman educational reforms challenges the declinist paradigm and counters Eurocentric portrayals of a stagnant Empire contrasted with a dynamic West (Sajdi Reference Sajdi and Sajdi2007, 27). As Somel argues, Ottoman reformers adapted aspects of Western educational practice but did not imitate them; until the 1870s, bureaucrats generally saw no contradiction between modernization and Islam, regarding Islamic values as integral to intellectual life (Somel Reference Somel2021, 21). Fortna (Reference Fortna2002, 3–5) similarly demonstrates that late Ottoman reforms drew on Enlightenment ideals and Western administrative models yet consistently infused them with Ottoman–Islamic elements. The result was a blended modernity, not mere Westernization, in which the relationship between education and religion developed along lines both comparable to and distinct from the West, reaffirming Islam’s place in the pursuit of authority. Complicating the assumption of a straightforward secularization, late Ottoman education embodied Western rationality of governance but remained anchored in Islamic moral frameworks (Fortna Reference Fortna2000). Although the declinist narrative persists in popular discourse, recent scholarship increasingly emphasizes deep continuities and mobility of ideas, situating Ottoman experience in a broader global context and problematizing Republican narratives that overstate rupture and disengagement from the Ottoman past.

During the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1920), the foundations of international and domestic legitimacy shifted significantly; nationalist educational reforms gained prominence as Western influence and national identity became more pronounced. The National Education and Discipline Society (Milli Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti), founded in 1915 by intellectuals such as İsmail Hakkı, exemplifies this transitional logic. It combined moral and scientific instruction with efforts to spread literacy to resist foreign cultural influence, but this time with an emphasis on unified national identity rather than Islam. Although this institution predated the Republic, it unofficially evolved to operate directly under the Ministry of National Education with similar aims and methods. In the pre-Republican twentieth century, national education roadmaps increasingly replaced the Ottoman perspective, though Islamic influences, particularly the emphasis on morality, persisted. This tendency is further illustrated during the Cabinet Councils period (1920–1923), when educational policy in the first and fifth Cabinet Council programs strongly emphasized the national character of education while still retaining a role for religious discipline (Dağlı and Aktürk Reference Dağlı and Aktürk1988, 3–5).

Nation-state and the disengagement from religion during the early Republican period

Following the establishment of the Republic, reforms in education were stripped of their Islamic tone and objectives. Religious education swiftly declined with the abolition of the Department of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti) in 1924, which led to the closure of all traditional religious schools funded by private foundations, including madrasahs. Under the same Unity of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) law only a two-hour weekly Quran and Religion course was retained, soon reduced, and made optional. Imam Hatip schools were closed in 1930. Over the next decade, religious courses were gradually phased out of high schools and secondary schools, then from urban schools in 1933, and finally from all rural schools in 1939. In higher education, the last Theology Faculty was retained until Dâru’l Fünûn’s reorganization into İstanbul University in 1933. It was then closed, replaced by the Institute of Islamic Studies, and further downgraded in 1936 to a single Islam and Philosophy course, rendering it inactive (Reed Reference Reed1956).

Although the assumption that schools should serve as sites of moral formation under state supervision endured throughout the early Republican period (1923–1938), discourses of secular–progressive modernization largely replaced the late Ottoman curriculum’s centuries-old focus on Islam and religious morals. The state’s monopolization of defining legitimate morality and the administrative grammar of moral formation as “teacher over parent, school over mosque” can be seen as a continuity from the Hamidian moment, even as the Republic sought to “de-Islamize” its content. After Ahlakiye (Morality) courses were phased out in the late Ottoman period and replaced by the Yurt Bilgisi (Civics) courses in the early Republican era, morality remained primarily a pedagogical topic within civics. It was only after the 1940s that a partially religious concept of morals, though still predominantly nationalist, was reintroduced into the curriculum as a component of the civics courses (Kesgin Reference Kesgin2011).

The broader project of nationalist reconstruction reflected the Türk Tarih Tezi (Turkish History Thesis), a state-sponsored historical narrative developed in the early 1930s that sought to establish the Turks as founders of a pre-Islamic, Central Asian civilization, thereby minimizing the Ottoman and Islamic heritage in favor of a secular–national origin story (Hanioğlu Reference Hanioğlu2011, 164). This vision was influenced by global intellectual currents, particularly social Darwinism, which shaped the late Ottoman elites’ thinking through its emphasis on progress and evolution. Positivist progressivism was later integrated into state ideology, especially after its introduction to Atatürk during the quest of defining a sui generis Turkish national identity (Hanioğlu Reference Hanioğlu2011, 170; Toprak Reference Toprak2012). In his opening speech of the first Heyet-i İlmiye (Scholarly Committee) in 1921 (considered the precursor to the National Education Councils), Atatürk stressed that the “national education program” aimed to break “away from the superstition of the old and all influences from the East and the West,” to align education with Turkey’s evolving national and historical culture (Arsan et al. Reference Arsan, Borak and Kocatürk2006, 19).

The pursuit of Western-style modernization in education, adapted to a distinct Turkish culture, was also a symptom of the broader project of establishing a nation-state. The key priority of educational cause during this period was the spread of literacy, captured in the goal that “not a single man [person] is illiterate,” which was deeply intertwined with the dissemination of official state ideology (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1939, 6). As Fortna (Reference Fortna2011, 7–13) observes, these literacy campaigns were not just educational projects, but political instruments designed to both denigrate Ottoman achievements and celebrate the advances of the Republic. Arabic, like Latin in the West, was dismissed as impractical and obsolete, reinforcing a narrative of progress through linguistic and cultural rupture. This approach reflected a broader global pattern, in which nation-states used literacy to promote “national progress and uplift” and to homogenize the population. In Turkey, the redefinition of literacy served to recode the ideal citizen as national and secular, maintaining the school’s role in moral formation, now grounded in new, officially sanctioned secular–national sources and symbols (Fortna Reference Fortna2000, Reference Fortna2011).

Secular reconsiderations, rhetoric, and reform in the aftermath of World War II

The notion of modernity as disengagement from religion, which had reached its zenith during the early Republican era, began to recede in the immediate aftermath of World War II. The victory of the liberal Alliance in World War II and Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system in 1945 were both pivotal, making liberal and democratic ideals central to the country’s evolving political discourse.

Within this shifting context, the idea that secularism is not hostility to religion gained increasing traction and became a widely circulated slogan among secular circles, even before its incorporation into the DP’s government program in 1950. Notably, Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay of the CHP championed this discourse and enriched it with his support of religious education, signaling a new, more conciliatory approach (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 1949a, 597–598). This evolving perspective also found clear resonance in the public sphere. For instance, the phrase “religious education is not contrary to secularism,” which was the title of an article in the newspaper Cumhuriyet (Gökay Reference Gökay1947) by a prominent CHP politician Fahrettin Gökay, was echoed in the media and popular debate.

This rhetorical shift soon translated into concrete policy changes within the CHP. Although religious education was not on the agenda at the major NEC meetings of 1939 and 1943, the CHP began re-examining its stance in the early 1940s. At the party’s Seventh General Assembly in 1947, religious education was formally addressed, and a commission was established to develop policy (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1948, 448–470). With some reservations about script and curriculum, the CHP authorized privately founded religious education institutions under the Ministry of Education in 1948, laying the groundwork for the eventual reopening of Imam Hatip schools in 1951 (Öcal Reference Öcal2017, 173). The right to religious education was explicitly promised in a government program for the first time, as announced by Prime Minister Günaltay in the parliament on January 20, 1949. In parallel, the CHP established the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University in 1949 (Law No. 5424), after two years of internal debate (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 1949b, 278). That same year, religious education was also added as an elective to the primary school curriculum (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 1949c, 163).

The shift within the CHP was not simply an outcome of changing ideological convictions but also reflected a broader strategy to maintain political legitimacy in the face of new electoral dynamics, a point later acknowledged by figures within the party itself. For instance, Hasan Tahsin Banguoğlu, the Minister of Education during the Günaltay government, notes in his diaries that the CHP’s decision to liberalize religious education was driven largely by the increasing electoral significance of the Islamic opposition gaining both political and economic influence (Yazıcı Reference Yazıcı2001, 83).

The 1953 NEC meeting marked a turning point as liberal and democratic discourse became increasingly evident in educational reform (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 5–22). The influence of democratic ideals was reflected in the fact that, for the first time, large-scale questionnaires gathered input from teachers, consultants, and public representatives for shaping NEC policy. Throughout these reform discussions, participants frequently cited international experts, organizational reports, and recommendations from abroad. This outward-looking perspective is encapsulated by the intellectual Peyami Safa, who attended the 1953 NEC meeting and summarized the discussions on religious education in the March 29, 1953 edition of Milliyet (Safa Reference Safa1953):

This orientation positioned the West as the standard reference point and a ready-made grammar of legitimation in policy debates and curriculum development within ministerial commissions and NEC subcommittees by the early 1950s (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 395, 435; Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1957, 11–12). Domestic actors embraced internationalist rhetoric to bolster their claims, using Western models as a discursive repertoire for justifying the reframing of religious instruction. At the same time, invoking international models helped depoliticize religious education and made its reintroduction more acceptable in the liberalizing postwar context. This transformation in the framing of religious education created new conceptual space for voices advocating a synthesis of secular and religious liberties. This is well illustrated by the first systematic critic of Turkish secularism, Ali Fuat Başgil, whose perspective in the late 1940s emerged from this very intersection of liberal and conservative idioms (Bora Reference Bora2017, 530–532). Başgil argued that religious education was a fundamental aspect of modern religious liberties of instruction, nurture, publication, and indoctrination (tâlim, tedris, neşir, ve telkin) to be protected within a secular framework (Başgil Reference Başgil2007, 15–16). His case demonstrates the new terms of debate and the growing complexity of ideological boundaries in this era as religious education became a site for articulating both democratic rights and moral order, state regulation, and civic pluralism.

Another important aspect of secular actors’ accommodation of religious education concerns the Turkish military. Although the military is often seen as the most emblematic secular barrier to religious revival, historical evidence regarding religious education reveals a more complex reality that challenges this familiar rhetoric of antagonism. Contrary to public image and official discourse, there are notable instances in which the military tolerated, or even enabled, the expansion of religious education. While such contradictions are frequently attributed to the Turkish–Islamic synthesis – a state-supported alliance between nationalist and religious factions typically associated with the post-1970s era – there are clear indications that the military’s accommodation of religious education can be traced further back, at least to the 1960s.Footnote ²

On May 27, 1960, the Turkish military staged a coup, overthrowing the DP government. The army, seeing itself as the protector of Atatürk’s secular and unitary legacy, justified its intervention on the grounds of safeguarding national unity and constitutional order (Zürcher Reference Zürcher2004, 229). The 1961 Constitution institutionalized mechanisms such as the Constitutional Court and the National Security Council which reflected the ongoing anxieties among secular elites that unregulated popular sovereignty could threaten the state’s integrity.

After the DP’s Minister of Education Atıf Benderlioğlu was discharged following the coup in 1960, a newly formed education commission issued several policy proposals on religious education, including proposals to reorganize Imam Hatip schools and religious instruction, ban Quran courses, and close the Higher Islam Institutes (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 1960). Another report in 1961, under direct military influence, also suggested closing Imam Hatip schools (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı 1961). Yet, neither of these resolutions was implemented, not under military rule nor in subsequent periods of strong military influence. On the contrary, seven more Imam Hatip schools were opened in 1963, during the second coalition government of İsmet İnönü, increasing the total number to twenty-six.

After the Minister of National Education Şevket Reşat Hatiboğlu approved this expansion, his successor İbrahim Öktem publicly opposed it, declaring, “not a single Imam Hatip school will be opened in my turn, and some of them will be closed” (Yeni Sabah 1963). Yet this turned out to be another instance of empty rhetoric, as no schools were closed and new ones continued to be opened. Within a year after the coup, there were four different ministers of education, and four more in the years that followed until the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi; AP) came to power. In other words, there was a contentious “tuning” of education policy, with religious education at the center of a heated debate. Despite these debates and strong military influence, there was no regression, but rather continued expansion of religious education.

The 1962 NEC meeting reflected similar dynamics. There were no significant repercussions for the relationship between religion and education, regardless of the clear influence of the military junta. Discussions focused mainly on the training of religious personnel and the embrace of nationalism (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1962, 64, 94–95, 163–164). The perspective on religious education was neither sharply different nor more restrictive than in the DP era. Issues of moral development, freedom of conscience, and religious liberties were noted. Higher learning goals for religious schools were discussed with attention to scientific and academic objectives, and curriculum development efforts began for Imam Hatip high schools scheduled to open in the following years.

The return of religious morals and the pedagogical transformation of religious education

While religious morality was out of favor during the early Republican period, an interest in secular–nationalist forms of morality emerged after the 1940s (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 1946, 428–431, 445–446, 465). In the first 1946 party program of the DP the discourse on education emphasized the primacy of democratic principles and aimed at integrating science and “morals encompassing all national and human values” (Demokrat Parti Reference Parti1946). While promising religious teaching, the training of religious functionaries, and divinity faculties, the program also highlighted moral values and virtues as essential guarantees of democracy (Ekinci Reference Ekinci1994, 65). The education section of the DP’s 1950 government program stated that “without national morals based on unshakeable principles and values” and “without a youth equipped with national character and tradition,” there could be “malign consequences” and “liberty cannot be assured” (Dağlı and Aktürk Reference Dağlı and Aktürk1988, 11).

In parallel, the discussions of morality gradually expanded to treat religious education as a worldly matter. In the words of an NEC member, religious content had to be carefully evaluated in terms of its social influence “after leaving religion in the shrines and in the private conscience” (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 404). The 1953 NEC meeting was dominated by discussions on morality, largely agreeing on a moral education combining universal values such as honesty, diligence, and altruism with nationalism, summarized as “accepting high morality principles adopted by all civilized nations,” and found its corresponding expression in religious education (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 373–473, 617–620). The Commission of Primary Education presented a concise religious education law aimed at (1) “revising the faith-based curriculum to align with children’s development and pedagogical principles,” (2) “using the history of Islam and the Prophet solely to convey moral values for children through anecdotes and stories,” and (3) “avoiding profundity and dogmatism in favor of softer, sweeter, and warmer forms of indoctrination” (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 354, 373–473). While some people criticized the idea of religious education in any form – such as Bülent Nuri Esen, who later left the meeting during deliberations, likely in protest – the prevalent view was broadly in line with the proposal. A member summarized that “not the metaphysical and faith branches, but aspects of morality, virtue, and national harmony should be embraced and urged” (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 378). Similarly, Minister of Education Tevfik İleri emphasized the need to prevent parents from turning to uninformed clerics, which might lead to serious consequences such as the revival of traditional religious establishments (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 380–383). He proposed implementing a well-structured, voluntary religious education program within the state’s secular schools to respond to democratic demands rooted in religious conscience. His speech earned applause from the room. The entire meeting reflected a transformation and moderation of religious education, gravitating toward a state-controlled, secular, and liberty-based universal ethics grounded in moral sentiments of solidarity.

İleri’s speech was part of a broader trend in morality education in Turkey. After the transition to a multi-party system, educational policy and curricula increasingly reflected an interplay between the morals of democracy and the morals of the nation. For example, the “Moral Education [Discipline] Congress” in 1951, the first of its kind in Turkey, was hosted by President Celal Bayar, Tevfik İleri himself, more than sixty teacher organizations, along with numerous statements and reports from absent contributors. In his opening speech, İleri emphasized that raising “Turkish children … with patriotic ideals and all sorts of values to be worthy of these ideals, requires a special focus on morality education” (Türkiye Öğretmen Dernekleri Millî Birliği 1951). His speech defined morality as “the cause of society and state at the same time” where the primary conditions are “liberty and order.” All forms and stages of religious education were discussed in the congress “to make and keep the moral individual in a developed society.”

Notions of state-controlled religion were also immediately observable in textbooks of religious education, which included extensive sections on morality. Although these books resembled nineteenth-century morality books in form, they underwent substantial revisions, reflecting a stronger emphasis on this-worldliness and universality. For example, moral teachings comprised more than half of the first book used in secondary schools, published in 1956, with Quranic verses selectively chosen and adapted to teach the “building blocks of good morals” and universal “moral duties” such as bodily health, dignity, patience, honesty, and love of animals (Süleyman Reference Süleyman1956, 11–18, 23–51). The second edition, published in 1963, was shortened from ninety-two to sixty-four pages, cutting some Quranic and historical content in favor of expanded universal morals. These textbooks included prefaces such as, “Only nations that valued morals and religion survived. Immoral and faithless people are always harmful to society … being religious is required for all Turkish children” (Süleyman Reference Süleyman1963, 2). Some textbooks emphasized national identity under titles like “Service of the Turks to Islam” and “Major Turkish Scholars,” while others incorporated direct nationalist references such as “Love of Nation” and included sections on “Civil Duties to Law and Government” and “Martyrdom” (Aksan and Rona Reference Aksan and Rona1960; Halacoğlu Reference Halacoğlu1965; Süleyman Reference Süleyman1963, 27–40).

The pedagogical purview in Turkish religious education around the mid-twentieth century is well illustrated by the poem Kur’ân-ı Kerim, which appeared in many religious education textbooks of the period. In eight concise couplets, the poem presented the Quran as a rational guide for good deeds, knowledge, and morals. Notably, its author, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, was best known for his strong Turkish nationalism. Although his works primarily reflected the National Literature Movement, the religious tone of this poem reveals the influence of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a leading figure of Islamic modernism. Mehmet Emin, once Afghani’s student, was “remolded by him” and increasingly came to value the social functions of religion (Akçura Reference Akçura2007, 125). Afghani’s central teaching in İstanbul, that “unity among people depends on the unity of religion and language,” also resonated in Mehmet Emin’s career, which focused on Turkish linguistic unity (Sarınay Reference Sarınay2008, 81). He published Kur’ân-ı Kerim in his first poetry book, shortly after Afghani praised his poem Cenge Giderken, both blending national and religious themes.

Shifts towards a secular, functionalist approach in religious education also appeared in teacher training. As religious education expanded, the challenge of adequately preparing teachers became clear. Earlier practices – relying on volunteer or elder teachers at the school – proved insufficient for new visions of religious education. The concern was not to exclude religion, but to moderate its teaching, leaving it to neither Islamists nor teachers engaged in anti-religious propaganda (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 386–391). The formal response was to introduce a religious education course into teacher-training schools, giving future teachers basic instruction in religion. These measures further underscored the state’s regulatory role, as teacher-training schools were firmly secular, nationalist, and progressive in culture. Moreover, religious instruction was limited to one hour per week and excluded theology. Despite the irony of teachers as both secular agents of the state and instructors of religion, this arrangement continued into the 1960s.

Although Imam Hatip schools and especially Higher Islamic Institutes had a greater weight of Islamic content compared to general education, they still retained state oversight, emphasis on “character and morality development,” and strict adherence to Turkish as the primary language of instruction (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 163–164). Moreover, these institutions remained structurally separate from mainstream public and academic education. Unlike graduates of other vocational schools, Imam Hatip graduates did not have access to higher education. Even the Divinity School at Ankara University was not accessible to them, leaving Higher Islamic Institutes as their sole academic path, leading primarily to careers as Imam Hatip teachers or religious functionaries. This closed-loop system persisted until structural and curricular reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, reforms gradually reoriented religious pedagogy toward standardized teacher training for those institutions. Between 1971 and 1973, courses in Islamic law, Quranic rhetoric, and Islamic history were gradually replaced by subjects like the sociology of religion, public education, and administrative courses (Tebliğler Dergisi Reference Dergisi1971, 255; Tebliğler Dergisi Reference Dergisi1972, 44; Tebliğler Dergisi Reference Dergisi1973, 73).

The boundaries of this moral transformation were also defined by exclusions. Although bans on religious publications remain understudied, it is clear that publications contradicting the state’s conception of religion – especially those rejecting this-worldly perspectives – were subject to intervention (Mardin Reference Mardin1989). In the mid-twentieth century, anti-establishment religious interpretations were targeted for censorship and confiscation, often using the same legal tools employed against communism (Coştu Reference Coştu2015; Yılmaz Reference Yılmaz1998). This pattern of exclusion extended to intellectual figures whose ideas challenged the prevailing moral order. A prominent example is Nurettin Topçu, the first Turkish student to earn a PhD in Philosophy from the Sorbonne, widely considered the first morality educator raised by the Republic. Contrary to expectations for an educator promoting the universal morality of Islam, Topçu became one of the most marginalized figures in the Republican framework. This was due to his rejection of the dominant liberal–conservative paradigm; as a Muslim with left-leaning views on social change and equality, his moral philosophy – rooted in Henri Bergson’s emphasis on creativity and change – clashed with deterministic, functionalist, and pragmatist perspectives (Köseoğlu Reference Köseoğlu2021). He openly criticized conservative traditions and customs as barriers to freedom. In his doctoral dissertation Conformisme et Révolte (Conformism and Revolt) (Topçu 1990 [1934]), he also objected to the Durkheimian concept of static social values. Despite his credentials, Topçu’s views were incompatible with the prevailing modern conservative–functionalist framework.

Anti-communism and the rise of modern conservatism in the politics of religious education

Post-World War II Turkey witnessed the rise of developmentalism, induced by the economic and political influence of the United States and the spread of modernization theory in the intellectual sphere. The expansion of education and technical training, aligned with economic development and urbanization, became central to reform (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1957, 64–65).Footnote ³ Although religious education was not directly part of developmental priorities, it served as a populist tool for fostering a political culture of modern conservatism and as part of a functionalist strategy to address perceived threats to national order and stability. Chief among these threats was communism, which, from the late 1940s onward, became a pervasive concern shaping both public discourse and the legal frameworks governing religion and education. Politicians and intellectuals increasingly drew on anti-communist anxieties to promote social solidarity and conservative morality, reinforced by Cold War politics.

This interplay was evident in the 1949 parliamentary debates on establishing the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara University. Figures like Hamdullah Suphi cited Western precedents, arguing that national religion had been mobilized to counter communism elsewhere, emphasizing religion’s role in social unity (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 1949b, 278). Similarly, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, referencing American pragmatist thinker William James, described religion as essential to “social experience” and a safeguard against moral and psychological disorder (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 1949b, 278). He insisted that the new Divinity Faculty would be “aligned to new civilized and social conditions … and worthy of the identity of our new community,” reflecting a liberal–functional discourse in which religion was a key instrument for national cohesion, while marginalizing groups seen as threatening state order. These debates demonstrate how anti-communist motives for educational reform intertwined with functionalist and conservative visions among Turkey’s postwar elite.

Anti-communist rhetoric was not limited to calls for order but served as a tool of legal and policy legitimation. The 1949 revision of Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, which became a mainstay of the state’s legal arsenal against threats to secular order, exemplified the merging of regulation on religious activity with anti-communist campaigns. Although it was brief, the article’s vagueness and potential to criminalize non-violent religious expression sparked debate; its defenders, such as Prime Minister Günaltay, justified it as a measure against communism, blurring the line between anti-communist and religious activity outside state regulation (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 1949a, 577–598, 596). Between the 1940s and 1970s, Article 163 was often used to suppress religious communities and publications under the charge of irtica (reactionary activity or propaganda).

Alongside evolving legal and discursive frameworks, the postwar period created new openings for social engineering and integrative policies. While functionalist and pragmatist interpretations of liberalism had already begun to challenge social Darwinism globally in the early twentieth century, they gained little visibility in Turkey until after World War II, due to the dominant paradigm of religious disengagement and legal positivism. Pragmatic efforts to combine “accommodating the rural” with “mentality transformation,” as pragmatist John Dewey had advocated for Turkey’s educational policy decades earlier, only gained real traction after the 1940s (Wolf-Gazo Reference Wolf-Gazo1996). His visit took place in 1924, but the Ministry of Education published his reports in 1939 and 1952. Dewey’s proposals, drawing on social instrumentalism by combining liberal Protestant and conservative elements, emphasized the value of habits, customs, and lived continuity in educational reform, alongside openness to new scientific and cultural forces and the use of schools as allies in social transformation (Wolin Reference Wolin2016, 387, 665–671). Similarly, Ziya Gökalp’s theory of hybridity and his sociological–functionalist approach to religion as a resource for modernization were largely overlooked until the 1940s, as early Republican thought instead emphasized his nation-building ideas aimed at forging a homogeneous national identity (Hanioğlu Reference Hanioğlu2011, 62–65; Nomer Reference Nomer2017). Only as the political and intellectual climate shifted toward integration after the 1940s did these functionalist influences begin to flourish (Vergili Reference Vergili2011).Footnote ⁴

During the 1950s, efforts to bridge the gap between state-led schooling and religious education led to ambitious social engineering, especially to overcome divides with rural communities. The 1953 NEC meeting acknowledged that villagers resisted state schooling due to its lack of religious content and faced penalties as a result (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 415–416). By 1957, as educational development advanced, vocational training including religious education became more prominent. Morality sections of some religious education textbooks began to include content on work ethics (Aksan and Rona Reference Aksan and Rona1960, 49–51). The prevailing idea was reflected by a member: “On this specific issue of religious education, we do not abide by what the folk says …; we take and reforge society’s traditions … and expect to form a new Turkish religion, … a new Muslimism” (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1953, 421).

These functionalist trends gained renewed political force in the 1960s, as the AP founded in 1961 increasingly inherited the DP’s rural and conservative base after the May 27, 1960 military coup and soon became the main rival to the CHP under Süleyman Demirel’s leadership. In this new era in which liberal–developmentalist economics was paired with social conservatism, the AP won clear parliamentary majorities in 1965 and 1969. The AP’s educational discourse, echoing late-DP themes and the language of constitutionalism and pluralism, explicitly linked democracy with moral citizenship. Its 1961 election manifesto declared, “democracy will not degenerate if it is based on a society with virtue,” centering on sentiments of “virtue, patriotism, renunciation, nationalism, and the commitment to ideals” in educational principles (Adalet Partisi Reference Partisi1961, 24). The AP’s populism strategically utilized discourses of center–periphery duality for both rural and urban constituencies, promoting education as a vehicle for democracy, development, and moral values instrumental to “law and order,” “national character,” and “solidarity” (Adalet Partisi Reference Partisi1961, 22–24; Adalet Partisi Reference Partisi1969, 50).

As the rural population became increasingly central to political support and development, educational reform was framed as a hinge for combining democracy and moral values, with idioms of civic responsibilities and anti-communism. The trend intensified in the 1960s, as global leftist movements gave fresh impetus to anti-communist and moralist rhetoric. Center-right parties increasingly denounced “moral decay” – a term rooted in late Ottoman discourse to refer to the weakening of Islamic social influence – as a threat to social order. The AP launched propaganda campaigns against “perverse currents” and promoted “national and moral faiths” as vital to the “road of civilization” (Adalet Partisi Reference Partisi1969, 11). These appeals paralleled unprecedented emphasis on education’s role in social order and solidarity with the effort of raising Turkish individuals who would “feel compelled to support society’s material and moral progress” (Adalet Partisi Reference Partisi1969, 54).

The AP’s 1965 manifesto made “facilitating citizens’ development as a monolithic entity and ensuring their material and spiritual growth” the cornerstone of education policy (Adalet Partisi Reference Partisi1965, 8). Terms like monolithic, mass, and general signaled the shift within the political constituency. The AP was also the first to promise higher education opportunities to Imam Hatip graduates in its government program (Dağlı and Aktürk Reference Dağlı and Aktürk1988, 18). While this promise was never realized during their tenure, it nonetheless exemplifies how mass educational expansion, while partly fulfilling democratic ideals, was nonetheless consistently shaped, and limited by populist rhetoric and statist forms of control. In 1969, for the first time in Turkey’s history, the government explicitly set the main objective of educational policy as “EDUCATION FOR EVERYONE”Footnote ⁵ in all stages of education. Under the same title, the ground of education would be defined on raising a youth whose “hearts are full of the sacredness of national and moral values” (Adalet Partisi Reference Partisi1969, 50–51). The association of morality with educational expansion shows how rights were closely tied to moral and national values, as seen in AP policy, and used as tools of encapsulation as much as inclusion.

Promises of religious education complemented these populist strategies and projections, as its main objective was to demonstrate “the significance of religion for the society” (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1962, 64). The synthesis of morals and democracy justified expansion of religious education in the secular school system. Religious education was cast not only as a tradition but as a modern instrument for defending social order and national identity against leftist ideologies. Moreover, families were urged to work with schools to foster religious sentiments in society (Millî Eğitim Şûrası 1962, 94–95). When it was introduced to high schools in 1967, the same function was reinforced as the role of Islam would be “character development and formation” as a religion “completely rational, civilizational, and progressive.” The principles and goals featured “the existence and necessity of a moral realm above the material one, instilling of interest and love towards the values above the matter … emphasizing the historical services of the Turks in spreading and taking hold of the Islam as a universal institution, emphasizing the suitability of Islam to Turkish spirit and national conscience” (Tebliğler Dergisi Reference Dergisi1967, 371–372).

The state’s discourse was institutionalized through regulatory policies that managed demographic shifts and the social base of religious schooling. A 1967 regulation on school population quotas set higher thresholds for vocational and religious schools, notably requiring a district population of over 50,000 for Imam Hatip schools (T.C. Resmî Gazete Reference Resmî Gazete1967, 3). As a result, aside from two schools in large districts, the twelve others newly founded by 1970 were located in city centers. This policy was not simply a response to urbanization, but a strategic effort by the state to concentrate and regulate the expansion of religious education, channeling demand into controlled urban settings that cultivated the conservative constituencies. This management of expansion illustrates how mass education became not just a tool for inclusion, but a means of social engineering, recasting religious education as both product and agent of transformation.