The Great Depression is generally viewed as the darkest time in the economic history of the United States. Alexander J. Field moves away from the well-known cyclical story of the Depression and puts a new focus upon the era‘s contribution to U.S. long-run economic growth. Field demonstrates, as he has in his prior academic research upon which much of the book is based, that potential output grew dramatically during the Depression years, 1929–1941. In fact, total factor productivity (TFP) grew faster during this episode than any other period in the nation's history. In Table 2.1 (p. 43) Field shows that between 1929 and 1941 TFP grew 14 percent faster than it did during the roaring 1920s, grew 23 percent faster than it did during the so-called “golden age” of 1948 to 1973, and grew 58 percent faster than it did during the information technology boom of 1995 to 2005. Although the 1930s were indeed a dark economic time, the underlying technological and organizational changes that occurred during the Depression helped the United States succeed militarily in the 1940s and laid the foundation for the postwar prosperity. With this insight, Great Leap Forward provides a novel growth narrative to the literature of the 1930s.
Past macroeconomic research on U.S. economic growth (particularly Moses Abramovitz and Paul David,Footnote 1 and Robert J. GordonFootnote 2) has suggested that TFP grew significantly between 1929 and 1950. However, it has generally been assumed that the Second World War was largely responsible for this surge. Conventional wisdom often credits the war for both ending the Great Depression and laying the foundation for the next three decades of prosperity.
In Chapter 3, Field convincingly shows, somewhat in the spirit of Robert Higgs,Footnote 3 that the war was not the positive supply shock that it is generally made out to be. While wartime emergencies did create long-term progress in mass production of airframes, penicillin, munitions, and a few other largely war-specific sectors, the conflict “diverted the cream of the American scientific and engineering talent … into military work such as the Manhattan Project” (p. 81). Additionally, managers and workers who were whipsawed from one sector of the economy to another now had to work around the rigorous regulations associated with government contracting. Highway and other public capital construction which flourished during the 1930s—hence adding to productivity of private capital during the war and after—practically ceased during the 1940s. Field concludes that there were heavy opportunity costs to wartime mobilization and he finds that TFP growth plummeted between 1941 and 1948. Had the war not have occurred, Field suggests not only that potential output would have been higher in 1948 than it otherwise was, but that “1948 productivity levels would have been approached in 1942” (p. 101). In this sense, the war represents six years of lost growth. Again, this paints a dramatically different picture of the Second World War with respect to economic growth than the conventional view.
So how could a decade in which unemployment hovered between 15 and 25 percent represent such a great leap forward in productivity? Furthermore, was the Depression itself the cause of the productivity surge? One might think that much of the nearly 400 pages of the book would be devoted to explaining these two questions. If I have a quibble with the book it is that it devotes too little time toward answering these two important questions and too much time on extensions—the equipment hypothesis, general purpose technologies, uncontrolled land development, financial fragility leading to the Great Recession of 2007–2009, to name a few.
With respect to the factors causing massive productivity gains during the 1930s, Field puts heavy emphasis upon public capital investments, particularly in roads, in boosting TFP (he also highlights factors such as research and development spending and better organizational innovations). During the 1920s the production of cars and trucks surged as their production costs fell, but highway construction did not keep up and this was a limiting factor in terms of the economic gains that the transportation revolution could bring. New Deal programs such as the Works Progress Administration and the Public Works Administration financed the construction of roads with a Keynesian demand-side rationale, but the supply-side effects of lowering the cost of transport and travel between markets was substantial. Interestingly, with respect to the second question about whether TFP growth in the 1930s was in some way caused by the economic downturn, Field makes the case that the road construction of the 1930s would have gone forward even absent the Depression. The Highway Act of 1921 committed to paving roads connecting major cities and instituted a study—which was finalized and approved in 1926—into the creation of a national highway system. “Given the political agreement on the national road structure at the end of 1926 and the continued overhang of millions of new car and truck registrations, the United States would probably have gone forward with this construction whether or not the Great Depression happened” (p. 73).
Field concludes the book with three chapters offering historical perspectives on 2007–2010 including a final chapter asking the intriguing question of whether economic downturns can have a silver lining—can crises lead to innovative solutions which have long term effects? While not completely ruling out the idea that certain sectors (U.S. automobiles if they mimic the actions of railroads during the 1930s) could potentially emerge stronger, Field concludes that growth of potential output would likely be higher in the presence of a smoother path of capital accumulation rather than a boom and bust cycle.
Although Great Leap Forward meanders a bit at times, it makes valuable and novel contributions to our understanding of the Great Depression and the Second World War and is highly recommended to readers with an interest in these time periods as well as those with an interest in productivity and growth in the twentieth-century United States.
