In Knowledge and Politics in Plato's Theaetetus, Paul Stern offers a meticulous and challenging interpretation of one of Plato's most difficult dialogues. What sets Stern's excellent account of the Theaetetus apart from all other interpretations of the dialogue is that he seeks to confront and explain every feature of the dialogue, or, as he puts it, to “attend as carefully as possible to the world of the dialogue in all its particularity” (7). He is awake to the drama of the dialogue—in fact, the drama plays an important role in his interpretation—but he also follows the argument with extreme care. Furthermore, Stern's interpretation is guided by a serious philosophic purpose: he seeks to defend Socrates' distinctive form of rationalism, or what he calls “the Socratic philosophic revolution” (248), against the critique of Platonic rationalism delivered by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Stern seeks to show that Socratic rationalism is “philosophically viable” (215) by arguing that the Nietzschean and Heideggerean attacks could find deserving targets in Socrates' predecessors, but that those attacks reflect a failure to appreciate what was distinctive about Socrates and his new form of philosophy.
What, then, was distinctive about Socrates and his new form of philosophy? Stern's argument is quite complex. But to start with his basic answer: Socrates saw, as his predecessors and contemporary rivals did not, the philosophic need to investigate politics. To begin to understand the meaning of this answer, however, it is necessary to connect a set of points that run throughout Stern's interpretation of the Theaetetus. According to Stern, Socrates differed from his predecessors and contemporary rivals, in the first place, by his deeper awareness of the limits of the knowledge attainable by human beings. Socrates was aware, as his rivals were not, that as embodied particular beings trying to grasp a world of parts and complex wholes resistant to perfect clarification, we can have only imperfect knowledge. For Socrates knowledge was a problem. Socrates' awareness of the problem of knowledge, moreover, gave him a critical distance on the hope for certainty that so often guides philosophy and that is displayed in theoretical men such as Theodorus and Theaetetus. Socrates was aware not only that the hopes of such men were futile but also that such hopes, and, more generally, pretheoretical conceptions of the good, are the true grounds on which almost every theoretical position rests. Socrates appreciated, in other words, the moral-psychological basis of theoretical claims or the power of conceptions of the good to shape people's claims about the character of the world. Finally, Socrates also differed from his predecessors insofar as he rejected their view of the good. Against the nearly universal view that the good is advantage—meaning ultimately that which secures one's own and protects against evils—Socrates, by thinking through the limits and necessities of human life, was led to a different view of the good as the humbler pursuit of the truth, insofar as the truth can be known.
With these points in mind, we can approach Stern's key argument about the philosophic need to investigate politics, an argument that is presented most fully in his account in chapter 6 of the perplexing digression of the Theaetetus. Socrates, Stern argues, was led to investigate politics precisely by his awareness that knowledge is a problem. If knowledge is a problem, then there is a need for a political defense of philosophy, that is, for an argument for the goodness of the philosophic life that begins from the messy reality of political life, rather than from the abstract speculations of theoreticians. What is learned in the Socratic investigation of politics? In Stern's account, politics provides a vivid and instructive lesson in the problem of knowledge, since an investigation of politics can make one aware of the problematic wholeness of two crucial wholes, the political community itself, which contains within it diverse members holding different views of the good; and the human soul, the diverse concerns of which are the roots of the views of the good expressed in political life. For Stern's Socrates, then, the study of politics is important in the first place for bringing home the key lesson about the limits of knowledge and the complexity of wholes. But the Socratic investigation of politics also allowed Socrates, according to Stern, to vindicate his view of the good by showing that it is in greater accord with the truth about human nature than the “anti-Socratic” view that the good is advantage, understood ultimately as a remedy for the evils that necessarily belong to human life.
In laying out Socrates' critique of his rivals' view of the good, Stern eventually places almost everyone on the anti-Socratic side: Theodorus, Theaetetus, Protagoras, the pre-Socratic philosophers, the political community itself, even Homer, whom Stern identifies as the original source of the view Socrates rejects (see, e.g., 93, 178–80). This brings me to the first of the two reservations I have about Stern's complicated and impressive argument. Stern makes Socrates so distinctive in his approach and insights that he lumps almost everyone else into the camp of “advantage seekers.” That Socrates stood quite so alone is implausible to me, and Stern is too quick, in my view, to criticize Socrates' rivals. Although Stern is certainly right to call attention to the fact that theoretical positions are often shaped by moral motives or by “views of good,” an emphasis on this fact carries with it the danger that one can then argue that any theoretical claim is really just an expression of a moral motive and thus that it is the motive, not the claim, that we must focus on to appreciate the true basis of the position. This form of psychological reductionism guides especially Stern's discussion of Protagoras, a figure who plays a critical role in the Theaetetus. My second reservation about Stern's argument is that there is a certain tension between his repeated emphasis on Socrates' “cognitive humility”—that is, Socrates' awareness of the complexity and elusiveness of key objects of knowledge, including and especially the good—and his great confidence that the Socratic life is the best life. If the good is really so perplexing and elusive, how can we be so sure of the Socratic view of it? To this, Stern might respond as follows: Socrates' view of the good is superior precisely because it is the view that does justice to the perplexing and elusive character of knowledge and the good; Socrates' view, moreover, is the one most in accord with our true nature, since it is the view that accepts, rather than flees, the necessity of evils; and finally, Socrates' view rests on a deep desire that all have not just to pursue the good, but to be sure that the good as they understand it is truly good. These arguments are expressed most fully and powerfully in Stern's account of the digression in chapter 6 (see especially 174–82; see also 79–80), and readers should form their own opinion of their adequacy. For my part, as impressive as I find Stern's analysis, I do not think he confronts directly enough what may be the most important challenge to the Socratic view: the position that would deny “the imperishability of evils” by claiming that human beings can experience, through divine agency, an ultimate release from evils.
These reservations about Stern's analysis do not change my assessment that he has written an outstanding book. His work deserves to be read and wrestled with by all who are seriously interested in the Theaetetus and in Plato's thought in general.
