Since the publication of this book, central banks have done a host of things they were not supposed to do either by theory or consolidated practice. The future will tell whether this is just a temporary adaptation to circumstances or the beginning of a deep mutation process. Should the latter be the case, historians would not be surprised: over time central banks have changed many skins, so that history hardly provides a blueprint of the central bank. If for a period of time both economists and historians have seen the Bank of England as the benchmark central bank to which all the others were expected to converge, history did not comply with their vision. The Reichsbank, and its successor, Bundesbank, never dreamed of “converging” to the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street. Huge differences also exist between the English and American experiences in central banking.
An academic economist with extensive research exposure to Federal Reserve banks, John Wood reveals superb talents as an historian. An entertaining writer, he exhibits a particularly felicitous touch in reconstructing interpersonal and group dynamics in the process of monetary policymaking.
Wood takes the non-judgmental entomologist's approach to central bankers (“who—he unsurprisingly discovers—do not see the world like economists”), vowing to observe them with a sympathetic eye, to try and understand “what makes them tick.” The book opens with an “introduction to central bankers.” The history of the Bank of England to 1914 follows (chapters 2–5). The subsequent four chapters cover central banking in the United States to the 1960s. Chapter 10 takes the reader back to England 1914–1971. The last eighty-odd pages (chapters 11–13) depart from the previous parallel, but separate narrative of Britain and the United States to take the reader through the evolution of central banking (including New Zealand's) from the 1970s to the early twenty-first century.
Central bank history epitomizes many of the challenges economic historians meet in applying economic theory and econometrics to the understanding of past events. Measuring the success of monetary policies may be an almost easy task compared to the assessment of the reasons behind the changes (some would say the evolution) of central banking over time (and across space). On the one hand, the theory of central banking is relatively weak (some economists' contrary opinion notwithstanding), on the other hand what a central bank is and does at any given time depends on politics, institutions, personalities, and the prevailing legal and economic doctrines. If central banking, as Hawtrey argued, is an art, then skills akin those of the art historian are required of those writing about it (Sayers being perhaps the unrivalled master of the trade). Wood is up to the task.
He does a superb job in telling the parallel stories of central bank development in the two main Anglo-Saxon countries. Wood writes engagingly and, while not providing new archival evidence, makes excellent use of the available sources in bringing to life the intellectual environment, the political constraints, the personality clashes which make the flesh and blood of monetary policymaking. If there is a disappointment in going through the rich, likable narrative of the first ten chapters, it is the weak comparative drive. The two stories run parallel to each other rather than shed light on each other, at least up to chapter 11 where the discussion of the thorny issue of rules versus authority takes a more comparative turn, highlighting a certain degree of convergence in central bank theory and practice driven by Volker's revolution in American monetary policy.
Wood's perspective is monetary policy, the main but hardly the only function performed by the institutions we now call central banks. To be sure, Wood's view of monetary policy is broad: several pages are devoted to often fascinating episodes of crisis management and lending of last resort. Such episodes sometimes mark a watersheds in the history of central banks: the United States got one as the result of 1907, while the early 1930s changed the very nature of central banks for more than a generation, turning them—as Norman complained—into “dignified Treasury Departments.” But crises highlight more than just lending of last resort: bank supervision and regulation come to the forefront. This is an area of central banking which remains essentially out of the book. Yet, central banks are part and parcel of a county's banking system; whether or not they assume full supervisory responsibility, they entertain daily relations with the banks to the extent that moral suasion has been a powerful policy tool, both in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Every author chooses a focus for his book and Wood cannot be faulted for focusing on monetary policy, but one wonders whether a closer examination of the relation between central banks and the banking system might have added another relevant perspective to monetary policymaking.
