For the United States, Peter Hahn insists, Cold War concerns—keeping the Soviets out, the oil flowing, the lines of communication open, and, finally, Western military bases operational—determined its Middle East policies. In addition, the United States sought peace by mediating the Arab–Israeli conflict, which could potentially destabilize the region. Although preferable, peace, however, was of lesser importance, according to Hahn, than America's Cold War priorities. Indeed, the United States preferred regional conflict to peace if the price was increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, sometimes even opposing peace proposals if the end result, in the American view, would have been a net gain for the Soviets. By 1961 these priorities had left the United States permanently entangled in the region, or in Hahn's parlance the United States was “caught in the Middle East.” American presidents Truman and Eisenhower had largely determined the future course of American policy in the Middle East of supporting conservative against radical regimes in the area. Given the controversies usually generated by the Arab–Israeli conflict, Hahn aims to be impartial: “In short, this book seeks to empathize with all sides to the Arab–Israeli dispute but sympathize with none” (p. 6).
Hahn describes President Truman pressured, on the one hand, by State and Defense Department officials to resist the creation of a Jewish homeland and thereafter keep Israel at arm's length to avoid alienating the Arabs, and on the other hand, by his White House advisers with strong Zionist sympathies supporting the creation of Israel and pressuring the president thereafter to stand by the new state. Both factions struggled mightily for the president's mind, Hahn claims. Roosevelt had given suitably ambiguous replies to both Arabs and Jews when they requested American support; Truman, in the end, came down firmly in favor of the Zionists. Israel and American Jewish organizations were never shy about using their White House connections to influence Truman for the benefit of the Jewish state. Chief among Truman's Zionist advisers were David Niles, whom Hahn by implication portrays as an almost sinister figure slinking along White House corridors divulging “classified information to the Zionists” (p. 28). However, Truman liked and trusted Niles who shielded the president from the more fire-eating Zionists. One wonders why Hahn needlessly has made an issue of Niles' position. A pattern soon developed in U.S.–Israeli relations, in which the Truman administration would take a strong stand against Israeli demands, then withdraw in the face of Jewish opposition. Hahn describes several such episodes, but he fails or declines to see a pattern of this nature in American–Israeli relations. One wishes Hahn had analyzed more carefully why Israel usually so easily overcame American opposition. Perhaps the simple explanation is that the Truman administration was more pro-Zionist than it was willing to admit publicly to avoid hurting Arab sensibilities.
Both presidents had one eye firmly cocked on the U.S. domestic political scene. Even president Eisenhower being elected with very limited Jewish support was constrained by a domestic opinion that overwhelmingly supported Israel. One of the finest parts of Hahn's book is the sophisticated discussion of when Eisenhower forced Israel to withdraw in March 1957 from the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had occupied during the Suez war in October–November 1956. In terms of U.S.–Israeli relations many observers have regarded this as Eisenhower's finest hour, being one of the few American presidents overcoming Israel's intransigence; but even he, as Hahn shows, was restricted in the kind of pressure he could apply by American domestic opposition. Still, from Jerusalem, and apart from the Sinai withdrawal, American policy must have seemed very predictable. Usually, after sometimes expressing outrage and threatening penalties, the Eisenhower administration caved in to Israeli pressure. When Israel conducted a massive raid against Syria on 11 December 1955 that killed more than fifty Syrians, the American reaction, as Hahn notes, was mild: “[U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster] Dulles imposed a measured punishment on Israel. Eisenhower authorized the secretary of state to criticize the operation and to suspend an impending deal to provide Israel with weapons” (p. 168). However, Dulles refused to accede to further Arab requests to punish Israel.
Hahn must have read most, if not all, of the literature, but unfortunately he has often a distinct reluctance to present his own point of view in the many historiographical debates to which he refers. The conclusions to each chapter are mostly bland and usually a summary of the preceding pages. (Curiously, the final conclusion also has a conclusion to the conclusion!) Copious quotes sometimes substitute for evidence.
The book is organized in four parts, covering virtually all aspects of U.S. policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict. Unfortunately, Hahn's discussion of the period before 1945 is somewhat superficial and rudimentary. By organizing the book thematically, he also makes the story often repetitive and sometimes causes the reader to lose sight of the overall perspective. His repeated assertions that the United States viewed the Middle East in a Cold War perspective and his insistence on the concomitant British decline do not make for convincing proof or easy reading. Hahn is also probably wrong when he argues that Truman and Eisenhower set American policies for decades to come, because the presidency of John F. Kennedy represented a sharp break with their policies. Kennedy sought to build a close relationship with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser through personal correspondence and generous food aid to Egypt. American farmers, at one point, fed 40 percent of the Egyptian population. Kennedy kept conservative Arab regimes at arm's length, believing them to be brittle constructions, out of touch with their own masses with only the dimmest prospects of survival.
Still, in spite of the criticism above, this is a most impressive book, based on multiarchival research. Hahn has consulted archival collections, public and private, in the United States, Britain, and Israel. It is also the first comprehensive work for the period, and to Hahn's great credit it is solidly empirically grounded and will be a treasure trove for scholars for years to come. Hahn carefully and thoroughly covers all the important issues for the period. Hahn's first book, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1961: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War (1991) has become something of a standard in the field. I am confident that Caught in the Middle East will attain similar stature.
