1. ABHARĪ
[160.14] Every J is B is used occasionally according to extramental existence (bi-ḥasabi al-wuğūdi al-ḫāriğī) and occasionally according to essence (bi-ḥasabi al-ḥaqīqa).
Abharī1
On the first usage, if it is said every J is B, what is meant is that every J in extramental existence is a B in extramental existence, whether the J is in the present or before it or after.
Abharī2, Preliminary Statement
On the second usage, if it is said every J is B, what is meant is that everything that would be a J were it to exist, would be a B in so far as it were to exist (anna kulla mā law wuğida kāna ğīm fa-huwa bi-ḥaytu law wuğida kāna bā’); that is, everything that has the first posited [state of existence] (al-ḥayṯiyyatu al-ūlā) would have the second. This means that everything that is the implicant of J is the implicant of B (anna kulla mā huwa malzūmu ğīm fa-huwa malzūmu bā’). This extends to the impossible such that it is true that everything that is man and non-animal is a man; because, even if it’s impossible of existence, it’s none the less true that were it to exist it would be a non-animal man, so, were it to exist, it would be a man.
The e-proposition on this account would never be true, because when you say no man is a stone its contradictory is true. This is because everything that is a man and a stone is a man, and everything that is a man and a stone is a stone, [161] so some man is a stone. From this it is clear that the i-proposition is always true.
The truth of the a-proposition obtains with the truth of the metathetic (ma‘a ṣidqi al-ma‘dūla), whose predicate is opposed to the predicate [of the a-proposition].Footnote 33 So if you say every man is an animal, it is also true that some men are non-animals. This is because everything that is a man and a non-animal is a man, and everything that is a man and a non-animal is a non-animal; so some man is a non-animal.
Abharī2 with Rider
Since this is the case, we may restrict the subject to what is not impossible. So if we say every J is B in accordance with the essence, we mean everything that is not impossible in itself or through another that is the implicant of J is the implicant of B (anna kulla mā huwa malzūmu ğīm min al-afrādi allatī lā yamtani‘u bi-dātihā wa-lā bi-ġayrihā fa-huwa malzūmu bā’).
Abharī3
And sometimes [“every J”] is used according to mental existence (bi-ḥasabi al-wuğūdi al-dihnī), so what is meant by every J is B is that everything that is J in the mind is B in the mind.
2. ṬŪSĪ
[161.9] There is occasion for discussion and reflection about each one of the three doctrines that Abharī has mentioned.
2 .1 Ṭūsī on Abharī1
As for the first usage, the one according to extramental existence, what is meant by every J is B is that every one of the Js existent extramentally (fī al-ḫāriğ) at the present time, in the past and in the future, are B extramentally. This is a doctrine connected with a certain ancient, and Avicenna mentioned it and described it as foolish and vulnerable to criticism. He said:Footnote 34
If we say every B is A and what is meant is every one of the things existingFootnote 35 at a given time as B, then it is some of what is described as B; our utterance “every B” is more general than that. He went on: Here we have propositions whose subjects are matters to the existence of which we do not advert, and in spite of that predicates are predicated of them which are neither necessary nor possible…
2 .2 Ṭūsī on Abharī2
[Ṭūsī argues first that Abharī’s preliminary statement of the essentialist reading reflects a misunderstanding of a formulation intended to exclude Alfarabi’s doctrine on the subject term. The preliminary statement also reflects Abharī’s confusion of truth-conditions for categoricals with those for conditionals. Ṭūsī then argues that the repair Abharī proposes (the Rider) is too strong.]
2.2.1 Ṭūsī on Abharī2, Preliminary Statement
[162.2] He explained the second doctrine, which he connects to the essence (al-ḥaqīqa), in a way due to which he fell into nonsense, namely: Abharī says that what is meant by every J Footnote 36is B is that everything that is the implicant of J is the implicant of B. This explanation is misleading, because the thing need not be said of its implicant. What is meant here by every J is every thing of which J is said, not every thing such that, were it to exist, J would exist. For many things are such that were they to exist, J would exist, yet J is not said of them: the perfect causes of J; the things of which J is a part; the things from which J is not separated in existence.
2.2.1.1
[162.7] He only fell into this nonsense due to what some people said in explaining this notion [of the essentialist reading of the subject]:
If we say every J we don’t mean by it only what is J extramentally, but rather that which, were it to exist (law wuğida), it would be true of it that it is J.
They didn’t mean by placing the condition [the law of law wuğida, “were it to exist”] here an implicational relation (al-mulāzama) between the existence of these things and their being described as J; rather, by this they intended to include in every J whatever is J actually before the intellect or in mental supposition from among whatever is not impossible to be J (qaṣadu bihi duḫūla mā huwa ğīm bi-al-fi‘li ‘inda al-‘aqli aw bi-al-farḍi al-dihnī mimmā lā yamtani‘u an yakūna ğīm fī qawlinā kullu ğīm).Footnote 37
[The problem arises] because what leaps to mind from the meanings of conditional particles is that the antecedent is being assumed to exist. And Abharī, having imagined the implicational relation [to be present], took the connective conditional to explain the quantification of the categorical (fī tafsīri haṣri al-ḥamliyya); he compounded universality of predication (I mean, generalization for individuals) with the universality of the conditional (I mean, generalization for circumstances). So he fell into absurdities which stuck to him because it is permissible that the antecedent in a conditional be absurd. This is the judgment that the subject of the sentence covers impossible things, such that if it is said every man, that which is a non-animal man is included by way of it.
Yet this is something no one held, because the later validating scholars (al-muta’aḫḫirīna min al-muḥaṣṣilīn) [in saying these things] refuted Alfarabi (in spite of his eminence in the verification of the philosophical sciences such that he was known as the Second Teacher) in his claim that when we say every J it includes what may be said to be J (daḫala fīhi mā yaṣiḥḥu an yuqāla ğīm). [According to this view], one must understand from “black” all that is not black among those things which may become black. So [given the position of Alfarabi they meant to refute], how could they permit the entry of what is impossible to be black into it?
2.2.1.2
[162.apu] To prove the unsoundness of [Abharī’s] view: It is true that every non-animal man is a man, even if it is impossible of existence, is justified by the fact that even if the subject is impossible of existence it is none the less true of it that it would be a non-animal man (were it to exist), and a man (were it to exist). This depends on the necessity of the implication from the whole [163] to its part (istilzāmi al-kulli li-ğuz’ihi).
What Abharī held and made judgments in accordance with may be set down against this, namely, that some obvious syllogisms which include a true conditional don’t produce. This is due to the possibility that the truth of true propositions won’t remain on a given assumption supposed for the antecedent, if it’s possible that it be absurd. So it is to be said to him: The antecedent in your statement, “were there to exist what is a non-animal man”, would be absurd as you have made clear. Thus it’s possible that the implication from the whole to its part not remain true with it (fa-ğāza an lā yabqā ma‘ahu ṣidqu al-mulāzamati bayna al-kulli wa-ba‘dihi). And therefore the predication of “man” on “non-animal man” does not follow from it […]
2.2.1.3
[163.9] Verifying the proposition goes [as follows]: “Man” which he placed as predicate cannot hold [of the subject] in a possible sense, for man in the possible sense is the thing which must be a rational animal, and it’s impossible that it be non-animal and non-rational. His subject – “non-animal man” – has the sense “the thing that is rational animal and non-animal.” “Animal which is non-animal”: how is it possible that it have as predicate “animal” for which it is impossible to be non-animal? Indeed it would be [just as] possible to predicate of it “man non-man”. So it is apparent that what he set out about it being a true proposition is not as he claims.
2.2.1.4
[163.14] What is strange is that he judged that the e-proposition on this interpretation is not true because it cannot be true with its contradictory (li-lā-iğtimā‘ihi ma‘a naqīḍihi ‘alā al-ṣidq),Footnote 38 as he explained; yet he did not judge that the a-proposition is also not true, in spite of the fact that he explained that it can be true with its opposite (I mean the metathetic proposition whose predicate is opposed to its predicate). Rather here he judged that two opposites can be true together, yet he did not judge there that two contradictories can be true together. But it’s necessary that he judge either the impossibility of the two universals being true together, or the possibility of opposites in universals being true together.Footnote 39
2.2.2 Ṭūsī on Abharī2 with Rider
[163.20] Then he fled from these repugnant consequences, going some way back towards the truth by restricting the subject to what is not impossible in itself or through another (bi-mā lā yamtani‘u lā bi-dātihi wa-lā bi-ġayrihi).
2.2.2.1
[163.apu] But this still won’t allow him to hold the doctrine mentioned. This is because if we say every J is B by special possibility or no J is B by special possibility (and B is something whose joining and not joining to J is neither essentially nor extrinsically impossible, but [one state or] the other is only true [164] according to two [different] times (wa-innamā yaṣduqu al-āḫaru bi-ḥasabi waqtayn)), then it will be true that all that is J and B is J necessarily and all that is J and B is B necessarily, and they produce some of what is J is B necessarily. Similarly it is true that all that is J and not B is J necessarily and all that is J and not B is not B necessarily, and they produce some of what is J is not B necessarily. So it is true that some J is necessarily B and some J is necessarily not B, along with the truth of every J is B by a special possibility and no J is B by a special possibility. From this it follows that two contradictories and two opposites can be true together. This only follows due to Abharī’s considering implication [a way to understand] categoricals (wa-innamā lazimahu dālika li-i‘tibārihi al-mulāzamata fī al-ḥamliyyāt).
2.2.2.2
[164.7] Let us skip over this section [relating problems in his view], and look into what his settled opinion in this is. So we say: As for restricting the subject to what is not impossible in itself, that is necessary. As for restricting it to what is not impossible through another, that raises questions. This is because what is possible in itself to be J and rendered impossible by another to be J actually and extramentally (bi-al-fi‘li fī al-ḫāriğ), but is supposed none the less to be J actually, must enter under every J; yet it doesn’t enter [under J] on this account in consequence of the restriction.
2 .3 Ṭūsī on Abharī3
[164.12] The third doctrine he sets out, the one used according to mental existence without any other consideration, is something no one could hold. This is because many absurdities are found in the mind. If existence is particularized as mental and no reference is made to the extramental, it wouldn’t be possible to use it. It is possible, for example, to judge of man that he flies, because he may be imagined by some minds to be like that. Then if it is said every man, the flying man enters under it, and the aforementioned absurdities return. There is no benefit in considering examples like this…
