Despite this book's title, its focus is on shifts in Israeli academic debates as they relate to what Asima Ghazi-Bouillon terms the “hegemonic discourse” of Labor Zionism (p. 6). Although the first chapter explores debates over the effect of the Oslo peace process on conceptions of Israeli collective identity, the remainder of the book is less focused on conceptions of identity than on establishing the main principles of Labor Zionism from the origins of the Zionist movement through the creation of the Israeli state. Ghazi-Bouillon then identifies what she categorizes as three “challenges” to that discourse in the past decades: the New Historians, post-Zionism, and neo-Zionism. The chapter outlining how Zionists shaped nascent Israeli identity, however, provides a good example of how national identity is constructed.
The major strength of this book is the author's critical examination of the three different scholarly movements and the use of in-depth interviews with their members to illustrate personal trajectories, ideological views, and the effect their scholarship and activism had on their careers in Israel and abroad. Ghazi-Bouillon argues that Israel's “political choices and structures of power, as well as its hegemonic discourse and hegemonic identity, were not, in fact, deeply shaken by [the] Oslo [peace process]” (p. 6); however, little empirical evidence is given to support this assertion. Although the book provides an excellent overview of the role of identity in the early years of the Zionist movement, this discussion lacks the same depth in the later chapters dealing with intellectual challenges to the “hegemonic discourse.” Given the book's title, I expected the author to focus more precisely on how these new intellectual currents impacted (and were impacted by) developments in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and how this, in turn, impacted Israeli identity. Little discussion is given to the unfolding of the peace process, however, apart from general comments regarding major “political disjunctures” such as the failure of Camp David II. Furthermore, the author includes no in-depth discussion of Israeli public opinion as it relates to either these academic debates or to the peace process more generally. She could have evoked, for example, the Peace Index run by Tamar Hermann and Ephraim Yaar (http://tauac.convio.net/site/PageServer?pagename=newsroom_publications_WandPIndex). The primary focus is instead on the shifting debates within the academic realm vis-à-vis what Ghazi-Bouillon calls the “hegemonic discourse.”
The misleading title aside, the book offers a significant contribution to the study of academic and intellectual debates within Israel, particularly in regard to the author's clarification of the distinction between New Historians and post-Zionists. For Ghazi-Bouillon, the New Historians used conventional historical methods and considered themselves Zionists at the time of their research and writing. Despite recognizing that the topics they wrote about were controversial—one even noted that he “enjoyed the fact that [he] was being iconoclastic” (p. 62)—the historians did not initially set out to challenge the Zionist narrative. The declassification of the Israeli archives pertaining to the 1948 war meant that the New Historians had access to unused sensitive material that shaped their projects. Furthermore, because their books were published around the same time, a period in which Israeli society was more self-reflective due to the controversy surrounding the Lebanon war, the historians were “lumped together” as New Historians and had a larger impact than they would have had individually (p. 62). Although opponents accused them of being ideologically motivated in their writing, the New Historians all rejected the normative dimension of their work (although Ilan Pappe later changed course) and stood by their positivist scholarship.
Ghazi-Bouillon contrasts the post-Zionist scholars with the New Historians by underscoring the former group's normative approach to scholarship—with a focus on justice and emancipation—and its tendency to embrace critical theory and postpositivist techniques. The author additionally notes that post-Zionism as a movement is very diverse and includes scholars from a number of different disciplines, including sociology, geography, and history. Yet what unifies post-Zionism in her view is its questioning of “the foundations of the Israeli state and society, linking political and social problems of current times to the structures of the state established even before independence was declared” (p. 115)—something the New Historians did not do. Another key difference the author notes is that post-Zionism seemed strongest in the field of sociology, where the scholars were able to wage theoretical debates and shift the hegemonic discourse within the discipline. Critical sociologists did not have as much of an impact on broader social debates, however, in large part because, as a discipline, sociology does not have the same formative relationship as history to the national identity narrative. In making this point, the author notes how several of the post-Zionist scholars she interviewed placed the failure of Oslo to bring about peace on its failure to address the core conflict issues (including those of 1948) rather than on the lack of a Palestinian partner, as was typically maintained in Israeli discourse, particularly post-2000.
The third intellectual trend that Ghazi-Bouillon discusses, neo-Zionism, has its origins in religious-territorial nationalism and neoconservatism and is, she argues, the most politically coherent of the three in its goals. In contrast to post-Zionists, neo-Zionists argue that the second intifada proved there was no Palestinian partner for peace, and some even compared Rabin's signing of the Oslo Accords to Neville Chamberlain's actions in Munich (p. 125). Ghazi-Bouillon discusses the battle waged by neo-Zionist institutes such as the Shalem Center against new Israeli textbooks that presented Israeli history in comparative perspective and included Palestinian perspectives on important historical events. She also discusses neo-Zionist institutions’ differing orientations toward diasporic Jewry, particularly American Jews.
Ghazi-Bouillon does an excellent job discussing the diversity within, and ideological similarities and differences between, the three intellectual movements that she documents. She builds a strong case for the role of history in constructing national identity as well as the political contentiousness of new trends in scholarship. Less clear from the book, however, is the extent to which these academic debates have relevance to the broader Israeli public outside university halls or policy circles. Her point that “common collective identity is subject to constant flux and redefinition” (p. 151) is well taken, but it is not obvious how these academic movements have impacted Israeli identity at the level of the general public. The author ends on a pessimistic note regarding future prospects for peace given the current ascendancy of neo-Zionism and the strengthening (rather than questioning, as happened in the 1980s) of this narrative as a result of the second Lebanon war. Although not covered in this book, Operation Cast Lead seemed to further cement an Israeli identity grounded in what Ghazi-Bouillon deems the “essential pillars of Israeli identity”: Jewishness, security, and the Labor Zionist conception of the Jewish state (p. 158). The author leaves us wondering what kind of political juncture would be necessary to shift Israel's current strong identity, which “could not allow for peace and coexistence,” into one more open to the possibility of a genuine peace with Palestinians, and what role, if any, academics can (or should) play in creating that space.
