¹ F. H. Brown, “Rattigan, Sir William Henry,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/35680. Rattigan and his works were rarely mentioned in modern studies of nineteenth-century English jurisprudence. For example, in a lecture celebrating the work of the English jurisprudence scholar John Salmond, legal historian A. W. B. Simpson noted that, when Salmond’s book Jurisprudence was first published in 1902, there were only four other comprehensive treatises on jurisprudence in print – by John Austin, William Markby, Thomas Erskine Holland, and Frederick Pollock. Simpson did not mention Rattigan’s book, first published in 1888. See A. W. B. Simpson, “The Salmond Lecture,” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 38 (2007): 669, 670–110.26686/vuwlr.v38i4.5548. Three works that do mention him are Michael Lobban, “Was There a Nineteenth Century ‘English School of Jurisprudence’?” Journal of Legal History 16 (1995): 34, 51–210.1080/01440369508531116; Amanjit Kaur Sharanjit, “La colonisation et la transposition des concepts juridiques: L’exemple du droit coutumier au Punjab (Inde),” Cahiers Jean Moulin 6 (2020)10.4000/cjm.1118, https://doi.org/10.4000/cjm.1118; Faisal Chaudhry, South Asia, the British Empire, and the Rise of Classical Legal Thought: Toward a Historical Ontology of the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 383, 391–7.

² W. H. Rattigan, The Science of Jurisprudence: Chiefly Intended for Indian Law Students (Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1888).

³ The scholarly consensus is that English jurisprudence in the period between the mid nineteenth century and the mid twentieth century was static and uninteresting, devoid of any major innovation, mostly repetitive, and generally “in a pretty sorry state.” See Neil Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence between Austin and Hart,” Virginia Law Review 91 (2005): 1, 2; William Cornish, Michael Lobban, and Keith Smith, “Theories of Law and Government,” in The Oxford History of the Laws of England, ed. William Cornish et al., Vol. 11: 1820–1914 English Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 72, 13010.1093/acprof:oso/9780199258819.003.0004; William Twining, Jurist in Context: A Memoir (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 2910.1017/9781108645911.

⁴ W. D. T. “Book Review,” American Law Review 23 (1889): 461–2.

⁵ Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, A Bibliography of Indian Law (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1958), 4. See also B. B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 331.

⁶ See G. S. Sharma, “Some Reflections on the Teaching of Jurisprudence in India,” in Studies in Law: An Anthology of Essays in Municipal and International Law, ed. V. V. Deshpande (Bombay: Asia Publishing, 1961), 39; Rajkumari Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research: An Evolutionary and Perspective Analysis,” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 24 (1982): 470, 470–5.

⁷ On legal innovation in various sorts of peripheries, see, generally, Assaf Likhovski, “Czernowitz, Lincoln and Jerusalem and the Comparative History of American Jurisprudence,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 4 (2003): 62110.2202/1565-3404.1077. For an autobiographical discussion of this phenomenon, see Twining, Jurist in Context, 39–77 (discussing Twining’s experiences as a law teacher in Khartoum and Dar es Salaam in the late 1950s and early 1960s).

⁸ See, e.g., William Twining, Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School (London: Stevens, 1994), 24–6; Robin Morse, “Dower, Dogma and Grand Designs: Law at King’s Nineteenth Century Style,” in King’s College London: In the Service of Society, ed. Christine Kenyon Jones (London: King’s College, 2004), 60; Patrick Polden, “The Education of Lawyers,” in The Oxford History of the Laws of England, ed. Cornish et al., Vol. 11, 117510.1093/acprof:oso/9780199258819.003.0034; Andrew Watson, “The Legal Education Revolution that Failed: Attempts to Establish a Legal University in Victorian Britain,” Journal on European History of Law 14 (2023): 2810.66847/jehl.v14i2.171.

⁹ See Polden, “The Education of Lawyers,” 1181–201; Watson, “The Legal Education Revolution,” 32–9; F. H. Lawson, The Oxford Law School 1850–1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). Law was also taught in the second half of the nineteenth century at academic institutions in Birmingham, Manchester, and Liverpool.

¹⁰ See, e.g., A. W. B. Simpson, “The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature,” University of Chicago Law Review 48 (1981): 632, 670–110.2307/1599330; David Sugarman, “Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition,” in Legal Theory and Common Law, ed. William Twinning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 26; David Sugarman, “‘A Hatred of Disorder’: Legal Science, Liberalism and Imperialism,” in Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence, ed. Peter Fitzpatrick (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 34; Steven Wilf, “Legal Treatise,” in The Oxford Handbook of Law and Humanities, eds. Simon Stern et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 687.

¹¹ For a history of English jurisprudence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see, generally, Lobban, “Was There a Nineteenth Century ‘English School of Jurisprudence’?” For discussions on the history of English jurisprudence textbooks, see Simpson, “The Salmond Lecture,” 670; Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence,” 77–87; Cornish et al., “Theories of Law and Government,” 123–31.

¹² Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence,” 77–87. On the history of British comparative law scholarship during that period, see John W. Cairns, “Development of Comparative Law in Great Britain,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 111.

¹³ A detailed discussion of the regulation of the legal profession in nineteenth-century India can be found in M. P. Jain, Outlines of Indian Legal and Constitutional History, 7th ed. (Gurgaon: Lexis Nexis, 2016), 765–81. See also Samuel Schmitthener, “A Sketch of the Development of the Legal Profession in India,” Law and Society Review 3 (1968/69): 337, 34510.2307/3053007; S. Dayal, “Legal Profession and Legal Education,” in The Indian Legal System, ed. Joseph Minattur (New Delhi: Indian Law Institute, 1978), 148, 155; Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research,” 470–5. On South India, specifically, see John J. Paul, The Legal Profession in Colonial South India (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1991).

¹⁴ Schmitthenner, “A Sketch,” 349–55, 361–2; Dayal, “Legal Profession,” 161.

¹⁵ Schmitthenner, “A Sketch,” 355–7.

¹⁶ At that time, the legal profession in Bengal was divided into three distinct categories: advocates, vakils, and pleaders. Advocates were entitled to practice on both the original and appellate sides of the High Court and also subordinate courts. Vakils were entitled to practice on the appellate side of the High Court and also in subordinate courts. Pleaders were entitled to practice in subordinate courts only. University education in the United Kingdom or a law degree from one of the older Indian universities (Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Allahabad, or Punjab) was required of advocates. Vakils were also required to hold a law degree from one of the older universities. Pleaders were required to hold a law degree from an Indian university. See Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1919), Vol. 3, 24–6.

¹⁷ See Vasudha Dalmia, “Sanskrit Scholars and Pandits of the Old School: The Benares Sanskrit College and the Constitution of Authority in the Late Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 24 (1996): 32110.1007/BF00219194; Amit Kumar Suman, “Colonial State and Indigenous Islamic Learning: A Case Study of Calcutta Madrasa,” Paedagogica Historica 58 (2022): 48610.1080/00309230.2020.1838583.

¹⁸ Here, I will discuss British India. On legal education in French India, see Laetitia Guerlain and Florence Renucci, “L’École de droit de Pondichéry (1838–1960): Étude exploratoire d’un établissement d’enseignement supérieur colonial,” Cahiers Jean Moulin 7 (2021)10.4000/cjm.1278, https://doi.org/10.4000/cjm.1278. For a comparative history of legal education in colonial India and French Indochina, see Sara Legrandjacques, “Inégaux en droit: approche comparée de l’enseignement juridique en Inde britannique et en Indochine française XIXe–XXe siècle,” Cahiers Jean Moulin 7 (2021)10.4000/cjm.1334, https://doi.org/10.4000/cjm.1334. A brief discussion of the history of legal education in colonial India is found in Jean-Louis Halpérin, “Historical Landmarks in Mapping the Spread of Positive Law Teaching,” in State Law and Legal Positivism: The Global Rise of a New Paradigm, eds. Baudouin Dupret and Jean-Louis Halpérin (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 33, 52–4. I also discuss this topic in Assaf Likhovski, “Jurisprudence and Nationalism in the British Empire in the Early Twentieth Century: India, Egypt, and Palestine Compared,” English Historical Review (forthcoming).

¹⁹ Paul, The Legal Profession, 6, 31–3.

²⁰ Arjun P. Aggarwal, “Legal Education in India,” Journal of Legal Education 12 (1959–60): 231, 232; Eric Ashby (with Mary Anderson), Universities: British, Indian, African: A Study in the Ecology of Higher Education (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 54–64; Schmitthenner, “A Sketch,” 362; Dayal, “Legal Profession,” 161; Raymond Cocks, “‘Sustaining the Character of a Judge’: Conflict Within the Legal Thought of British India,” Journal of Legal History 35 (2014): 4410.1080/01440365.2014.883048; Jain, Outlines, 794.

²¹ [Indian Universities Commission], Report of the Indian Universities Commission, 1902 (Simla: Government Central Printing Office, 1902), 34, 82; Misra, Indian Middle Classes, 326.

²² Misra, Indian Middle Classes, 333; Schmitthenner, “A Sketch,” 364, 366, 372; Dayal, “Legal Profession,” 148, 155, 161–2, 164; Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research,” 480–5; Legrandjacques, “Inégaux en droit,” 7, 25. See also Aggarwal, “Legal Education,” 232 (mentioning slightly different numbers for 1886–1887). The number of law students in the United Kingdom is for the academic year 1938–1939. See Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence,” 79. Another indication of the difference in scale can be found by comparing the number of law teachers. In 1933–1934, there were only 109 teachers of law in England, while in the University of Calcutta alone there were 78. See Twining, Blackstone’s Tower, 23–4; Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report, 1:164. Beginning in the mid nineteenth century, South Asian students also traveled to England to train as barristers at the Inns of Court. Naturally, once they returned, many of these students came to occupy leading roles in their local legal system. Some of these London-trained barristers, such as Mohandas Gandhi (who studied law at the Inner Temple) or Muhammad Ali Jinnah (who trained at Lincoln’s Inn), later became leading anti-colonial nationalist politicians. However, because of the costs involved in traveling and living in London, the number of South Asian students trained at the Inns of Court was relatively small compared to those studying law in British India. See Schmitthenner, “A Sketch,” 365–7; Alan M. Guenther, “Syed Mahmood and the Transformation of Muslim Law in British India” (PhD diss., McGill University, 2004), 45–63; Mitra Sharafi, “A New History of Colonial Lawyering: Likhovski and Legal Identities in the British Empire,” Law and Social Inquiry 32 (2007): 1059, 1060, 1082–310.1111/j.1747-4469.2007.00087.x; Mitra Sharafi, Law and Identity in Colonial South Asia: Parsi Legal Culture, 1772–1947 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 104–1010.1017/CBO9781107256545; Verena Steller, “The ‘Rule of Law’ in British India, or a Rule of Lawyers? Indian Barristers vs the Colonial State,” Comparativ: Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 24(5) (2014): 7810.26014/j.comp.2014.05.04; Sara Legrandjacques, “Law of the Strongest? A Global Approach of Access to Law Studies and Its Social and Professional Impact in British India (1850s–1940s),” Social Sciences 10 (2021): 11310.3390/socsci10030113; Mitra Sharafi, “South Asians at the Inns of Court: Empire, Expulsion, and Redemption circa 1900,” in In Between and Across: Legal History Without Boundaries, eds. Kenneth W. Mack and Jacob Katz Cogan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), 17910.1093/oso/9780197680995.003.0009. On Indian law students in early twentieth-century Ireland see Conor Mulvagh, Irish Days, Indian Memories: V. V. Giri and Indian Law Students at University College Dublin, 1913–1916 (Sallins: Irish Academic Press, 2016).

²³ Jain, Outlines, 794.

²⁴ Aggarwal, “Legal Education,” 235, 237–9, 246–7; Schmitthenner, “A Sketch,” 362; Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research,” 496; Jain, Outlines, 794. A detailed list of the works that early twentieth-century Indian law students were expected to read can be found in “[Memorandum],” in Indian Universities Commission, University of Bombay: Part III: Written Statements (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1902), 1, 3–4 (suggesting that, for their first LL.B. exams, law students at the Government Law School in Bombay should be required to read excerpts from two books on jurisprudence (by Austin and Rattigan), as well as four additional books: on international law, the English Constitution, Roman Law, and Hindu law). See also William G. Rice, “A Quick Look at Legal Education in India and Pakistan,” Journal of Legal Education 11 (1958): 364 (on Indian legal education in the early post-Independence period).

²⁵ For general histories of academic education in British India, see, e.g., Syed Nurullah and J. P. Paik, History of Education in India during the British Period (Bombay: Macmillan & Co., 1943); Syama Prasad Mookerjee, “Education in British India,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 233 (1944): 3010.1177/000271624423300107; Sanjay Seth, Subject Lessons: The Western Education of Colonial India (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007)10.1215/9780822390602; Surja Datta, A History of the Indian University System: Emerging from the Shadows of the Past (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)10.1057/978-1-137-53571-9.

²⁶ Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report, 3:27–8; Presidency College Calcutta, Centenary Volume, 1955 (Alipore: West Bengal Government Press, 1956), 12–13; P. N. Banerjee, “Foundation of the University Law College,” Calcutta University Law College Magazine 27 (1959): ix–xi.

²⁷ Seth, Subject Lessons, 159–67; Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, new ed. (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010), 127–55.

²⁸ See University of Calcutta, The Calendar 1931 (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1931), 14, 16; Hundred Years of the University of Calcutta: A History of the University Issued in Commemoration of the Centenary Celebration, eds. Pramathanath Banerjee et al. ([Calcutta]: University of Calcutta [Press], 1957), 180–4, 217–28; Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement, 127–55; Nariaki Nakazato, Neonationalist Mythology in Postwar Japan: Pal’s Dissenting Judgment at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 85; Datta, A History of the Indian University System, 8, 43–6, 60–8.

²⁹ Kris Manjapra, “Knowledgeable Internationalism and the Swadeshi Movement, 1903–1921,” Economic and Political Weekly 47(42) (October 2012): 53, 59–60. The establishment, in 1916, of Benares Hindu University is another example of the impact of Indian cultural nationalism (and Hindu nationalism) on Indian universities at the time. See Leah Renold, A Hindu Education: Early Years of the Banaras Hindu University (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4–6.

³⁰ “Minute by the Hon’ble T. B. Macaulay dated the 2nd February 1835,” in Selections from the Educational Records, ed. H. Sharp (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1920), 107, 109.

³¹ University of Calcutta, Calendar 1931, 14, 16; Hundred Years of the University of Calcutta, 221; Narendra Krishna Sinha, Asutosh Mookerjee: A Biographical Study (Calcutta: Asutosh Mookerjee Centenary Committee, 1966), 56, 94–100, 114, 117, 140–4, 151; Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement, 127–55; Kris Manjapra, Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals Across Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 47–5210.4159/harvard.9780674726314; Kankan Bhattacharyya, “Sir Asutosh and Rise of Modern Science in India,” Indian Journal of History of Science 50 (2015): 420, 424–3310.16943/ijhs/2015/v50i4/48314. It is interesting to note that Asutosh Mookerjee’s son, Syama Prasad Mookerjee – who, like his father, also trained as a lawyer and also served as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta (between 1934 and 1938) – was a leading right-wing Hindu nationalist politician. In 1939, Syama Prasad became the President of the Hindu nationalist Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha Party, a forerunner of the Bharatiya Janata Party. See Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 51.

³² Indian Universities Commission, University of Calcutta: Part II: Written Statements Presented by Witnesses (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1902), 80; Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report, 3:34.

³³ Asutosh Mukhopadhyay, The Law of Perpetuities in British India (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1902), 301. Mookerjee was quoting the English legal scholar Frederick Pollock, but he added the words “true and living,” which did not appear in Pollock’s original sentence. This was probably done under the impact of the state-of-the-art notion of “living law” that was fashionable at the time in Continental Europe. On this notion, see, e.g., Katharina Isabel Schmidt, “Law, Modernity, Crisis: German Free Lawyers, American Legal Realists, and the Transatlantic Turn to ‘Life,’ 1903–1933,” German Studies Review 39 (2016): 12110.1353/gsr.2016.0014.

³⁴ Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report, 3:33–41. It should be noted that the creation of the Law College did not lead to a monopoly of the College on law teaching. A few other colleges affiliated to the university continued to offer law degrees. Footnote Ibid., 41–2.

³⁵ University of Calcutta, Calendar 1931, 208–9.

³⁶ Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report, 2:85–9, 102; Asutosh Mookerjee, “The Study of Law,” in The Judicial World of a Multi-Splendoured Genius: Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, ed. Sudhish Pai (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing 2014), 143, 146.

³⁷ Dayal, “Legal Profession,” 162; Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research,” 486–91.

³⁸ Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research,” 497.

³⁹ On the series, see Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report, 3:44; Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research,” 497–8; Rajeev Dhavan, “Legal Research in India: The Role of the Indian Law Institute,” American Journal of Comparative Law 34 (1986): 527, 52910.2307/840360; Dolores F. Chew, “Of ‘Unchaste’ Widows and Tenants-for-Life: Legal Constructions of Gender and Property in Nineteenth Century Bengal” (PhD diss., University of Calcutta, 1994), 129, http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/164657; Shahbaz Ahmad Cheema, “Tagore Law Lecturer’s [Sic] Contribution to Islamic Legal Scholarship in British India,” Al-Qalam (December 2013): n.p.

⁴⁰ See Agrawala, “Indian Legal Research,” 497. One should note that some of the earlier lectures were broader in scope. See Nandini Chatterjee, “Law, Culture and History: Amir Ali’s Interpretation of Islamic Tradition,” in Legal Histories of the British Empire: Laws, Engagements and Legacies, eds. Shaunnagh Dorsett and John McLaren (London: Routledge, 2014), 45, 53–410.4324/9781315851457-4 (discussing Ameer Ali’s 1884 lectures on gifts in Islamic law). For a list of the topics of the Tagore Lectures, see University of Calcutta, Hundred Years of the University of Calcutta, 436–9.

⁴¹ C. L. Tupper, “English Jurisprudence and Indian Studies in Law,” Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 3 (1901): 84, 86. See also Neeladri Bhattacharya, “Remaking Custom: The Discourse and Practice of Colonial Codification,” in Tradition, Dissent and Ideology: Essays in Honour of Romila Thapar, eds. R. Champakalakshmi and S. Gopal (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 20.

⁴² S. N. Dhyani, Jurisprudence: A Study of Indian Legal Theory, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co., 1985), 19–20. See also V. R. Krishna Iyer, “Towards a Third World Jurisprudence,” in Law versus Justice: Problems and Solutions (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1981), 132–7. On Austinian jurisprudence and colonialism, see also Assaf Likhovski, Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 114–16; G. Blaine Baker, “Popularizing the Rule of Law: Sheldon Amos and the International Scientific Series, 1874 to 1909,” Journal of Legal History 33 (2012): 151, 16510.1080/01440365.2012.698883.

⁴³ On the role of India in the history of the law treatise, see Angela Fernandez and Markus Dubber, “Introduction: Putting the Legal Treatise in Its Place,” in Law Books in Action: Essays on the Anglo-American Legal Treatise, eds. Markus Dubber and Angela Fernandez (Oxford: Hart, 2012), 1, 8–9. On the need for more studies of the history of the law book in South Asia, see, generally, Mitra Sharafi, “South Asian Legal History,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 11 (2015): 309, 32310.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102612-134041.

⁴⁴ The term “Hindu law” is used in this chapter to refer to what is sometimes called “traditional Hindu law” – the law found in ancient and medieval Indian texts – and not to the colonial descendent of this law, Anglo–Hindu law – the personal law of some non-Muslim communities in British India. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the question of whether “Hindu law” actually existed before the British conquest has been hotly debated. On this, see the literature mentioned in Footnote note 99 below. For a recent discussion on the terminological problems associated with the term “Hindu law,” see also Timothy Lubin, Donald R. Davis, Jr., and Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Introduction,” in Hinduism and Law: An Introduction, eds. Timothy Lubin, Donald R. Davis, Jr., and Jayanth K. Krishnan (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 110.1017/CBO9780511781674. For a general discussion on traditional Hindu law, see, e.g., Donald R. Davis, Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)10.1017/CBO9780511674754. For a discussion on Anglo–Hindu law, see Donald R. Davis, Jr. and Timothy Lubin, “Hinduism and Colonial Law,” in Hinduism in the Modern World, ed. Brian A. Hatcher (New York: Routledge, 2016), 96.

⁴⁵ William Markby, Elements of Law: Considered with Reference to Principles of General Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871). See also Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence,” 7–8 (noting the Indian pedigree of Markby’s book). For an earlier work, see John Bruce Norton, Topics of Jurisprudence: Or Aids to the Office of the Indian Judge (Madras: Higginbotham, 1862). Norton’s book was essentially a collection of maxims on equity, accompanied by discussions of topics such as “mistake,” “intention,” and “agency.” It was inspired by similar English works such as Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims (London: A. Maxwell & Son, 1845). On Norton, see G. C. B., “John Bruce Norton (1815–1883),” in Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Sidney Lee (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895), 41:216.

⁴⁶ Markby, Elements, v.

⁴⁷ T. G. Watkin, “Sir William Markby (1829–1914),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/50590. See also Lucy Taylor Markby, Memories of Sir William Markby, K.C.I.E.: By His Wife (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917).

⁴⁸ The book was divided into twelve chapters discussing the following topics: general conception of law; sources of law; relations which arise out of law; primary duties and obligations; liability; grounds of non-liability; ownership; possession; servitudes or easements; prescription and limitation; sanctions and remedies; and procedure. The categories upon which this structure was based may perhaps be traced back to the structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, and even further back to Roman law.

⁴⁹ Markby, Elements, 6.

⁵⁰ Footnote Ibid., xii (Indian students and Roman law); Footnote ibid., 9 (the power of courts in India to review the acts of the Governor-General); Footnote ibid., 31 (comparing commentaries on English law to ones on Hindu law); Footnote ibid., 39 (the “Koran and the Shasters” were a source of law in India, just as “the precepts of the Bible have been applied to the institutions of daily life by ourselves …”); Footnote ibid., 58 (Indian examples of juristic persons); Footnote ibid., 244 (imprisonment for debt in India).

⁵¹ Footnote Ibid., 33–4. On Markby’s understanding of custom and Austinian jurisprudence, see also Michael Lobban, “Legal Theory and Judge-Made Law in England, 1850–1920,” Quaderni Fiorentini 40 (2011): 553, 581–4.

⁵² See William Markby, “Analytical Jurisprudence,” The Law Magazine & Review and Quarterly Digest of All Reported Cases 5th Ser. 1 (1876): 617, 625–7 (using the example of the recognition of interest by Muslim merchants in India, despite the Quranic prohibition on taking interest, to illustrate the Austinian notion of a tacit command). See also Wilfrid E. Rumble, Doing Austin Justice: The Reception of John Austin’s Philosophy of Law in Nineteenth-Century England (London: Continuum, 2005), 161–2.

⁵³ See R. B. Michell, Jurisprudence: With Special Reference to the Law of India (Madras: Higginbotham, 1883); Philip Morton, ed., Outlines of Jurisprudence (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1892); Philip Morton, A Preliminary Manual of Jurisprudence for the Use of Students (Lahore: The “News” Press, 1898).

⁵⁴ The first edition of the book was published in India. The second and third editions were published in London. My discussion is based on the third edition. See William H. Rattigan, The Science of Jurisprudence: Chiefly Intended for Indian Law Students, 3rd ed. (London: Wildy, 1899).

⁵⁵ Footnote Ibid., viii.

⁵⁶ Footnote Ibid., vii.

⁵⁷ Because of the “Indian” nature of Rattigan’s book, it was recommended as the textbook on jurisprudence to be used in Indian law schools, rather than Markby’s or Holland’s books. See “[Memorandum],” in Report of the Indian Universities Commission, 3.

⁵⁸ The table was created by comparing the first edition of Markby’s book, published in 1871, with the third edition of Rattigan’s book, published in 1899, using Wordclouds.com. While the two works are of different lengths, comparing the relative use of different keywords by the two authors reveals, I believe, the “Indian” orientation of Rattigan’s book compared to Markby’s. Such quantitative analysis is of limited value if one is only interested in the content of the jurisprudential arguments made by the two authors. However, it does illustrate the fact that Rattigan’s book was more focused on Indian topics, and used more examples taken from Indian law and culture than Markby’s book.

⁵⁹ It should be noted that the source of inspiration for nineteenth-century English jurisprudential literature, Austin’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, also relied heavily on Continental works (as indicated by the list of books provided at the beginning of Austin’s book). See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, 3rd ed. (London: John Murray, 1869), Vol. 1, ix–xiii. See also Stefan Vogenauer, “An Empire of Light? Learning and Lawmaking in the History of German Law,” Cambridge Law Journal 64 (2005): 48110.1017/S0008197305006938. For a somewhat similar openness to non-English sources in another part of the British Empire, see, e.g., G. Blaine Baker, “The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the Late-Victorian Empire,” Law and History Review 3 (1985): 21910.2307/743630.

⁶⁰ Rattigan, Science, 3rd ed., 5–10.

⁶¹ The review was cited on the opening page of the third edition of Rattigan’s book. See Rattigan, Science, 3rd ed., “Press Opinions on the Second Edition.”

⁶² Roman and Continental legal ideas reached India through various channels. Non-English European merchants and settlers were one group of actors involved in importing Continental legal norms and ideas. In some localities in India, such as Goa (which was a Portuguese colony) or Pondicherry (which was French), these norms remained valid even after Indian Independence. See K. M. Sharma, “Civil Law in India,” Washington University Law Quarterly 1 (1969): 1, 11–13, 17–38; Subhash C. Jain, “French Legal System in Pondicherry: An Introduction,” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 12 (1970): 573. British lawyers trained in civil and canon law, British administrators influenced by their classical education, British judges using Roman and Continental texts in their judgments, and British law reformers emulating the Continental codification movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were other actors importing Roman and Continental law to India. For example, the first volume of Savigny’s System des heutigen romischen Rechts was translated into English by a Madras judge, William Holloway, and Rattigan himself translated the second volume. On Holloway, and on the impact of Roman law in India more generally, see J. Duncan M. Derrett, “The Role of Roman Law and Continental Laws in India,” Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 24 (1959): 657, 670–82. See also Fernandez and Dubber, “Introduction,” 12–13 (mentioning another Anglo–Indian translation of Savigny, Sir Erskine Perry’s translation of Savigny’s book on possession). Indian scholars such as Asutosh Mookerjee were also fascinated by Roman law and urged Indians to study it. See Sharma, “Civil Law,” 5–11; Derrett, “Role of Roman Law.”

⁶³ Rattigan, Science, 3rd ed., 16. For an earlier example of the same argument, see Gooroodass Banerjee, The Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhan (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1879), 3–4. Interest in customs was also apparent in Markby’s book. Markby mentioned Indian village courts as an example of courts basing their decisions solely on customs. He also noted that the courts in India, when dealing with Hindus and Muslims, were directed by the legislature of British India to rule according to the “law and usages of Hindoos and Mahommedans, and not [according] to the law alone.” See Markby, Elements, 34. However, Markby did not rely on these facts, as Rattigan did, to critique Austinian jurisprudence.

⁶⁴ Rattigan, Science, 3rd ed., 13–18. On the role of customary law in the Punjab, see, generally, Bhattacharya, “Remaking Custom”; Andrew Sartori, “A Liberal Discourse of Custom in Colonial Bengal,” Past and Present 212 (2011): 16310.1093/pastj/gtr007.

⁶⁵ For Maine’s critique of Austin’s command theory and for his view of Hindu law, see Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1861), 7–8, 16–20. See, generally, Raymond Cocks, Sir Henry Maine: A Study in Victorian Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Enrico Pattaro, ed., A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Vol. 8: A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Common Law World, 1600–1900 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 198–9; David Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the Transatlantic Turn to History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 115–49.

⁶⁶ Rattigan, Science, 3rd ed., 74–7.

⁶⁷ Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), v. On Allen, see E. T. Williams, “Allen, Sir Carleton Kemp,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/30383.

⁶⁸ Allen, Law in the Making, 35–7.

⁶⁹ “Reviews,” Calcutta Law Journal 48 (1928): 24n, 24n–25n.

⁷⁰ The first jurisprudence book in English by a South Asian was authored by a young Burmese student studying in London. See Chan-Toon, The Nature and Value of Jurisprudence, Roman Law and International Law (London: W. Clowes & Sons, 1888). A second edition was published the following year. See Chan-Toon, The Nature and Value of Jurisprudence, 2nd enlarged ed. (London: Reeves and Turner, 1889), v–vii. For a somewhat unkind review of the second edition, see “Book Review,” Law Quarterly Review 5 (1889): 322. On Chan-Toon (and his infamous wife), see “Chan-Toon, Mrs. M.: Mabel Mary Agnes Cosgrove,” in Edwardian Fiction: An Oxford Companion, eds. Sandra Kemp, Charlotte Mitchell, and David Trotter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 6210.1093/acref/9780198117605.001.0001; Gregory Mackie, “Forging Oscar Wilde: Mrs. Chan-Toon and for Love of the King,” English Literature in Transition, 1880–1920 54 (2011): 267. It is interesting to note that Chan-Toon was also the author of one of the first books that attempted to summarize the principles of Buddhist law. See Chan-Toon, The Principles of Buddhist Law: Also Containing a Translation of Important Portions of The Manu Thara Shwe Myin, with Notes (Rangoon: Myles Standish, 1894). Additional works are P. C. Sen, A Summary of Holland’s Jurisprudence (Konnagar near Calcutta: J. M. Sen & Co., 1896); Mohamed Kalandar Ally Khan, A Summary of the Science of Jurisprudence with an Appendix Containing Leading Cases and Examination Questions (Hyderabad: Premier Steam Press, 1912); B. R. Agaskar and V. N. Vedak, Summary Lecture Notes on Jurisprudence; Being a Student’s Personal Book of Notes Covering the Matter Generally Required for the Paper on General Jurisprudence as Set at the First LL.B. Examination in Bombay (Bombay: Vinaya Printing Press, 1917); M. Barkat Ali, A Handbook of Jurisprudence (Lahore: The Observer Press, 1919); “A Vakil,” in Principles of Jurisprudence: For the Use of Law Students, 7th ed. (Calcutta: Das Gupta & Co., 1926); A Hand-Book of Jurisprudence Incorporating Maine’s Ancient Law (Madras: V. Ramaswamy Sastrulu & Sons, 1929).

⁷¹ One exception is Syed Mohamad, the author of a summary of Holland’s book, who advertised himself on the title page of his book as the “author of ‘Mind and Molecular Theory’, ‘Science and Islam’ etc.” In his preface, he admitted that “I am yet a student myself.” However, he continued, existing works summarizing the topic were of low quality, without explanation or critique, which “may have been useful to the rising sons of India in turning them out as Indian Jurists.” While summarizing Holland’s ideas, he therefore added notes to the text, in brackets, questioning some of them. See Syed Mohamad, The Student’s Holland: An Analytical Explanatory and Critical Commentary (Allahabad: Ram Dayal Agarwala, 1912), i.

⁷² See University of Calcutta, Calendar 1922 (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1922), 9, 288; University of Calcutta, Calendar 1931, 208; Karunamay Basu, The Modern Theories of Jurisprudence (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1925), Vol. 1, iii.

⁷³ Basu, Modern Theories, Vol. 1; Karunamay Basu, The Modern Theories of Jurisprudence, Vol. 2 (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1929) (this volume was subtitled The Plea for a Synthetic Philosophy of Law). See, generally, Nader Hakim and Fabrice Melleray, eds., Le renouveau de la doctrine française: Les grands auteurs de la pensée juridique au tournant du XXe siècle (Paris: Dalloz, 2009).

⁷⁴ On the American translation project, see David S. Clark, “The Modern Development of American Comparative Law, 1904–1945,” American Journal of Comparative Law 55 (2007): 587, 599–600, 60810.1093/ajcl/55.4.587. Another relevant American theoretical work was a three-volume collection of excerpts on the evolution of law. See Evolution of Law: Select Readings on the Origin and Development of Legal Institutions, eds. Albert Kocourek and John H. Wigmore eds., 3 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1915–1918). For discussions of the influence of American legal scholarship on Indian law in the later, post-Independence period, see Upendra Baxi, “Understanding the Traffic of Ideas in ‘Law’ between America and India,” in Traffic of Ideas between India and America, ed. Robert M. Crunden (Delhi: Chanakya Press, 1985), 319; Rajeev Dhavan, “Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of America Scholarship on Indian Law,” American Journal of Comparative Law 33 (1985): 50510.2307/840238; Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India,” American Journal of Legal History 47 (2003): 447; Jayanth K. Krishnan, “From the ALI to the ILI: The Efforts to Export an American Legal Institution,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 38 (2005): 1255.

⁷⁵ Basu’s book mentioned the works of non-English legal theorists such as Berolzheimer, Gareis, Gray, Korkunov, Miraglia, and Pound.

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Sitaram Banerjee, “Philosophy and Law,” Calcutta Law Journal 26 (1917): 5n (citing Jhering, Kohler, and Korkunov); “The Society and the Law (Psychical Theory of Society),” Calcutta Law Journal 28 (1918): 5n (mentioning Korkunov); B. K. Acharyya, “Scientific Study of Law,” Calcutta Law Journal 27 (1918): 29n, 37n (mentioning Garies, Korkunov, and Pound, and also calling for the study of comparative law, following the example of Japanese legal education); K. Krishna Menon, Outlines of Jurisprudence (Madras: Huxley Press, 1929) (mentioning Savigny and Korkunov); Asoke Sen, “The Relation between Law and Morality,” Calcutta University Law College Magazine 12 (1942): 75 (mentioning Korkunov, Pound, and Jellinek).

⁷⁷ See Andrew Sartori, Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 68–10810.7208/chicago/9780226734866.001.0001. On Indian liberal thought, see, generally, C. A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁷⁸ Sartori, Bengal, 97, 120, 126–9.

⁷⁹ Kris Manjapra, “From Imperial to International Horizons: A Hermeneutic Study of Bengali Modernism,” Modern Intellectual History 8 (2011): 32710.1017/S1479244311000217; Manjapra, Age of Entanglement, 12, 41. On earlier, fin-de-siècle, French influences, see Sartori, Bengal, 136–42. On Indians studying at American universities in the early twentieth century (and on the politics of this move as an expression of Indian nationalism), see Manjapra, Age of Entanglement, 41, 52–4, 213; Sara Legrandjacques, “Global Students? The International Mobility and Identity of Students from Colonial India and Indochina, 1880s–1945,” Global Histories 4(2) (October 2018): 46, 53–5.

⁸⁰ Manjapra, “From Imperial to International Horizons,” 337–9.

⁸¹ Footnote Ibid., 342, 345–6, 348; Manjapra, Age of Entanglement, 47–52, 98–102.

⁸² Basu, Modern Theories, Vol. 1, xi–iii, liii.

⁸³ Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, liii–iv. Other works written by Indian scholars of the time also showed an awareness of, and interest in, sociological jurisprudence. See Acharyya, “Scientific Study,” 32n; Sures Chandra Chakravarti, Studies in Jurisprudence and International Law (Calcutta: Butterworth & Co., 1924); N. Srinivasan, “The Juristic and Political Ideas of Duguit,” Indian Journal of Political Science 1 (1939): 1.

⁸⁴ See Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence,” 37–8. Perhaps the closest English equivalent to Basu’s book, both in terms of the period in which it was published and also its interest in non-English theories, was George Keeton’s 1930 book. See George W. Keeton, The Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence (London: A. & C. Black, 1930). This book was based on lectures delivered in Hong Kong in 1924. On the influence of non-English legal theories on this book, see Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence,” 9–13 (noting Keeton’s awareness of American legal theories, such as legal realism, especially in the second edition of his book, published in 1949). One should also note the presence of Continental works by scholars such as Berolzheimer or Duguit in Keeton’s book. See also Duxbury, “English Jurisprudence,” 54–69 (discussing the impact of American legal realism on English works). For a general discussion of the relationship between English and American legal scholars, see David Sugarman, “A Special Relationship? American Influences on English Legal Education, c. 1870–1965,” International Journal of the Legal Profession 18 (2011): 710.1080/09695958.2011.630899.

⁸⁵ John Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1924), 15, 564.

⁸⁶ Thomas Erskine Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, 12th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1917).

⁸⁷ Basu said in the preface to the first volume that “it was pointed out to me as a defect by a very high authority that my synopsis did not contain any reference to Hindu jurisprudence.” In the preface to the second volume, he mentioned in this context “the great patron of learning, whose words [were] uttered while he was at the helm of our University,” and noted that he was now dead, thus indicating that this person was Asutosh Mookerjee. Basu, Modern Theories, Vol. 1, vii; Vol. 2, vi.

⁸⁸ Basu, Modern Theories, Vol. 1, vii. This might be seen as an echo of a more general theme in modern Western culture, the Orient as a source of ancient wisdom. See, e.g., Harry Oldmeadow, “Ex Oriente Lux: Eastern Religions, Western Writers,” Literature & Aesthetics 21 (2011): 23.

⁸⁹ Basu, Modern Theories, Vol. 1, vii–viii. Another excuse Basu provided for not discussing Hindu legal theories was that “the comparative study of Hindu legal philosophy and jurisprudence in all its phases in the light of modern juristic theories is a fascinating subject for juristic research, and is further, bound to be immensely useful in the practical field of legal reform which is now-a-days so much in demand all over the civilised world.” Nevertheless, he continued, “it is a vast subject, more comprehensive and arduous than even the whole course of my lectures, [ … and, therefore,] I trust it may be selected as a future subject of the Tagore lectures and undertaken by some worthier devotee (than myself) alike of Hindu and the modern social and legal philosophy; or better still, considering that the subject is capable of infinite expansion and research, a more permanent chair or institution may be founded under suitable conditions to promote its culture.” Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, viii.

⁹⁰ Basu, Modern Theories, Vol. 2, v–vi.

⁹¹ There were also only a few references to Indian terms. One example is the allusion to the Hindu notions of “atman” and “manas” as equivalents of Western notions of soul and mind. See Basu, Modern Theories, Vol. 1, 17, 323. Another example is the reference to yoga or darsana when explaining neo-platonism. See Footnote ibid., Vol. 1, 41, 42. Finally, in Basu’s discussion of anarchism, a footnote said that “modern social anarchists of a religious or ethical type are represented by Tolstoy and Tucker, who do not advocate violence but passive resistance; cf. that advocated by Mr. Gandhi in leading the recent non-cooperation movement against the bureaucratic government in British India.” Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 323.

⁹² Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 257–8.

⁹³ Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 261.

⁹⁴ In a somewhat similar fashion, when Basu discussed Herbert Spencer’s sociology, he talked about “European nations … and of less civilised races, e.g., the Polynesians, the Africans, and some Asiatic people.” Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 378.

⁹⁵ Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 429. See also his discussion of Chamberlain’s pro-English racist sentiments. Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 432.

⁹⁶ Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 146–7.

⁹⁷ Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 311–27. It is interesting to note that contemporary English works, such as Holland’s and Keeton’s books, contained no such discussions of socialist legal theory.

⁹⁸ Footnote Ibid., Vol. 1, 174.

⁹⁹ There is a large body of works discussing the extent to which the English invented the “law” of their South Asian subjects. Such discussions can be found in the nineteenth-century debate about the existence of “Hindu law” between James Henry Nelson and John D. Mayne. See J. H. Nelson, A View of Hindu Law as Administered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Madras: Higginbotham, 1877), i–iii, 1–16; J. H. Nelson, A Prospectus of the Scientific Study of the Hindu Law (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1881), v–viii; John D. Mayne, “Hindu Law in Madras,” Law Quarterly Review 3 (1887): 446; John D. Mayne, A Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 7th ed. (Madras: Higginbotham, 1906), ix–x, 2–5. On the Nelson vs. Mayne debate, including antecedents, and later discussions, see, e.g., Radhabinod Pal, The History of Hindu Law in the Vedic Age and in Post-Vedic Times down the Institutes of Manu (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1958), 1–2; J. D. M. Derrett, “J. H. Nelson: A Forgotten Administrator-Historian of India,” in Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ed. C. H. Philips (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 354; Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, “Barristers and Brahmans in India: Legal Cultures and Social Change,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 8 (1965): 24, 36–810.1017/S0010417500003881; Nandini Bhattacharyya-Panda, Appropriation and Invention of Tradition: The East India Company and Hindu Law in Early Colonial Bengal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3–10, 30–2. Twentieth-century discussions of the topic include Marc Galanter, “The Displacement of Traditional Law in Modern India,” Journal of Social Issues 24 (1968): 65, 69–7610.1111/j.1540-4560.1968.tb02316.x; Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 57–75. For a relatively recent summary of the debate in the literature about the nature of British codification of Hindu Law, see Sharafi, “South Asian Legal History,” 319. See also Jean-Louis Halpérin, “Western Legal Transplants and India,” Jindal Global Law Review 2 (2010): 14; Davis and Lubin, “Hinduism and Colonial Law”; Axel Michaels, “The Practice of Classical Hindu Law,” in Lubin et al., eds., Hinduism and Law, 58; Rachel Sturman, The Government of Social Life in Colonial India: Liberalism, Religious Law and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)10.1017/CBO9780511851940; Eleanor Newbigin, The Hindu Family and the Emergence of Modern India: Law, Citizenship and Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)10.1017/CBO9781139795364; Geetanjali Srikantan, Identifying and Regulating Religion in India: Law, History and the Place of Worship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020)10.1017/9781108886307. For arguments that Hinduism itself was a modern construct, see, e.g., Gauri Vishwanathan, “Colonialism and the Construction of Hinduism,” in The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, ed. Gavin Flood (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 23, 26–2710.1002/9780470998694.ch2; Brian K. Pennington, Was Hinduism Invented? Britons, Indians, and the Colonial Construction of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)10.1093/0195166558.001.0001; Chaudhry, South Asia, 407–19. For a general discussion on the problem of designating ancient normative traditions as “legal systems,” see Dupret and Halpérin, eds., State Law and Legal Positivism.

¹⁰⁰ See, e.g., William Hay Macnaghten, Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1828–1829); Thomas Strange, Hindu Law … (London: Parbury, Allen, 1830); Standish Grove Grady, A Manual of Hindu Law for the Use of Students and Practitioners (London: Wildy and Sons, 1871); Mayne, A Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage; Dinshah Fardunji Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law (Bombay: N. M. Tripathi, 1912). For a recent discussion of Hindu law in colonial case law, see, e.g., Tirthankar Roy and Anand V. Swamy, Law and the Economy in Colonial India (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

¹⁰¹ See, e.g., Julius Jolly, Hindu Law and Custom, trans. Batakrishna Ghosh (Calcutta: Greater Indian Society, 1928); Ganganatha Jha, Hindu Law in Its Sources, 2 vols. (Allahabad: Indian Press, 1930–1933); P. V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, 5 vols. (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930–1962). For works on specific subfields of Hindu law, see, e.g., Amareswar Thakur, Hindu Law of Evidence: Or a Comparative Study of the Law of Evidence According to the Smrtis (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1933).

¹⁰² One can also find a few older works discussing some jurisprudential aspects of Hindu law – for example, whether the secular Austinian definition of law fitted the notion of law in Hindu law. See Chew, “Of ‘Unchaste’ Widows,” 132–3, 148–50 (discussing books based on Tagore Lectures from the 1870s and 1880s, in which the Indian authors criticized the Western, secular definitions of law as inapplicable to Hindu law). See also Janaki Nath Pal Sastri, “Hindu Jurisprudence,” Calcutta Law Journal 8–9 (1908–1909): 13n (an article on the topic published in several installments).

¹⁰³ See, generally, Geoffrey A. Oddie, Imagined Hinduism: British Protestant Missionary Constructions of Hinduism, 1793–1900 (New Delhi: Sage, 2006).

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., Kenneth W. Jones, Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

¹⁰⁵ For example, none of the works I will discuss is mentioned in modern works on Hindu law, such as Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).

¹⁰⁶ See, generally, Assaf Likhovski, “History of British Legal Education in Mandatory Palestine,” in Experimental Legal Education in a Globalized World: The Middle East and Beyond, eds. Mutaz M. Qafisheh and Stephen A. Rosenbaum (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 177, 189–97 (on the use of Austinian jurisprudence to legitimize British colonial rule). See also Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 33–510.1515/9781400835072 (on James Mill’s argument that British colonial rule was meant to free Indians from their “stagnant” customs). On the image of Hindu law as frozen and “perverted,” see Maine, Ancient Law, 20. See also Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 32–3, 102, 172, 208.

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., Schmitthenner, “A Sketch,” 376–81; Mithi Mukherjee, India in the Shadows of Empire: A Legal and Political History, 1774–1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 105–49.

¹⁰⁸ Marc Galanter, “The Aborted Restoration of ‘Indigenous’ Law in India,” in Law and Society in Modern India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 37. On the history of British and Nationalist attitudes to the Panchayats, see, generally, James Jaffe, Ironies of Colonial Governance: Law, Custom and Justice in Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)10.1017/CBO9781316104392; James Jaffe, “Gandhi, Lawyers, and the Courts’ Boycott during the Non-Cooperation Movement,” Modern Asian Studies 51 (2017): 134010.1017/S0026749X1600024X. See also Deepa Das Acevedo, “Developments in Hindu Law from the Colonial to the Present,” Religion Compass 7 (2013): 252, 257–810.1111/rec3.12052 (a brief discussion on the attempts by nationalists to reform specific aspects of Hindu law during the colonial period); Smita Narula, “Law and Hindu Nationalist Movements,” in Lubin et al., eds., Hinduism and Law, 234 (a discussion of the relationship between Hindu nationalism and Hindu law after Indian Independence).

¹⁰⁹ Priyanath Sen, The General Principles of Hindu Law (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1918). Sen came from an upper-caste family in Bengal and first studied Sanskrit with his father, who was a Sanskrit scholar. He was later trained as a Sanskrit scholar at the University of Calcutta. See “Dr. Priya Nath Sen,” Calcutta Law Journal 10 (1909): 37n. See also Priya Nath Sen, Philosophy of the Vedanta (Calcutta: Oriental Publishing House, 1900). It is interesting to note that the lecture series delivered a year before, by Sripati Roy, was also more theoretical in comparison with previous years. See Sripati Roy, Customs and Customary Law in British India (Calcutta: Hare Press, 1911).

¹¹⁰ Sen, General Principles, 2–3.

¹¹¹ Footnote Ibid., 1–4.

¹¹² Footnote Ibid., 5.

¹¹³ Footnote Ibid., 6–7, 36. On the problematic distinction between “religious” and “secular” law, see Cohn, Colonialism, 71; Robert A. Yelle, “The Hindu Moses: Christian Polemics against Jewish Ritual and the Secularization of Hindu Law under Colonialism,” History of Religions 49 (2011): 14110.1086/649524.

¹¹⁴ Sen, General Principles, 26–31. On sanctions in Hindu law, see also Jogendra Chunder Ghose, The Principles of Hindu Law, 3rd ed. (Calcutta: S. C. Auddy & Co., 1917), Vol. 1, 7. In Chapter 5 of this book, I discuss in more detail this argument as well as additional ones which appeared in works written in India in the first decades of the twentieth century on ancient Indian constitutional history.

¹¹⁵ Sen, General Principles, 30.

¹¹⁶ Maine, Ancient Law, 20.

¹¹⁷ Sen, General Principles, 37–8, 374.

¹¹⁸ Footnote Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Footnote Ibid, 61. Another work in which Maine’s theories were criticized was Surendra Nath Sen, An Essay on Hindu Jurisprudence (Allahabad: Indian Press, 1911). While Maine portrayed Hindu law as inflexible and non-dynamic, unlike Roman and English law, Surendra Nath argued that this inflexibility was not “an unmixed evil” because it prevented the “adulteration” of the law, such as that witnessed in the case of Roman law after the Barbarian invasions. This inflexibility also ensured “uniformity, simplicity and certainty” (Footnote ibid., 7–8). Later in his book, Surendra Nath also discussed a large number of means by which the Brahmanical sages were able to repeal old laws, thus challenging the image of Hindu law as static (Footnote ibid., 38–41). In addition, the book also criticized the Austinian definition of law. Hindu law did not emanate from a sovereign human authority (the Hindu king being merely the enforcer of laws, not their creator), it was not necessarily a command (it included rules of conduct that Austin would not have considered law), and it was not related to the use of force (the sanctions being religious, not earthly) (Footnote ibid., 22–31). The identity of the author of this book is unclear; the British Library Catalog identifies the author as Surendra Nath Sen (1890–1962), who was a University of Calcutta historian. However, the title page of the book, published in Allahabad, states that the author is “a vakil, high court, nwp [North-Western Provinces].”

¹²⁰ Sen, General Principles, 284.

¹²¹ Footnote Ibid., 293.

¹²² Footnote Ibid., 302–3.

¹²³ Footnote Ibid., 374–77.

¹²⁴ On this idea, see, generally Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 69.

¹²⁵ Sen, General Principles, 376–8.

¹²⁶ See, generally, Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 156, 163. It is unclear how original some of Sen’s arguments were, and to what extent he was merely repeating arguments made previously by others. For example, the rejection of Austinian positivism using the argument that Hindu law did not fit the Austinian model because its norms were not the commands of a political sovereign and were not accompanied by political sanctions was, as we saw, already present in earlier works, for example, in Rattigan’s textbook. It was also present in works written by Indian lawyers. See Banerjee, Hindu Law of Marriage, 3; J. R. Ghorpure, Hindu Law (Bombay: Maruti Babaji, 1905), 1–2.

¹²⁷ For a brief biography, see Samaresh Devnath, “Sengupta, Naresh Chandra,” in Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003), Vol. 9, 168. On the University of Dacca, see Ashby, Universities, 109–10, 134. On Sen Gupta’s ongoing interest in the study of Hindu law, see N. C. Sengupta, “Hints on an Historical Study of Hindu Law,” Calcutta University Law College Magazine 13 (1943): 7, 18.

¹²⁸ Nares Chandra Sen Gupta, Sources of Law and Society in Ancient India (Calcutta: Art Press, 1914), v–vii, 27.

¹²⁹ Footnote Ibid., i–ii.

¹³⁰ Footnote Ibid., i, ii, 8–20, 44.

¹³¹ Footnote Ibid., 22–3, 78.

¹³² Footnote Ibid., 22–3.

¹³³ Footnote Ibid., 8. On democracy in ancient India and on the idea of an “ancient Indian constitution” (two ideas which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5), see also Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 164, 267.

¹³⁴ Sen Gupta, Sources of Law and Society, 80–1. The quote is taken from Luigi Miraglia, Comparative Legal Philosophy: Applied to Legal Institutions, trans. John Lisle (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 120.

¹³⁵ Sen Gupta, Sources of Law and Society, 5–6, 28–32, 50–51, 99–100.

¹³⁶ Nares Chandra Sen Gupta, The Evolution of Law (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1925).

¹³⁷ Footnote Ibid., v–vi.

¹³⁸ Footnote Ibid., 21.

¹³⁹ Footnote Ibid., 18–19.

¹⁴⁰ Footnote Ibid., 19–20.

¹⁴¹ Footnote Ibid., 22.

¹⁴² Footnote Ibid., 22. See also Footnote ibid., 95–6 (an additional place in the book in which Maine was criticized).

¹⁴³ Footnote Ibid., 36.

¹⁴⁴ Footnote Ibid., 34–7.

¹⁴⁵ Footnote Ibid., 55.

¹⁴⁶ Footnote Ibid., 56. It is not clear that he was depicting the development of Roman law correctly. See Blewett Lee, “A Sketch of Woman’s Rights in Ancient Rome,” Northwestern Law Review 2 (1894): 67, 69.

¹⁴⁷ Sen Gupta, The Evolution of Law, 68.

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., Sastri, “Hindu Jurisprudence”; Nagendra Nath Mukerjee, “Indo-Aryan Penal Jurisprudence,” Calcutta Law Journal 14 (1911): 29n; Atul Chandra Gupta, “The Spirit of Hindu Law,” Calcutta Law Journal 42 (1925): 43n.

¹⁴⁹ Mohamed Elias, “A. S. Panchapakesa Ayyar,” in Encyclopedia of Post-Colonial Literatures in English, eds. Eugene Benson and L. W. Conolly, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), 1:91–2.

¹⁵⁰ A. S. Panchapakesa Ayyar, “The Contribution of Hindu Law to World Jurisprudence,” Reprint from the Madras Law Journal, Golden Jubilee Number, 1941 [a copy of the reprint of this article can be found in the British Library].

¹⁵¹ Footnote Ibid., 1.

¹⁵² Footnote Ibid., 1.

¹⁵³ Footnote Ibid., 2–3, 5–6.

¹⁵⁴ Footnote Ibid., 3.

¹⁵⁵ Footnote Ibid., 8.

¹⁵⁶ Footnote Ibid., 8–10.

¹⁵⁷ Footnote Ibid., 16.

¹⁵⁸ Thakur Prasad Dubey, “Hindu Jurisprudence: Its Beauties and Comparative Greatness,” Allahabad Law Journal 42 (1944): 11.

¹⁵⁹ Footnote Ibid., 13.

¹⁶⁰ Footnote Ibid., 16–17. For similar sentiments, see S. Varadachariar, The Hindu Judicial System (Lucknow: Lucknow University, 1946), v.

¹⁶¹ For the earlier approach, see Sen, General Principles, 5 (only parts of Hindu law were now applicable in the courts of British India because, “owing to altered conditions of the Hindu community, a considerable portion of [Hindu law] does not at all attract the attention of a practicing lawyer,” and it had therefore “ceased … to be living law”); Sen, An Essay, 117 (“the subject of Hindu Jurisprudence … has hitherto been a virgin field … [and] failed to attract more capable workers, presumably because the bulk of the Shastric laws … [are] no longer the laws in force in British India, [and therefore] could not be expected to rouse a deep practical interest”). But see Sen Gupta, Sources of Law and Society, 6 (mentioning Nelson’s argument that Hindu law never existed, and arguing that the similarity between “non-jural” customs of contemporary Hindu India and ancient Hindu law proved that it had existed, and still existed, and was not “affected by the political changes of history … in spite of all aberrations and all subsequent influences”).

¹⁶² See, e.g., Faisal Devji, “Apologetic Modernity,” Modern Intellectual History 4 (2007): 6110.1017/S1479244306001041; Leor Halevi, Modern Things on Trial: Islam’s Global and Material Reformation in the Age of Rida, 1865–1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019)10.7312/hale18866; Adeel Hussain, Law and Muslim Political Thought in Late Colonial North India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022)10.1093/oso/9780192859778.001.0001.

¹⁶³ Another major legal system in Colonial South Asia was Buddhist law. In Colonial Burma, the British created a body of Anglo–Buddhist personal law. In 1894, the Burmese author mentioned in Footnote n. 70 above, Chan-Toon, published a book summarizing the “principles” of this law. This was not a theoretical work, but one whose main audience was practitioners. See Chan-Toon, Principles of Buddhist Law. A similar work was Sisir Chandra Lahiri, Principles of Modern Burmese Buddhist Law (n.p.: Graduate Friends & Co., 1925). There were also historical works published in British India that dealt with the history of Buddhist law, written from a historical or a philological perspective, rather than attempting to critically engage with nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western jurisprudence. See Durga N. Bhagvat, Early Buddhist Jurisprudence (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1939). On Buddhist law in colonial Burma, see also Andrew Huxley, “Positivists and Buddhists: The Rise and Fall of Anglo-Burmese Ecclesiastical Law,” Law and Social Inquiry 26 (2001): 11310.1111/j.1747-4469.2001.tb00173.x; Sharafi, Law and Identity, 131–2.

¹⁶⁴ See, e.g., Iza R. Hussin, The Politics of Islamic Law: Local Elites, Colonial Authority, and the Making of the Muslim State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016)10.7208/chicago/9780226323480.001.0001; Julia Stephens, Governing Islam: Law, Empire, and Secularism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)10.1017/9781316795477. On the terminological problems of designating this system, see Stephens, Governing Islam, 8n19; Guenther, “Syed Mahmood,” 11–13.

¹⁶⁵ Calcutta University Commission 1917–1919, Report, 1:164, 2:108–39; University of Calcutta Convocation Addresses, Vol. 6: 1924–34 (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1938), 240, 263; Census of India, 1911, Vol. 5, part II, Bengal: Tables (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, 1913), 23–5. It is important to note that, in some areas of India, Muslim lawyers outnumbered Hindu ones. See Misra, Indian Middle Classes, 327–32 (noting that there were relatively few Muslim lawyers in Bengal, but that Muslim lawyers dominated the upper echelons of the bars of the United Provinces and Bihar).

¹⁶⁶ Michael Anderson mentioned nine such books written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Michael R. Anderson, “Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India,” in Institutions and Ideologies: A SOAS South Asian Reader, eds. David Arnold and Peter Robb (London: Routledge, 1993), 165, 175–6. A more comprehensive list was recently compiled by Sohaira Siddiqui: see Sohaira Z. M. Siddiqui, Islamic Law on Trial: Contesting Colonial Power in British India (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2025), 161–2. See also Guenther, “Syed Mahmood,” 28–30, 172–3 (another general discussion of works on Anglo–Muhammadan law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); Gregory C. Kozlowski, Muslim Endowments and Society in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 130–110.1017/CBO9780511896873 (on the influence of English legal classification structures on texts on Islamic law published in India); John Strawson, “Revisiting Islamic Law: Marginal Notes from Colonial History,” Griffith Law Review 12 (2003): 362, 369–7010.1080/10383441.2003.10854525; John Strawson, “Islamic Law and English Texts,” Law and Critique 6 (1995): 2110.1007/BF01128499; Scott Alan Kugle, “Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia,” Modern Asian Studies 35 (2001): 25710.1017/S0026749X01002013; Elisa Giunchi, “The Reinvention of Sharia Under the British Raj: In Search of Authenticity and Certainty,” Journal of Asian Studies 69 (2010): 111910.1017/S0021911810002895.

¹⁶⁷ The Hedaya, or Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws, trans. Charles Hamilton (London: T. Bensley, 1791); William Hay Macnaghten, Principles and Precedents of Moohummudan Law … (Calcutta: Mission Press, 1824). See, generally, Kugle, “Framed”; Strawson, “Revisiting Islamic Law,” 375–6; Sohaira Siddiqui, “Navigating Colonial Power: Challenging Precedents and the Limitation of Local Elites,” Islamic Law and Society 26 (2019): 272, 274–910.1163/15685195-02612A03.

¹⁶⁸ In this subsection, I discuss books on Islamic law and jurisprudence. The interaction between English legal and jurisprudential ideas and Islamic law was not confined to such works. There were other, less direct, arenas of interaction, for example, in the decisions of Muslim judges in British India, such as Syed Mahmood. In addition, such interaction could be also found in other arenas, for example, in political writing. See Guenther, “Syed Mahmood,” 54–5, 172–99. See also Siddiqui, “Navigating Colonial Power”; Siddiqui, Islamic Law on Trial.

¹⁶⁹ See Ameer Ali, Student’s Handbook of Mahommedan Law, 4th ed. (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1903).

¹⁷⁰ Ameer Ali, The Personal Law of the Mahommedans (London: W. H. Allen, 1880); Ameer Ali, The Law Relating to Gifts, Trusts and Testamentary Dispositions Among the Mahommedans (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1885).

¹⁷¹ See Chatterjee, “Law, Culture and History,” 45, 49–54. See also Cheema, “Tagore Law Lecturer’s,” 5–6. On Ali’s knowledge of Arabic and of Islamic law, see Chatterjee, “Law, Culture and History,” 48–9; Muslims in India: A Biographical Dictionary, ed. Naresh Kumar Jain (New Delhi: Manohar, 1979), Vol. 1, 85; Memoirs and Other Writings of Syed Ameer Ali, ed. Syed Razi Wasti (Lahore: People’s Publishing House, 1968), 19.

¹⁷² Dinshah Fardunji Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law (Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1905), iii.

¹⁷³ Footnote Ibid. For a critical assessment of Mulla’s approach to Islamic law, see Shahbaz Ahmad Cheema, “Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law in Pakistani Courts: Undoing/Unraveling the Colonial Enterprise?” Lahore University of Management Sciences Law Journal 4 (2017): 56, 61–7. See also Shahbaz Ahmad Cheema and Samee Ozair Khan, “Genealogical Analysis of Islamic Law Books Relied on in the Courts of Pakistan,” Al-Adwa 28(40) (2013): 23, 29–31. Mulla was a Parsi and, therefore, a religious “outsider” to Islamic law. A detailed discussion of his life can be found in Sharafi, Law and Identity, 113–15. On the role of native “outsiders” as mediators between local legal systems and the British, see Sharafi, “A New History of Colonial Lawyering,” 1072–9.

¹⁷⁴ Faiz Badruddin Tyabji, Principles of Muhammadan Law: An Essay at a Complete Statement of the Personal Law Applicable to Muslims in British India, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Butterworth, 1919), i.

¹⁷⁵ Footnote Ibid. Tyabji, the son of the first Muslim president of the Indian National Congress, studied at a modern Muslim school in Bombay, the Anjuman-I-Islam School (founded by his father), and he turned to its Principal to translate the Arabic texts used in his book. See Footnote ibid., v–vi.

¹⁷⁶ Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence: According to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i and Hanbali Schools (London: Luzac, 1911). The first chapter of the book, providing a historical overview of the legal history of Islam, was published in three installments in the Columbia Law Review. See Abdur Rahim, “Historical Sketch of Mohammedan Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law Review 7 (1907): 101, 186, 25510.2307/1109683. Similar articles were published in Vols. 3 and 5 of the Calcutta Law Journal in 1906 and 1907. It is interesting to note that, while C. H. Alexandrowicz did mention a couple of works on Hindu jurisprudence in his 1958 bibliography of Indian law, he failed to mention Abdur Rahim’s book. The only work on Islamic jurisprudence that he mentioned was a book by Columbia University Professor Joseph Schacht. See Alexandrowicz, Bibliography, 4, 6. But see Roscoe Pound, “Book Review,” Harvard Law Review 29 (1916): 34810.2307/1326083 (noting the contribution of Abdur Rahim’s book to the “science of law”). Abdur Rahim read Arabic, but the extent of his formal training in Islamic law is unclear (he studied in the government high school in the city of Midnapore in Bengal). Biographical information on him can be found in Jain, ed., Muslims in India, Vol. 1, 32–3; Eminent Mussalmans (Madras: G. A. Natesan & Co., 1926), 465, 467–9. In her recent book, Sohaira Siddiqui also discusses Abdur Rahim’s book (as well as two additional works dealing with more specific theoretical issues, Syed Karamat Husein, A Treatise on Right and Duty, Their Evolution, Definition, Analysis, and Classification According to Jurisprudence, Being a Portion of the Muhammadan Law of Gifts (Allahabad: Indian Press, 1899) and Hamid Ali, Custom and Law in Anglo-Muslim Jurisprudence (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1938)). See Siddiqui, Islamic Law on Trial, 170–5.

¹⁷⁷ See Cheema, “Tagore Law Lecturer’s,” 7.

¹⁷⁸ See C. G. Weeramantry, Islamic Jurisprudence: An International Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), xi10.1007/978-1-349-19456-8 (Mohammad Hidayatullah, the Chief Justice, and later Vice President, of India, notes that “Abdur Rahim’s book Muslim Jurisprudence has been for a long time the only book [on the topic] suitable for scholars”).

¹⁷⁹ Abdur Rahim, Principles, vi.

¹⁸⁰ Footnote Ibid., vi–vii.

¹⁸¹ See Cheema, “Tagore Law Lecturer’s,” 8.

¹⁸² Abdur Rahim, Principles, 23.

¹⁸³ Footnote Ibid., 35, 40, 55, 65, 97, 266, 271–2, 282, 305–7, 309, 382.

¹⁸⁴ Footnote Ibid., 57.

¹⁸⁵ Footnote Ibid., 57–9.

¹⁸⁶ The relative conservatism of the works on jurisprudence and Islamic law can be contrasted with the creative and critical engagement of Muslim scholars with Western liberal economic theory. See Stephens, Governing Islam, 155–67.

¹ “University Intelligence. Oxford,” The Globe, November 14, 1901; “University Intelligence,” The Times, September 26, 1904; The University of Leeds, First Report 1903–4 (Leeds: McCorquodale, 1905), 35; Les sources du droit positif: Fascicule 1, Orient (Égypte, Palestine, Chine, Japon), ed. Elemér Balogh (Berlin: Hermann Sack, 1929); “Mesibah li-khvod Menahel Shi‘urey ha-Mishpat,” Davar, May 24, 1933; Dr. Norman Bentwich, “[Obituary] Dr. F. M. Goadby,” The Times, August 18, 1956. On Goadby and his works, see also Assaf Likhovski, “Colonialism, Nationalism and Legal Education: The Case of Mandatory Palestine,” in The History of Law in a Multicultural Society: Israel 1917–1967, eds. Ron Harris et al. (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002), 75; John Strawson, “Orientalism and Legal Education in the Middle East: Reading Frederic Goadby’s Introduction to the Study of Law,” Legal Studies 21 (2001): 66310.1111/j.1748-121X.2001.tb00185.x; John W. Cairns, “Development of Comparative Law in Great Britain,” in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, eds. Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 111, 125–6.

² Frederic M. Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law: A Handbook for the Use of Egyptian Law Students (London: Butterworth, 1910); Frederic M. Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law: A Handbook for the Use of Law Students in Egypt and Palestine, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworth, 1921).

³ In the preface to the book, Goadby explained that English works that were used in Egypt, such as Holland’s book, were written from a “dominantly English” point of view, which made them less useful for “students who know nothing and need to know nothing about English law.” See Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law (1910), v.

⁴ R[oscoe] P[ound], “[Review] Introduction to the Study of Law: A Handbook for the Use of Egyptian Law Students by Frederic M. Goadby,” Harvard Law Review 25 (1912): 397.

⁵ M. S. A., “[Review] Introduction to the Study of the Law: A Handbook for the use of Egyptian Law Students,” Law Quarterly Review 27 (1911): 121; “[Review] Introduction to the Study of the Law: A Handbook for the Use of Egyptian Law Students, 2nd edition, 1914,” Law Quarterly Review 31 (1915): 123.

⁶ E. Mills, Census of Palestine 1931 (Alexandria: Whitehead and Morris, 1933), Vol. 1, 44; United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly (New York: n.p., 1947), Vol. 1, 11.

⁷ Donald M. Reid, Lawyers and Politics in the Arab World, 1880–1960 (Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), 84; Norman de Mattos Bentwich and Helen Bentwich, Mandate Memories, 1918–1948 (New York: Schocken, 1965), 212.

⁸ Israel State Archive [ISA], Record Group 3, LS 194/23 II, Note on the Jerusalem Law Classes; ISA, Record Group 3, CS 256, “Law Classes in Jerusalem,” October 5, 1920; Gad Frumkin, Derekh Shofet bi-Yerushalayim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1954), 157.

⁹ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 181; Reid, Lawyers, 1–2, 76–9, 91–114, 303; Nathan Brun, Shoftim u-Mishpetanim be-Erets Yisrael: Beyn Kushta li-Yerushalayim, 1900–1930 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2008), 72–113; Mustafa Serdar Palabıyık, “International Law for Survival: Teaching International Law in the Late Ottoman Empire (1859–1922),” Bulletin of SOAS 78 (2015): 271, 275–6. On the Ottoman legal reforms of the nineteenth century, see, generally, Avi Rubin, Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)10.1057/9780230119062. On Ottoman-educated intellectuals and bureaucrats in interwar Middle Eastern countries, see, generally, Michael Provence, The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017)10.1017/9781139049221.

¹⁰ Government of Palestine, Report on Palestine Administration, July 1920–December 1921 (London: HMSO, 1922), 94–5; Reid, Lawyers, 313–14; Gabriel Strassman, ‘Otey ha-Glimah: Toldot ‘Arikhat ha-Din be-Erets Yisra’el (Tel Aviv: Lishkat ‘Orkhey ha-Din be-Yisra’el, 1984), 315–24.

¹¹ Central Zionist Archives [CZA], A 255/706, Herbert Samuel, Speech at the Law Classes, 1924, 2; Bentwich and Bentwich, Mandate Memories, 212; Norman Bentwich, My 77 Years: An Account of My Life and Times, 1883–1960 (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961), 30–1.

¹² For a more detailed discussion of the history of legal education in Mandatory Palestine, see Likhovski, “Colonialism”; Assaf Likhovski, “Limudey ha-Mishpatim ba-Universitah ha-‘Ivrit bi-Tkufat ha-Mandat” in Toldot ha-Universitah ha-‘Ivrit bi-Yerushalayim: Hitbasesut u-Tsmihah, ed. Hagit Lavski (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2005), 543; Assaf Likhovski, Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 106–26.

¹³ “Beyt ha-Sefer le-Mishpatim,” Do’ar ha-Yom, February 1, 1923; H. Kantrovitch, “The Jerusalem Law Classes,” Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 1937 (1937): 46, 46–7; ISA, Record Group 3, LS 194/23 II, Note on the Jerusalem Law Classes.

¹⁴ Regulations of the Jerusalem Law Classes, Palestine Gazette, May 25, 1933, sections 2, 5(4), 3, 8. In the 1920s, the British did contemplate the creation of a university in Palestine, to provide academic rather than vocational education. However, this idea never came to fruition. See Pinhas Ofer, “A Scheme for the Establishment of a British University in Jerusalem in the Late 1920s,” Middle Eastern Studies 22 (1986): 27410.1080/00263208608700663.

¹⁵ In addition to jurisprudence and legal history there were a few other courses that were more theoretical (political science, political economy, political history, and constitutional history). On the curriculum of the Law Classes, see Council of Legal Studies-Jerusalem, Provisional Program of Studies and Examination Regulations, 1922 (n.p., Ha-Solel, n.d.); CZA, A 215/173, “Examinations, 1923”; Kantrovitch, “Jerusalem Law Classes”; Bentwich and Bentwich, Mandate Memories, 212–13.

¹⁶ Samuel Eisenstadt, “‘Al Hora’at ha-Mishpat ha-‘Ivri be-Veyt ha-Sefer shel Memshelet Erets Yisrael,” Ha-Mishpat 2 (1927): 209. See also Paltiel Dikshtein, “Ha-Universitah veha-Mishpat,” Ha-‘Olam, August 18, 1931.

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion, see Likhovski, “Limudey ha-Mishpatim,” 543.

¹⁸ Ha-Lishkah ha-Tsiyonit ha-Merkazit, “‘Al Ve‘idat ha-Universitah,” Ha-‘Olam, January 9, 1920, 12; Frumkin, Derekh Shofet, 231.

¹⁹ CZA, A 255/826, Norman Bentwich, “Proposal for a Legal Faculty at the Jerusalem University.”

²⁰ Likhovski, “Limudey ha-Mishpatim,” 559.

²¹ See CZA, A 212/37, Samuel Eisenstadt, “Ha-Universitah shel Tel Aviv: Beyt ha-Sefer le-Mishpat ve-le-Kalkalah,” 4; David N. Myers, Re-inventing the Jewish Past: European Jewish Intellectuals and the Zionist Return to History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 87–9.

²² Hebrew University Archive, Jerusalem, Ha-Vaʿadah ha-Matmedet, Yeshivah Asirit, May 15, 1946.

²³ Bentwich, My 77 Years, 31, 98.

²⁴ Nathan Feinberg, Pirkey Hayim ve-Zikhronot (Jerusalem: Mabat, 1985), 139–42.

²⁵ Likhovski, “Limudey ha-Mishpatim,” 554–7.

²⁶ On this movement, see, generally Likhovski, Law and Identity; Ronen Shamir, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and Law in Early Mandate Palestine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Amihai Radzyner, “Jewish Law in Palestine under Ottoman Rule and the Attitude toward Foreign Law,” in The Cambridge Companion to Judaism and Law, ed. Christine Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 31710.1017/9781139565974.012; Nir Kedar, Law and Identity in Israel: A Century of Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019)10.1017/9781108670227. On pre-Zionist Jewish and non-Jewish scholarly interest in Jewish law, see, e.g., Shalom Albeck, “Ha-Mishpat ha-‘Ivri u-Mada‘ey ha-Yahadut,” in Heker ha-Torah shebe-‘Alpeh be-Hamishim Shnot ha-Medinah, ed. Zvi Arieh Steinfeld (Jerusalem: Orkhot, 2001/02), 15; Leora Batnitkzy, “From Politics to Law: Modern Jewish Thought and the Invention of Jewish Law,” Diné Israel 26 (2008–10): 7. On some of the theoretical problems associated with the attempt to define the category “Jewish law,” see, e.g., Rachel Rafael Neis, “The Seduction of Law: Rethinking Legal Studies in Jewish Studies,” Jewish Quarterly Review 109 (2019): 11910.1353/jqr.2019.0005.

²⁷ Assaf Likhovski, “The Invention of ‘Hebrew Law’ in Mandatory Palestine,” American Journal of Comparative Law 46 (1998): 339, 348–50, 359–6110.2307/840933; Likhovski, Law and Identity, 129–30.

²⁸ “Hebrew law” is one of a group of terms (such as halakhah, the law of the Torah, rabbinical law, etc.) used to designate Jewish law. See, e.g., Likhovski, Law and Identity, 132–3. The Moscow Scholarly Society for the study of Jewish law had its roots in the Russian Jewish Historical and Ethnographic Society. See Jeffrey Veidlinger, Jewish Public Culture in the Late Russian Empire (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 229–6010.2979/5546.0. See also Paltiel Dikshtein, “Ariyeh Karlin, ZL,” Ha-Praklit 14 (1957): 380.

²⁹ On this system, see, generally, Shamir, Colonies of Law; Likhovski, Law and Identity, 35–6, 130–2.

³⁰ See Likhovski, “Colonialism,” 82–3.

³¹ Dikshtein, “Ha-Universitah veha-Mishpat,” 633–4.

³² Lecturers at the Tel Aviv School came from many European universities, having previously studied or taught law at London, Cambridge, Leeds, Bern, Rome, Modena, Florence, Brussels, Amsterdam, Paris, Heidelberg, Berlin, Leipzig, Vienna, Kaunas, Odessa, St. Petersburg, and New York. See CZA, A 212/2, Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah, Sefer ha-Shanah li-Shnat 1937/8; CZA, A 212/2, Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah, Sefer ha-Shanah li-Shnat 1947/8, 35–40.

³³ CZA, A 212/32, To the Friends of the Hebrew Science in the World (1947); CZA, A 212/32, Paltiel Dikshtein, “‘Al Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah be-Tel Aviv,” 3.

³⁴ CZA, A 212/2, Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat ve-Kalkalah – Prospekt li-Shnat ha-Limudim 1937/8; CZA, A 212/32, To the Friends of the Hebrew Science in the World (1947); CZA, A 212/32, Dikshtein, “‘Al Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah be-Tel Aviv,” 3.

³⁵ On the lack of a course on Roman law in the Law Classes, see also Dikshtein, “Ha-Universitah veha-Mishpat,” 633. On the attitude of Jewish law scholars in Mandatory Palestine to Jewish law, see, generally, Assaf Likhovski, “The Eagle and the Dove: Jewish Law Scholars and Roman Law During the Interwar Period,” in Pensiero giuridico occidentale e giuristi romani: Eredità e genealogie, eds. Pierre Bonin et al. (Turin: G. Giappichelli, 2019), 267.

³⁶ Tel Aviv University Archive, Box 61.71, Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah, Taktsir Yedi‘ot li-Studentim li-Shnat 1945/6, 3.

³⁷ CZA, A 212/2, Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah, Sefer ha-Shanah li-Shnat 1947/8, 3; CZA, A 212/37, Samuel Eisenstadt, “Ha-Universitah shel Tel Aviv: Beyt ha-Sefer le-Mishpat ve-le-Kalkalah,” 12.

³⁸ Tel Aviv University Archive, Box 61.71, Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah, Sidrey ha-Limudim ve-Tokhniyoteyhem 1944/45, 7; Tel Aviv University Archive, Bar Shira Personal Archive, File 20, Hoda‘ah 786, 2–4; Tel Aviv University Archive, Bar Shira Personal Archive, File 3, Hoda‘ah 626, 12, 16; Footnote ibid., Hoda‘ah 243, 6; Tel Aviv University Archive, Bar Shira Personal Archive, File 19, Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah, Sefer ha-Shanah, 1947/48, 19.

³⁹ In 1944, the administrators of the School reached an agreement with French authorities that its graduates would be able to obtain a doctorate in law from the Beirut branch of the University of Lyon. Later, a similar arrangement was reached with the University of Florence. See CZA, A 212/37, Samuel Eisenstadt, Ha-Universitah, 12, 16–17, 72, 102; Yitzhak Orren, “Kenes Yovel ha-50 le-Veyt ha-Sefer le-Mishpat be-Tel Aviv: Divrey Ptihah,” ‘Iyuney Mishpat 11 (1985/86): 5, 10, 14; Uri Cohen, “Ha-Mirdaf Ahar Legitimatsyah Akademit: Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah,” Mehkarey Mishpat 25 (2009): 179, 198–9, 200–4.

⁴⁰ Strassman, ‘Otey ha-Glimah, 74. Another factor that prevented British officials from recognizing the Tel Aviv School was their fears of Arab reactions. See CZA, A 212/37, Samuel Eisenstadt, Ha-Universitah, 102.

⁴¹ Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law (1910), v.

⁴² See, e.g., Footnote ibid., xi–xii, 25, 51; Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law, 3rd ed. (1921), 4, 182.

⁴³ Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law (1910), 24–5, 84–104, 112, 134, 142, 147, 150, 262.

⁴⁴ Table 2.1 was created using WordClouds.com. The lists are based on the first edition of Goadby’s book and on Thomas Erskine Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, 12th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1917).

⁴⁵ Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law (1910), 8, 24, 46, 58, 10410.2307/1324656.

⁴⁶ Footnote Ibid., 50–1.

⁴⁷ Footnote Ibid., 58.

⁴⁸ Footnote Ibid., 8–18, 241, 306, 320–2, 362–5.

⁴⁹ Footnote Ibid., vi, 202, 313.

⁵⁰ Goadby called the author “Amir Aly” and the work “Mohammedan Law.” He did not mention the exact edition he was relying on.

⁵¹ Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law (1910), 38–40, 68. The use of the example of religious law to show the limited nature of Austin’s theory was not original. It can be traced back to Henry Maine. For Maine’s critique of the Austinian theory of law, see, e.g., Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1861), 7–8.

⁵² Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law (1910), 69–72, 78, 121, 16410.1038/scientificamerican03121910-164asupp.

⁵³ Footnote Ibid., 3.

⁵⁴ Footnote Ibid., 18.

⁵⁵ Footnote Ibid., 42.

⁵⁶ Footnote Ibid., 51.

⁵⁷ Goadby, Introduction to the Study of Law, 3rd ed. (1921), v–vi.

⁵⁸ Footnote Ibid., 56.

⁵⁹ Footnote Ibid., 136–7.

⁶⁰ Footnote Ibid., v.

⁶¹ Footnote Ibid., 29–30, 101–3.

⁶² Tel Aviv University Archive, Yisrael Bar-Shira Personal Archive, File 3, “Hoda’ah 248: Tokhnit ha-Yediot le-Bhinot ha-Gmar: Kayits 1939,” 4.

⁶³ In addition to producing original works on jurisprudence, the Jews of Mandatory Palestine also translated textbooks and monographs on the subject authored by European scholars. See Iosif Pokrovsky, Ha-Probleymot ha-Yesodiyot shel ha-Mishpat ha-Ezrahi, trans. A. Litai (Jerusalem: Dfus ha-Po‘alim, 1922/23). On this book, see Martin Avenarius, “Osnovnyia problemy grazhdanskago prava (Basic Problems of Private Law), 1917, Iosif Alekseevich Pokrovsky (1868–1920),” in The Formation and Transmission of Western Legal Culture: 150 Books That Made the Law in the Age of Printing, ed. Serge Dauchy et al. (Cham: Springer, 2016), 43810.1007/978-3-319-45567-9. See also Rudolf von Jhering, Ha-Ma’avak le-Mishpat, trans. Baruch Krupnik (Tel Aviv: Mishpat u-Medinah, 1947).

⁶⁴ Paltiel Daykan (Dikshtein), Torat ha-Mishpat: Taktsir ha-Hartsa’ot she-Nikre’u be-Veyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah be-Tel Aviv ba-Shanim 1942/3–1949/50 (Tel Aviv: Beyt ha-Sefer ha-Gavohah le-Mishpat vele-Kalkalah, 1949/50).

⁶⁵ David Tidhar, Entsiklopedyah le-Halutsey ha-Yishuv u-Vonav (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Rishonim, 1949), Vol. 3, pp. 1433–4. Retrieved from http://www.tidhar.tourolib.org/tidhar/view/3/1433.

⁶⁶ Daykan (Dikshtein), Torat ha-Mishpat, 14, 38, 149.

⁶⁷ On the Free Law Movement, see, e.g., James E. Herget and Stephen Wallace, “The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism,” Virginia Law Review 73 (1987): 39910.2307/1073069; Assaf Likhovski, “Czernowitz, Lincoln and Jerusalem and the Comparative History of American Jurisprudence,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 4 (2003): 62110.2202/1565-3404.1077; Katharina I. Schmidt, “Law, Modernity, Crisis: German Free Lawyers, American Legal Realists, and the Transatlantic Turn to ‘Life,’ 1903–1933,” German Studies Review 39 (2016): 12110.1353/gsr.2016.0014.

⁶⁸ Daykan (Dikshtein), Torat ha-Mishpat, 13–14, 149; Paltiel Dikshtein, “Ha-Mishpat veha-Yosher be-Mishpat ha-Shalom ha-‘Ivri,” Ha-Po‘el ha-Tsa‘ir 15.33 (July 26, 1922), 5. In his textbook Dikshtein also mentioned Pokrovsky’s book Ha-Probleymot, which contained a chapter on judicial discretion, including an extended discussion (and critique) of the ideas of both German and French Free Law thinkers. See Daykan (Dikshtein), Torat ha-Mishpat, 14; Pokrovsky, Ha-Probleymot, 53, 60–70. Another example of the influence of Free Law theory on Dikshtein’s thought can be found in Paltiel Dikshtein, Mishpat ha-Shalom Ha-‘Ivri: She’elotav le-Halakhah ule-Ma‘aseh (Tel Aviv: Hotsa’at Mishpat ha-Shalom Ha-‘Ivri ha-‘Elyon, 1924/25), 14–19.

⁶⁹ Daykan (Dikshtein), Torat ha-Mishpat, 14, 38, 149.

⁷⁰ Footnote Ibid., 14, 15, 21.

⁷¹ Yosef Sagy, “Re’ayon ‘im Profesor Gad Tedeschi,” in Sefer Zikaron le-Gad Tedeschi, eds. Izhak Englard et al. (Jerusalem: Harry Sacher Institute, 1995), 23, 23–8. See also Likhovski, “Czernowitz,” 652–6; Likhovski, “Limudey ha-Mishpatim,” 554–7; Leslie Sebba, “Law and Society in Israel: An Emerging Agenda,” Israel Studies Forum 17 (2001): 83, 102; Pablo Lerner, “Leaving Home, Transplanting Law: Guido Tedeschi and Other Jewish Émigrés from Europe,” Studi Senesi 130 (2018): 229.

⁷² See Mavo le-Torat ha-Mishpat ‘alpi Hartsa’otav shel Professor G. Tedeschi, ed. Aharon Barak (Jerusalem: Mif‘al ha-Shikhpul, 1958), 50–1 (opposing the use of Jewish law as the basis of the Israeli legal system); Roberto Bachi, “Divrey Roberto Bachi,” in Le-Zikhro shel Gad Tedeschi: Davrim she-Ne’emru bi-Mlot Shloshim le-Moto (Jerusalem: Ha-Akademyah ha-Yisre’elit le-Mada‘im, 1995), 10.