Recent regional hostilities—and the realization that many urban residents in Iran lack access to technically verified safe shelters—have exposed a serious gap in the country’s preparedness for modern warfare. Contemporary civil defense planning must account not only for high-explosive threats but also for the potential use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents. International guidance emphasizes urban resilience, shelter engineering, and population-level risk reduction as essential elements of preparedness.Reference Farhat, Alinier and Chaabna^1, Reference Kivi, Hadi and Nazari² In this context, accessible and validated urban shelters are a basic public responsibility.

International benchmarks indicate that urban shelters should withstand blast pressures and structural shock, limit the infiltration of hazardous agents, and maintain minimum habitability during prolonged emergencies. This requires reinforced structural design, overpressure protection, CBRN-capable filtration, protected entrances and exits, reliable ventilation, and independent power and water supplies. Their location should be determined through spatial risk assessment and coverage analysis using GIS and demographic data so that shelter access matches population distribution and hazard exposure.Reference Jones, Woolven and Durodié^3, Reference Kawasaki, Cui and Kurokawa⁴

In Iran’s major cities, conditions are concerning. Tehran, according to local experts and field observations, lacks a documented network of shelters designed for wartime or CBRN conditions. Public statements have sometimes suggested that underground parking structures or metro stations could serve this purpose. However, no publicly available technical evidence shows that these facilities were designed, retrofitted, or evaluated against modern protective criteria. As a result, residents may be relying on spaces whose protective performance has never been demonstrated.

Governance problems further widen this gap. No single institution at the national or municipal level has a clear mandate to plan, construct, maintain, and audit a coherent urban shelter system. Responsibilities are dispersed across organizations with other primary missions. This fragmentation slows progress, weakens coordination, and makes it difficult to enforce unified technical standards or ensure regular inspections, drills, and public communication.

Existing dual-use facilities, such as basements in public buildings or a small number of hardened structures, are too few, unevenly distributed, and often technically inadequate for dense metropolitan populations. Proposals to use schools as temporary shelters are also problematic: many are old, not designed for blast loads or CBRN protection, and in some cases already vulnerable under ordinary seismic conditions. Converting such buildings into ad hoc shelters may increase rather than reduce risk.

This is more than a technical shortcoming. It is a major failure in urban risk governance. Millions of residents live and work in cities where, during a severe escalation, they may have no access to verified protective spaces. From a disaster-risk-reduction perspective, this structural omission increases vulnerability and undermines preparedness.

We therefore urge national and municipal authorities to adopt a clear and accountable shelter strategy. This should include designating a single lead institution, publishing technical standards aligned with international best practice, conducting independent evaluations of facilities intended as shelters, and communicating realistic protective options to the public. Delaying action leaves urban populations exposed when even a basic evidence-based shelter system is still absent.