In ordinary times, habeas corpus is an arcane subject, left to lawyers and legal historians. In extraordinary times, like the post–September 11 “War on Terror” in the United States, the subject becomes more widely studied and debated, and perhaps understood, as the tension between the desire for public security and the commitment to individual liberty is made clear. Paul D. Halliday's monumental reexamination of the history of habeas corpus should be read through this lens. Through his examination of the use of habeas corpus in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, and its travels across the globe with the expansion of the British Empire, we come to understand the great promise of the writ as well as its limits.
Halliday's historical narrative is supported by an impressive empirical study of thousands of writs issued between 1500 and 1800, drawn from records from the Crown Side of the King's Bench housed in the National Archives in London. The quantitative assessment of this data is summarized in the appendix while the narrative, drawing upon particular cases as examples of larger patterns, is front and center. The larger patterns revealed by the data show that over three centuries, on average fifty-three percent of prisoners or detainees were released through habeas petitions. But during that time span there were four periods where the release rates were either substantially higher or lower, and the data suggest that this can be explained by a combination of the justices who sat on the King's Bench at those particular times and the political context of the period. For example, during the period of the Civil War, release rates were quite low, and during the expansion of the British Empire in the eighteenth century, when sailors were being forced into service, release rates were quite high. Similarly, justices' conceptions of their role appear to make a significant difference, with some justices quite willing to be creative in the use of the writ to control the diverse jurisdictions across England, and ultimately across the globe, and others feeling much more constrained by other jurisdictions, the common-law rules of habeas, or the increasing constraints imposed by Parliament or colonial assemblies.
Woven around these data are the stories of individual judges and individual petitioners, as Halliday seeks to show how the use of the writ developed across the centuries. In the process we come to understand that “the Great Writ” became “great” largely through the creative assertions of authority by justices on the King's Bench and not by defense of the writ in Parliament. Challenging our modern conception of the writ as being about the liberty of individuals, Halliday demonstrates that at its inception the writ was attached to the king's absolute prerogatives of control over his kingdom. In exchange for their willingness to be his loyal subjects, the king promised protection to his subjects, and that protection included protection from unjust detention. The writ was directed at the various entities that had been granted a royal franchise or the authority to police particular areas controlled by the king. Halliday demonstrates that the notion of natural rights of individuals to be free from unauthorized or unjust restraint was a later development and not the rationale used by the King's Bench as it developed and expanded the use of the writ.
Beginning as a process for assessing the legitimacy of confinement of persons accused of crimes and other wrongdoing, “the writ's focus shifted to detentions that involved no allegations of wrong: it was used to monitor impressments, slavery and apprenticeship, and spousal or child custody” (120). Halliday argues that the writ “reached its apogee” in the late seventeenth century as “the justices broadened their definition of detention in a way that expanded their oversight over all aspects of life that might generate one person's constraint of another” (120–21).
Through this creative process the justices of the King's Bench asserted the king's (and queen's) authority across the realm. The justices were particularly suspicious of detentions made by local justices of the peace, who were perceived by the justices as creating the greatest potential for oppression. Rates of imprisonment by justices of the peace were four times as high as by the Privy Council, and the latter, while not immune from demands to produce the body, got much greater respect and deference from the justices than did the local officials.
As the British Empire expanded, the writ traveled with it, but not without challenges to its legitimacy. Halliday demonstrates the ways in which the writ was and was not used in Barbados, Quebec, Calcutta, Ceylon, New South Wales, New Zealand, and Australia. New variations of old questions that had been resolved within England challenged the reach of the justices. Who were subjects for the purposes of using habeas corpus? How could the writ be enforced when oceans separated the justices from the detainees? Was the common-law existence of the writ sufficient or must there be statutory authorization for the writ to exist? How was local indigenous law to be reconciled with the British legal system? In the end, high courts had to be established in these far-flung locales, and political unrest and resistance from those being colonized would lead to widespread and frequent suspension of the writ. “The writ continued to appear, and to be clipped, as British dominions proliferated,” writes Halliday. “Charters would create courts with common law authority to use the writ by analogizing to King's Bench. Colonial legislators would then curb that power in order to control ethnically various subjects during periods of political disquiet created by cultural conflict and by Britons' seizure of lands once occupied only by indigenous peoples” (291).
Halliday ends with the recognition that by the mid-nineteenth century the writ existed all over the globe but that it had been “hemmed in” by the power of legislatures and imperial governors. He finds our modern assumption that habeas corpus is a stronger protection of individual rights today than it was in earlier times condescending. Halliday asserts that the history he has uncovered suggests otherwise and that the Great Writ's heyday had already passed by the time the American Constitution was written, threatened from the 1790s on with a “legislative onslaught on liberties of every kind” (314).
Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire is an important and timely book. It is a challenging book as well, for it assumes that the reader has a strong background in British legal history. Without that knowledge, it will be a difficult read but nonetheless worthwhile. Read through the lens of contemporary legal conflicts over the War on Terror it provides important insights into disputes about executive prerogative, judicial supremacy, and the legal status of prisoners of war and enemy combatants. It requires us to recognize that these are not new disputes requiring novel solutions, but ancient ones. And it suggests that the survival of the writ as “the great palladium of liberty” depends substantially on justices willing to assert their authority and use their discretion so “the sighs of individual prisoners might be heard” (309).
