Alan Goldman’s impressively wide-ranging work already includes important contributions to analytic aesthetics, most notably his (1995) Aesthetic Value. In Philosophy & the Novel, Goldman makes a welcome foray into the philosophy of literature. Combining new material with articles previously published in The Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism and Philosophy and Literature, the book presents a compact case for the practice commonly known as philosophical criticism (a term Goldman himself doesn’t actually use)—i.e., criticism of literary works aimed at explicating the philosophically interesting content they embody.
The book is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 1-4) develops a theory of literary value and a theory of art interpretation, which together serve to provide theoretical justification for the practice of philosophical criticism. The second part (Chapters 4-8) offers a concrete demonstration of this practice, exploring philosophical themes in four novels (Pride and Prejudice, Huckleberry Finn, Cider House Rules, and Nostromo). It is worth noting that the focus on novels in Part 2 is not dictated by the arguments in Part 1, which would seem to apply to all forms of literature. Indeed, despite its title, the book contains only a few passing comments about what makes novels, as distinct from other literary forms, particularly ripe for philosophical criticism.
On Goldman’s view, a work’s literary value lies in its ability to simultaneously engage our perceptual, imaginative, emotional, and cognitive capacities. This pluralistic view, claims Goldman, has “deeper and more impressive philosophical roots” than the main alternatives, expressivism and formalism, and unlike the latter recognizes the “indissoluble link between grasp of form itself and the exercise of cognitive, imaginative, and emotional capacities” (4). Goldman devotes Chapter 4 to showing how the appeal of mystery novels can be more satisfactorily explained on this view than on others, which tend to underestimate the genre’s diversity in terms of style and quality. There is evidence throughout the book, but especially in this chapter, of both a real appetite for literature and a wide diet of it that are all too rare among philosophers.
In contrast to those such as Martha Nussbaum who think that literature is cognitively valuable mainly insofar as it can develop and refine various mental skills, Goldman argues that literary works can also embody general propositions about reality. Further, he argues that the process of evaluating the truth or plausibility of these propositions, as well as the “learning that occurs in that process of evaluation, are part of the cognitive engagement that is part of the appreciation of the literary value” of such works (12). According to Goldman, the propositions expressed through literary works can include philosophical theses, both conceptual and empirical. Accepting such theses can be reasonable and hence count as genuine learning provided they cohere sufficiently with knowledge the reader antecedently possesses and are conveyed in a manner indicating that the author is sincere, trustworthy, and knowledgeable about the subject.
By enabling us to see literary works as expressions of philosophically interesting theses, philosophical criticism performs what Goldman argues, in Chapter 2, is the proper function of interpretation, namely to facilitate our appreciation of those features of literary works that make them valuable as such. Since incompatible interpretations can do this equally well, this theory implies that they can be equally acceptable—a point in its favour, Goldman thinks, given that incompatible interpretations are countenanced in actual critical practice. And since the author of a work typically intends only one interpretation of it, Goldman argues, the theory further implies that interpretations need not be constrained by authorial intentions. In Chapter 3, Goldman offers support for this theory of interpretation through an extended example, presenting two interpretations of The Sun Also Rises that are incompatible with each other—one treating it as an affirmation, the other as a denial, of the possibility of moral development—and yet equally acceptable, he argues, insofar as they enable us to appreciate different, but equally valuable, features of the novel.
This, in broad outline, is the argument of Part 1. In Part 2 Goldman proceeds to put the kind of criticism thus argued for into practice. Each of the four chapters in this part focuses on a separate novel and how it can be seen as answering to a contemporary philosophical issue, generally related in every case to the conditions involved in achieving full moral agency. On Goldman’s interpretation, for example, Pride and Prejudice tells us what kinds of cognitive-perceptual, emotional, and volitional skills are necessary for mature moral judgment and action, and how these skills typically develop; the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn tells us that rationality does not require being motivated to act on one’s moral judgments; and Cider House Rules tells us that one can be morally obligated to follow a rule even if a particularist approach to the situation might lead to a better outcome. In each of these chapters, the relevant philosophical issues are clearly explained at the outset and the interpretation on offer is dutifully situated in the context of existing treatments of the novel, both literary and philosophical.
Those sympathetic to the view that literature can yield propositional learning, but wary of Jerome Stolnitz’s classic objection that literary themes often ring banal when stated explicitly, will appreciate Goldman’s efforts to articulate some of the non-trivial propositions that can be gleaned from novels. Indeed, Goldman’s chapter on Pride and Prejudice might be seen as a direct rebuttal to Stolnitz’s suggestion that the only thing we learn from the novel is that “stubborn pride and ignorant prejudice sometimes keep attractive men and women apart.”Footnote 1 Those skeptical of Goldman’s propositional brand of literary cognitivism (or literary cognitivism tout court), however, may find the arguments offered in Chapter 1 a bit thin. And those hoping to discover in Part 2 a style of philosophical criticism that, contrary to stereotype, displays sensitivity to the intellectual context in which literary works are written or resists the “utopian” tendency (as Noël Carroll once called it in reference to Nussbaum’s work) to see moral truth wherever it looks in the literary canon, will likely be disappointed. But the more troubling one finds these features of Goldman’s criticism, the more provocative one will find the theory of interpretation he develops in Chapters 2 and 3, for this theory suggests that such features are not always to be regretted. Sensitivity to historical context is important if the aim is to uncover the author’s actual intentions. But while authorial intentions constrain the non-interpretive descriptions of a work that any acceptable interpretation must fit, otherwise ignoring authorial intentions allows critics to interpret a work in ways that help readers to appreciate it more than if they had to read it the way the author intended. Likewise, given two interpretations that are equally true to the non-interpretive facts about a work, the one that ascribes it the more plausible philosophical view will promote greater appreciation and thus always be the more acceptable, on Goldman’s theory. Whether Goldman’s defense of this theory is ultimately convincing—a matter I leave for the reader to decide—this part of the book seems most likely to stimulate further discussion on the topic.
